JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: WESTERMAN -v- EDWARDS [2020] WASC 60
CORAM: LE MIERE J
HEARD: 20 JANUARY 2020
DELIVERED : 4 MARCH 2020
FILE NO/S: CIV 2183 of 2019
BETWEEN: SHARON WESTERMAN
Plaintiff
AND
JOHN EDWARDS
First Defendant
KRED LEGAL PTY LTD
Second Defendant
WAYNE BERGMAN
Third Defendant
TONY TAYLOR
Fourth Defendant
WILLIE JUMBO
Fifth Defendant
DORIS EATON
Sixth Defendant
ALICE MITCHELL
Seventh Defendant
KEVIN ALLENEighth Defendant
ELSIE JEAN WALKER
Ninth Defendant
Catchwords:
Application for action against one defendant be dismissed - Not incapable of proof - Action continuing against other defendants - Evidence may give rise to inferences inconsistent with dismissal - No substantial narrowing of issues or saving of resources
Strike out application - Generality - Capable of greater refinement - Fails to represent final distillation - Weasel words - Improper - Likely to prejudice, embarrass or delay a fair trial
Legislation:
Charitable Trusts Act 1962 (WA)
Result:
Paragraphs 12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 12.5, 12.7, 12.8 and 12.12 of the amended statement of claim be struck out
The application otherwise be dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Plaintiff | : | Mr S K Shepherd |
| First Defendant | : | Mr S R Ringrose |
| Second Defendant | : | Mr S R Ringrose |
| Third Defendant | : | Mr M G Lundberg |
| Fourth Defendant | : | Mr M G Lundberg |
| Fifth Defendant | : | Mr M G Lundberg |
| Sixth Defendant | : | Mr M G Lundberg |
| Seventh Defendant | : | No appearance |
| Eighth Defendant | : | Mr M G Lundberg |
| Ninth Defendant | : | Mr M G Lundberg |
Solicitors:
| Plaintiff | : | Chris Stokes & Associates |
| First Defendant | : | Jackson McDonald |
| Second Defendant | : | Jackson McDonald |
| Third Defendant | : | Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan Llp |
| Fourth Defendant | : | Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan Llp |
| Fifth Defendant | : | Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan Llp |
| Sixth Defendant | : | Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan Llp |
| Seventh Defendant | : | No appearance |
| Eighth Defendant | : | Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan Llp |
| Ninth Defendant | : | Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan Llp |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Buckeridge v Walter [2010] WASCA 134
Drummoyne Municipal Council v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1990) 21 NSWLR 135
Favell v Queensland Newspapers Pty Ltd (2005) 79 ALJR 1716
Gascoine v McGinty (1995) 14 WAR 542
Hardie v Herald and Weekly Times Pty Ltd [2016] VSCA 103
Mirror Newspapers Ltd v Harrison (1982) 149 CLR 293
Monte v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1979] 2 NSWLR 663
Morris v Newcastle Newspapers Pty Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 260
Setka v Abbott (2014) 44 VR 342
Taylor v Jecks (1993) 10 WAR 309
LE MIERE J:
Summary
The plaintiff is a Njamal woman. The fourth to ninth defendants are Njamal people, each of whom is a named applicant for Njamal native title claims.
The second defendant, Arma Legal, is an incorporated legal practice. The first defendant is the practice manager of Arma Legal. The third defendant is a director of Arma Legal.
In May 2017 the Attorney General…
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- AGLC
- Westerman v Edwards [2020] WASC 60
- Case
- [2020] WASC 60
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the plaintiff's allegations were sufficiently precise to constitute a defamatory statement. The court referenced the principles set out in Drummoyne Municipal Council v Australian Broadcasting Corporation, which emphasise that the specificity required in a defamatory allegation is a matter of degree, depending on the context and nature of the defamatory matter. The court found that the allegations in this case, while broad, were not so vague as to be incapable of refinement. The court concluded that the plaintiff's allegations, although general, could be sufficiently refined to meet the necessary specificity required by law. The court dismissed the application to strike out the allegations, allowing the action to proceed against the defendants.
In summary, the court ruled that the plaintiff's allegations, though general, were not so vague as to be incapable of refinement. The court found that the plaintiff's claims could be made sufficiently specific to meet the requirements of defamation law. The court's decision allows the plaintiff to continue with the action against the defendants, rejecting the argument that the allegations were too vague to proceed. The court's ruling ensures that the plaintiff's right to pursue a defamation claim is not unduly hindered by the generality of the allegations.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The principles to be applied when determining whether an imputation is sufficiently precise and represents the final distillation of the alleged defamatory meaning were described by Gleeson CJ in Drummoyne Municipal Council v Australian Broadcasting Corporation.[5] In that case the primary judge had struck out three imputations in a statement of claim, which alleged 'corrupt' conduct or acts of the plaintiff council. The New South Wales Court of Appeal (by majority) upheld that decision. In doing so Gleeson CJ stated the principle as follows:The requirement that a plaintiff must 'specify' the act or condition which he claims was attributed to him, that is to say, the statement which he says was made about him, which follows from the scheme of the Defamation Act, the provisions of the Supreme Court Rules, and the ordinary rules of pleading, is one which, in its practical application, raises questions of degree. Almost any attribution of an act or condition to a person is capable of both further refinement and further generalisation. In any given case a judgment needs to be made as to the degree of particularity or generality which is appropriate to the occasion, and as to what constitutes the necessary specificity. If a problem arises, the solution will usually be found in considerations of practical justice rather than philology. …Furthermore, whilst the principles relevant to the plaintiff's obligation remain constant their practical application may depend upon the facts and circumstances of the given case, and the relevant circumstances may include the manner in which the defendant, or the author of the defamatory matter, has expressed the defamatory matter. Defamation may come in the form of snide insinuation or robust denunciation, or something in between those two extremes. The attribution to a person of an act or condition may be done with a high degree of particularity or it may take the form of the most generalised and non-specific abuse. It is a feature of certain forms of defamation that one can read or hear matter published concerning a person and be left with the powerful impression that the person is a scoundrel, but find it very difficult to discern exactly what it is that the person is said or suggested to have done wrong. The requirement upon a plaintiff cannot go beyond doing the best that can reasonably be done in the circumstances. If a defendant has posted in a public place a sign that simply says 'X is disgusting', the degree of specificity with which it is appropriate to require X to formulate the defamatory imputation will need to be related to the nature and content of the defamatory matter.[5] Drummoyne Municipal Council v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1990) 21 NSWLR 135. The defendants say that imputation 12.1 is pleaded at an impermissibly high level of generality because the publication makes high level and very general allegations about the conduct of the plaintiff towards the Njamal people. The defendants say that the precise act or condition asserted of or attributed to the plaintiff is unclear ‑ what does it mean to behave against, or contrary to, the interests and wishes of a group of people - leaving the defendants in a state of uncertainty as to the case to be met and the manner in which a plea of justification could be pleaded.