WHITE & INGLE

[2017] FCCA 509

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WHITE & INGLE [2017] FCCA 509

Catchwords:
FAMILY LAW – Children – Interim Application to change children’s residence as a result of Carbohydrate Deficient Transferrin testing results showing elevated levels of alcohol consumption by a parent – Application refused – Early Final Hearing allocated.

Legislation:

Family Law Act 1975, ss.60B; 60CA; 60CC; 61DA and 65DAA

Cases cited:

Goode v Goode (2007) 36 Fam LR 422, (2006) FLC 93-286

MRR v GR [2010] HCA 4

Eaby & Speelman [2015] FamCAFC 104
Rice v Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725
Banks & Banks [2015] FamCAFC 36

Applicant: MR WHITE

Respondent: MS INGLE

File Number: BRC 2370 of 2016

Judgment of: Judge Lapthorn

Hearing date: 13 February 2017

Date of Last Submission: 13 February 2017

Delivered at: Brisbane

Delivered on: 20 March 2017

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Andrew

Solicitors for the Applicant: Creevey Russell Lawyers

Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Bunning

Solicitors for the Respondent: O'Neill Family Law

ORDERS

1. That the Application in a Case filed 29 November 2016 be dismissed.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym White & Ingle is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT MELBOURNE

BRC 2370 of 2016

MR WHITE

Applicant

And

MS INGLE

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. The parents of four year old X and two year old Y have had proceedings before the court since 17 March 2016.  Orders were made by consent of the parties on 28 July 2016 (“the July 2016 Orders”) for the parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for the boys; for them to live with their mother and to spend time with their father on alternate weekends Friday morning to Monday afternoon and in the other week from Monday morning to Tuesday afternoon.  A significant issue between the parents is a concern held by the father that the mother is misusing alcohol to such an extent that her care of the children is compromised or has the potential to be so compromised. 

2. The July 2016 orders addressed this concern by making provision for Carbohydrate Deficient Transferrin (CDT) testing in the following terms:

   3. That the Applicant Mother will arrange to undertake a withdrawal of blood for the purpose of CDT blood tests within 48 hours of a written request of the Respondent Father no more frequently than for the purposes of six (6) tests between the date of these Orders and the next mention date in this matter and no more frequently than ten (10) days in between requests and the Applicant Mother shall authorise the testing entity to forward the invoice for those tests and the results directly to the Respondent Father and with the Applicant Mother to provide the relevant invoice to the Respondent Father by way of photograph on Iphone as soon as she comes into possession of same.

   4. That if the withdrawal of blood for the CDT tests are not taken in compliance with Order 4 for any reason other than the Respondent Father's non-payment for tests then it will be deemed as an elevated test for the purposes of Order 5.

   5. That if the test results show a reading of 1.5% or above, on two (2) occasions (taking into account Notation A), then either party will have liberty to apply to the Court upon the giving of forty-eight (48) hours' notice.

3. The mother produced two test results in excess of 1.5% on 20 October and 4 November 2016. The father, relying on order 5 above filed an Application in a Case on 29 November 2016.  In that application he sought a change of the children’s residence so that they live primarily with him and spend time with their mother in the same terms as they were spending time with him pursuant to the July 2016 orders.  The parties agreed to further interim orders pending a hearing of the father’s application and orders were made in Chambers by consent on 1 December 2016 (“the December 2016 orders”).  These orders maintained the living and spend time arrangements for the boys pending the interim hearing but made certain provisions in relation to the mother’s blood tests as follows:

   3. That the Applicant Mother will arrange to undertake a withdrawal of blood for the purpose of CDT blood tests within 48 hours of a written request of the Respondent Father no more frequently than 3 tests before the end of January 2017 with not less than 14 days between each test and monthly thereafter and the Applicant Mother shall authorise the testing entity to forward the invoice for those tests and the results directly to the Respondent Father and with the Applicant Mother to provide the relevant invoice to the Respondent Father by way of photograph on iPhone as soon as she comes into possession of same.

   4. If the withdrawal of blood for the CDT tests are not taken in compliance with Order 3 for any reason other than the Respondent Father's non-payment for tests then it will be deemed as an elevated test.

4. The father did not make any request for blood tests until 3 February 2017.  The mother did not comply with this request but had undertaken a blood test of her own volition on 30 January 2017.

