White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower and Hart (No 2)

Link copied
Case Copied 42 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (No 2) [2000] FCA 1132

COSTS – interest on costs – costs in respect of a period prior to the judgment for costs – power of Federal Court of Australia to award interest on such costs – costs reflected money expended in defending litigation incorrectly brought – existence of a cause of action as basis of claim for interest.

COSTS – interest on costs – costs in respect of period prior to the award of costs – duration of period for which interest should be paid – delays in proceeding – correct interest rate to award.

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth): s 43, s 51A, s 52

Knight v FP Special Assets Limited (1992) 174 CLR 178 referred to
Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534 referred to
McWilliams Wines Pty Ltd v Liaweena (NSW) Pty Ltd (1993) 32 NSWLR 190 not followed
South Australian Superannuation Fund Investment Trust v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (1996) 66 SASR 509 referred to
Nykredit Mortgage Bank Plc v Edward Erdman Group Ltd [1997] 1 WLR 1627 referred to
Commonwealth of Australia v SCI Operations Pty Limited (1998) 192 CLR 285 referred to
Smallacombe v Lockyer Investment Co Pty Ltd (1993) 42 FCR 97 referred to
Serisier Investments Pty Ltd v English (1989) 1 Qd R 678 followed
Namol Pty Ltd v AW Baulderstone Pty Ltd (No 2) (1993) 47 FCR 388 referred to
EMCL Pty Ltd v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd (No 2) (1998) 160 ALR 382 referred to
EMCL Pty Ltd v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd [1999] FCA 978 referred to

WHITE INDUSTRIES (QLD) PTY LTD v FLOWER & HART (A FIRM) (No 2)
QG 198 of 1986

GOLDBERG J
14 AUGUST 2000
SYDNEY (HEARD IN BRISBANE)


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

QG 198 of 1986

BETWEEN:

WHITE INDUSTRIES (QLD) PTY LTD
Applicant

AND:

FLOWER & HART (A FIRM)
Respondent

JUDGE:

GOLDBERG J

DATE:

14 AUGUST 2000

PLACE:

SYDNEY (HEARD IN BRISBANE)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. On 14 July 1998 I published reasons for judgment in which I concluded that the respondent firm of solicitors, Flower & Hart, was liable to pay to the applicant, White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (“White”), the costs which it had incurred in defending the claim which had been brought against White by Caboolture Park Shopping Centre Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (“Caboolture Park”) on an indemnity basis:  White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (1998) 156 ALR 169 (affirmed on appeal Flower & Hart v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1999) 87 FCR 134).

  2. At the time I published my reasons for judgment I did not determine the amount of the costs which Flower & Hart was required to pay to White.  Those costs have now been agreed by the parties in the sum of $1.65 million.  The only outstanding issue is whether interest is payable by Flower & Hart in respect of those costs…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower and Hart (No 2) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2000] FCA 1132
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd and Flower and Hart were involved in a legal dispute, the specifics of which were not detailed in the provided text. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The primary issue before the court was whether the jurisdiction granted under section 43 of the Act allowed for the awarding of interest on costs. Flower and Hart argued that section 43 only granted the power to award costs and did not include any authority to award interest on those costs. They further contended that section 51A did not confer any power on the court to award interest on any costs ordered to be paid. According to Flower and Hart, a "cause of action" for interest on costs only arose when the court ordered costs to be paid, not when a party paid its legal advisers for incurred or anticipated costs.

The court considered the expansive nature of the jurisdiction to award costs under section 43, noting that it was not narrowly defined by Parliament. The Full Court in Caboolture Park Shopping Centre Pty Ltd (In Liq) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd and the High Court in Knight v FP Special Assets Limited had both recognised the broad discretion of the court to make orders for costs. The court held that the jurisdiction conferred by section 43 was sufficiently wide to include the power to award interest on costs, as the absence of a narrower definition suggested an intention to confer a broad discretion. The court found that the argument limiting the jurisdiction based on potential abuse was not persuasive, as the court had the authority to develop principles governing the exercise of the discretion to prevent any abuse.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

GOLDBERG J (dissent)
Flower & Hart submitted that the only power given by s 43 of the Act was the power to award costs and it did not include any power to award interest on costs. Flower & Hart said that s 51A did not give the Court any power to award interest on any costs ordered to be paid. It was said that in a situation where costs are ordered to be paid there is no “cause of action” which gives rise to an order for costs and that a claim or entitlement, as of right, for costs only arises, not when a party pays its legal advisers a sum on account of costs incurred or to be incurred, but rather when a Court orders a party’s costs to be paid by another party. Is interest payable on costs in respect of a period prior to judgment? The jurisdiction conferred by s 43 of the Act to award costs is very wide. In Caboolture Park Shopping Centre Pty Ltd (In Liq) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1993) 45 FCR 224, the Full Court, referring to s 43, said at 229:“The jurisdiction of the Court to award costs has not been narrowly defined by Parliament and the Court is able to make such orders for the payment of costs as may be required for the just disposal of all proceedings brought before it.”The unfettered discretion of the Court to make an order for costs pursuant to s 43 was recognised by the High Court in Knight v FP Special Assets Limited (1992) 174 CLR 178, where at 185 Mason CJ and Deane J said:“According to their natural and ordinary meaning, the words of the rule [O 91, r1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Queensland– similar in terms to s 43 of the Act] are sufficiently expansive to enable the Court to make an order for costs against a person, whether that person is formally a party to the proceedings or not. The jurisdiction and the discretion thereby conferred are not limited. Because they are not limited it is easy to postulate a variety of circumstances where an exercise of the jurisdiction against a non‑party would be extravagant and unjust. However, the existence of that possibility provides no justification for the imposition by the courts, by way of implication, of an arbitrary limitation upon the general jurisdiction conferred by the rule. To do so would, as will appear, deny power to the Court to order costs against a non‑party in cases in which, in the interests of justice, such orders should be made. The inevitable answer to arguments directed to limiting curial jurisdiction based on the supposition that the jurisdiction might lend itself to abuse is that the court will and should develop principles governing the exercise of the discretion which will ensure that the jurisdiction is not exercised in such a way as to give rise to abuse. And that is the answer to the appellants’ case to the extent to which it seeks to confine the scope of the jurisdiction by reference to arguments in terrorem.”In Caboolture Park Shopping Centre Pty Ltd (In Liq) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (supra) the Full Court considered s 43 to be no narrower than O 91 r1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Queensland.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: