Westbrook and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs
[2013] AATA 247
•24 April 2013
[2013] AATA 247
Division
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION
File Number
2012/0666
Re
Warren Reginald Westbrook
APPLICANT
And
Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal Deputy President D G Jarvis
Date 24 April 2013 Place Adelaide The decision under review is remitted to the respondent for reconsideration pursuant to s 42D of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth).
.......... [Sgd] ..........
Deputy President D G Jarvis
CATCHWORDS
SOCIAL SECURITY - Age pension - assessment of ordinary income on a yearly basis - computation of underpayments - decision under review remitted for reconsideration.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - request for review of earlier Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) decision - finality of AAT decisions - jurisdiction - AAT cannot review conduct of Departmental officers - futility of application for review as to portion of disputed period - held that AAT could not dismiss application in part, but should decline to consider disputed period.
LEGISLATION
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), ss 33(1)(a), 42B
Social Security Act 1991 (Cth), ss 109(2), 1064-E1
Social Security (Administration) Act 1999, ss 43(1), (2) and (3)
CASES
Re Filsell and Comcare (2009) 109 ALD 198
Re Haldane-Stevenson v Director of Social Security (1985) 9 FCR 73
Re Matusko and Australian Postal Corporation (1995) 21 AAR 9
Re Michael and Secretary, Department of Employment, Science and Training (2006) 90 ALD 457
Re Rana and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (2008) 104 ALD 595
Re Westbrook and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2011] AATA 37
Re Williams and Australian Electoral Commission (1995) 38 ALD 366
Secretary, Department of Family and Communities Services v Rolley (2000) 175 ALR 4
Wang v Minister, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2006] FCA 898Wang v Minister, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2007] FCAFC 17
SECONDARY MATERIAL
Pearce DC, Administrative Appeals Tribunal (2nd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2007)
REASONS FOR DECISION
Deputy President D G Jarvis
24 April 2013
The applicant, Warren Reginald Westbrook, was in receipt of an age pension. As a result of obtaining information through a freedom of information request, he lodged with Centrelink a letter dated 10 February 2011 in which he said that Centrelink had calculated his age pension by overstating income amounts earned by his wife during the 13 week period commencing on 27 March 2009, with the result that his pension had been underpaid during that period.[1] In a later conversation with a Centrelink officer on 19 September 2011, he referred to earnings having been overstated during a slightly longer period, from 27 March to 30 June 2009.
[1] Exhibit R1, T5, page 48.
An authorised review officer (ARO) then reviewed the assessment of Mr Westbrook’s pension to determine whether he was paid the correct amount of age pension during this latter period. The decision made by the ARO may be summarised as follows.
(a)She decided that it was not appropriate to revisit Mr Westbrook’s entitlement to age pension for the fortnight from 27 March to 9 April 2009 inclusive, because that issue had been the subject of a previous application for review which culminated in a decision of this tribunal dated 28 January 2011. In that decision Senior Member Bean varied an earlier decision by Centrelink to raise and recover an overpayment of $470.89 (which had been calculated by reference to the total of the combined income that he and his wife had received during that fortnight) by reducing the amount of the overpayment to $210.65.[2]
(b)The ARO further decided, after taking into account Mrs Westbrook’s income for the period from 10 April to 4 June 2009, that Mr Westbrook had been underpaid age pension by $62.10 in total, and that accordingly that amount was payable to him.
(c)She also decided that in respect of the period from 5 June to 30 June 2009, she could not review Mr Westbrook’s pension entitlement because he had been notified of the amount of pension assessed during that period by letter dated 7 September 2009, and did not seek a review of his entitlement during that period within 13 weeks of receiving that notification.[3]
[2] Re Westbrook and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2011]
AATA 37.
[3] Exhibit R1, T9, pages 60-63.
Mr Westbrook subsequently applied to the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (SSAT) for a review of the ARO’s decision. The SSAT affirmed the decision made by the ARO. He then applied to this tribunal for review of the ARO’s decision.
The issues before the tribunal are, broadly, those identified by the ARO.
LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS
Section 43(1) of the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) (SS Act) provides for the circumstances in which a person is qualified for an age pension. Section 44(1) then provides in effect that an age pension is not payable to a person if the person’s age pension rate would be nil.
Section 55(a) of the SS Act provides relevantly that a person’s age pension is worked out by using the Rate Calculator A at the end of s 1064. Section 1064-A1 provides in effect that the rate of pension is a daily rate, and that the rate is worked out by dividing the annual rate calculated according to Rate Calculator A by 364, and that fortnightly rates are provided for information only. The section then includes a Method Statement. This provides in Step 1 for working out the person’s maximum basic rate using Module B, and subsequent Steps refer to possible additions to the maximum basic rate. Step 5 entails applying the “ordinary income test” using Module E to work out the income reduction. Step 9 involves working out the reduction for assets, but it is common ground that that Step is not relevant in the present proceedings.
Section 1064-E1 provides for how to work out the effect of a person’s “ordinary income” on the person’s maximum payment rate. Step 1 of the Method Statement is to “(w)ork out the amount of the person’s ordinary income on a yearly basis”. Subsequent Steps provide for further adjustments which are not relevant to a determination of the matters in issue in these proceedings. If a person is a member of a couple, the couple’s ordinary incomes (on a yearly basis) are added together, and the resulting total is divided by two to work out the amount of each person’s ordinary income for the purposes of Module E (s 1064-E2).
Under s 43(1) of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) (Administration Act), a social security periodic payment (which by a chain of definitions includes the age pension) is to be paid in arrears and by instalments relating to such periods (not exceeding 14 days) as the Secretary determines. Under s 43(2), instalments of a social security periodic payment are to be paid at such times as the Secretary determines. The Secretary has determined that the age pension was to be paid in arrears by instalments of 14 days, and that the instalment periods during the period under consideration commenced on 27 March 2009. Section 43(3) of the Administration Act provides for the method of calculating the periodic payment of social security payments. It provides as follows:
“43(3) Subject to subsection (4), the amount that is to be paid to a person as an instalment of a social security periodic payment in relation to a period is the total of the amounts of the social security periodic payment (calculated by reference to the daily rate of payment applicable to each day) payable to the person for days in that period on which the social security periodic payment was payable to the person.”
CONSIDERATION
For reasons which I will explain below, it is not appropriate to consider Mr Westbrook’s contentions that he was underpaid age pension in respect of the third period identified in the ARO’s decision. I will consider that period first, and then turn to the other two periods.
Third period - from 5 June to 30 June 2009
By a letter dated 7 September 2009, Centrelink notified Mr Westbrook of the age pension fortnightly rates payable to him from the pay period starting on 5 June 2009 until the pay period ending on 27 August 2009.[4] As mentioned above, the reviewable decision does not address the period from 5 to 30 June 2009, because the ARO concluded that she was unable to do so in view of Centrelink’s notification in its letter of 7 September 2009.
[4] Exhibit R1, T15, page 137.
The ARO based her conclusion on s 109(2) of the SS Act. This provides in effect that if a pensioner applies for review of a decision in relation to his or her social security payment more than 13 weeks after notice has been given of the decision and a favourable determination is made as a result of the application for review, the favourable determination takes effect on the day on which the application for review was made.
Mr Westbrook requested review of the pension assessment for the 13 week period commencing from 27 March 2009 in a letter dated 10 February 2011, and made a further oral request for a review during a telephone conversation with Centrelink on 19 September 2011. These requests were made more than 13 weeks after the letter from Centrelink dated 7 September 2009 notifying him of the rate at which his age pension had been assessed. Accordingly, by virtue of s 109(2) of the SS Act, even if I were to make a favourable determination in respect of the period now under consideration it could not take effect until the date when my determination was made. That would make any such favourable determination irrelevant, because no arrears could be payable to Mr Westbrook.
