Whiteman and Australian Postal Corporation (Compensation)

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Whiteman and Australian Postal Corporation (Compensation) [2015] AATA 486 (7 July 2015)

Division GENERAL DIVISION

File Numbers

2013/5220; 2014/0320

Re

Cheryl Whiteman

APPLICANT

And

Australian Postal Corporation

RESPONDENT

Tribunal

Ms G Ettinger, Senior Member

Date 7 July 2015
Place Sydney

The Tribunal finds that it has no jurisdiction to make decisions about incapacity payments to Ms Whiteman in relation to her shoulder injury for the period 3 July 2006 to 5 November 2010.

........................................................................

Ms G Ettinger, Senior Member

CATCHWORDS

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – jurisdiction – compensation – injury to left shoulder – claim – whether Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider entitlement to compensation under section 19 and 20 during period Applicant was part-time  – no particular claim made –  contents of application before original decision maker – Tribunal does not have jurisdiction.

LEGISLATION

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 43

Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) ss 19, 20, 62, 64

CASES

Casarotto v Australian Postal Commission (1989) 17 ALD 321

Comcare v Simmons (2014) 138 ALD 58
Lees v Comcare (1999) 56 ALD 84
Whiteman v Australian Postal Corporation [2010] AATA 645

Secondary Materials

REASONS FOR DECISION ON JURISDICTION

Ms G Ettinger, Senior Member

7 July 2015

BACKGROUND

  1. Ms Cheryl Whiteman was an employee of the Australian Postal Corporation (Australia Post), from 1989 until 5 November 2010. In 2004, Ms Whiteman suffered an injury to her left shoulder arising out of her employment with Australia Post. Liability was accepted by Australia Post pursuant to the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth), (the Act), and compensation paid.

  2. The matter about which I now write, concerns Ms Whiteman’s claim for compensation pursuant to sections 19 and 20 of the Act, that is currently before this Tribunal. The reviewable decision in matter 2014/0320 dated 17 January 2014 dealt with claims for compensation for incapacity, and identified the period from which liability for incapacity was denied, as commencing 5 November 2010. That date coincided with Ms Whiteman’s resignation from Australia Post. In that decision she was refused compensation for her left shoulder condition on the basis she had voluntarily removed herself from suitable employment. The delegate wrote on 17 January 2014:

    … consider that you were fit for suitable employment from 5 November 2010 but chose to take an early retirement. Therefore liability for incapacity from 5 November 2010 is denied.

    The Applicant’s submissions

  3. Following four days of hearing, and during closing submissions, a question of jurisdiction of the Tribunal has arisen. Mr Grey of counsel who represented Ms Whiteman, claims that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider her entitlement to compensation under section 19 for the period 3 July 2006 to 5 November 2010 during which Ms Whiteman worked 25 hours a week, having reduced her work hours from the pre-injury time of seven hours 21 minute per day.

  4. Mr Grey argues notwithstanding that no particular claim was made for the period 3 July 2006 to 5 November 2010, (but only for the period 5 November 2010…

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Details
Case
[2015] AATA 486
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Whiteman and Australian Postal Corporation (Compensation) involved the applicant, Whiteman, who sought compensation for an injury to her left shoulder from the Australian Postal Corporation. The dispute centred on whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) had jurisdiction to consider the applicant's entitlement to compensation under sections 19 and 20 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act during the period when she was part-time. The AAT was tasked with determining if it had the authority to review the decision made by the reconsideration officer from the Australian Postal Corporation.

The legal issues that the court had to resolve were primarily concerned with the scope of the AAT's jurisdiction under sections 43(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act and sections 62 and 64 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act. Specifically, the court needed to examine whether the AAT could review the decision of the reconsideration officer and whether it had the power to consider the applicant's claim for compensation during the period when she was part-time, a period not specifically claimed in the initial application.

The court concluded that the AAT did not have the jurisdiction to consider the applicant's claim for compensation during the period she was part-time. This decision was based on the fact that the reconsideration officer did not have a particular claim regarding this period before her when she made her determination. The AAT's powers were limited to reviewing the decision made by the reconsideration officer, and any claim outside the scope of that decision was beyond its jurisdiction. The court further emphasized that the AAT could not exercise any powers that were not available to the reconsideration officer, consistent with the observations made in previous cases.