5. The mother opposed the father’s application and in her Response sought orders for the issuance of passports for the children and provision for the mother to take the children overseas for 22 days in June and July 2017.  The overseas travel aspect has been adjourned to another date.

Issues

1. I am asked by the father to change the current arrangements, to which he consented to in both July and December 2016, so that the children move from their mother’s care to live primarily with him.  He brings that application on the basis of what his counsel described as a ‘trigger’, i.e. the mother has provided two CDT blood tests with readings in excess of 1.5% and therefore attracting the liberty to apply pursuant to Order 5 of the July 2016 orders.  In determining any change of residence however I must not just look at the triggering event in isolation but determine what is in the children’s best interests having regard to the legislative framework.

Legal Principles

1. All parenting proceedings are governed by the provisions of Pt VII of the Family Law Act1975.  In determining their outcome the Court is required to have regard to the objects and principles that underlie that part[1] and must consider the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration.[2] 

   [1] S.60B

   [2] S.60CA

2. The objects of Pt VII are to ensure that the best interests of children are met by both parents having a meaningful involvement in their children’s lives; that the children are protected from physical or psychological harm; that they receive adequate and proper parenting; and the parents fulfil their duties and meet their parental responsibilities.[3] Section 60B(2) sets out the principles underlying those objects. Unless it would be contrary to a child’s best interests the principles are:

   a)Children have a right to know and be cared for by both their parents;

   b)Children have a right to regularly spend time and communicate with both their parents and other persons significant to their care, welfare and development;

   c)Parents jointly share duties and responsibilities concerning the care, welfare and development of their children;

   d)Parents should agree about the future parenting of their children; and

   e)Children have a right to enjoy their culture.

   [3] S.60B lists the objects and principles for Pt VII.

3. The legislative framework which must be followed in all parenting cases,[4] mandates that when making a parenting order the court must apply a presumption that it is in the best interests of the child for the parents to have equal shared parental responsibility.[5]  This presumption does not apply in cases of child abuse and/or family violence or may be rebutted when the evidence establishes that it is not in the child’s best interests for it to apply.[6]

   [4] Goode v Goode (2007) 36 Fam LR 422, (2006) FLC 93-286

   [5] S.61DA

   [6] S.61DA(2) & (4)

4. In the event that the court orders the parties to have equal shared parental responsibility the court must apply the provisions of s.65DAA which provide for a consideration of the child spending equal time with the parents.  In determining this issue the court must be satisfied that it is both in the child’s best interests and reasonably practicable.[7]  If the court finds that equal time is not in the child’s best interests or  that it is not reasonably practicable then the court must consider the child spending substantial and significant time with the parents and in doing so must again be satisfied that such an arrangement is both in the child’s best interests and reasonably practicable.[8]

   [7] S.65DAA(1)(a) & (b), MRR v GR [2010] HCA 4

   [8] S.65DAA(2)(c) & (d)

5. The proceedings before me, as is the case for most interim hearings, were heard “on the papers” without the benefit of having the evidence tested.  There were a number of contested factual issues that will need determining should this matter proceed to a final hearing however it is not possible to determine them at this stage.  Although it may be tempting to ignore disputed factual issues in interim proceedings that is not always appropriate.  When the circumstances warrant it the court must weigh up the probabilities of the competing claims.  In Eaby & Speelman[9] Ryan J writing for the Full Court said:

   [18]  Her Honour early in her reasons referred to Goode & Goode for guidance as to the correct approach to the determination of interim parenting proceedings.  It is true that in Goode & Goode, at [68], the Full Court said that the circumscribed nature of interim hearings means that the court should not be drawn into issues of fact or matters relating to the merits of the substantive case where findings are not possible.  However, that does not mean that merely because the facts are in dispute the evidence on the topic must be disregarded, and the case determined solely by reference to the agreed facts.  Rather, the proper approach to contentious matters of fact in the determination of interim hearings is as explained in Marvel v Marvel, at [122] and [123], as follows:

   [122]    In SS v AH [2010] FamCAFC 13 the majority (Boland and Thackray JJ) discussed at [88] of their reasons the care necessary to be exercised in making findings in interim parenting proceedings. Their Honours said:

   [88] In our view, findings made at an interim hearing should be couched with great circumspection, no matter how firmly a judge’s intuition may suggest that the finding will be borne out after a full testing of the evidence.