In these circumstances, the proceedings in this tribunal in respect of the period from 5 to 30 June 2009 are futile. I have considered whether, for that reason, that part of the application for review should be dismissed pursuant to s 42B of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act).[5] However, I do not think that on its proper construction s 42B applies to part of a proceeding. Where Parliament intended the Act to refer to a part of a proceeding, or a matter arising out of a proceeding, it has used express words to that effect, as appears in s 42C of the AAT Act. No such words are used in s 42B. I have accordingly concluded that there is no power to dismiss a part of a proceeding under s 42B. Further, it would not of course be appropriate to dismiss the entire application, because I do have jurisdiction to consider the period from 10 April to 4 June 2009, being a portion of the period covered by the application. I think in the circumstances the appropriate approach is that I should not investigate the applicant’s contentions in respect of the third period, namely 5 to 30 June 2009, by exercising the broad discretion conferred on the tribunal by s 33(1)(a) of the AAT Act. That section provides in effect that the procedure of the tribunal is within the discretion of the tribunal; it authorises the tribunal to adopt a flexible approach to the resolution of applications before it, thus facilitating the ability of the tribunal to provide a mechanism of review that is fair, just, economical, informal and quick, as required by s 2A of the AAT Act.[6]
[5] See Re Williams and Australian Electoral Commission (1995) 38 ALD 366, where the proceedings were dismissed because the applicant had ceased to have any interest in reviewing the decision in question in that case, and other authorities indicating that proceedings should be dismissed under s 42B referred to in Pearce DC, Administrative Appeals Tribunal (2nd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths 2007) at [9.8].
[6] For an example of the use of s 33(1)(a) to limit the matters canvassed on an application for review see Re Rana and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (2008) 104 ALD 595.
Second period - from 10 April to 4 June 2009
In the hearing before the SSAT Mr Westbrook conceded that the income detailed by Centrelink in relation to this period appeared to be correct.[7] However, in the present proceedings he contended during the hearing that the calculation of his age pension during this period was incorrect for various reasons, some of which were misconceived. In written submission that he made following the hearing, he raised further matters, some of which have led me to conclude that the reviewable decision should be set aside. I refer first to his contentions in relation to the appropriate manner of calculating his and his wife’s income on an annual basis.
[7] Exhibit R1, T2, paragraph 33.
Calculation of income on a yearly basis
Mr Westbrook contended that Centrelink had included in its calculations of pension entitlement income that he himself had earned in addition to his wife’s earnings, and that his income should have been apportioned over a 52 week period, since it was casual work that he had only undertaken during one fortnight, and that he could not continue to work because of ill health. However, as appears from the ARO’s decision, the only income attributed to Mr Westbrook in respect of the second period, being the period now under consideration, was Mr Westbrook’s share of income from financial investments.
Mr Westbrook also contended that his wife’s income should have been calculated by adding up the total of her income in the year ended 30 June 2009, and then dividing that total by 26, and using the resulting figure to calculate his pension entitlement in respect of each of the fortnights under consideration.
The SS Act was amended with effect from 20 September 2009, but it is of course necessary to determine the appropriate method of calculating employment income by reference to the provision that applied during the periods in issue in this matter. My following analysis proceeds on that basis, and it is not necessary to consider the effect of the later amendments.
As mentioned above, Step 1 of the Method Statement provided for in s 1064-E1 of the SS Act entails working out the amount of the person’s ordinary income on a yearly basis. The subsequent Steps in the Method Statement and the subsequent provisions of s 1064-E make it clear that the annual rate of ordinary income determines the eligibility for pension, and the rate of pension. Nevertheless, it remains necessary to determine, according to the circumstances of each case, the annual rate of income of a claimant or pensioner. Different methods of assessing an annual rate of income should be used, according to whether or not earnings are received at a regular or constant rate. This was explained in Secretary, Department of Family and Communities Services v Rolley,[8] where a pensioner received income from casual employment over a 16-week period. The Department re-assessed his pension on the basis that for the purposes of s 1064-E1, his ordinary income was to be extrapolated to an annual rate. A Full Court of the Federal Court held that the determination of whether a payment received is to be treated as recurring income from which an annual rate may be extrapolated requires an evaluative judgment, according to the circumstances of each case. The Court (French J (as he then was) and Kiefel and Dowsett JJ) said:
“So a person in regular employment, albeit it may be part-time, could expect to have income received from that employment dealt with on the assumption that earnings at the current rate would continue and be extrapolated by multiplication to an annual rate. On the other hand a one-off payment for work unlikely to be repeated could be dealt with on the basis that it reflected the total income from employment likely to be derived in any period of 12 months.”[9]
[8] (2000) 175 ALR 4.
