FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Westpac Banking Corporation v Smith [2020] FCA 1360
File number(s): NSD 2173 of 2017 Judgment of: RARES J Date of judgment: 8 September 2020 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – Application for inquiry into conduct of receivers pursuant to s 423 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – whether length of engagement by receivers of a hotel consultant in addition to a licencee manager of licenced gaming hotel raised a prima facie case requiring inquiry – where length of receivership extended due to conduct of mortgagor and its director – where mortgagor obtained statutory assessment that significantly reduced mortgagee’s and receivers’ legal costs and disbursements chargeable against mortgagor under securities – where lack of qualifications for expert giving evidence tendered in support of application for inquiry –whether conduct of receivers liable to attract sanctions or control for what might be broadly described as disciplinary reasons, including lack of diligence – held: inquiry refused Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 420, 423
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 79
Personal Properties Securities Act2009 (Cth)
Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW)
Liquor Act 2007 (NSW)
Cases cited: Belvista Pty Ltd v Murphy (1993) 11 ACSR 628
Hall v Poolman (2009) 75 NSWLR 99
Northbourne Developments v Reiby Chambers Pty Ltd (1989) 19 NSWLR 434
Oswal v Carson(in their capacity as receivers and managers of Burrup Fertilisers Pty Limited (receivers and managers appointed) (No 3) (2013) 300 ALR 149
Young v Thompson (formerly trustee of the property of Young) (2017) 253 FCR 191
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency Number of paragraphs: 48 Dates of hearing: 7 - 8 September 2020 Counsel for the Applicant/Cross Respondent: Mr T Faulkner SC with Ms A Garsia Solicitor for the Applicant/Cross Respondent: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent/Cross Claimant: Mr M Condon SC with Mr E Walker Solicitor for the Respondent/Cross Claimant: Levitt Robinson Solicitors ORDERS
NSD 2173 of 2017 BETWEEN: WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION
Applicant and Cross Respondent
AND: JOSEPHINE AAPA SMITH
First Respondent and Cross Claimant
ORDER MADE BY:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
8 SEPTEMBER 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The cross claim be dismissed.
2.The parties provide submissions limited to five pages and to file and serve any evidence on the question of costs by 24 September 2020.
3.The matter be set down for an interlocutory hearing on the question of costs on a date to be fixed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
REVISED FROM TRANSCRIPT
RARES J:
This is an application under s 423(1)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) by Josephine Smith (Ms Smith) and two companies which she controls, Smith & Smith Investments Pty Limited and Nouveau Pacific-A Pty Limited, for an order that there be an inquiry about the…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 1360
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court determined that there was insufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for an inquiry into the conduct of the receivers, as the likely return of any money derived from such an inquiry would not warrant the expenditure. The court also emphasised the importance of exercising caution when considering an inquiry into a receiver's conduct, particularly in situations where a degree of latitude in the exercise of business judgment is warranted. Moreover, the court found that the assessment of legal costs and disbursements under the Legal Profession Act was a separate process from that dealt with by section 423(1)(b) and its analogues. Consequently, the court concluded that Ms Smith's application for an inquiry should be dismissed.
The court further ordered that the cross-claim be dismissed, and the parties should provide submissions limited to five pages and to file and serve any evidence on the question of costs by 24 September 2020. The matter was set down for an interlocutory hearing on the question of costs on a date to be fixed. In summary, the court dismissed Ms Smith's application for an inquiry and ordered the parties to provide submissions on the question of costs, while acknowledging her partial success in substantially reducing the costs chargeable on the securities.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The cross claim be dismissed.
2. The parties provide submissions limited to five pages and to file and serve any evidence on the question of costs by 24 September 2020.
3. The matter be set down for an interlocutory hearing on the question of costs on a date to be fixed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Ms Smith relied on Hall 75 NSWLR at 127 [90], where the Court of Appeal discussed the expression in s 536(1)(b), which is relevantly analogous but not exactly so, with s 423(1)(b), “if a complaint is made to the court or ASIC with respect to the conduct of the liquidator in connection with the performance of his or her duty.” There the Court of Appeal held that the expression would cover complaints about incompetence or lack of diligence as well as complaints about failure faithfully to perform duties. They held that natural and ordinary meaning of the words ought not be read down. Consideration Here, s 423(1)(b) allows a complaint to be made about an act or omission of a controller of the property, such as a receiver, of a corporation “in connection with performing or exercising any of the controller’s functions and powers”.The court, relevantly, may inquire into the matter and may take such action as it thinks fit.Thus a complaint about a controller’s lack of diligence is within the scope of s 423(1)(b): cf: Hall 75 NSWLR at 127 [90]. Nonetheless, in my opinion, the power is still one to be exercised with appropriate caution as McLelland J explained in Northbourne 19 NSWLR at 438F–G; Belvista 11 ACSR at 630, which the Full Court applied in Leslie [2001] FCA 37 at [4], [6] and [8]. The power is enlivened to deal with conduct of a controller or receiver that is liable to attract sanctions or control for what might be broadly described as disciplinary reasons, which can include a lack of diligence. The receivers had no onus to establish that their conduct was reasonable. Rather, the onus was on Ms Smith to show that there was a prima facie case for an inquiry to be ordered of the kind that the Full Court explained in Leslie [2001] FCA 371 at [6] and [8]. Ordinarily, the court will allow a person in the position of a receiver or liquidator a degree of latitude in the exercise of business judgment in the performance or the conduct of his or her task. This is particularly so in a situation such as this where Mr Kelly was confronted with the necessity to run a licensed gaming hotel and preserve its value as a security pending sale. That asset’s value was dependent upon the maintenance of its liquor licence in an area in which difficulties with compliance might be expected. It was essential that Mr Kelly ensured that he, and those for whom he was responsible, including the licensee, took reasonable care to ensure that the hotel was managed appropriately and in a way that safeguarded the secured asset, including its licence under the Liquor Act, the value of its land and business. I accept that, as Ms Smith has pointed out, the substantial reduction in the amounts of those legal costs and disbursements that both Westpac, as mortgagee, and the receivers, could charge upon the secured estate raised her bona fide concern about the quantum of the overall receivership costs and expenses. However, the process under the Legal Profession Act for assessment of legal costs and disbursements is different to that with which s 423(1)(b) and its analogues deal, as the authorities that I have referred to explained.