   [9] [2015] FamCAFC 104

   [123]    Later, at [100] their Honours amplified their comments and said:

   [100]    The intuition involved in decision-making concerning children is arguably of even greater importance when a judge is obliged to make interim decisions following a hearing at which time constraints prevent the evidence being tested. Apart from relying upon the uncontroversial or agreed facts, a judge will sometimes have little alternative than to weigh the probabilities of competing claims and the likely impact on children in the event that a controversial assertion is acted upon or rejected. It is not always feasible when dealing with the immediate welfare of children simply to ignore an assertion because its accuracy has been put in issue.

   [19]  As would be immediately apparent, this approach enables the court to appropriately and carefully deal with contentious issues relevant to the welfare of the child, and for those issues to not be ignored. 

6. Counsel for the mother argued that given there has already been two sets of interim parenting orders made in this matter it is incumbent on the father to show a material change of circumstances before the court should consider an change in the parenting arrangements.  In making that submission he was relying on the authority in Rice v Asplund[10] where Evatt CJ said:

   The court should not lightly entertain an application to reverse an earlier custody order.  It would need to be satisfied by the Applicant that there was some changed circumstance which would justify such a serious step, some new factor arising, or, at any rate, some factor which was not disclosed at the previous hearing which would have been material.  These are not necessarily matters for preliminary submission, but they are matters that the judge should consider in his reasons for decisions.

   [10] (1979) FLC 90-725

7. I am not satisfied this is a matter where the Rice and Asplund principle applies.  The July 2016 orders and November 2016 orders made provision for the matter to be relisted if the mother’s test results were above the 1.5 level or are deemed to be such because of a failure to comply.  That is what has happened and accordingly it was open for the father to bring his application.

Material relied on 

1. The father relied on:

   a)His Application in a case filed 29 November 2016;

   b)His affidavit filed 13 January 2017; and

   c)The affidavit of Mr M filed 15 December 2016.

2. The mother relied on:

   a)Her Response to an Application in a Case filed 27 January 2017;

   b)Her affidavit filed  27 January 2017; and

   c)The affidavit of Dr D filed 8 February 2017.

3. A report from Ms N was tendered into evidence and became exhibit M1 and an email dated 6 February 2017 between the parties’ solicitors which became exhibit F2.  The court was assisted by an Aide Memoir tendered on behalf of the father which, for ease, was marked F1 and written submissions tendered on behalf of the mother.

4. The court has also had the benefit of the affidavit of Ms S filed 27 July 2016 who prepared a Family Report at the request of the parties.

Evidence

1. The parties commenced their relationship in 2004 and lived in the (country omitted) from where the mother hails.  They relocated to Australia in 2012 and lived on a property near (omitted) owned by the father’s parents.  X was born on (omitted) 2012 and Y was born on (omitted) 2014.  The parties separated on 23 July 2015.

2. For the purposes of this interim determination I do not propose canvassing much of the evidence surrounding separation other than to note there are a number of allegations raised as to the extent of the mother’s care of the children as a consequence of her consumption of alcohol and a withholding of the children by the father for lengthy periods of time.  There is no dispute however that the mother has been the children’s primary carer since birth.  She now lives with the children in (omitted) some 280km from the father’s home on the (omitted) property.  The travel time is around three and a half hours drive.

3. On 6 August 2015 and 26 November 2015 the parties entered into parenting plans but the circumstances surrounding the reasons for reaching agreement in relation to the parenting plans is challenged.  The mother commenced these proceedings by filing her Initiating Application on 17 March 2016.

4. The mother has provided the father with numerous CDT test results since August 2015.  The father’s evidence is that he has requested five CDT tests from the mother after the July 2016 orders.  The mother has complied with the first four requests.  The first two results were within what is described as the normal range but the reading from the test conducted on 20 October 2016 was 2.8 and is regarded as ‘elevated’.  The test conducted on 4 November 2016 was 1.6 and therefore over the 1.5 provided for in the July 2016 orders but is said to be inconclusive.

