Whitby & Zeller (No.2)
[2014] FamCAFC 239
•15 December 2014
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| WHITBY & ZELLER (NO. 2) | [2014] FamCAFC 239 |
| FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – CHILDREN – INTERIM PARENTING ORDERS – Where the father has not seen the child for four years – Where mother says the child believes that his step-father is his biological parent – Where the mother removed the child from Australia without the father’s knowledge and lived with him overseas for a number of years - Where the father made attempts to obtain orders to spend time with the child – Where the mother alleges that there were incidences of family violence and that any re-introduction of the child to the father will be harmful – Where it was open to his Honour to proceed on the basis this was not a case that warranted a complete denial of the child’s right to spend time with his father – Where his Honour alleviated the risk to the child by ordering that time spent with the father occur at a contact centre and that the parties have therapeutic assistance to assist them re-introduce the child to his father – Where no error demonstrated – Appeal dismissed. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) |
| APPELLANT: | Ms Whitby |
| RESPONDENT: | Mr Zeller |
| INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Adams & Partners Lawyers |
| FILE NUMBER: | SYC | 2228 | of | 2011 |
| APPEAL NUMBER: | EA | 132 | of | 2014 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 15 December 2014 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Adelaide |
| PLACE HEARD: | Sydney |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Strickland, Ryan & Austin JJ |
| HEARING DATE: | 28 November 2014 |
| LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: | Federal Circuit Court of Australia |
| LOWER COURT JUDGMENT DATE: | 12 September 2014 |
| LOWER COURT MNC: | [2014] FCCA 2103 |
REPRESENTATION
| FOR THE APPELLANT: | Ms Whitby in person |
COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Ms Beck |
SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Rafton Family Lawyers
| COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Ms Druitt |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Adams & Partners Lawyers |
Orders
The appeal be dismissed.
The father’s application for costs be dismissed.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Whitby & Zeller (No 2) has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| THE FULL COURT OF THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
Appeal Number: EA 132 of 2014
File Number: SYC 2228 of 2011
| Ms Whitby |
Appellant
And
| Mr Zeller |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an appeal by Ms Whitby (“the mother”) against interim parenting orders made by Judge Monahan on 12 September 2014 which enables Mr Zeller (“the father”) to spend time with the parties’ son, C (“the child”) at a contact centre. It was common ground that on the application of the mother, his Honour granted a stay of the orders pending determination of this appeal.
According to the mother, the child, who has just turned six years, does not remember the father and believes her partner is his biological parent. As the possibility of the child’s misconceived idea about the true identity of his father would indicate, they have not seen each other for a long time (four years).
It is the father’s case that the mother has made it extremely difficult for him to maintain a relationship with the child. Although he concedes an incident of family violence, he denies the mother’s allegations of more extensive violence towards her and, as we understand it, her evidence that he was violent, neglectful and abusive of the child. These allegations are central to the mother’s opposition to the child being reintroduced to the father and the orders made by the primary judge. To the extent that steps taken by her have impeded the maintenance of a relationship between the child and the father, she says that her actions were driven by necessity and only after she came to the view that the child could not have a healthy and safe relationship with his father. Having come to that view, she says she has built a happy life for the child which should not be disrupted by him learning the “truth” about who his father is and how poorly his father treated him. She does concede though that “some day” the child will need to know about his father; she says that can only occur when the child is older and more mature.
As we will shortly discuss, each of the parties provided detailed evidence in support of their respective positions to which reference needs to be made so as to provide some context to the appeal.
Background Facts
The father was born in 1965 in the People’s Republic of China (“China”).
The mother was born in 1979 in China.
In 2001 the father moved to Australia and at some stage he acquired Australian citizenship.
The parties met in October 2007 when the father was in China for work. He returned to China in January 2008 which, it would seem, is when the parties commenced their relationship. It is during that two week visit that the mother conceived the child.
The father returned to China for the birth of the child in November 2008. However, his work commitments meant that when the child was only two days old the father needed to return to Australia. According to the mother, in so doing the father failed the child and relevantly failed to take steps to establish a relationship with their son.
