WESTLAKE & WESTLAKE
[2020] FamCAFC 26
•4 February 2020
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| WESTLAKE & WESTLAKE | [2020] FamCAFC 26 |
| FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – Where the father’s appeals are listed for consideration of dismissal pursuant to s 96AA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) – Where the father was ordered to file amended Notices of Appeal – Where the grounds of appeal do not demonstrate any appellable error by the primary judge and they have no reasonable chance of success – Appeals dismissed. FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – APPLICATIONS IN AN APPEAL – Where the father sought to adduce further evidence in the appeal – Where the further evidence relates first to court recordings of the father’s prior proceedings and videos and secondly to submissions made to a parliamentary enquiry – Where the applications do not meet the requirements for the receipt of further evidence – Applications dismissed. FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – COSTS – Where the mother sought costs against the father – Where the father has been wholly unsuccessful – Where the parties’ financial circumstances do not prevent a costs order being made – Where the father is to pay the mother’s costs in a fixed sum. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 96AA, 102QB, 117 |
| CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172; [1998] HCA 67 Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577; [2006] HCA 55 Dairy Farmers Co-operative Milk Co Ltd v Acquilina (1963) 109 CLR 458; [1963] HCA 59 Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63 Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488; [2000] HCA 48 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507; [2001] HCA 17 Rice and Asplund (1999) FLC 90-725 Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141; [1986] HCA 54 |
| APPELLANT: | Mr Westlake |
| RESPONDENT: | Ms Westlake |
| INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Legal Aid QLD |
| FILE NUMBER: | BRC | 6180 | of | 2012 |
| FIRST APPEAL NUMBER: | NOA | 76 | of | 2019 |
| SECOND APPEAL NUMBER: | NOA | 93 | of | 2019 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 4 February 2020 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Brisbane |
| PLACE HEARD: | Brisbane |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Strickland, Watts & Tree JJ |
| HEARING DATE: | 4 February 2020 |
| LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: | Family Court of Australia |
| LOWER COURT JUDGMENT DATE: | 16 August 2019; 18 September 2019 |
| LOWER COURT MNC: | [2019] FamCA 563; [2019] FamCA 670 |
REPRESENTATION
| THE APPELLANT: | In person |
| COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Ms Carmody |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Cherry Family Lawyers |
| COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Ms Lyons |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Legal Aid QLD |
Orders
The amended Notices of Appeal in appeal numbers NOA 76 of 2019 and NOA 93 of 2019 filed on 13 November 2019 be dismissed.
The Applications in an Appeal filed on 6 January 2020 and 24 January 2020 be dismissed.
The father pay the costs of the mother fixed in the sum of $2,000.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Westlake & Westlake has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).
| THE FULL COURT OF THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
Appeal Number: NOA 76 of 2019; NOA 93 of 2019
File Number: BRC 6180 of 2012
| Mr Westlake |
Appellant
And
| Ms Westlake |
Respondent
And
Independent Children’s Lawyer
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Strickland J
Introduction
Mr Westlake (“the father”) appeals from final parenting orders and an order pursuant to s 102QB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) made by a Judge of the Family Court of Australia on 16 August 2019 and 18 September 2019, respectively.
Both appeal proceedings, namely appeal numbers NOA 76 of 2019 (“the parenting order appeal”) and NOA 93 of 2019 (“the vexatious order appeal”) have been listed before this Court today for consideration of their dismissal pursuant to s 96AA of the Act.
The final parenting orders provide for the discharge of a previous parenting order made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia in 2014 permitting the father to spend supervised time with the children, and substitute an order to the effect that the father not spend any time with the children, and the parties’ respective applications to vary the 2014 parenting orders be dismissed.
The s 102QB order prohibits the father from instituting proceedings against Ms Westlake (“the mother”) or her lawyers or the Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”) without first obtaining leave of the Court. Orders were also made dismissing the father’s application for a vexatious proceedings order against the mother and all outstanding applications.