5. The mother said that she remembered in October 2016 having three to four drinks on two separate nights early in the month when attending a friend’s home for dinner and on another weekend she attended a concert in Brisbane and consumed a number of alcoholic drinks.  The boys were in their father’s care that weekend.  She attributes the elevated reading to this consumption.

6. A consultant pharmacologist and forensic toxicologist, Mr M, gave evidence on behalf of the father.  He said that CDT tests do not detect alcohol directly but rather the effect of alcohol on the body.  He has prepared three reports[11] after reviewing the mother’s test results.  In his first report he said:

   i)  Carbohydrate deficient transferrin (CDT) is regarded as an indirect alcohol biomarker.  That is, this test does not detect alcohol directly, but rather the affect of alcohol on the body.  Levels of total CDT are generally less than 1.4% in social or infrequent users of alcohol with values between 1.4% and 1.6% being somewhat equivocal.  Total CDT values greater the than 1.6% are regarded as elevated and result from a transient or short-term change in the glycosylation pattern of transferrin where the relative amounts of carbohydrate deficient transferrin (CDT) are increased over the amount of normally glycosylated transferrin. 

   This change in glycosylation pattern may be caused by excessive consumption of alcohol and / or medical or analytical issues such as liver disease; paraprotein interference; hypertension; iron deficiency and some genetic disorders.

   ii) Whilst the amount of alcohol required to elevate CDT levels is somewhat variable, it is generally accepted that the consumption of more than 50 to 60 grams of alcohol (5 to 6 standard drinks) a day for more than 7 to 10 days will cause an increase in CDT levels above ‘normal’ levels.  Following the abstinence from alcohol use, CDT levels may remain elevated for a period of a further couple of weeks.  Therefore when CDT levels in the blood are found at levels above ‘normal’ this may indicate or be consistent with excess alcohol consumption in the week or weeks prior to sample collection.  When CDT levels in the blood are found at levels regarded as ‘normal’, this is consistent with either no alcohol use or minimal alcohol use.  Infrequent or isolated drinking sessions are unlikely to significantly raise or alter normal CDT levels, therefore when CDT levels in the blood are found at levels above ‘normal’ this may indicate or be consistent with excess alcohol consumption. 

   [11] Dated: 14 October 2015, 1 August 2016 and 18 November 2016

7. In his last report he said in response to specific questions:

   1.  Interpret the results since August 2016

   a.  The results of testing on samples collected on 26/08/16 and 21/09/16 suggest that in the two weeks prior to these samples being collected, excessive consumption of alcohol is not likely.  These results do not exclude ‘social’ use of alcohol or the occasional ‘binge’ session.

   b.  The result of the testing on the sample collected on 20/10/16 is regarded as high and is consistent with regular, excessive use of alcohol in the two weeks prior to the collection of this sample.

   c.  The result of the testing on the sample collected on 04/11/16 is regarded as equivocal and higher than ‘normal range’.

   i.   Whilst this CDT value may have been contributed to by the regular excessive use of alcohol in the two weeks prior to the collection, given the preceding elevated reading and the normally slow reduction in CDT levels (50% fall every two weeks) this reading could also be explained by the normal reduction in CDT values.  That is, in absence of other evidence, this result should not be interpreted as being caused by excessive alcohol ingestion. 

   2.  Advise whether the spike in October 2016 can be explained by one off binge drinking session over the period of a weekend

   a.  It is not likely that one off drinking session would lead to such a significant increase in CDT results.  It is more likely that these results are due to excessive regular consumption over a period of a week or more.    

8. The mother filed evidence from Dr D who is employed by a pathology company as a specialist in clinical chemistry, endocrinology who has experience in interpreting CDT test results.  He said in his affidavit:

   7.  It has been requested that I comment on whether a CDT test reading of 2.8 it is  indicative of prolonged regular drinking, or if it could be caused by drinking alcohol over a shorter period, such as during the afternoons and nights of a weekend. 

   8.  From my experience, CDT elevation may be seen with a variety of patterns of drinking alcohol.  It does not necessarily indicate daily alcohol consumption, as elevated levels can be seen after a short period of significantly elevated consumption, such as over a weekend.  An elevated level of consumption of alcohol over the period of a two (2) days on a weekend could result in a CDT level of 2.8.  Therefore, the shortfalls of CDT testing in the family law context so as to ascertain whether an individual is drinking excessively are that:-

   a.  heavy social drinking on weekends can lead to elevated CDT test results

   b.  differences in individual body composition will result in larger amounts of alcohol being required in some individuals and smaller amounts in other to return the same CDT readings.  