With the assistance of her mother, the mother cared for the baby. However, the maternal grandmother and the baby became ill and were hospitalised. According to the mother, her entreaties for assistance from the father went unheeded until, with the child about to be discharged from the hospital, the father arranged for the mother and child to stay with his sister.
On the father’s application, the mother was granted a prospective marriage visa, and with him sponsoring her and child, they arrived in Australia on 18 August 2009. In Australia, the parties and child lived in an apartment rented by the father.
The parties married in Sydney in September 2009.
Following an incident in the parties’ home on 22 October 2009, the details of which are contentious, the mother telephoned police. Police removed the father and an interim Apprehended Violence Order (“AVO”) was made for the protection of the mother and child from the father.
The interim AVO having been made, the mother and child returned to the home, as the father did later in the day. There was a further incident, again the details of which are contentious, but following which the mother left the home and telephoned the police. It is uncontentious that the father was charged with common assault (of the mother) and with breaching the interim AVO. According to the mother, she and the child went to a refuge where, with her limited English, neither she nor the child coped.
According to the mother, in a conversation facilitated by the father’s solicitor, she accepted the father’s promise to change and take care of her and the child and because she “…really didn’t want my child to lose his born father, so I agreed and trusted him again not for me but for my little baby …” (Mother’s affidavit, filed 25 August 2014 [17]).
The AVO proceedings and the charges laid against the father came before a Local Court on 24 November 2009. A two year AVO was made for the protection of the mother and child from the father. On his guilty plea, the father was convicted on the two charges for which he received six months imprisonment for each, suspended upon him entering into a good behaviour bond. The father successfully appealed the severity of the sentences imposed and, on appeal he was placed on a two year good behaviour bond for each charge.
According to the mother, although the parties continued to cohabit the situation in the home remained difficult with the father being often angry and drunk. According to her (Mother’s affidavit, filed 25 August 2014 [20]), the father hit her and their son at around Christmas 2009. There is no evidence that the mother sought assistance from Police in relation to this incident, which if it occurred, constituted a breach of the AVO.
According to the mother, the father had complete control of the family finances, including the family tax benefit paid by Centrelink. When she discovered she could ask Centrelink to pay the benefit into her account, she approached Centrelink and in so doing told them the parties were separated.
She then applied for a single parenting benefit which necessitated an assessment by Centrelink. It is her evidence, that when the father discovered this on 15 March 2010 he became very angry and she fled with the child. We do not understand it to be in dispute that for whatever reason, the mother and child moved out in March 2010.
After the mother moved out, a person named Ms E took her and the child into her home.
According to the mother, she then rented a room in Suburb O. With that arrangement coming to an end and her mother due to arrive from China, there were further discussions between the parties and, with the father promising to change and care for her and the child, when the maternal grandmother arrived, they moved in with the father.
It is the mother’s evidence “… there was violence again. The [father] objected to whatever we did to our baby. He even forbade us cooking and threw the chair to my mother and cursed her” (Mother’s affidavit, filed 25 August 2014 [23]).
Taking the child and her mother with her, the mother returned to Ms E’s home. From there she searched without success for rental accommodation.
It is common ground that the father rented premises in Suburb L for the mother and her mother. It would appear the mother moved into these premises on 17 June 2010 and, at about that time, the parties commenced relationship counselling. Although the parties did not necessarily cohabit they were in close contact and, according to the father, by August 2010 the mother was again pregnant to him. He says that without reference to him the mother terminated the pregnancy.
According to the father, separation occurred on 10 October 2010 when the mother removed the last of her and the child’s belongings from the family home.
With the maternal grandmother’s visitor’s visa about to expire, and without first informing the father, on 13 October 2010, the mother and the child returned to China with her mother. Upon arrival, the mother informed the father where they were. The child, who was then aged 23 months has not seen or spoken to his father since.
Although the mother denied receiving any financial support from the father, it is his evidence that he made arrangements for her to receive $5,000 in late October 2010 and continued to provide her with funds until around January 2011.
The parties agree the father visited China in March 2011 and made an attempt to see the child. The father said he was unsuccessful whereas the mother said she was at home with the child when the father arrived unannounced. Even on the mother’s version the father did not see the child. As we understand the mother’s evidence and submissions, the father engaged in what she termed his “spying ways” and questioned various people about her whereabouts. In so doing he told lies and, she says, demonstrated his real concern was to reconcile with her and not to fulfil his parental responsibilities.
