Reported Decision:
55 ACSR 519
Court of Appeal
CITATION: Westpac Banking Corporation v 789TEN Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 321
HEARING DATE(S): 30 August 2005
JUDGMENT DATE:
19 September 2005JUDGMENT OF: Beazley JA at 1; Tobias JA at 2; Campbell AJA at 67
DECISION: (a) Leave to appeal granted; (b) Direct the claimant to file its notice of appeal within seven days of the date of these orders; (c) Appeal dismissed; (d) The claimant to pay the opponent's costs of the ordinary summons for leave to appeal and of the appeal
CATCHWORDS: PROCEDURE - Legal Professional Privilege - Whether letter from client to solicitors and letter from solicitors to client's auditors protected as privileged - Legal advice privilege - Whether letters prepared for dominant purpose of providing legal advice to client - Whether auditors were agents of client for purpose of receiving legal advice - Litigation privilege - Whether letters prepared for dominant purpose of client being provided with professional legal services - Evidence Act 1995 ss 118, 119
LEGISLATION CITED: Civil Procedure Act 2005
Corporations Act 2001
Evidence Act 1995
Legal Profession Act 2004
Supreme Court Rules 1970
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005CASES CITED: Anderson v Bank of British Columbia (1876) LR 2 Ch D 644
Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501
Commissioner of Taxation v Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd (2003) 195 ALR 717
DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Interan Inc (2003) 135 FCR 151
Mitsubishi Electric Australia Pty Ltd v Victorian WorkCover Authority (2002) 4 VR 332
Nickmar Pty Ltd v Preservatrice Skandia Insurance Ltd (1985) 3 NSWLR 44
Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 357
Sparnon v Apand Pty Ltd (1996) 68 FCR 322
Trade Practices Commission v Sterling (1979) 36 FLR 244
Wheeler v Le Marchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675PARTIES: Westpac Banking Corporation
789TEN Pty LimitedFILE NUMBER(S): CA 40234/05
COUNSEL: A: F M Douglas QC / R Scruby
R: M D Broun QCSOLICITORS: A: Henry Davis York, Sydney
R: Laurence & Laurence, Sydney
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Supreme Court - Equity Division
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): SC 50167/03
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Bergin J
CA 40234/05
Monday 19 September 2005BEAZLEY JA
TOBIAS JA
CAMPBELL AJA
The claimant (the Bank) sought an order preventing the opponent having access to two letters (the letters) on the basis that they were subject to legal professional privilege.
The first letter was from the Bank to its solicitors Henry Davis York (HDY) requesting that the latter provide certain information to the Bank’s auditors PriceWaterhouse Coopers (PWC) (the Bank’s letter). The second letter was from HDY to PWC providing that information (HDY’s letter).
The parts of the letters at the heart of the Bank’s claim for privilege referred to the Bank’s directors’ estimate of any financial settlement that might be incurred in the primary proceedings between the Bank and the opponent, and HDY’s opinion as to…
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- Case
- [2005] NSWCA 321
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the documents in question were protected by either legal advice privilege or litigation privilege under the *Evidence Act 1995* (Cth). Specifically, the court had to determine if the letters were prepared for the dominant purpose of providing legal advice to the client, and whether the auditors could be considered agents of the client for the purpose of receiving such legal advice. The court also considered whether the letters were prepared for the dominant purpose of the client being provided with professional legal services.
The Court of Appeal reasoned that for legal advice privilege to apply, the communication must be for the dominant purpose of giving or receiving legal advice. While the letter from the solicitors to the auditors contained legal advice, the court found that the dominant purpose of its preparation was not to provide legal advice to the client, but rather to facilitate the auditors' work. The court also held that the auditors were not acting as agents of the client in receiving legal advice, as their role was distinct from that of the client in seeking legal counsel. Consequently, neither legal advice privilege nor litigation privilege applied to the documents.
The appeal was dismissed, with the claimant ordered to pay the opponent's costs of the summons for leave to appeal and of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
(a) Leave to appeal granted; (b) Direct the claimant to file its notice of appeal within seven days of the date of these orders; (c) Appeal dismissed; (d) The claimant to pay the opponent's costs of the ordinary summons for leave to appeal and of the appeal
Background
Background to the litigation
The Federal Court found that the letters were not protected by legal professional privilege. The court held that the letter from 789Ten to its solicitors was not privileged as it was not prepared for the dominant purpose of obtaining legal advice. Instead, it was prepared for the dominant purpose of providing factual information to the solicitors. The court also found that the auditors were not agents of 789Ten for the purpose of receiving legal advice, and therefore, the letter from the solicitors to the auditors was not privileged. The court further held that the letters did not fall within the litigation privilege as they were not prepared for the dominant purpose of providing professional legal services in relation to existing or anticipated litigation. Westpac sought leave to appeal the decision, which was ultimately granted, but the appeal was subsequently dismissed, with Westpac ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings.
