White v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

White v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1376

Citation: White v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1376
Appeal from: White v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 2486
Parties: EDWARD CHRISTOPHER WHITE v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File number: QUD 597 of 2014
Judge: COLLIER J
Date of judgment: 4 December 2015
Catchwords: MIGRATION – r 1.15A(1A)(b)(i) and (iii)(B) Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – r 1.15A(1A)(b)(iii)(B) Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – whether appellant and spouse have “mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife” – whether appellant and spouse “do not live separately and apart on a permanent basis” – whether criterion in r 1.15(1A)(b)(i) required findings separate and independent from findings in r 1.15(1A)(b)(iii)(B) – r 1.15(1A)(b)(i), (ii) and (iii) need to be satisfied in order to satisfy criteria – appellant did not challenge Tribunal findings pursuant to r 1.15(1A)(b)(i) – Tribunal found appellant did not meet r 1.15(1A)(b)(i) – appeal fatally flawed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 65
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 1.15(1A)(b)(i), 1.15(1A)(b)(iii)(B), 1.15A(1), 1.15A(1A), 1.15A(1A)(b), 1.15A(1A)(b)(i), 1.15A(1A)(b)(iii), 1.15A(1A)(b)(iii)(B), 1.15A(3)
Cases cited: Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321
Lu v Minister for Immigration (2004) 141 FCR 346
Main v Main (1949) 78 CLR 636
SZOXP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 1
Tulk v Tulk (1906) 13 ALR 45
Date of hearing: 1 April 2015 and 4 November 2015
Place: Brisbane
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 36
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr AD Scott
Solicitor for the Appellant: Bottoms English Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr B McGlade
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent entered a submitting notice, save as to costs.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

QUD 597 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

EDWARD CHRISTOPHER WHITE
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

COLLIER J

DATE OF ORDER:

4 DECEMBER 2015

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

QUD 597 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

EDWARD CHRISTOPHER WHITE
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

COLLIER J

DATE:

4 DECEMBER 2015

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, in which the primary Judge dismissed an application to review a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) (the Tribunal). The Tribunal had dismissed an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 1376
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of White v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved a British citizen who sought to appeal a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) that denied his application for a subclass 820 Partner visa. The appellant was married to an Australian citizen, his visa sponsor, but they had not been living together on a permanent basis since the grant of the visa. The primary issue in the appeal was whether the appellant and the visa sponsor had a "mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife" and whether they "do not live separately and apart on a permanent basis." The court was also required to decide if the criterion in regulation 1.15A(1A)(b)(i) required findings separate and independent from findings in regulation 1.15A(1A)(b)(iii)(B). Additionally, the court had to determine if the appellant’s failure to challenge the Tribunal’s findings pursuant to regulation 1.15A(1A)(b)(i) meant that the appeal could be resolved on that point.

The court held that the expression "live separately and apart" in regulation 1.15A(1A)(b)(iii)(B) derived its meaning from matrimonial law and that the appellant did not challenge the findings of the Tribunal regarding regulation 1.15A(1A)(b)(i). However, the court found that the appellant’s failure to challenge those findings did not mean the appeal could be resolved on that point alone. The court further held that the Tribunal and the primary Judge did not err in their interpretation of the phrase "live separately and apart" and that the appellant’s appeal was fatally flawed.

The court concluded that the Tribunal might have decided the matter differently had it not erred on the "live separately and apart" criterion, but the error did not deprive the appellant of the possibility of a successful outcome. The court held that the "live separately and apart" criterion and the "mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife" criterion were not materially different, but that it was required to construe each criterion separately.