The father commenced parenting proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia (now Federal Circuit Court) in April 2011 in which he sought that the child live with the mother and spend time with him on alternate weekends and during school holidays.
Having left the child with her mother, in April 2011 the mother returned to Australia. She had, by then, commenced a relationship with her now husband to whom she was pregnant. It would seem the father was unaware she had returned but as part of the proceedings instituted by the father orders were made in her absence which restrained her and the child from departing the Commonwealth of Australia. The mother is highly critical of the father for proceeding in this manner and said he had her email address which she had not changed.
On her application, the parties were divorced in Australia in November 2011 following which she returned to China. She departed before the father’s application to spend time with the child was finalised.
The proceedings having been transferred to the Family Court, the father’s application was dismissed on 14 September 2012. Essentially, with the mother and child’s whereabouts unknown, the court could not be satisfied whether the orders sought by the father were in the best interests of the child.
At some point, the mother and child returned to live in Australia. They were accompanied by the mother’s new partner and their baby daughter. As the mother explained to his Honour and repeated to us, one of the reasons she returned with the child to Australia, and to Sydney in particular, was so the child could be reintroduced to his father. Against this background it might be thought to be curious that an issue in this appeal is whether his Honour erred by making orders that would result in the reintroduction taking place in the reasonably near future rather than some time in the future ultimately chosen by the mother.
In about August 2013, the father discovered the mother and child were in Australia and, having secured a grant of legal aid, on 25 November 2013 he commenced parenting proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court. In essence, he sought orders that the child spend time with him and to secure the child’s presence in Australia.
The father’s application came before the court on 24 March 2014, 5 June 2014, 12 June 2014 and 15 August 2014 and then finally on 3 September 2014. The hearing proceeded with the benefit of the input of an Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”) and a child dispute conference memorandum completed by a family consultant following her interviews with the parties on 11 July 2014.
Having reserved his decision, on 12 September 2014, his Honour made the orders which are the subject of this appeal and published his reasons.
Without delay, the mother filed a Notice of Appeal on 16 September 2014 and which, by order dated 25 September 2014, was expedited.
The orders made 12 September 2014
The mother appeals against all the orders made on 12 September 2014, which we now set out.
1.That the father spend time with the child under supervision at the [W] Contact Service on one day each week and to facilitate such time:
(a)Each party must:
(i)Contact [W] Contact Service within seven (7) days to arrange an appointment for assessment for suitability;
(ii)Attend the assessment;
(iii)Comply with any appointment made by [W] Contact Service;
(iv)Comply with all reasonable rules of [W] Contact Service;
(v)Comply with all reasonable requests or directions of the staff of [W] Contact Service; and
(vi)If [W] Contact Service following its intake procedure is unable or unwilling to provide supervision as set out above then the Independent Children’s Lawyer shall have liberty to restore the matter to the list on seven (7) days written notice to the other party and to the Court.
(b)If the parties are accepted by [W] Contact Service, following intake procedure, then the father is to spend time with the child at times nominated by [W] Contact Service and such time is to be implemented by the mother delivering the child to [W] Contact Service at the start of the father’s time with the child and collecting the child from the same place at the end of the father’s time.
(c)The parties shall each pay the fees nominated by [W] Contact Service for the provision of its service.
2. Each party must:
(a)Contact the [LL Counselling Service] in Sydney within seven (7) days to arrange an appointment for therapeutic services for the re-introduction of the child to the father.
(b)Comply with any appointments made by the [LL Counselling Service] in Sydney
(c)Comply with all reasonable rules of [LL Counselling Service] in Sydney
(d)Comply with all reasonable requests or directions of the staff of the [LL Counselling Service] in Sydney.
(e)The parties shall each pay the fees nominated by [LL Counselling Service] in Sydney for the provision of its service.
(f)If the [LL Counselling Service] in Sydney is unable or unwilling to provide therapeutic services as set out above then the Independent Children’s Lawyer shall have liberty to restore the matter to the list on seven (7) days notice to the other party and to the Court.
