JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CRIMINAL
CITATION: WHINCUP -v- CITY OF MANDURAH [2017] WASC 89
CORAM: CORBOY J
HEARD: 6 OCTOBER 2016
DELIVERED : 4 APRIL 2017
PUBLISHED : 30 MAY 2017
FILE NO/S: SJA 1030 of 2016
BETWEEN: BRADLEY DOUGLAS WHINCUP
Applicant
AND
CITY OF MANDURAH
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :MAGISTRATE V EDWARDS
File No :MH 2516 of 2013, MH 6018 of 2014
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Single judge appeal against conviction - Breach of Health Act 1911(WA) and Building Act 2011 (WA) - Whether honest claim of right
Legislation:
Builders' Registration Act 1939 (WA)
Building Act 2011 (WA), s 9
Building Regulations 1989 (WA)
Building Regulations 2012 (WA)
Building Services (Registration) Act 2011 (WA)
Criminal Code (WA), s 22, s 24
Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA)
Health Act 1911 (WA), s 3, s 143, s 144
Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1960 (WA), s 364, s 374
Local Government Act 1995 (WA)
Town Planning and Development Act 1928 (WA)
Result:
Leave granted to extend time within which to appeal
Leave granted to amend notice of appeal to allege, in respect of Charge 1, that the appellant had an honest claim of right to use the shed as a dwelling and further, that the sentence imposed should be set aside and the appellant resentenced (the Amended Grounds)
Leave to appeal on the Amended Grounds allowed
Leave to appeal on all other grounds refused
Appeal against sentence on Charge 1 allowed and appellant resentenced
Appeal against conviction on all other charges dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant: In person
Respondent: Mr T L Beckett
Solicitors:
Applicant: In person
Respondent: McLeods Barristers & Solicitors
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Interim Advance Corporation v Fazio [2008] WASCA 140
Investments (WA) Pty Ltd v City of Swan [No 2] [2013] WASCA 251
Narkle v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 160
Ostrowski v Palmer [2004] HCA 30; (2004) 218 CLR 493
Scolaro v Shephard [No 2] [2010] WASC 271
Shire of York v Rosmil Pty Ltd [2010] WASC 189
Walden v Hensler (1987) 163 CLR 561
CORBOY J:
Summary
The respondent (City) issued a prosecution notice in June 2013 alleging that:
(1)between 6 January 2013 and 7 May 2013 at lot 240, HN192 Pleasant Grove Circle, Falcon (the Property) within the district of the City, the appellant used as a dwelling a building not originally constructed as a dwelling-house without having first obtained the consent of the City, contrary to s 144 of the Health Act 1911 (WA) (Charge 1);
(2)in or about November 2012 at the Property, the appellant carried out building work without a building permit being in effect for that work, contrary to s 9 of the Building Act 2011 (WA) (Charge 2);
(3)in or about April 2013 at the Property, the appellant carried out building work without a building permit being in effect for that work, contrary to s 9 of the
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- Case
- [2017] WASC 89
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the appellant could have honestly believed that he was entitled to use the shed as a dwelling following the inspection of the property and receipt of the City's letter of 16 January 2013. The court found that the City's letters of 16 January and 21 February 2013 left open the possibility that the appellant was entitled to use the shed as a dwelling by inviting him to respond to the assertions made in the letter of 16 January 2013. The appellant could have honestly believed that the City would permit him to reside in and use the shed as a dwelling during the time that he was given to reply to the letters. However, the court found that the appellant could not have honestly held that belief once the time allowed for his reply had expired and he had not provided a response that was accepted by the City.
The court found that the appellant was entitled to believe that he had the City's implied consent to continue using the shed while he was given a reasonable opportunity to contest the matters raised by the City's officers during the inspection of the property and in the City's letter of 16 January 2013. However, the appellant must have known that the City did not consent to the use of the shed as a dwelling on and from 28 February 2013. The court found that the appellant's appeal was dismissed.
The court ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that the conviction and sentence of the appellant be affirmed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Section 22 and s 24 may both apply where an accused person had an honest and reasonable belief that they had approval from a regulatory body such as a local government to do an act with respect to property. In this case, there may be a real issue as to whether any belief held by the appellant that he was entitled to use the Shed as a dwelling was a reasonable belief given some of the matters identified earlier that were relevant to the question of consent. However, s 22 does not require that the accused's belief was reasonable. An honest claim of right may be established even though the claim was unfounded - 'what is important is the honest belief that one is legally entitled to do to the property that which one is doing': Interim Advance Corporation v Fazio [2008] WASCA 140 [78] (Buss JA, Miller JA & Newnes AJA agreeing). Buss JA (McLure P & Hall J agreeing) stated in Narkle v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 160 [41]:If it is necessary for a trial judge to consider, at the close of the evidence in a criminal trial, whether a particular defence should be left to the tribunal of fact, the relevant question, in a case where … the legal burden is on the State and the evidential burden is on the accused, will be: is there evidence which, taken at its highest in favour of the accused, could lead a reasonable tribunal of fact, properly instructed, to have a reasonable doubt that each of the elements of the offence had been negatived? That test also applies to a magistrate hearing a criminal charge and it applies even if the accused has not raised the possible defence. In my view, the magistrate was required to consider whether s 22 applied to Charge 1 in light of the appellant's evidence concerning the statement made by Mr Crossley. I also consider that the City did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant did not honestly believe that he was entitled to use the Shed as a dwelling as a result of Mr Crossley's statement prior to the inspection of the property in January 2013. However, I do not consider that the appellant could have honestly believed that he was entitled to use the Shed as a dwelling following the inspection of the Property and receipt of the City's letter of 16 January 2013. He did not reply to the letter. He also did not reply to the City's further letter of 21 February 2013. The City's second letter advised that a prosecution would be commenced if no satisfactory response was received by 28 February 2013. In those circumstances, the appellant was entitled to believe that he had the City's implied consent to continue using the Shed while he was given a reasonable opportunity to contest the matters raised by the City's officers during the inspection of the Property and in the City's letter of 16 January 2013. However, the appellant must have known that the City did not consent to the use of the Shed as a dwelling on and from 28 February 2013. The City's letters of 16 January and 21 February 2013 left open the possibility that the appellant was entitled to use the Shed as a dwelling by inviting him to respond to the assertions made in the letter of 16 January 2013. The appellant could have honestly believed that the City would permit him to reside in and use the Shed as a dwelling during the time that he was given to reply to the letters. However, he could not have honestly held that belief once the time allowed for his reply had expired and he had not provided a response that was accepted by the City.