[2003] TASSC 149
CITATION:Whayman v The Motor Accidents Insurance Board [2003] TASSC 149
PARTIES: WHAYMAN, Conley Wescar
v
MOTOR ACCIDENTS INSURANCE BOARD, TheWHAYMAN, Carol Jill
v
MOTOR ACCIDENTS INSURANCE BOARD, The
TITLE OF COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
JURISDICTION: ORIGINAL
FILE NO/S: 867/2000
868/2000
DELIVERED ON: 24 December 2003
DELIVERED AT: Hobart
HEARING DATE: 11-14 November 2003
JUDGMENT OF: Cox CJ
CATCHWORDS:
Damages – Measure and remoteness of damages in actions for tort – Mental and nervous shock – Common law – Distinction from ordinary grief – What amounts to recognised psychiatric illness.
Swan v Williams (Demolition) Pty Ltd (1987) 9 NSW LR 173, followed.
Tame v New South Wales; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd [2002] 191 ALR 449, referred to.
Aust Dig Damages [26]
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Plaintiffs: J W Avery, M A Ryan
Defendant: K E Read, D Cooper
Plaintiffs: Avery Partners
Defendant: Piggott Wood & Baker
Judgment Number: [2003] TASSC 149
Number of paragraphs: 31
Serial No 149/2003
File No 867/2000
File No 868/2000
CONLEY WESCAR WHAYMAN v THE MOTOR ACCIDENTS
INSURANCE BOARD
CAROL JILL WHAYMAN v THE MOTOR ACCIDENTS
INSURANCE BOARD
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT COX CJ
24 December 2003
These two actions were heard together. The plaintiffs are the parents of Matthew Whayman who was killed in a motor vehicle accident on the Midlands Highway near Oatlands on 26 March 1999. He was a passenger in his own car with which another car, driven on to the wrong side of the road, collided head-on. In addition to Matthew Whayman, another passenger in his car and the 61 year old driver of the other vehicle, were fatally injured. The plaintiffs have sued the defendant Board pursuant to the Motor Accidents (Liabilities and Compensation) Act 1973, s16, for damages for nervous shock sustained by each of them as a consequence of the negligent driving of the deceased driver, John Martin Hoy. It is not disputed that the latter owed the plaintiffs a duty of care, that he was negligent and that nervous shock to them was reasonably foreseeable. The sole issue is whether or not the plaintiffs have established that they have suffered compensable nervous shock.
Matthew Whayman was 26 years old at the time of his death. He was the younger of the plaintiffs' two sons. His elder brother, Michael, was about four years older and was married. Matthew was single but had a daughter who, according to the history given to one of the psychiatrists, was born some eighteen months before his death. He and the child's mother did not then live together. He was a computer expert and had a great interest in radio broadcasting. In his home at Aotea Road, Sandy Bay, which his parents had bought for him for approximately $90,000 on the understanding that he would, in due course, repay that sum, he had a licensed radio station which operated 24 hours a day, much of the transmission being the result of computerised programming. He was a happy, well…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Whayman v The Motor Accidents Insurance Board and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2003] TASSC 149
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue the court had to address was whether the plaintiff's condition qualified as a recognised psychiatric illness under the common law, separate from the ordinary emotional distress and grief typically associated with such accidents. The court needed to establish the criteria for determining what constitutes a recognised psychiatric illness and assess whether the plaintiff's condition met these criteria. Additionally, the court had to consider the principles of remoteness of damages to decide if the plaintiff's claimed mental and nervous shock was a foreseeable consequence of the accident.
The court ruled that the plaintiff's condition did not amount to a recognised psychiatric illness as it was essentially ordinary grief and sorrow, which is a normal human response to a distressing event. The court emphasised that for damages to be awarded, the plaintiff must demonstrate that her condition is more than just ordinary grief, aligning with the common law's distinction between recognisable psychiatric illness and normal emotional responses. The court further held that the plaintiff's claims of mental and nervous shock were too remote to be compensable under the common law. Consequently, the court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for damages.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi