Weston and Inspector-General in Bankruptcy [2022] AATA 1135 (12 May 2022)
Division:TAXATION AND COMMERCIAL DIVISION
File Number(s): 2021/0705
Re:Paul Weston
APPLICANT
AndInspector-General in Bankruptcy
RESPONDENT
AndSalim Mehajer
OTHER PARTY
DECISION
Tribunal:Mrs J C Kelly, Senior Member
Date:12 May 2022
Place:Sydney
The Other Party’s application to reopen this matter is refused.
............................................................[sgd]…………….........
Mrs J C Kelly, Senior Member
CATCHWORDS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Request to reopen the hearing – Substantive matter in relation to an objection to discharge from bankruptcy – Public interest in finality of review applications – Four classes of cases recognised by the courts – Application to reopen the hearing refused
LEGISLATION
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 33
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 139ZG, 149D, 149N
CASES
Ashton Coal Operations Pty Ltd v Director-General, Dept of Environment, Climate Change and Water (No 2) [2011] NSWLEC 116
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich [2006] NSWSC 826
Citigold Corporation Ltd v Chief Executive, Department of Environment, & Heritage Protection (No 3) [2016] QLC 21
EB v CT (No. 2) [2008] QSC 306
Inspector-General in Bankruptcy v Bradshaw [2006] FAA 22
Re Confidential and Commissioner of Taxation [2013] AATA 382
Teoh v Hunters Hill Council & Anor (No 3) [2009] NSWLEC 121
SECONDARY MATERIALS
Law Handbook: Your Practical Guide to the Law in New South Wales, Redfern Legal Centre Publishing. Redfern, NSW, 2019 (15th Edition).
REASONS FOR DECISION
Mrs J C Kelly, Senior Member
12 May 2022
Introduction
The substantive proceedings were heard on 24 November 2021 and the decision reserved. In a letter dated 9 December 2021, Mr Salim Mehajer (the Other Party who is the bankrupt) wrote to the Tribunal requesting that the hearing be reopened “in the interest of justice and to save from any future application to appeal”. This is the decision in respect of that application. He was unrepresented during both the substantive proceedings and this application.
The nature of the substantive proceedings
The substantive proceedings were brought by the Applicant, the trustee in bankruptcy, who lodged an objection to discharge from bankruptcy on 11 November 2020 (Objection) under the grounds specified in paragraphs 149D(1)(f) and 149D(1)(d) of the BankruptcyAct 1966 (Cth) (the Act).
The ground in paragraph 149D(1)(f) is that the bankrupt failed to pay to the trustee an amount that the bankrupt was liable to pay under s 139ZG of the Act. The ground in paragraph 149D(1)(d) was that the bankrupt, when requested in writing by the trustee to provide written information about the bankrupt’s property, income or expected income, failed to comply with the request.
On 13 November 2020, the Other Party applied to the Respondent, the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy, requesting a review of the Applicant’s decision to lodge the Objection on all grounds.[1] On 12 January 2021, a delegate of the Respondent decided to confirm the ground of objection contained in paragraph 149D(1)(f) (the confirmed ground) and to cancel the ground of objection in paragraph 149D(1)(d)…
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- Case
- [2022] AATA 1135
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Senior Member were whether the Respondent's change of position at the substantive hearing constituted a sufficient ground to reopen the proceedings, and whether the Other Party's alleged belief that the Respondent would maintain its original stance justified such reopening. The Other Party also contended that a diagnosis of Bipolar II disorder might have impaired his judgment, potentially accounting for his belief that his payable income assessment could be reviewed.
The Senior Member considered the public interest in the finality of review applications and recognised four classes of cases where a hearing might be reopened. The Respondent argued that its duty as a decision-maker was to assist the Tribunal in reaching the correct or preferable decision, rather than to defend its initial decision. The Senior Member acknowledged that the Respondent had indeed taken a different position at the substantive hearing, indicating that it may not have had reasons for cancelling the paragraph 149D(1)(d) ground. However, the Senior Member found that this change of position, and the Other Party's subsequent belief about the need to present submissions on reasonable excuse, did not establish a ground for reopening the hearing. The psychiatric diagnosis was also not found to be a basis for reopening.
The application by the Other Party to reopen the hearing was refused.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Secondly, the Other Party claimed that his diagnosis of Bipolar II disorder by Dr Henderson, psychiatrist[7] shows there is a reasonable possibility that the Other Party’s judgment was significantly impaired such that there is a reasonable possibility that the condition accounts for his belief that he could have his payable income assessment reviewed. Consideration[7] Report of Dr Anthony Henderson (Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist) dated 9 September 2020. Exhibit OP2. First ground – the Respondent’s change of position at the hearing The following is the background to the Other Party’s first ground for seeking reopening of the case. The reviewable decision provided detailed consideration and reasons for cancelling the paragraph 149D(1)(d) ground and confirming the paragraph 149D(1)(f) ground. The Respondent’s Statement of Facts Issues and Contentions (SoFIC) in the substantive proceedings was dated 5 July 2021. It includes the Other Party as a party the proceedings. It set out a detailed argument, including reference to authorities, supporting its confirmation of the paragraph 149D(1)(f) ground and cancellation of the paragraph 149D(1)(d) ground. The cancelled ground was the only ground that was in dispute between the Respondent and Applicant in the substantive proceedings. The Applicant set out in detail in its SoFIC dated 19 July 2021 why the Respondent’s decision to cancel the ground should be set aside. In the substantive proceedings, the Other Party provided The Other Party’s Outline of Contentions[8] (Outline) which explicitly stated that the Tribunal had to review both grounds of objection and addressed each in detail. He concluded that he sought to have the cancelled ground remain unchanged and the confirmed ground cancelled. [8] Filed under cover of a letter dated 9 August 2021. In relation to the application to reopen, the Respondent accepted that it took a different position from that set out in its SoFIC during the hearing of the substantive matter on 24 November 2021. It argued that its task as the decision-maker is not to adjudicate whether it was able to defend the decision but to assist the Tribunal to reach the correct or preferable decision. It referred to subsection 33(1AA) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) and various authorities to that effect. The “different position” taken by the Respondent at the substantive hearing was this. Mr Hutchins, who appeared for the Respondent, stated near the beginning of the hearing that in accordance with the Respondent’s duty, having a better understanding of the issue in respect of the cancelled ground, and certain material having come to light, it may not have had reasons for cancelling that ground. I do not criticise the Respondent for taking the position it did at the substantive hearing. However, the question is whether its change of position requires the hearing to be reopened. The Other Party claimed that because he had believed that the Respondent would maintain its argument that the cancelled ground should remain cancelled, the Other Party did not put forward any submissions and cases to establish a “reasonable excuse” in accordance with the Act. Thereafter, in his request to reopen, the Other Party quoted at length from the reasons for cancelling the paragraph 149D(1)(d) ground set out in the reviewable decision, including the reasons for finding that he had a reasonable excuse and various authorities supporting that position.