Wheeler v Kelly

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94 CLR 206

the commissioner could not be SO construed. It would not manifest any such intention. It would only manifest an intention to curb the powers of the commissioner. Accordingly the appellant must fail whether the general principle of construction or the particular principle embodied in the Acts Interpretation Act is relied upon by the respondent but their legal significance would not appear to differ.

Appeal dismissed with costs. Solicitor for the appellant, M. G. Everett. Solicitor for the respondent, D. M. Chambers, Crown Solicitor for the State of Tasmania.

94 CLR 207

[ ]

WHEELER AND ANOTHER

KELLY AND OTHERS

RESPONDENTS. DEFENDANTS,

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF

NEW SOUTH WALES. Acquisition of land-Resumption-" For any public purpose "-Public purpose

" any purpose declared by the Minister to be a public purpose "-Declara- tion of War Veterans' Home as public purpose-Resumption for extension of 1955,

Home-Whether public purpose within declaration-Validity of resumption SYDNEY,

-Crown Lands Consolidation Act 1913-1948 (N.S.W.) (No. 7 of 1913-No. 48 Dec. 6, 7;

of 1948), 88. 5, 197. 1956,

Section 5 of the Crown Lands Consolidation Act 1913-1948 (N.S.W.) provides MELBOURNE,

In this Act, unless the context necessarily requires a different meaning, the expression-' public purpose means and includes, in addition to any purpose specified as a public purpose in any section of this Act, any purpose declared by the Minister, by notification in the Gazette, to be a public purpose within the meaning of such section".

Held, (1) that the words 'in addition to in such section mean no more than " as well as"; (2) that the word "any" in the phrase in addition to any purpose specified " shows that the phrase is contingent in its applica- tion or hypothetical in its sense and that it means in addition to a purpose, if there be one specified ".

Section 197 (1) of such Act provides in its first paragraph 'The Governor may acquire, for the purpose of access or approaches to any natural water, tank, or dam, or for a road, or travelling stock route, or camping reserve, or watering place, or settlement, or for any public purpose any land of any tenure, either by way of purchase or resumption or by granting in fee simple, or for any less estate, any Crown land in exchange for such land

Held, (1) that the expression "land of any tenure " includes freehold land and is not limited to land held on one of the types of tenure created by the Crown Lands Consolidation Act 1913-1948; (2) that the words " or for any

94 CLR 208

public purpose should not be read ejusdem generis with the preceding purposes specifically mentioned.

War Veterans' Home, a company limited by guarantee under the Companies Act 1936 (N.S.W.), has for its principal purpose the maintenance of homes at various places, including Narrabeen, for war veterans. The Minister for Lands (N.S.W.) relying upon 8. 5 of the Crown Lands Consolidation Act declared such company a…

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Details
Case
[1956] HCA 5
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involved an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appellants, Alice Ann and Alan George Wheeler, were the registered proprietors of land at Narrabeen, New South Wales, which was resumed by the Governor in Council for the extension of the War Veterans' Home. The respondents included a nominal defendant for the Government of New South Wales, the Registrar-General of New South Wales, and War Veterans' Home, a company limited by guarantee established for the maintenance of homes for war veterans. The appellants sought declarations that the resumption and the preceding notifications were invalid.

The primary legal issues before the court were the interpretation of section 5 of the Crown Lands Consolidation Act 1913-1948 (N.S.W.), which defined "public purpose," and its application to section 197 of the same Act, which conferred power to resume land. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the Minister for Lands had the power to declare War Veterans' Home a public purpose within the meaning of section 197, and whether the subsequent resumption for the extension of the Home was valid. The appellants argued that the definition of "public purpose" in section 5 was too restrictive to apply to section 197, and that the phrase "for any public purpose" in section 197 should be interpreted narrowly, possibly ejusdem generis with the preceding enumerated purposes.

The Court reasoned that the definition of "public purpose" in section 5 was not intended to be restrictive. It held that the phrase "in addition to any purpose specified" meant "as well as," and that the word "any" indicated a hypothetical or contingent application, meaning "in addition to a purpose, if there be one specified." The Court found no sufficient reason to exclude the application of this definition to section 197. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that "land of any tenure" in section 197 was limited to tenures created by the Crown Lands Consolidation Act, concluding it included freehold land. The contention that "for any public purpose" should be read ejusdem generis with the preceding specific purposes was also dismissed, as the Court found no basis for implying such a restriction. The Court concluded that if a purpose could be fairly regarded as a public purpose, a bona fide declaration by the Minister would be conclusive, and that the War Veterans' Home could reasonably be considered a public purpose.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Alice Ann Wheeler and Alan George Wheeler, the plaintiffs, were the registered proprietors of certain lands at Narrabeen, New South Wales. These lands adjoined the property occupied by War Veterans' Home, a company limited by guarantee under the Companies Act 1936 (N.S.W.) and established for the purpose of maintaining homes for war veterans and their dependants. On 24 January 1947, the Minister for Lands, pursuant to section 5 of the Crown Lands Consolidation Act 1913-1948, declared War Veterans' Home to be a public purpose within the meaning of section 197 of the same Act. This declaration was published in the Government Gazette of New South Wales.

On 28 April 1949, the Governor of New South Wales, acting on the advice of the Executive Council and in accordance with section 197 of the Act, notified and declared the resumption of the plaintiffs' lands for the purpose of extending the War Veterans' Home at Narrabeen. This notification was also published in the Government Gazette. The plaintiffs subsequently brought an action in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, seeking declarations that the notifications and the resumption were invalid and appropriate injunctions against the defendants, which included the Crown, War Veterans' Home, and the Registrar-General of New South Wales. The plaintiffs' action was dismissed by Myers J., leading to their appeal to the High Court.