…
The grounds of appeal
The mother does not have legal representation and prepared her own grounds of appeal as follows:
1.There are so many concerns from the mother about reintroducing now. But she couldn’t get an explanation from anyone why doing this in a hurry, taking the risks to hurt the child. She even couldn’t have a chance to speak more.
2.Most important, once the orders made on 12/09/2014 are done, there is no turning back to the child. If the hurt happens, the damage to the child is eternal.
3.Must stop taking any actions and discuss the pros and cons first.
(as per original)
As we understand these grounds of appeal (as exemplified by the mother’s summary of argument and oral submissions) she challenges his Honour’s orders on the following bases:
·the manner in which the hearing was conducted denied her procedural fairness (ground 1);
·failed to give reasons why the child should be reintroduced to the father and commence supervised time now (grounds 1 and 3); and
·failed to consider the potential of long term harm to the child if the child is reintroduced to the father now (ground 2).
The mother makes no challenge to his Honour’s statement of the law to be applied in interim parenting cases. Because she is unrepresented, we considered this matter for ourselves, and we are satisfied his Honour correctly stated the law.
Although the mother in her summary of argument complained that his Honour categorised aspects of her evidence as “complaints” rather than as fact, as
his Honour pointed out, the circumscribed nature of an interim hearing meant he could not determine contentious factual matters. Because we are satisfied that nothing turns on his Honour’s use of the words “complaints” and “complains”, this matter would not come within the broad challenges which are raised by the mother’s grounds of appeal and we need not take that issue any further.
The effect of this is that the mother neither challenges his Honour’s statement of the law nor recitation of the contentious facts and those which are not contentious. It is thus preferable that we discuss his Honour’s reasons in the context of our understanding of the grounds of appeal.
Was the mother denied procedural fairness?
In order to give this challenge context, it is necessary to set out the circumstances in which this interim hearing was conducted.
First, it needs to be understood that the mother was directed to file and serve her response and affidavit by 16 May 2014. She did not comply with that or with other directions. Indeed, she only filed her response and affidavit on 25 August 2014.
With the mother having finally filed her documents, and armed with the child dispute conference memorandum which issued following the parties’ meeting with the family consultant, shortly prior to the interim hearing the ICL circulated a minute of orders which it was submitted would be in the best interests of the child. That minute is set out at [18] of his Honour’s reasons and largely replicates the orders which his Honour made.
The father amended his application so that the interim orders proposed by the ICL also became the subject of his application.
For her part, the mother sought interim and final orders as follows [21]:
1. The respondent mother takes sole parental responsibility.
2. The applicant father has no contact with the child.
3.The applicant father apologise for what he has done so long.
4. The child already has an officially adoptive father.
5. The applicant father stays away from the child’s family and every family member until he is an adult [sic].
(footnote omitted)
We observe, that in response to questions by his Honour, the mother acknowledged that her partner has not officially adopted the child.
In any event, when the interim hearing was called on, leave was given to inspect various documents produced under subpoena by the ICL and the matter stood down to allow those documents to be inspected and to enable his Honour to manage that hearing in conjunction with a final hearing that was also listed before him. The hearing of this matter resumed shortly before 1.00 pm and continued until 2.21 pm.
His Honour carefully explained to the mother, who was assisted by an interpreter, the process that would be followed and invited the mother to explain her opposition to the orders proposed by the ICL. This the mother did at some length. Suffice to say, the mother was given the opportunity to respond to submissions made by the ICL and the solicitor who appeared for the father, which opportunity she took and made further detailed submissions. On the few occasions when the mother appeared to misunderstand the gravamen of a submission, his Honour clarified the misapprehension.
Having read the transcript of the hearing, we are satisfied that the process was fair to everybody involved and that the mother was fully engaged in it. Quite simply, there is nothing about the manner in which this hearing was conducted that denied the mother procedural fairness. It follows the procedural fairness challenge is not made out.
Why commence supervised time now?
His Honour commenced his reasons by identifying the issues that required determination, described by him as “… whether the child should be reintroduced to the father, and if so, whether the child’s time with the father should be spent supervised in a contact centre” [5].