The mother and the ICL oppose the appeals and contend that both appeals should be dismissed pursuant to s 96AA of the Act. The mother submitted that she is in full agreement with the submissions of the ICL in that regard.
What are also listed today are the father’s Applications in an Appeal to adduce further evidence which were filed on 6 January 2020 and on 24 January 2020 respectively. I will return to these Applications in due course.
Background
By way of background, a Judge of the Federal Circuit Court made final parenting orders on 20 February 2014 following a nine day trial concerning the parties’ two children, X born in 2009 and Y born in 2011 (“the children”). Those parenting orders provided for the children to live with the mother, for the children to spend supervised time with the father at a contact centre and for the mother to have sole parental responsibility for the children. The basis for those orders was the Federal Circuit Court judge’s finding that the father posed an unacceptable risk of emotional harm to the children by reason of his persecutory beliefs regarding the mother.
The Federal Circuit Court judge concluded that the children needed to be “protected from the father’s persistent beliefs about the mother” (at [237] of the Reasons for Judgment of 20 February 2014) and that the father is “intent on proving allegations against the mother, and puts this need above the needs of the children” (at [269] of the Reasons of 20 February 2014). Notably, the Federal Circuit Court judge found that if the father was to undergo psychiatric assessment and treatment as recommended by the single expert, “he should be able to establish a significant change in circumstances to permit him to bring an application for unsupervised time” in the future (at [298] of the Reasons of 20 February 2014). As a result, paragraph 13 of the orders made on 20 February 2014 provided that:
13.If the father obtains an effective course of psychiatric treatment as recommended by Dr C for a period of 12 months and provides a report to the mother that his persecutory beliefs about her have ameliorated, the parties participate in Family Dispute Resolution to review the children’s supervised time with the father.
Not long after the 2014 parenting orders were made, the children ceased spending time with their father due to the contact centre withdrawing its services because of the non-payment of fees. Attempts to obtain an alternative contact centre also failed. Thus, the children have not spent time with the father since March 2014.
The primary judge was faced with each parties’ competing proposals to vary the 2014 parenting orders, and required the application of the rule in Rice and Asplund (1999) FLC 90-725 (“Rice and Asplund”), namely whether there were changed circumstances sufficient to warrant reconsideration of the earlier order. The father’s application was for the children to be progressively returned to his care, or alternatively, for the children to be immediately returned to his care, with the mother to spend supervised time with the children. The mother’s proposal was to vary the 20 February 2014 order so that the children would not spend any time or communicate with the father.
After considering the parties’ submissions, the primary judge found that there had been no abatement of the father’s beliefs and notably, “[h]is beliefs about the mother have become even more extreme” (at [43]).
Two reports were completed during the proceedings, namely a report by Dr E dated 6 June 2017 and a report by Dr F dated 26 March 2019. The first report was the product of the father’s psychological treatment with Dr E, with the father attending 33 sessions during the period from 14 April 2014 to 30 May 2017. Dr E opined that the father did “demonstrate specific moderation to his previous maladaptive coping and prior almost exclusive focus on a legal remedy to his sense of injustice regarding the outcomes of past Family Court proceedings” (Affidavit of Dr E filed 3 October 2017, page 24).
The second report was a psychiatric assessment of the father ordered on 11 October 2018 in relation to whether a case guardian should be appointed for the father. Whilst Dr F did not assess the father as suffering from a disability which warranted the appointment of a case guardian, he did opine that the father “remains extremely aggrieved and embittered about the legal process which he still perceives as profoundly unjust” and that the father “presents with a personality with obsessional and narcissistic traits which are very well developed which do not equate to being a mental illness which can be treated” (Affidavit of Dr F filed 5 April 2019, pages 38-39).
The primary judge held that nothing in either report nor in the evidence relied upon by the father persuaded her Honour that the father’s persecutory beliefs about the mother had diminished, and quite to the contrary, her Honour found they had in fact intensified. Her Honour therefore was not satisfied that there had been a sufficient change in circumstances or a non-disclosure of sufficient gravity to justify a reversal of the living arrangements for the children (at [55]).