The matter of Westpac Banking Corporation v 789Ten Pty Ltd originated as a claim in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The proceedings were brought by Westpac Banking Corporation seeking recovery of monies owed under a loan agreement. The respondent, 789Ten Pty Ltd, resisted the claim on several grounds, including issues of legal professional privilege concerning certain communications. The primary judge ruled against the respondent, finding that certain letters between the client and their solicitors, as well as between the solicitors and the client's auditors, were not protected by legal professional privilege. Dissatisfied with this decision, 789Ten Pty Ltd applied for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, arguing that the primary judge had erred in their assessment of the privilege claims. The Court of Appeal subsequently granted leave to appeal, directing the respondent to file its notice of appeal within a specified period. The appeal was subsequently dismissed by the Court of Appeal, which upheld the primary judge's findings on the privilege issue. In light of the dismissal, the Court ordered that the claimant pay the respondent's costs associated with both the application for leave to appeal and the appeal itself.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the letter from the client to the solicitors is protected by legal professional privilege.
2. Whether the letter from the solicitors to the client's auditors is protected by legal professional privilege.
3. Whether the legal advice privilege applies to the letters, considering if they were prepared for the dominant purpose of providing legal advice to the client.
4. Whether the auditors can be considered agents of the client for the purpose of receiving legal advice.
5. Whether the litigation privilege applies to the letters, considering if they were prepared for the dominant purpose of providing professional legal services to the client.
6. Whether sections 118 and 119 of the Evidence Act 1995 apply to determine the privilege status of the letters.
Held
1. The court concluded that the letter from the client to the solicitors was not protected by legal professional privilege.
2. The court concluded that the letter from the solicitors to the client's auditors was protected by legal professional privilege.
3. The court concluded that the legal advice privilege did not apply to the letters as they were not prepared for the dominant purpose of providing legal advice to the client.
4. The court concluded that the auditors could not be considered agents of the client for the purpose of receiving legal advice.
5. The court concluded that the litigation privilege applied to the letters as they were prepared for the dominant purpose of providing professional legal services to the client.
6. The court concluded that sections 118 and 119 of the Evidence Act 1995 did not apply to determine the privilege status of the letters.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the case of Westpac Banking Corporation v 789Ten Pty Ltd, the court addressed the issue of whether two sets of letters were protected by legal professional privilege. The first set of letters was from the client to their solicitors, and the second set was from the solicitors to the client's auditors. The court began by considering the nature of legal professional privilege, which protects confidential communications between a client and their legal adviser for the dominant purpose of seeking or providing legal advice.
The court then turned to the specific letters from the client to the solicitors. It was determined that these letters were indeed protected by legal professional privilege. The court reasoned that the communications were between the client and their legal advisers, and the primary purpose of these communications was to seek legal advice on matters pertinent to the client's legal issues. The court relied on established authorities such as *Esanda Finance Corporation v Peat Marwick Hungerfords* to reinforce the principle that communications made for the dominant purpose of seeking legal advice are privileged. The court did not find it necessary to distinguish or depart from prior authority on this point.
Next, the court examined the letters from the solicitors to the client's auditors. The primary issue here was whether these letters were protected by legal professional privilege. The court held that these letters were also protected, reasoning that the dominant purpose of the communications was to provide legal advice to the client, even if the auditors were the recipients. This was consistent with the legal advice privilege, which extends protection to communications made for the dominant purpose of providing legal advice, regardless of the identity of the recipient. The court again relied on precedent, such as *Esanda*, to support its reasoning.
The court also considered whether the legal advice privilege applied to the letters, specifically focusing on whether they were prepared for the dominant purpose of providing legal advice to the client. The reasoning here was that the preparation and content of the letters clearly indicated a purpose to provide legal advice, thereby satisfying the criteria for legal advice privilege. The court's analysis aligned with the principles established in *Esanda*, affirming that the dominant purpose test was met in this case.
Furthermore, the court examined whether the auditors could be considered agents of the client for the purpose of receiving legal advice. The court concluded that the auditors were not agents of the client in this context. The primary function of the letters was to provide legal advice to the client, and the auditors' role as recipients did not alter the privileged nature of the communications. The court's reasoning was consistent with the broader understanding that legal advice privilege is not negated merely because the advice is indirectly communicated to a third party.
The court also evaluated whether the litigation privilege applied to the letters, considering if they were prepared for the dominant purpose of providing professional legal services to the client. The court found that the litigation privilege was not applicable, as the dominant purpose of the letters was not to advance the client's litigation strategy but rather to provide general legal advice. This distinction was crucial, as the litigation privilege applies specifically to communications made for the dominant purpose of litigation, as outlined in cases like *News Limited v South Australian Cricket Association*.
Finally, the court addressed sections 118 and 119 of the Evidence Act 1995, which govern the application of legal professional privilege. The court applied these sections to determine the privilege status of the letters. Section 118 of the Act provides that legal professional privilege applies to confidential communications made for the dominant purpose of seeking or providing legal advice. Section 119 further specifies that privilege applies even if the communication is made to a third party, as long as the dominant purpose remains the provision of legal advice. The court's application of these statutory provisions was consistent with their interpretation of the legal advice privilege.
The ratio decidendi of this decision is that communications between a client and their legal advisers, made for the dominant purpose of seeking or providing legal advice, are protected by legal professional privilege, even if the communications are indirectly addressed to third parties such as auditors. This protection extends to both sets of letters in question, as they were prepared for the dominant purpose of providing legal advice to the client. The court's adherence to established legal principles and statutory provisions underscores the binding nature of this legal principle in Australian law.