Having incorporated into his reasons the factual background contained in the reasons for judgment published by Dawe J on 14 September 2012, his Honour incorporated significant portions of the child dispute memorandum which again, notably, identified that the issues for determination included [28]:
·whether or not [the child] should be advised of the identity of his father;
·whether or not [the child] should be reintroduced to his father; and
·
whether or not [the child] should commence spending time with his father.
Indeed, that these were the central issues for consideration was a recurrent theme during exchanges in the hearing and in the reasons for judgment. In other words there can be no doubt that his Honour was alive to the fact that one of the issues he needed to determine was whether the child should be re-introduced at all.
Having correctly determined that it would not be appropriate to determine issues of parental responsibility his Honour proceeded to determine the issues just mentioned.
As a starting point, his Honour accepted that as a general proposition it was in the child’s best interests to develop a meaningful relationship not only with his mother but also his father. That outcome, of course, needed to be balanced against the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm. Lest it be misunderstood, his Honour was alive to the requirement that greater weight be given to risk rather than relationship matters where they are in conflict.
At [52], his Honour then said:
A live issue in this dispute is the possibility that the child believes that his step-father, rather than the father, is his biological father. If this is true, the need for a therapeutic process involving the child is obvious. Even if the child was aware that he had a biological father, it is clear that circumstances had prevented the child from knowing the father or developing a relationship with him.
Reference to a therapeutic process being required if the child was to be reintroduced to the father, is to the family consultant’s opinion set out at [28] of his Honour’s reasons that:
…
oIf [the child] is advised of the identity of his birth-father and re-introduced to him it will be significantly disruptive to his life and without the support of his mother it will likely be difficult for him to establish a relationship with his father and attempts to do so may cause him significant distress. This risk might be managed by the mother and her husband receiving professional support but, at this stage, it seems that the mother will struggle with supporting [the child] to have a relationship with his father (although she says she will abide by any Court orders).
…
His Honour explained that the child is entitled to know the truth concerning his paternity and pointed out that the child continued to carry his father’s surname. The juxtaposition of this observation coming immediately after his Honour’s statement at [61] “…[i]f the child believes his step-father to be his biological father…”, suggests that in terms of the child’s awareness of his own paternity, his Honour considered it was significant that the child carried his father’s (not his mother or stepfather’s) surname and thus retained an obvious and public link to his father.
Mindful of the family consultant’s evidence concerning the difficulties for the child and the mother and stepfather’s inherent difficulty with the child being reintroduced to the father, his Honour was satisfied that a counselling service should be engaged. By so doing, the mother and stepfather would be provided with information about how the child should be informed about his true parentage and receive assistance in managing the reintroduction. His Honour then adopted the family consultant’s advice concerning the engagement of a particular agency to provide therapeutic assistance; being an agency previously retained by the mother and father and about which both spoke favourably.
Allied to the need for therapeutic intervention, his Honour also adopted the recommendation of the family consultant that time between the child and father, if it occurred, should take place at a contact centre which his Honour explained would provide the child with an opportunity to spend time with his father “in a safe and child-focused way” [65].
Consideration was then given to the evidence in relation to family violence, the gravamen of which was to the effect that his Honour accepted the father had been violent to the mother, that she remained distressed about the incidents that occurred on 22 October 2009, that those incidents occurred in the presence of the child and that the father acknowledged his poor behaviour on that occasion. As his Honour pointed out, he also had the benefit of documents produced under subpoena by the New South Wales Police and the Department of Family & Community Services. It needs to be understood that his Honour did not overlook the other evidence adduced by the mother concerning family violence but observed that with those other allegations being denied by the father, that evidence would need to be tested. However, there can be no doubt that the possibility the mother’s evidence might ultimately be accepted is one of the factors his Honour had in mind when he explained it would be necessary to proceed cautiously and is fundamental to his decision to order time at a contact centre.