Her Honour then turned to deal with the mother’s application for the father to spend no time or communicate with the children. Relying on the evidence that the children had not seen their father for almost five and half years, the contact centre difficulties and the father’s persistent beliefs about the mother, her Honour made an order to discharge paragraphs 4 and 5 of the 2014 parenting order and substituted those paragraphs with a provision that the father not spend time with the children. Her Honour reasoned that this would minimise the prospect of further proceedings.
Following the decision delivered on 16 August 2019, the same Family Court judge proceeded to hear the parties’ competing applications for a vexatious proceedings order against each other. Her Honour also heard the father’s application to dismiss the ICL. In her reasons for judgment, the primary judge outlined the numerous proceedings the father has instituted in the Family Court and other courts over the course of seven years, and the several complaints he has made about the ICL and other legal practitioners involved in his matters. The primary judge found that all of the 13 proceedings instituted by the father were vexatious. Notably, the primary judge concluded in determining whether to make a vexatious proceedings order that the father “has demonstrated a refusal ‘to understand the principles of finality of litigation’. He has no insight. The father’s rather bizarre polemics do nothing to persuade me that he will cease his propensity to institute vexatious proceedings without intervention” (at [70] of the Reasons for Judgment of Carew J of 18 September 2019). Further, her Honour found that the father did not address any basis upon which a vexatious proceedings order could be made against the mother.
Accordingly, the primary judge made a vexatious proceedings order against the father, and dismissed the father’s application to remove the ICL and his application against the mother.
As stated earlier, the father appeals from both the decisions of her Honour. At the first procedural hearing of these appeals, orders were made to file amended Notices of Appeal which properly identified specific error(s) of law or principle made by the primary judge. After the amended Notices of Appeal were filed, an order made in chambers on 11 December 2019 provided for the father to show cause as to why the appeals should not be dismissed pursuant to s 96AA, and all parties were ordered to file submissions in relation to this issue.
Applications in an Appeal
The father has filed two Applications in an Appeal to adduce further evidence; one on 6 January 2020 and one only recently on 24 January 2020, albeit the latter application was only listed for mention today. Both of the applications can be dealt with today.
The Application in an Appeal filed on 6 January 2020 seeks orders granting the father leave to acquire unedited audio recordings of all previous parenting and divorce proceedings from July 2012 to the present date, and for the Court to allow these recordings into evidence in the appeal hearing. The application also seeks for two videos to be played to the Full Court at the appeal hearing.
In the affidavit supporting the application, the father refers to various proceedings and judicial officers who have presided over the parties’ proceedings, and claims that the audio recordings show how the “various courts have acted to overthrow the constitution of [A]ustralia and instead create a parallel jurisdiction based on feminist ideologies, I refer to it as feministastan. As it closely mimics the behaviour of [I]slamic state, isis and other terrorist ideologies” (Affidavit of the father filed 6 January 2020, page 2).
The father claims that the videos he seeks to show to the Full Court are a “sensible shortcut to introduce the public’s perception of the court in [less than] 30 minutes” (Affidavit of the father filed 6 January 2020, page 3).
The second Application in an Appeal seeks to “introduce” the submissions made by both the Family Law Practitioners Association and the ‘RANZCP’ (allegedly a professional body representing psychologists and psychiatrists) to the parliamentary enquiry into the family law system. The father says that those submissions outline the “foreign political ideology that Justice Carew applied in reaching her judgment” and the “lasting intergenerational harm caused by [the] Judiciary and the ICL and others” (Affidavit of the father filed 24 January 2020, paragraphs 1 and 2).
As will be explored later in these reasons, none of the father’s grounds of appeal hold any merit, and the further evidence he seeks to admit does not demonstrate error by the primary judge and would not have had any effect on the decision.
The circumstances in which this court can receive evidence on an appeal are constrained. In CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172 (“CDJ v VAJ”) McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ observed (at [109]) that the exercise of the power is remedial in nature, to give the Full Court discretion to receive further evidence where “that evidence, if accepted, would demonstrate that the order under appeal is erroneous”.
