JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION -v- JOHNS [2025] WASC 185
CORAM: FORRESTER J
HEARD: 8 MAY 2025
DELIVERED : 8 MAY 2025
FILE NO/S: CIV 1115 of 2023
BETWEEN: WESTPAC BANKING CORPORATION
Plaintiff
AND
KATHLEEN SARAH LOUISA JOHNS
Defendant
Catchwords:
Application for summary judgment - Order 14 Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) - Mortgage action - Plaintiff's application for possession of property - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
National Credit Code
Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA)
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA)
Result:
Extension of time granted
Application for summary judgment granted
Summary judgment entered for the plaintiff pursuant to O 14
Order for defendant to deliver up vacant possession of property
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Plaintiff | : | C M Guy |
| Defendant | : | No appearance |
Solicitors:
| Plaintiff | : | TG Legal & Technology Lawyers |
| Defendant | : | In Person |
Cases referred to in decision:
Kounis v Westpac Banking Corporation [2023] WASCA 185
Lashansky v Legal Practice Board of Western Australia [No 3] [2013] WASCA 260
Sutton Investments Pty Ltd v Realistic Investments Pty Ltd [2017] WASCA 14
FORRESTER J:
(This judgment was delivered extemporaneously on 8 May 2025 and has been edited from the transcript to correct matters of grammar and infelicities of language, and to insert headings and references.)
Introduction
On 7 February 2023, the plaintiff commenced proceedings seeking orders that the defendant deliver up to the plaintiff vacant possession of a property over which the defendant had granted the plaintiff a mortgage as security for a loan from the plaintiff to the defendant.
The defendant is alleged to have defaulted on the loan and the plaintiff seeks to enforce the loan agreement and mortgage.
The plaintiff has now applied for summary judgment in the proceedings.
For the reasons which follow, the application should be granted.
Evidence relied upon
The plaintiff read the following affidavits in support of the application:
(a)Peter Scalzi affirmed 6 November 2024;
(b)Cassandra Michelle Guy sworn 9 December 2024;
(c)Olivia Daly Tallon affirmed 9 December 2024; and
(d)Cassandra Michelle Guy sworn 8 May 2025.
The defendant has not lodged any evidence in relation to the application.
Factual background
The following facts are deposed to in the affidavits relied upon by the plaintiff.
The defendant is the registered proprietor of the property known as 27 Great Eastern Highway, Bellevue, more particularly described as Lot 418 on Plan 2505 and being the whole of the land comprised in Certificate of Title Volume 1436 Folio 435 (Property).[1]
[1] Scalzi Affidavit, 6 (Annexure A).
On or about 1 March 2016, the plaintiff entered into two written loan agreements (Loan Agreements) with Clinton Ross Thomson and the defendant (Borrowers).
Loan Agreements
The Loan Agreements were comprised of the plaintiff's Consumer Credit Contract Schedules and the plaintiff's Terms and Conditions set out in the You and Your Loan booklet November 2014.[2]
[2] Scalzi Affidavit, 23 ‑ 66.
Pursuant to the terms of the Loan Agreements:
(a)the Borrowers jointly borrowed:
(i)$304,000…
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- Case
- [2025] WASC 185
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In determining the application, the court reiterated the principles governing summary judgment applications, emphasizing that such applications are only appropriate in cases where there is a high degree of certainty about the outcome if the case proceeded to trial. The plaintiff bore the burden of persuading the court that there was no real prospect of the defendant succeeding in any defence. The court found that the undisputed facts established that the defendant had defaulted on the loan agreements and that the statutory requirements for enforcement proceedings had been met. Consequently, the court held that the plaintiff had satisfied its burden of establishing a prima facie right to summary judgment. The onus then shifted to the defendant to show why judgment should not be given against him, but the defendant failed to provide any evidence that could demonstrate an arguable defence.
Given the undisputed facts and the absence of any evidence from the defendant that could rebut the plaintiff's claims, the court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment. The court ordered that possession of the property be delivered to the plaintiff and that the defendant pay the outstanding debt, together with interest and costs.
The court further noted that the defendant's application for an extension of time to apply for summary judgment was not well-founded, as the application was made outside the statutory period and there was no compelling reason to grant leave. The court emphasised the importance of timely applications to avoid unnecessary expense.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The legal principles relevant to an application for summary judgment pursuant to O 14 r 1 are well established. As the Court of Appeal observed in Kounis v Westpac Banking Corporation:Summary judgment is a procedure designed to deal with cases that are not fit for trial. The power to determine a proceeding summarily must be attended with great care - sometimes expressed in terms of 'exceptional caution'. It is only in the clearest of cases, when there is a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceedings if they went to trial, that summary judgment ought properly to be granted. The claimant carries the burden of persuading the court that the claim is a good one, that there is no defence to it, that leave to defend should not be granted and that judgment should be given for the claimant. If the claimant can establish a prima facie right to summary judgment, the burden then shifts to the defendant to satisfy the court why judgment should not be given against him or her. In this respect the defendant has an evidentiary burden. However, the overall burden of persuasion remains on the party moving for summary judgment.A defendant seeking to resist summary judgment does not have to show a defence on the balance of probabilities. However, the defendant must at least show cause as to why there is an arguable defence.[12] The rationale for the time limit is to ensure that applications for summary judgment are made at an early stage of the proceedings, before unnecessary expense has been incurred. In Lashansky v Legal Practice Board of Western Australia, Newnes JA (with whom Pullin and Murphy JJA agreed) made the following observations in relation to an application by a defendant for an extension of time in which to apply for summary judgment:It is clearly desirable that any application for summary judgment be made promptly so as to avoid unnecessary expense being incurred. However, the requirements for leave to make an application for summary judgment out of time will not ordinarily be demanding if on its face the application has some merit. It is not easy to imagine a situation in which a case which is apparently devoid of merit should be allowed to proceed to trial simply because the defendant did not bring the application for summary judgment within the 21 days specified ... in O 16 r 1(1). Questions of costs, of course, may arise where an application is made very late, but that is another matter.[13][13] Lashansky v Legal Practice Board of Western Australia [No 3] [2013] WASCA 260 [48]. I am satisfied, on the evidence before me, that the defendant entered into two Loan Agreements with the plaintiff on 1 March 2016, as well as a mortgage for the benefit of the plaintiff as part security for the loans made under the Loan Agreements. I am satisfied that the defendant has defaulted on both of those Loan Agreements. Pursuant to s 88 of the National Credit Code, enforcement proceedings in relation to a credit contract or mortgage cannot be commenced unless there is a default and the debtor or mortgagor (as the case may be) has been given a default notice allowing a period of at least 30 days from the date of the notice to remedy the default and the default has not been remedied.