1. Although the evidence of the two experts appear to be at odds as to how an elevated reading can be interpreted I am satisfied that the reports of Mr M are of more benefit to this interim determination as his are based on a more longitudinal study of the mother’s results as opposed to Dr D’s more narrow focus given he was asked to report on one reading.  Having said that I am not rejecting Dr D’s report but given the difficulties in determining the disputed issues at this interim stage I am of the view the more detailed report of Mr M is more helpful to me in weighing up the risk of harm issues.

Determining the best interests of the children – the s.60CC considerations

1. The court is required to determine a child’s best interests by considering a number of factors set out in s.60CC.  In interim proceedings it is not always possible to give full consideration to all of the factors given the difficulty in determining factual disputes.  In Banks & Banks[12] the Full Court held that in interim hearings it is not always necessary for the judge to discuss each factor.  Their Honours[13] said:

   [47]  As the Full Court pointed out in Goode, the fact there will often be little uncontested evidence in interim proceedings means that only limited consideration may be able to be given to the relevant s 60CC factors. 

   [48]  It should also be said that in parenting proceedings, as in all civil litigation, it will be the issues that are joined that will dictate which s 60CC factors are relevant.  By their nature, interim parenting proceedings should be confined to those issues which, in the best interests of the child, require determination prior to a proper determination at a trial.  The fact such disputes are commonly dealt with in overcrowded court lists makes it even more desirable to identify with precision those issues which can, or should, be resolved on an interim basis.   

   [49]  Although the primary judge discussed all the potentially relevant factors in her ex tempore reasons, that luxury will not always be available.  Furthermore, there is a risk that in discussing every s 60CC factor, the judicial officer may lose sight of the forest for the trees.  It is also important to stress here that the requirement to “consider” each factor does not mean each must be discussed, especially where the evidence leads inexorably to a particular conclusion: SCVG & KLD.[14]

   [50]  When it is obvious that the findings made as to some of the s 60CC factors will be determinative of the child’s best interests on an interim basis, it is a sterile and unnecessary exercise to address other factors.  Moreover, it will be a sterile exercise to determine whether or not particular facts are disputed if they are relevant only to one of the non-determinative s 60CC considerations.  Properly understood, we do not interpret what was said in Goode as meaning that in an interim case, each and every fact must be characterised as disputed or not; and that each s 60CC factor must be traversed where it is obvious on the facts and issues joined that there are only one or two decisive factors.

   [12] [2015] FamCAFC 36

   [13] Thackray, Murphy & Kent JJ

   [14] (2014) FLC 93-582

2. In addressing the relevant considerations I propose to group some of them together to minimise repetition.

Each child’s relationships[15]

[15] S.60CC(2)(a): The benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child’s parents.

1. There is no dispute that the mother has been the children’s primary carer all of their lives.  The family reporter observed the children to have warm and familiar interactions with each of their parents.  She observed nothing concerning in those interactions.  Neither party alleged the children did not have a good relationship with the other parent.  The report writer recommended the children live primarily with their mother.  This recommendation was however made on the assumption that the mother was not consuming alcohol which is not the case.

2. I would be concerned however as to how the children would cope moving from their mother’s primary care if the father is successful in this application.  Further evidence from the family report writer may assist in this regard.

Risk of harm issues[16] and parental capacity/responsibility[17]

[16] S.60CC(2)(b): The need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence

[17] S.60CC(3)(f): The capacity of: (i)     each of the child’s parents; and (ii)  any other person (including any grandparent or other relative of the child);  to provide for the needs of the child, including emotional and intellectual needs.

1. The primary concern of the father is his belief that the children are at an unacceptable risk of harm whilst in the care of the mother for their primary care.  His counsel was clear though that the father did not consider the children to be at an unacceptable risk of harm if they were to spend shorter periods of time with her.  He did not seek any supervision of her time and the orders sought provided for the children to spend alternate weekends with their mother from Friday morning to Monday afternoon and in the other week from Monday morning to Tuesday afternoon.