The appeal centred on the interpretation and application of the Crown Lands Consolidation Act 1913-1948, specifically sections 5 and 197. The plaintiffs contended that the definition of "public purpose" in section 5 could not apply to section 197, and thus, the Minister's declaration of War Veterans' Home as a public purpose was invalid. They also argued that the power of resumption under section 197 should be narrowly construed to exclude purposes like the extension of War Veterans' Home. The defendants, on the other hand, maintained that the Minister's declaration was valid and that the resumption was properly authorised under the Act. The case thus raised significant questions about statutory interpretation and the extent of administrative powers under the Crown Lands Consolidation Act.

The matter of Wheeler v Kelly came before the High Court of Australia as an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The original case, heard and dismissed by Myers J. on 28th June 1955, involved a challenge by Alice Ann Wheeler and Alan George Wheeler against the resumption of their land at Narrabeen by the Minister for Lands of New South Wales. The resumption was declared under Section 197 of the Crown Lands Consolidation Act 1913-1948 for the purpose of extending the War Veterans' Home at Narrabeen, a company limited by guarantee formed to maintain homes for war veterans. The plaintiffs sought declarations of invalidity regarding the notifications and the resumption itself, as well as injunctions to restrain the resumption. The appeal to the High Court sought to contest the validity of this resumption and the interpretation of certain statutory provisions concerning public purpose and the scope of the resumption power.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the definition of "public purpose" in Section 5 of the Crown Lands Consolidation Act 1913-1948 (N.S.W.) apply to Section 197 of the same Act?
2. If so, can the Minister validly declare a purpose to be a "public purpose" under Section 5, and does such a declaration bind the court in determining the validity of land resumption?
3. Does the phrase "land of any tenure" in Section 197 include freehold land, or is it limited to land held under the types of tenure created by the Crown Lands Consolidation Act 1913-1948?
4. Should the phrase "or for any public purpose" in Section 197 be read ejusdem generis with the preceding purposes specifically mentioned in the section?
5. Is the extension of the War Veterans' Home at Narrabeen a valid public purpose under Section 197 for the resumption of the plaintiffs' land?

Held
1. The definition of "public purpose" in Section 5 of the Crown Lands Consolidation Act 1913-1948 (N.S.W.) applies to Section 197 of the same Act. The court concluded that the Minister's declaration of a purpose as a "public purpose" under Section 5 is valid and binding on the court in determining the validity of land resumption.
2. The court held that the phrase "land of any tenure" in Section 197 includes freehold land and is not limited to land held under the types of tenure created by the Crown Lands Consolidation Act 1913-1948.
3. The court determined that the phrase "or for any public purpose" in Section 197 should not be read ejusdem generis with the preceding purposes specifically mentioned in the section.
4. The court found that the extension of the War Veterans' Home at Narrabeen is a valid public purpose under Section 197 for the resumption of the plaintiffs' land.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the case of Wheeler v Kelly, the High Court was tasked with determining the validity of a land resumption under the Crown Lands Consolidation Act 1913-1948 (N.S.W.). The Court first addressed whether the definition of "public purpose" in Section 5 of the Act applied to Section 197. The plaintiffs argued that the definition was limited to sections that explicitly specified a purpose as a public purpose, and thus, Section 197 could not benefit from this definition. However, the Court rejected this interpretation, finding that the words "in addition to" in Section 5 meant "as well as" and that "any" in "in addition to any purpose specified" indicated a contingent application. Therefore, the definition was not limited to sections that explicitly stated a purpose as a public purpose.

The Court then considered whether the Minister could validly declare a purpose to be a "public purpose" under Section 5, and whether such a declaration would bind the Court. The Court held that if the Minister could fairly regard a purpose as a public purpose, a bona fide declaration would be conclusive. The declaration of War Veterans' Home as a public purpose by the Minister was thus valid, and the Court was bound by this declaration in determining the validity of the land resumption.

Next, the Court examined whether the phrase "land of any tenure" in Section 197 included freehold land or was limited to tenures created by the Crown Lands Consolidation Act 1913-1948. The Court found that the phrase "land of any tenure" should be given its ordinary meaning and included freehold land. The Court rejected the argument that tenure under the Act should be a restrictive interpretation, holding that there was no sufficient reason to exclude freehold land from the definition.

The Court also considered whether the phrase "or for any public purpose" in Section 197 should be read ejusdem generis with the preceding purposes specifically mentioned in the section. The plaintiffs argued that the purposes mentioned (access to natural water, roads, etc.) were related to land development and settlement, and thus, the phrase should be limited to similar purposes. However, the Court found no safe ground for such an implication and rejected this argument.

Finally, the Court determined whether the extension of the War Veterans' Home at Narrabeen was a valid public purpose under Section 197 for the resumption of the plaintiffs' land. Given that the Minister had declared War Veterans' Home a public purpose and the extension of the Home fell within this declared purpose, the Court held that the resumption was valid.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the definition of "public purpose" in Section 5 of the Crown Lands Consolidation Act 1913-1948 (N.S.W.) applies to Section 197, and a valid declaration by the Minister of a purpose as a public purpose under Section 5 binds the Court in determining the validity of land resumption. Additionally, the phrase "land of any tenure" in Section 197 includes freehold land, and the phrase "or for any public purpose" should not be read ejusdem generis with the preceding purposes specifically mentioned in the section. The extension of the War Veterans' Home at Narrabeen was a valid public purpose under Section 197 for the resumption of the plaintiffs' land.