White v Roberts - [1999] HCATrans 411

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Sydney No S30 of 1999

B e t w e e n -
MARGARET WHITE
Applicant
and
JAMES WILLIAM ROBERTS
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal

GAUDRON J
McHUGH J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 19 NOVEMBER 1999, AT 2.00 PM

MR D.F. JACKSON, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR R.J. COLQUHOUN, for the applicant. (instructed by Colquhoun & Colquhoun)

MR T.E.F. HUGHES, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR M.T. VESPER, for the respondent, the defendant below. (instructed by M.J. Raymond, Solicitor for Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Australia Limited)

GAUDRON J: Yes, Mr Jackson.

MR JACKSON: Your Honours, the terms of section 79(1) of the Motor Accidents Act 1988 appear at page 54 of the application book in paragraph 9. Your Honours will see that section 79(1) provided that:

No damages shall be award for the non‑economic loss of an injured person as a consequence of a motor accident unless the injured person’s ability to lead a normal life is significantly impaired by the injury suffered in the accident.

The threshold question is contained in the words:

unless the injured person’s ability to lead a normal life is significantly impaired by the injury suffered in the accident.

As the President said in the Court of Appeal at page 57, paragraph 14:

In the case presently under appeal the trial judge found that the respondent’s ability to lead a normal life was significantly impaired for a duration of only eight months.

That is the significant impairment, though significant, had ceased before trial. Now, your Honours, therefore, the majority in the Court of Appeal held, following the case of Matthews, to which they refer, no damages could be award for non‑economic loss because “is” in the provision means is at the time of trial or perhaps presumably time of judgment. The provision, your Honours will recall ‑ ‑ ‑

GAUDRON J: Well, it may simply mean continuous. It may refer to a continuity, regardless of any precise point, which would not cover the eight months.

MR JACKSON: Well, your Honour, that is a possible view, but what we would seek to say is that to adopt the view that there is no ability to award damages if the capacity to lead a normal life is no longer impaired at the time of the trial is a possible, but, in our submission, not the better view of the provision.

McHUGH J: Why would not the legislature have used the past tense “was”, if your argument is correct?

MR JACKSON: Well, your Honour, the legislature might have, I suppose, but one has to look at what the legislature actually said and what we would submit is that all that the section appears to be intended to require is that the consequence of the motor accident…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading White v Roberts

Details

AGLC: White v Roberts [1999] HCATrans 411
Case: [1999] HCATrans 411
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Gaudron and McHugh JJ heard an appeal concerning a dispute between White and Roberts. The core of the disagreement related to the interpretation and enforceability of a deed of settlement and release, which White sought to set aside. Roberts, the respondent, resisted this claim, asserting the deed was valid and binding.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the deed of settlement and release was voidable on the grounds of duress or undue influence, and consequently, whether White was entitled to have the deed set aside. The court was required to consider the circumstances under which a party could escape the obligations undertaken in a settlement agreement, particularly where allegations of improper pressure were raised.

Their Honours found that the evidence did not establish duress or undue influence sufficient to vitiate the deed. They applied established legal principles concerning the vitiating factors of duress and undue influence, emphasizing the need for clear and convincing proof of coercion or unconscionable conduct. The court considered the nature of the pressure exerted, the vulnerability of the party alleging duress or undue influence, and the availability of independent advice. Ultimately, Gaudron and McHugh JJ concluded that White had entered into the deed voluntarily, with full understanding of its terms and consequences, and therefore, the deed was not voidable.

Orders