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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Adelaide No A20 of 1992 B e t w e e n -
BRUCE CORBETT WHITTEM
Applicant
and
ANTONIO ARCADI
Respondent
Office of the Registry
Adelaide No A21 of 1992 B e t w e e n -
HUGH COWELL NIELD
Applicant
and
BRUCE CORBETT WHITTEM
Respondent
Applications for special leave
to appeal
DEANE J
DAWSON J
TOOHEY J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
FROM ADELAIDE BY VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA
ON FRIDAY, 12 MARCH 1993, AT 10.32 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
| Whittem | 1 | 12/3/93 |
MR R.J. WHITINGTON: If it please the Court, I appear for
the applicant in the first matter, and for the
respondent in the second matter. (instructed by Grope Hamilton)
| MR G.B. HEVEY: | If it please the Court, I appear for with my |
learned friend, MRS. BOLZON, for the respondent.
(instructed by Michell Sillar Lynch & Meyer)
MR D.M.J. BENNETT, QC: If it please the Court, I appear
with my learned friend, MR S.H. MILAZZO, for the
applicant in the second matter. (instructed by Piper Alderman)
| DEANE J: | Am I correct Mr Whitington, that if the |
application in Neild succeeds, you wish to press on
with an application for leave in Whittem v Arcadi?
MR WHITINGTON: That it so.
DEANE J: But if the application in Neild fails you do not
wish to press on with your application for leave?
| MR WHITINGTON: | Yes, that would be so. |
DEANE J: If you just give us a moment. In that case, the
convenient course would seem to be to hear Mr
Bennett in the second matter. Yes, Mr Bennett.
MR BENNETT: If the Court pleases.
| DEANE J: | You seem to be travelling around the country |
wherever our video camera goes, Mr Bennett.
| MR BENNETT: | Technology is wonderful when it enables one to |
go from Sydney to Adelaide or Brisbane to appear
before Your Honours in Canberra. Your Honours, when this Court decided Breskvar v Wall in 1971, it
resolved a long-standing controversy at law schools
and among legal academics and practitioners between
the deferred indefeasibility school and the
absolute indefeasibility school. It resolved that dispute for six of the eight jurisdictions in Australia because the provisions of the Real Property Act in Queensland which were
involved in that case were similar to those in all
the other States except South Australia and in the Australian Capital Territory. South Australia and the Northern Territory, however, have a totally
different form of a section concerning
indefeasibility and the issue which arose in this
case is whether there is absolute or deferred
indefeasibility where there is a forged or voidinstrument under that section.
| Whittem | 12/3/93 |
That is an issue which has been considered by
four judges in this,State - two of the Supreme
Court and two of the Federal Court - and they have
divided two judges to two on that issue. The point is a classic patent ambiguity. If Your Honours…
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- Case
- [1993] HCATrans 72
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the Real Property Act in South Australia, and by extension the Northern Territory, provided for deferred indefeasibility or absolute indefeasibility in circumstances where a certificate of title or instrument of title was obtained by forgery or was otherwise void. This question arose due to a perceived ambiguity in the relevant statutory provisions, which differed from those considered in the High Court's earlier decision in *Breskvar v Wall*.
Mr Bennett, appearing for the applicant in the second matter, argued that the South Australian and Northern Territory provisions, unlike those in most other Australian jurisdictions, created a "classic patent ambiguity" regarding the nature of indefeasibility. He referred to section 69 of the Real Property Act, highlighting subsections (I) and (II). Subsection (I) addresses fraud and provides an exception for bona fide purchasers, while subsection (II) states that a certificate or instrument of title obtained by forgery or through an insufficient power of attorney, or from a person under a legal disability, shall be void. The Court was to determine how this voidness interacted with the principle of indefeasibility.
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