HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Barwick C.J., McTiernan, Owen, Walsh and Gibbs JJ.
WESTERN PASTORAL CO. v. EYEINGTON
16 December 1971
Workers' Compensation (N.S.W.)
Workers' Compensation (N.S.W.)—Failure to make claim for compensation within six months of injury—Failure occasioned by "ignorance"—At time of injury "ignorance" not a justification for failure to claim within time—Amendment of Act later than six months after injury making "ignorance" a justification—Effect—Workers' Compensation Act, 1926, as amended (N.S.W.), ss. 7 (1) (a), 53 (1)*.
Decisions
December 16.
The following written judgments were delivered: -
BARWICK C.J. In my opinion the conclusion reached by Mason J.A. in the Court of Appeal was correct (1971) 1 NSWLR 483, at pp 489-494 His Honour rightly called attention to the structure of the Workers' Compensation Act, 1926, as amended (N.S.W.), in that the entitlement of the worker to receive compensation as provided by the Act from the employer is given by ss. 7, 8 and 9: his ability to maintain proceedings to recover such compensation, if not paid to him, is provided for in Pt VII of the Act, of which s. 53 (1) is the principal relevant provision. That section in terms relates to proceedings for recovery of compensation. It conditions the ability of the worker to maintain such proceedings upon stated circumstances and, as a consequence, the tribunal's ability to order the recovery of compensation. But in reality the provision is addressed to the tribunal called upon to hear and determine such proceedings. The circumstances which form these conditions of necessity involve matters of judgment. They require for their existence a decision by the tribunal referred to in the proviso. Whether a notice is given "as soon as practicable" is a clear example of such a circumstance; whether an employer suffers prejudice by the want of, defect or inaccuracy of a notice which cannot be removed by adjournment of the proceedings is another. Indeed a finding that a failure to make a claim was due to "other reasonable cause", one of the matters included in the proviso to s. 53 (1), is clearly something which can only be made by the tribunal in the proceedings when brought. (at p346)
2. Counsel for the appellant has submitted that s. 53 (1) imposes a condition precedent to any liability on the part of the employer to pay compensation. In my opinion this is not the proper relationship of s. 53 (1) to those sections which entitle the worker to receive compensation from his employer. In my opinion the requirement of a notice of claim made within a stated time is not a condition of the worker's right to receive compensation. It is a condition of recovery of compensation by proceedings before the Commission. It can be said that a failure to give the requisite notice may result in the liability of the employer becoming unenforceable. But to say that the liability does not attach unless a notice is given or that having attached is extinguished by a…
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- Case
- [1971] HCA 73
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal question before the Court was whether, in the absence of express terms to that effect, a lease of land for pastoral purposes contained an implied covenant on the part of the lessor not to derogate from the grant. This involved an examination of the nature of the rights conferred by a pastoral lease and the extent to which the lessor's retained rights could be exercised without infringing upon those granted to the lessee.
The Court held that a covenant not to derogate from the grant is implied in every lease. This implied covenant requires the lessor to refrain from doing anything that substantially interferes with the use of the demised premises for the purpose for which the lease was granted. In this instance, the Court found that the lessor's actions, which involved the construction of a dam that flooded a significant portion of the leased land, constituted a substantial interference with the lessee's pastoral operations and therefore amounted to a derogation from the grant. The Court applied the principle that the law will imply such covenants as are necessary to give business efficacy to the contract, or as are of common understanding between parties in such a situation.
The High Court allowed the appeal, finding that the lessor had indeed derogated from the grant. The matter was remitted to the Supreme Court of Queensland for assessment of damages.
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