After considering the nature of the jurisdiction of the Full Court to hear appeals, their Honours said:
111.…Nor can the availability of further evidence relevant to the issues in the appeal be treated as equivalent to a ground of appeal, proof of which prima facie entitles the appellant to a new trial. The power to admit the further evidence exists to serve the demands of justice. Ordinarily, where it is alleged that the admission of new evidence requires a new trial, justice will not be served unless the Full Court is satisfied that the further evidence would have produced a different result if it had been available at the trial. Without that condition being satisfied, it could seldom, if ever, be in the interests of justice to deprive the respondent of the benefit of the orders made by the trial judge and put that person to the expense, inconvenience and worry of a new trial.
It is not evident that the audio recordings, the videos or the submissions are at all relevant, and nor can it be said that their availability at the trial would have produced a different outcome. I propose to therefore dismiss both of the father’s Applications in an Appeal.
Dismissal
Pursuant to s 96AA of the Act, the Court may dismiss an appeal if it has no reasonable prospect of success. Section 96AA specifically provides:
96AA Appeal may be dismissed if no reasonable prospect of success
(1) If:
(a) an appeal has been instituted in a court under this Part; and
(b) having regard to the grounds of appeal as disclosed in the notice of appeal, it appears to the court that the appeal has no reasonable prospect of success (whether generally or in relation to a particular ground of appeal);
the court may, at any time, order that the proceedings on the appeal be dismissed (either generally or in relation to that ground).
Paragraph 96AA(1)(a) has been satisfied as the father has filed his appeals in this Court. In order to determine whether the appeals have any reasonable prospect of success under s 96AA(1)(b), the merits of the grounds of appeal must be addressed.
The Appeals
The father’s amended Notices of Appeal in both appeals are identical and consist of the same 10 grounds. Accordingly, they can be dealt with together and they are as follows:
1.The orders as made by Justice Carew continue to facilitate slavery and/or the slave trade as defined in criminal code Act 1995 – division 270. The orders are contrary to the children’s best interests as defined in section 60 of the family law act.
2.The orders as made by Justice Carew are reckless and/or irresponsible. The orders function contrary to section 60 and 43 of the family law act, through application of a domestic violence model that overthrows the intention of parliament in enacting the sex discrimination act (cth) 1984.
3.The orders function to placate a vindictive mother and facilitate the lawyers involved escaping disciplinary action for serious and substantial misconduct. Section 60 of the Family Law act is defeated.
4.Paragraphs 16, 33 of Judge Baker’s reasoning Fails to comprehend the profound effects of stolen generation practices on the Children, The Father’s Children from a new relationship and the Father in this proceeding and the previous proceeding in 2014.
5.In clear violation of the intent of the family law act, especially section 60. Justice Carew failed to consider one simple proposition, The Father was not mentally ill. Rather that he was retraumatised/harmed by the court process. Her Honour knowingly excluded the testimony of Dr F as the questions the Father intended to ask him. Place the psychological harm and/or trauma caused by previous proceedings in front of the court.
6.Justice Carew acted in a tyrannical and oppressive manner to hide the serious and substantial misconduct of the solicitors involved.
7.Real or percieved (sic) bias of judicial officer.
The changed dynamic of domestic violence resulting from the Father not suffering mental illness has to date been systematically ignored by the Justice Catherine Carew due to the perpetrators sex. In direct violation of the sex discrimination act(cth).
8.Justice Catherine Carew failed to consider the differing needs of the child X from the child Y.
9.The orders as made function to defeat parliamentary intent of the contempt section of the family law act.
10.The orders as made have a propensity to excite in the minds of the general public. A belief that Justice Carew’s previous employment in the family law practitioners association, quasi union type thing. May have interfered with proceedings facilitating Mr Settgast and Mr Blayney to escape responsibility for their actions. Promoting a general dissatisfaction with all judicial determinations amongst the general public.