2. The report of Mr M would suggest that in October 2016 the mother had been using alcohol excessively and if that is accepted the children would have been in her care for some of the times she was consuming alcohol.  In the context of the father’s allegations that the mother has passed out whilst caring for the children this is a significant concern.  It is somewhat surprising that the father does not say the mother is an unacceptable risk to the children for short periods of time but is a risk of that magnitude for long periods.  These issues need a proper and thorough exploration that an interim hearing can not accommodate.

3. The mother also raises concern as to the fathers ability to supervise the children particularly in regards to his work obligations on the rural property and the approach taken to care of children by him and his family in that context.  This also needs to be tested at a final hearing.

Practical difficulties[18]

[18] S.60CC(3)(e): The practical difficulty and expense of a child spending time with and communicating with a parent and whether that difficulty or expense will substantially affect the child’s right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis.

1. The parties live some three and a half hours from each other.  This imposes some practical difficulties in ensuring the children move between both homes but not such that the orders sought in either application would be unworkable.

Limiting further proceedings[19]

[19] S.60CC(3)(l): Whether it would be preferable to make the order that would be least likely to lead to the institution of further proceedings in relation to the child. 

1. This matter needs to have a final hearing set down as soon as possible in order to determine the contested issues and to minimise the prospects of repeated applications in a case.

Presumption of Equal Shared Parental Responsibility

1. Neither party sought to set aside the orders for equal shared parental responsibility made in the July 2016 orders and continued in the December 2016 orders.  I am also of the view that there is no reason to re-visit this order.

Consideration of Equal Time or Substantial and Significant Time

1. The current orders provide for substantial and significant time with each parent and the competing applications would see that continue.  Given the ages of the children and the distance between the two homes it is not surprising neither party sought an equal time order.  Such an arrangement would not be in the children’s best interests in those circumstances.

Discussion

1. The father raises legitimate concerns for the safety and well being of the children in light of the mother’s test results.  I am not satisfied however it is in the best interests of the children to change their primary care at this interim stage because despite the legitimate concerns when I weigh up the young ages of the boys, the fact that the mother has been their primary carer, the lack of evidence as to how they will cope with such a significant change in care arrangements and take into account the dispute between experts as to the interpretation of the mother’s test results I am of the view that a testing of the evidence is necessary.  I was pleased to read at paragraphs 14 to 16 of his affidavit, that the father was aware of the potential for the children to experience difficulty in transitioning between the two homes.  What he did not address however was how he planned to take over the primary care of the boys when he has significant work responsibilities on the property.  That of course will be explored at the final hearing but I am without that evidence at this stage.  Rather than changing the children’s residence at this interim stage I am satisfied the concerns raised by the father are sufficiently serious to warrant an early listing for final hearing.

2. For these reasons I dismiss the application in a case and allocate trial dates at the earliest opportunity.

I certify that the preceding thirty-nine (39) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Lapthorn

Date:  20 March 2017

S.60CC(3)(b): The nature of the relationship of the child with: (i)  each of the child’s parents; and (ii) other persons (including any grandparent or other relative of the child).
S.60CC(3)(c): The extent to which each of the child’s parents has taken, or failed to take, the opportunity: (i) to participate in making decisions about major long-term issues in relation to the child; and (ii) to spend time with the child; and (iii) to communicate with the child.
S.60CC(3)(d): The likely effect of any changes in the child’s circumstance, including the likely effect on the child of any separation from: (i)  either of his or her parents; or (ii)  any other child, or other person (including any grandparent or other relative of the child), with whom he or she has been living.S.60CC(3)(j): Any family violence involving the child or a member of the child’s family.
S.60CC(3)(k):  If a family violence order applies, or has applied, to the child or a member of the child’s family-any relevant inferences that can be drawn from the order, taking into account the following: i) The nature of the order;  ii)  The circumstances in which the order was made; iii)  Any evidence admitted in proceedings for the order; iv)  Any findings made by the court in, or in proceedings for, the order;  v)  Any other relevant matter.S.60CC(3)(ca): The extent to which each of the child’s parents has fulfilled, or failed to fulfil, the parent’s obligations to maintain the child.
S.60CC(3)(i): The attitude to the child, and to the responsibilities of parenthood, demonstrated by each of the child’s parentsS.60CC(3)(m): Any other fact or circumstance that the court thinks is relevant.