In light of the above, the court dismissed the appeal with costs. The court also noted that the entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant, a British citizen, and his visa sponsor first met in December 2003 in Cairns. The appellant returned to Australia in September 2008 on a prospective marriage visa and married the visa sponsor on 16 June 2009. He was then granted a Subclass 820 Partner visa. The appellant relocated to Victoria in May 2009 due to a lack of work in Cairns and remained there until January 2011, during which time he visited the sponsor in Cairns six or seven times. In April 2011, the appellant obtained work in Cairns and rented an apartment there, while the sponsor continued to reside in Port Douglas where her family was based. The appellant and the sponsor never resided together on a permanent basis since the visa was granted. Both parties claimed they were considering purchasing a business together but were not pooling their money and maintained separate bank accounts. The Tribunal noted evidence suggesting that the parties presented themselves as a couple to third parties.

This case involves an appeal against a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) which found that the appellant did not meet the criteria for a partner visa under the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). The appellant did not challenge the Tribunal's finding that he did not have a mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife. The appeal was heard in the Federal Court of Australia and focused on whether the Tribunal erred in its interpretation of the phrase "live separately and apart" and whether this error was material to the outcome of the case.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Before turning to the notice of appeal and the notice of contention it is useful to examine the background facts.Decision of the Tribunal The appellant is a British citizen, validly married to his visa sponsor. They first met in December 2003 in Cairns (in which area the visa sponsor is based) and continued a relationship over a number of years. The appellant returned to Australia in September 2008 as the holder of a prospective marriage visa. On 16 June 2009 after the wedding was granted a Subclass 820 Partner visa. The nature of the relationship between the appellant and the visa sponsor is detailed in the Tribunal’s decision. In summary:·The appellant relocated to Victoria in May 2009 because he could not obtain work in the Cairns area, and remained in Melbourne until January 2011. He claimed that he visited the sponsor in Cairns six or seven times during this period.·In April 2011 the appellant obtained work in Cairns, and rented an apartment in Cairns to live. The sponsor remained in Port Douglas where she was employed, and where her adult children and grandchildren resided.·At the time of the Tribunal hearing the appellant and the sponsor resided at separate addresses – the sponsor in a rented apartment in Mossman north of Port Douglas, and the appellant with friends in Cairns. At no time since the Subclass 820 visa to the appellant had been granted had the sponsor and the appellant resided together on a permanent basis.·In the Tribunal the sponsor and the appellant claimed that they did not live together because of their respective work commitments. The appellant gave evidence that he did not hold a driver’s licence and there was no work for him in Port Douglas, so he continued to live in Cairns. The Tribunal noted that the sponsor gave evidence to the same effect.·Both the appellant and the sponsor gave evidence to the Tribunal to the effect that they were considering purchasing a business together in the future. At the time of the hearing however, the appellant and the sponsor were not pooling their money, and were using separate bank accounts.·The Tribunal noted a number of phone bills, electricity statements and rental receipts in the parties’ joint names or showing the same residential address, but placed no weight on them given the appellant’s evidence that he and the sponsor were not living together and did not pool their money.·Statutory declarations were provided to the Tribunal from third parties stating that the appellant and the sponsor presented themselves as a couple. Relevantly, the Tribunal noted in respect of post-hearing submissions:34.In the same submission, the registered migration agent submitted that the travel time between Port Douglas and Cairns is actually approximately 1 and a half hours. It was submitted that, having jobs geographically apart by such a distance would have a huge negative impact in terms of time sacrificed and fuel costs, were the parties to live together.35.The registered migration agent further submitted that the Regulations do not spell out how the term “living apart permanently” should be defined and the applicant and sponsor’s living arrangements should be considered temporary. The agent submitted that, unless the Tribunal is certain beyond all reasonable doubt that the parties live apart permanently, in that they will never live in together, it is open to the Tribunal to find that the parties’ current living arrangement is temporary, no matter how long it has been going on.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Both parties in the appeal accepted that the expression “live separately and apart” in reg 1.15A(1A)(b)(iii)(B) is a term of art deriving its meaning from matrimonial law. In this appeal, the appellant no longer challenges the decision of the Tribunal insofar as it was not satisfied that the appellant and the sponsor had a mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife to the exclusion of all others within the meaning of reg 1.15A(1A)(b)(i).Consideration This appeal raises three issues, namely:(1)Whether the fact that the appellant does not challenge the findings of the Tribunal in respect of reg 1.15A(1A)(b)(i) means that this appeal can be resolved on that point, as claimed by the first respondent in its notice of contention.