(As per original)
Although these grounds of appeal are difficult to follow and tend to overlap each other, they appear to argue three main propositions, namely:
a)Her Honour showed actual or apprehended bias;
b)Her Honour denied the father procedural fairness; and
c)Her Honour erred in failing to distinguish between the differing needs of X and Y, and therefore denied X a meaningful relationship with the father due to an allegation of Y having a “mental illness”.
Actual or Apprehended Bias
The grounds as to bias should and will be dealt with first (Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577 at [117]). As will be explored shortly, the father has failed to demonstrate actual or apprehended bias by the primary judge.
The High Court in Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 (per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ) settled the appropriate test to be applied in the case of asserted apprehended bias. Their Honours stated the inquiry at [11] as:
…whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide.
The inquiry requires two steps: (1) the identification of what it is said might lead the judge to decide a case other than on its legal and factual matters and (2) there must be an articulation of the logical connection between that matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits (Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337).
As to a complaint of actual bias, the appellant must demonstrate that the primary judge’s mind is “so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration, whatever evidence or arguments may be presented” (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 at [72])(“MIMA v Jia Legeng”). It requires the appellant to establish the “subjective motives, attitudes, predilections or purposes of the decision-maker” (MIMA v Jia Legeng).
The father makes allegations that the Family Court system promotes “slave trade” and is influenced by feministic biases. He states in his grounds of appeal that her Honour wrongly found that the father was suffering from a mental illness and that he perpetrated domestic violence against the mother, and that these findings stem from a feminist bias in the application of family law. His main contention seems to be that the primary judge has decided both matters in a way which covers up the deficiencies in the conduct of the family law practitioners, judicial officers involved in the case and the family law system itself. The father’s assertions are pure speculation and he does not advance any evidence for those assertions.
It is evident that the father is still fixated on the outcome of the parenting proceedings and his allegations of bias are merely an attempt to continue to assert his persecutory beliefs about the mother and the family law system.
As such the father has failed to satisfy the tests to establish actual or apprehended bias on the part of the primary judge and these grounds of appeal have no merit.
Procedural Fairness
Again, although difficult to discern, it seems that the complaints of procedural unfairness go to the primary judge not allowing certain evidence to be admitted during the hearings.
In relation to excluding certain evidence, the appellant needs to demonstrate that the evidence which was allegedly wrongly excluded would have had a material impact on the trial judgment (Dairy Farmers Co-operative Milk Co Ltd v Acquilina (1963) 109 CLR 458 at 463). Even then, a failure of procedural fairness will not automatically result in the appeal being allowed, and a new trial will not be ordered if it can be demonstrated that the primary judge’s decision was inevitable despite the procedural irregularity (Stead v State Government Insurance Commission (1986) 161 CLR 141).
One of the father’s complaints was the primary judge’s refusal to allow him to rely on certain documents contained in two volumes of documents, in the parenting orders hearing on 13 August 2019. The father nonetheless made submissions to her Honour in relation to only a few of those documents which included reference to a code of ethics for psychologists, a ‘female aggression wheel’ diagram, and certain emails from 2012 referring to a blue card which the father suggested demonstrated that the mother’s evidence at trial that she was not employed was incorrect.
It is not apparent how the admission of these documents would have altered either of the primary judge’s decisions in any way.
Another complaint was the primary judge’s refusal to allow the father to rely on an audio recording of the domestic violence proceedings between him and the mother in the Magistrates Court in 2017, in the parenting orders hearing on 13 August 2019. The father says that that recording was relevant for two reasons; first, a witness in those proceedings had committed perjury and she was a witness relied upon in the parenting trial, and secondly, the mother failed to rely upon certain recordings from the domestic violence hearing which she claimed she would do so in the parenting proceedings. Neither of those assertions demonstrate that the primary judge’s decision would have changed if the recording was admitted into evidence.