In summary, the AAT found that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the applicant's claim for compensation during the period when she was part-time. The court upheld the decision of the reconsideration officer, reinforcing that the AAT's review powers are constrained by the scope of the original decision-maker's authority. The final orders of the court affirmed the AAT's decision, dismissing the applicant's claim for compensation for the period in question.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Mr Gollan of counsel who appeared for Australia Post submitted that: The question of jurisdiction is defined by reference to s.43(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act and also ss.62 and 64 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act. The scope of the Tribunal’s authority of a review under the 1988 Act (SRC Act) has been considered in a number of cases, and relevantly I reproduce some of their Honours’ wisdom as follows:In Casarotto v Australian Postal Commission (1989), Hill J said:“The Tribunal is not a primary administrator, so that it could not embark upon any matter that was not properly before the original decision-maker whose decision is being reviewed (cf Re Tradigrain Australia Pty Ltd and Export Development Grants Board (No 1) (1984) 6 ALD 442)…”In Lees v Comcare (1999) the Full Federal Court made these observations:“39. In considering the extent of the power of the AAT when reviewing decisions under the Act it is to be noted, first, that the AAT is authorised by s.64 of the Act to review only reviewable decisions – that is, for present purposes, second tier or reconsideration decisions made under s.62 of the Act. Decisions under s.62 of the Act are the result of the reconsideration by Comcare or a licensed authority of a determination, as defined by s.60 of the Act, concerning which a claimant will have received a notice in writing setting out the terms of the determination and the reasons for the determination: s.61(1). Secondly, it is to be noted that the powers of the AAT under s.43(1) of the AAT Act are powers “[f]or the purposes of reviewing” the reviewable decision, not powers that may be exercised at large. Further, the powers and discretions that the AAT may exercise under s.43(1) are the powers and discretions conferred by the Act on the determining authority for the purposes of reconsidering a determination under s.62 of the Act. The AAT will not be authorised on review of a reviewable decision to exercise any powers and discretions which would not have been available to the determining authority at the second tier decision-making stage, albeit that such powers and discretions might have been available to the determining authority at the first tier decision-making stage…”So the question is: what did the decision-maker, Catherine Banh Reconsideration Officer, have before her when composing her Reconsideration Determination dated 17 January 2014? What she had before her was a claim asserted by the Applicant as being an entitlement to weekly incapacity payments from the time of her termination. She had before her information that allowed, conclusively, a conclusion that her termination date was 5 November 2010 and an assertion that since that date to the time of determination there was a present entitlement to s.19 and/or s.20 benefits.In the circumstances, the second tier decision-maker had a claim to the exclusion of the now agitated pre-period between 3 July 2006 to 5 November 2010. Consistent with Lees, the AAT is only authorised on review of this reviewable decision to exercise any powers and discretions which were available to the second tier decision-maker. There can be no question that the only power of review was with respect to the claimed period and that which formed the basis for the original determination.Addressing some of the matters raised by my learned friend, the approach undertaken by the Respondent in these proceedings is not one of technicality and, absent equity, good conscience or the like it is one consistent with law; it is one consistent with the observations made in the Respondent’s Facts, Issues and Contentions; it is one consistent with the evidence understood to have been given in proceedings previously before the Tribunal that resulted in a determination dated 27 August 2010; it is consistent with the determination made in those previous proceedings, being no.2008/4048, at [12] where the Tribunal found:“She says her supervisor at the time was not sympathetic to her impairment but her decision to work part-time was not related to her impairment as such (Australia Post documents confirm that it was for “personal” reasons).”It is consistent with an interpretation of the substance of the Amended Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions (whilst the Respondent does accept the final orders sought went beyond the period articulated in the claim, the Determination and the Reviewable Decision).It is not sufficient for the Applicant to say that they included such an assertion on a reading of their Amended Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions or for it to be suggested that there was an unobjected-to opening that asserted such a claim (which is disputed when one reads the part of the transcript referred to in the Applicant’s submissions, it does not conclude as asserted), because there cannot be consent jurisdiction, there can only be jurisdiction as defined by reference to the provisions and cases such as Lees (supra).The Tribunal’s conclusions

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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