[9] (2000) 175 ALR 4 at [20].
The Court added that the circumstances of the particular case would show how to treat earnings from intermittent employment. It then went on to hold that the approach taken by the tribunal on the facts of that case of not extrapolating the income over a 12 month period, but treating it as income earned over a closed period of 16 weeks, was correct.[10]
[10] In the decision of the tribunal at first instance, Deputy President Forgie provided a helpful analysis of earlier authorities, with which I respectfully agree.
The Guide to the Social Security Law (Guide) as in force prior to 20 September 2009 states that there were two methods of assessing income for pensioners, as follows:
“Annual income assessment
If earnings are at a regular constant rate, the current rate whether weekly, fortnightly or monthly, is converted to an annual figure.
Variable Income
If income is not earned at a constant or clearly recognisable rate, average earnings over a suitable period may be used to obtain a rate. If there is difficulty in deciding what period to average earnings over, the guiding principle is that the calculation should provide a reasonable reflection of the current rate of income. Generally an average of the previous 13 weeks earnings provides an acceptable figure if the pattern of earnings is likely to continue. However, less than 13 weeks average MAY be more appropriate if the shorter period better reflects the pattern of earnings.”[11]
[11] Guide, paragraph 4.3.3.30.
The payslips used by the ARO to calculate Mrs Westbrook’s earnings over the four fortnightly periods from 10 April to 4 June 2009 indicate that her income was not earned at a constant or clearly recognisable rate. Further, in Mr Westbrook’s letter to the tribunal of 5 March 2013, he lists the amounts referred to on Mrs Westbrook’s payslips over the period from 21 June 2008 to 19 June 2009, and also refers to her having earned a further amount of $644.25 for the following fortnight. These figures indicate that her income was not being earned at a regular constant rate, but fluctuated from time to time. In those circumstances, consistently with the Guide, I have concluded that the correct way to assess her income would be to average her income over the 13 weeks prior to 4 June 2009.
In the case of Mr Westbrook, it appears that he received payment for the fortnight that he worked during the above period of 13 weeks, but then no other income from employment during the financial year ended 30 June 2009. I accordingly consider, in accordance with the evaluation approach referred to in Rolley (supra), that in his case his income should be averaged over 52 weeks, and not 13 weeks.
In his written submissions provided after the conclusion of the hearing, Mr Westbrook also contended that his wife had incurred work-related expenses of $3,172 in the year ended 30 June 2009, as claimed in her tax return, and that these expenses would be allowed by the Australian Tax Office. He relied upon Haldane-Stevenson v Director-General of Social Security,[12] which suggests that costs directly associated with earning income may be deducted in order to arrive at the income of an applicant for a pension. He also referred to the following paragraphs from the Guide:
“Payment to reimburse for expenses
An amount paid to a person to reimburse for the cost of expenses they have incurred is not considered income. The person does not gain additional benefit from the payment. When an organisation or employer pays MORE than the amount actually incurred by a person, the extra IS income as the person has gained additional funds in excess of the amount they paid for expenses.
…
Allowances paid by employers
Payment of an allowance from an employer for expenses incurred IS income where there is discretion to use for the employee’s own use or benefit. The payment is NOT included in any income assessment when payments are specifically for expenses associated with their employment and the employee does not have discretion to use for other purposes.
Examples:
·Allowances for travelling, clothing or meals.”[13]
[12] (1985) 9 FCR 73.