The last complaint goes to the primary judge’s refusal to allow the father to cross-examine Dr F, the court appointed psychiatrist, at the hearing. The primary judge gave the father the opportunity to reduce his questions for Dr F into writing and her Honour ultimately found that none of the questions were relevant to the issue she was tasked to determine, namely whether the threshold test in Rice and Asplund had been established. Her Honour recorded that, if anything, the questions the father intended to put to Dr F provided further evidence of his continued persecutory beliefs about the mother and his dissatisfaction with the final parenting orders made in 2014.
None of the father’s complaints demonstrate how it would have a material impact upon the primary judge’s decisions. Even if the evidence that was available was admitted, and even if the questions for Dr F had been asked and answered, the primary judge’s decisions would have still been inevitable and the father has not been able to show anything to the contrary.
Thus, the grounds of appeal which go to procedural unfairness lack merit.
Failing to take matters into account
A psychologist’s report dated 20 May 2015 was tendered, without objection, by the father during the first hearing. That report suggested that the child, Y, “falls within the Autistic Spectrum range, with a moderate level of autistic spectrum related symptoms demonstrated” (at [38]). The primary judge noted in her reasons that the father took issue with the report’s diagnosis of Y. In relation to this, the father submitted to the primary judge that “[t]he [m]other has knowingly mislead (sic) the court regarding diagnosis of the child Y with Autism…” (at [42(14)]).
As the ICL rightly submits, nothing turned on this evidence and her Honour did not rely on this evidence or the related submissions by the father in determining the father’s failure to demonstrate a change in circumstances, or in finding that the father instituted many vexatious proceedings.
Evidently, this ground of appeal lacks merit.
Conclusion
As demonstrated, none of the father’s grounds of appeal show any appellable error on the part of the primary judge and the father has failed to demonstrate why both of his appeals should not be dismissed. Having regard to the grounds of appeal, it is clear that both of the father’s appeals have no reasonable prospect of success and therefore, the father’s two amended Notices of Appeal filed on 13 November 2019 will be dismissed pursuant to s 96AA of the Act.
Costs
In the event that the appeals and the Applications in an Appeal were dismissed, the mother sought an order for costs. The amount sought on a party/party basis is $4,111.90, being the amount of the Legal Aid grant, or $515, being the contribution by the mother to Legal Aid.
The father opposed the application, citing his financial circumstances. He indicated that his annual income is approximately $36,000, he resides in his motorhome, and his major expenses are the running of his motor vehicle and the payment of child support.
The mother’s financial circumstances are that she works as a cleaner and earns approximately $35,000 per year. Her major expenses all relate to the living costs of herself and the children.
The question of costs is governed by s 117 of the Act. Subsection 117(1) provides that each party is to bear their own costs, but ss 117(2) provides that where there are circumstances that justify an order for costs, an order for costs can be made, and the factors to be addressed in considering any application for an order for costs are those set out in s117(2A).
Here the father has been wholly unsuccessful and this is a sufficient circumstance to justify an order for costs.
We are obliged to take into account the respective financial circumstances of the parties and in that regard I am not persuaded that their financial circumstances, and particularly those of the father, prevent an order for costs being made. Thus, I propose to order that the father pay the costs of the mother fixed in the sum of $2,000.
Watts J
I agree with the reasons given by the presiding judge and I agree with the orders the presiding judge proposes in respect of the Notices of Appeal, the Applications in an Appeal and the order as to costs.
Tree J
I also agree with the orders proposed by Strickland J for the reasons he has given.
Strickland J
The orders of the Court will be:
(1)The amended Notices of Appeal in appeal numbers NOA 76 of 2019 and NOA 93 of 2019 filed on 13 November 2019 be dismissed.
(2)The Applications in an Appeal filed on 6 January 2020 and 24 January 2020 be dismissed.
(3)The father pay the costs of the mother fixed in the sum of $2,000.
I certify that the preceding fifty-nine (59) paragraphs are a true copy of the ex-tempore reasons for judgment of the Honourable Full Court (Strickland, Watts & Tree JJ) delivered on 4 February 2020.
Associate:
Date: 4 February 2020
0
10
1