FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
White v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1376
Citation: White v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1376 Appeal from: White v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 2486 Parties: EDWARD CHRISTOPHER WHITE v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL File number: QUD 597 of 2014 Judge: COLLIER J Date of judgment: 4 December 2015 Catchwords: MIGRATION – r 1.15A(1A)(b)(i) and (iii)(B) Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – r 1.15A(1A)(b)(iii)(B) Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – whether appellant and spouse have “mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife” – whether appellant and spouse “do not live separately and apart on a permanent basis” – whether criterion in r 1.15(1A)(b)(i) required findings separate and independent from findings in r 1.15(1A)(b)(iii)(B) – r 1.15(1A)(b)(i), (ii) and (iii) need to be satisfied in order to satisfy criteria – appellant did not challenge Tribunal findings pursuant to r 1.15(1A)(b)(i) – Tribunal found appellant did not meet r 1.15(1A)(b)(i) – appeal fatally flawed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 65
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 1.15(1A)(b)(i), 1.15(1A)(b)(iii)(B), 1.15A(1), 1.15A(1A), 1.15A(1A)(b), 1.15A(1A)(b)(i), 1.15A(1A)(b)(iii), 1.15A(1A)(b)(iii)(B), 1.15A(3)Cases cited: Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321
Lu v Minister for Immigration (2004) 141 FCR 346
Main v Main (1949) 78 CLR 636
SZOXP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 1
Tulk v Tulk (1906) 13 ALR 45Date of hearing: 1 April 2015 and 4 November 2015 Place: Brisbane Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 36 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr AD Scott Solicitor for the Appellant: Bottoms English Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr B McGlade Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent entered a submitting notice, save as to costs.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
QUD 597 of 2014
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: EDWARD CHRISTOPHER WHITE
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
COLLIER J
DATE OF ORDER:
4 DECEMBER 2015
WHERE MADE:
BRISBANE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The appeal be dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
QUD 597 of 2014
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: EDWARD CHRISTOPHER WHITE
AppellantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
COLLIER J
DATE:
4 DECEMBER 2015
PLACE:
BRISBANE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, in which the primary Judge dismissed an application to review a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) (the Tribunal). The Tribunal had dismissed an application for review of a decision made by a delegate of the Minister…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 1376
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the expression "live separately and apart" in regulation 1.15A(1A)(b)(iii)(B) derived its meaning from matrimonial law and that the appellant did not challenge the findings of the Tribunal regarding regulation 1.15A(1A)(b)(i). However, the court found that the appellant’s failure to challenge those findings did not mean the appeal could be resolved on that point alone. The court further held that the Tribunal and the primary Judge did not err in their interpretation of the phrase "live separately and apart" and that the appellant’s appeal was fatally flawed.
The court concluded that the Tribunal might have decided the matter differently had it not erred on the "live separately and apart" criterion, but the error did not deprive the appellant of the possibility of a successful outcome. The court held that the "live separately and apart" criterion and the "mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife" criterion were not materially different, but that it was required to construe each criterion separately.