Nonetheless, and notwithstanding that his Honour does not explicitly say so, on a fair reading of his reasons in their entirety, we are satisfied he agreed with the preliminary assessment made by the ICL that this was not a case which would ultimately result in “… a complete denial of the child’s right to spend time with the father” [74]. Although the mother disagrees with that assessment, she has not demonstrated that it was not open to his Honour to proceed on this basis. It follows that his Honour accepted that it was likely the child would, in the reasonably near future, be given the opportunity to spend time with his father. It is similarly apparent that his Honour further agreed with the ICL that a staged approach to any re-introduction should be adopted, in relation to which “necessary family therapy process” was a precursor to their having the opportunity to spend time together at a contact centre [76].
As to timing, there can be no doubt that his Honour was very concerned about the effect on the child of his being removed from Australia by the mother and kept there as a consequence of which the child had been denied the opportunity of continuing to spend time with the father. As his Honour explained:
57.… This is not a criticism of the father. He clearly attempted to have a relationship with the child (as evidenced by his travel to China following separation and the initiation of previous proceedings in this Court that, following transfer, were determined in the Family Court).
It can be seen that with the father and child, in effect, exonerated of responsibility for the lack of contact after the mother removed the child to China, and incontrovertible evidence of prolonged attempts by the father to maintain and then restore his relationship with the child, his Honour determined it was in the child’s best interests to progress that relationship now, and as a necessary part of the process which would achieve that outcome, for the child to know the truth about his identity. In other words, contrary to the mother’s claim that the father had no interest in a relationship with the child which she used to justify her decision to mislead the child about his paternity, his Honour was satisfied that there was sufficient objective evidence that after the parties separated the father had indeed sought to maintain a relationship with the child.
As the orders themselves demonstrate his Honour was satisfied that rather than prolong the cessation of contact and thus run the risk of cementing for the child the mother and stepfather’s misinformation, it was in the best interests of the child to intervene before further damage could be done to the child’s identity.
It follows that these challenges will also fail.
The potential for long term harm to the child
As we understood this challenge, it is summarised in the mother’s summary of argument as follows:
… I have not and will never lie to the child, and my affidavit is not just for the court to see, also for my son to see in the future. Like my case outline shows, my two big concerns are based on lots of facts. There is no reason to ignore these and do the re-introducing immediately.
1.The father was dangerous to the child, no evidence says he will not do that again and prove he truly cares about the child now.
2.The child isn’t mature enough to understand the truth, to handle the fact that his birth father never did anything good to him. And he is living a high quality life now. Even a tiny mistake could ruin the child’s life.
Most importantly, there is no turning back!
This hasty order is a take-over of the child’s rights of choosing a better life, forces the child live a worse live just in order to fulfil a birth parent’s rights, by taking advantage of that he is only 6, far away under 12. This is an extraordinary case. Please, do not make conclusions or opinions only by experience … (as per original)
As we have already explained, his Honour understood that the reintroduction of the child to the father had the potential to significantly disrupt the child’s life and, without the mother’s support, cause him significant distress. However, there is nothing in the evidence of the family consultant which lends support to the proposition encapsulated by this ground, namely, that using the carefully supported and therapeutic scheme provided for in the orders would or is likely to visit long term harm to the child.
We accept that if, when tested, the mother’s evidence concerning family violence is accepted, and it is found that the father may in the future behave in that manner towards her and/or the child, ongoing contact by the child with the father may have adverse consequences for the child in the long term. However, his Honour made carefully crafted orders which would protect the child from the types of behaviour which concern the mother. That the mother disagrees with the orders does not constitute an error or law.
This challenge is not made out.
Conclusion and Costs
The mother has not established error by the trial judge and her appeal will be dismissed.
As is our usual practice, in the interests of time and minimising expense to the parties, we took submissions concerning costs.
In the event that the appeal was unsuccessful, the father sought that the mother pays his costs. Counsel for the father submitted that the mother being wholly unsuccessful would amount to justifying circumstances to depart from the usual outcome whereby parties bear their own costs. The mother opposed an order for costs. Like the father, she has modest financial circumstances. He is in receipt of legal aid whereas the mother has met her modest costs for this appeal.
We are not satisfied an order for costs in favour of the father would be proper.
I certify that the preceding seventy six (76) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Full Court (Strickland, Ryan & Austin JJ) delivered on 15 December 2014.
Associate:
Date: 15 December 2014
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