(2)The relevance of observations made by the Tribunal during the hearing before it in relation to the concept “live separately and apart”, in particular whether those observations coloured its eventual findings.(3)Whether the Tribunal and the primary Judge erred in their interpretation of the phrase “live separately and apart”, such that the Tribunal made an error going to its jurisdiction, and the current appeal ought be allowed. In relation to the first issue, the Minister submits that it is fatal to the appeal. It is appropriate to deal with this issue before turning to issues 2 and 3. At the hearing Counsel for the appellant confirmed that the appellant was not, in this appeal, seeking to disturb the findings of the Tribunal in respect of reg 1.15A(1A)(b)(i), namely that the Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant and the sponsor had a mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife to the exclusion of all others. The Minister contends, in summary, that even if the Tribunal erred in respect of reg 1.15(1A)(b)(iii)(B) and its interpretation and application of the phrase “live separately and apart”, the Tribunal would still have refused the grant of the partner visa because the requirement stipulated in reg 1.15A(1A)(b)(i) was not met. In addressing this issue the appellant submits in summary:·In Lu v Minister for Immigration (2004) 141 FCR 346 at 360 Sackville J explained:It seems to me that the correct approach is that stated in Stead and adopted by the High Court in Aala. The test is whether the applicant has been deprived of the possibility of a successful outcome by the decision-maker’s failure to observe the requirements of the statute. If so, the jurisdictional error could have had a bearing on the outcome and the applicant is not to be denied relief on the basis that the error was insignificant. The test must be applied by reference to the material actually before the decision-maker and, where the decision-maker’s reasoning processes is [sic] known, taking into account his or her approach to the exercise of the particular statutory power. The question is not whether the decision-maker would probably have reached the same result even if the omitted consideration had been taken into account.·The question is therefore whether the alleged error of the Tribunal in respect of reg 1.15(1A)(b)(iii)(B) deprived the appellant of the “possibility” of a successful outcome. It is not whether the Tribunal “would probably have reached the same result” even if it did not make the alleged error.·Despite the Tribunal’s finding on the “mutual commitment to a shared life as husband wife” criterion, it is still possible that the Tribunal might have decided the matter differently had it decided the matter according to law.·The Tribunal did not in its reasons explain how it construed the phrase “mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife”. There is no express statement in those reasons as to what it considered to be “a shared life as husband and wife”. There is some suggestion, however, in the transcript of the Tribunal proceeding that the learned member thought that the legislation only recognised a narrow category or relationship.·It is possible that the Tribunal’s understanding of the “live separately and apart” criterion affected her understanding of the meaning of reg 1.15A(1A)(b)(i). That this is so is apparent from the focus of the Tribunal on the extent of physical separation between the appellant and the sponsor when dealing with the phrase “mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife”.·As is made plain in such cases as Main and SZOXP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 1 a matrimonial relationship may subsist notwithstanding the parties’ physical separation, for example in the case of married shift workers who may see little of each other when their shifts at work do not coincide. The Tribunal did not consider whether changes to the shifts of the appellant and the sponsor could improve the amount of face-to-face contact between them, and it is possible that this was because the Tribunal had adopted a narrow view of the type of relationship recognised by the legislation based on its understanding of the “live separately and apart” criterion.·The Tribunal might have decided the matter differently had it not erred on the “live separately and apart” criterion.·The Minister is wrong when he contends that the “live separately and apart” criterion and the “mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife” criterion are not materially different. If the Tribunal used its conclusions on “mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife” to inform its conclusions on “live separately and apart” it was in error, because it was required to construe each criterion separately. In writing the appellant submits:By the same principle, it would be wrong to assume that a conclusion on the “live separately and apart” criterion equates with a conclusion on the “mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife” criterion. Otherwise the “mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife” criterion would be a dead letter and the legislative requirement that both criterions [sic] be considered would be otiose.