In light of the above, the court dismissed the appeal with costs. The court also noted that the entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
The appeal be dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
This case involves an appeal against a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) which found that the appellant did not meet the criteria for a partner visa under the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). The appellant did not challenge the Tribunal's finding that he did not have a mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife. The appeal was heard in the Federal Court of Australia and focused on whether the Tribunal erred in its interpretation of the phrase "live separately and apart" and whether this error was material to the outcome of the case.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Both parties in the appeal accepted that the expression “live separately and apart” in reg 1.15A(1A)(b)(iii)(B) is a term of art deriving its meaning from matrimonial law. In this appeal, the appellant no longer challenges the decision of the Tribunal insofar as it was not satisfied that the appellant and the sponsor had a mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife to the exclusion of all others within the meaning of reg 1.15A(1A)(b)(i).Consideration This appeal raises three issues, namely:(1)Whether the fact that the appellant does not challenge the findings of the Tribunal in respect of reg 1.15A(1A)(b)(i) means that this appeal can be resolved on that point, as claimed by the first respondent in its notice of contention.(2)The relevance of observations made by the Tribunal during the hearing before it in relation to the concept “live separately and apart”, in particular whether those observations coloured its eventual findings.(3)Whether the Tribunal and the primary Judge erred in their interpretation of the phrase “live separately and apart”, such that the Tribunal made an error going to its jurisdiction, and the current appeal ought be allowed. In relation to the first issue, the Minister submits that it is fatal to the appeal. It is appropriate to deal with this issue before turning to issues 2 and 3. At the hearing Counsel for the appellant confirmed that the appellant was not, in this appeal, seeking to disturb the findings of the Tribunal in respect of reg 1.15A(1A)(b)(i), namely that the Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant and the sponsor had a mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife to the exclusion of all others. The Minister contends, in summary, that even if the Tribunal erred in respect of reg 1.15(1A)(b)(iii)(B) and its interpretation and application of the phrase “live separately and apart”, the Tribunal would still have refused the grant of the partner visa because the requirement stipulated in reg 1.15A(1A)(b)(i) was not met. In addressing this issue the appellant submits in summary:·In Lu v Minister for Immigration (2004) 141 FCR 346 at 360 Sackville J explained:It seems to me that the correct approach is that stated in Stead and adopted by the High Court in Aala. The test is whether the applicant has been deprived of the possibility of a successful outcome by the decision-maker’s failure to observe the requirements of the statute. If so, the jurisdictional error could have had a bearing on the outcome and the applicant is not to be denied relief on the basis that the error was insignificant. The test must be applied by reference to the material actually before the decision-maker and, where the decision-maker’s reasoning processes is [sic] known, taking into account his or her approach to the exercise of the particular statutory power. The question is not whether the decision-maker would probably have reached the same result even if the omitted consideration had been taken into account.·The question is therefore whether the alleged error of the Tribunal in respect of reg 1.15(1A)(b)(iii)(B) deprived the appellant of the “possibility” of a successful outcome. It is not whether the Tribunal “would probably have reached the same result” even if it did not make the alleged error.·Despite the Tribunal’s finding on the “mutual commitment to a shared life as husband wife” criterion, it is still possible that the Tribunal might have decided the matter differently had it decided the matter according to law.·The Tribunal did not in its reasons explain how it construed the phrase “mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife”. There is no express statement in those reasons as to what it considered to be “a shared life as husband and wife”. There is some suggestion, however, in the transcript of the Tribunal proceeding that the learned member thought that the legislation only recognised a narrow category or relationship.·It is possible that the Tribunal’s understanding of the “live separately and apart” criterion affected her understanding of the meaning of reg 1.15A(1A)(b)(i). That this is so is apparent from the focus of the Tribunal on the extent of physical separation between the appellant and the sponsor when dealing with the phrase “mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife”.·As is made plain in such cases as Main and SZOXP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 1 a matrimonial relationship may subsist notwithstanding the parties’ physical separation, for example in the case of married shift workers who may see little of each other when their shifts at work do not coincide. The Tribunal did not consider whether changes to the shifts of the appellant and the sponsor could improve the amount of face-to-face contact between them, and it is possible that this was because the Tribunal had adopted a narrow view of the type of relationship recognised by the legislation based on its understanding of the “live separately and apart” criterion.·The Tribunal might have decided the matter differently had it not erred on the “live separately and apart” criterion.·The Minister is wrong when he contends that the “live separately and apart” criterion and the “mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife” criterion are not materially different. If the Tribunal used its conclusions on “mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife” to inform its conclusions on “live separately and apart” it was in error, because it was required to construe each criterion separately. In writing the appellant submits:By the same principle, it would be wrong to assume that a conclusion on the “live separately and apart” criterion equates with a conclusion on the “mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife” criterion. Otherwise the “mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife” criterion would be a dead letter and the legislative requirement that both criterions [sic] be considered would be otiose.