[13] Guide, paragraph 4.3.2.10.
There was no evidence before me as to the nature of the work-related expenses which Mr Westbrook is relying upon to reduce his wife’s income. I note, however, that Haldane-Stevenson (supra) was decided under the predecessor of the SS Act. The current Act includes an explanation as to the general meaning of “ordinary income” in the following terms:
“1072. A reference in this Act to a person’s ordinary income for a period is a reference to the person’s gross ordinary income from all sources for the period calculated without any reduction, other than a reduction under Division 1A.”
Division 1A of Part 3.10 of Chapter 3 of the SS Act then deals with the permissible deductions from business income, including income from investments. It incorporates reference to deductions permitted under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), but it appears that Division 1A will not be relevant to the assessment of the income received by Mrs Westbrook, as her income was apparently derived from personal exertion. I also note that the extracts from the Guide on which Mr Westbrook relies refer to additional payments made by an employer by way of reimbursement for expenses or allowance for expenses incurred. It is not clear from the information before me whether these paragraphs have any application to Mrs Westbrook’s income.
As the claimed reduction for expenses was a matter which emerged after the completion of the hearing, the Secretary has not had an opportunity to investigate or consider this issue. In all of the circumstances, I consider that it is appropriate to refer this matter to the Secretary for reconsideration, on the basis that the calculation of age pension be made in the light of any necessary further investigations, and in accordance with these reasons. In particular:
(a)Mr Westbrook’s earnings should be averaged over a period of 52 weeks (and for ease of calculation, it would appear appropriate for this to be the financial year ended 30 June 2009);
(b)Mrs Westbrook’s earnings should be averaged over the 13 weeks prior to 4 June 2009;
(c)the claimed reduction for work-related expenses should be further investigated; and
(d)investment earnings should be taken into account, and of course there should be adjustment for the ordinary income free area.
Once details of Mrs Westbrook’s work-related expenses are known, and if it appears (notwithstanding the comments I have made in paragraph 24 above) that they can be used to reduce her income, it may also be necessary to determine whether the work-related expenses claimed on her tax return were incurred in the 13 week period, or alternatively, if the figure claimed represented the expenses over the full financial year, whether a proportion should be attributed to the 13 week period, and then in turn, to each of the fortnights included in the period now under consideration. This question might depend on the nature of the expenses and when they were incurred, and might involve the sort of evaluation to which the Court referred in Rolley (supra).
It will also be necessary to adjust Mrs Westbrook’s before tax earnings to establish her earnings in each of the fortnights in question, as the ARO did, because her fortnightly pay periods did not correspond with the fortnightly periods of Mr Westbrook’s entitlement to age pension.
Mr Westbrook has recently queried the amount of his age pension entitlement, and whether the relevant rate included the utilities and telephone allowance. This should also be investigated. As to this issue, I note that Deputy President Bean recorded in the earlier proceedings that Mr Westbrook’s maximum pension entitlement was $478.90 per fortnight, and there did not appear to have been any contest about that figure in those proceedings.
During the hearing Mr Westbrook complained that Centrelink had based its calculations on amounts of income received by his wife, and that those amounts exceeded the income that was actually paid to her by her employer. He referred to various figures that appeared in the T documents, including in particular those appearing in T13 at page 105. He was concerned that this document included two figures for the fortnight ending 24 April 2009, but it is clear only one payment from Mrs Westbrook’s employer was taken into account by the ARO in determining the pension entitlement for that fortnight.[14] Counsel for the Secretary, Mr A Parker, explained that the table of figures in T13 had been prepared in connection with the earlier proceedings, and also confirmed that it had not been taken into account by Centrelink in determining Mr Westbrook’s age pension for the later period now under consideration, or by the ARO in recalculating his entitlements. Mr Parker had been counsel in the earlier proceedings, and I accept his explanation. It is clear that this document is not relevant to the period from 10 April to 4 June 2009.
[14] Exhibit R1, T9, page 62.
During the hearing Mr Westbrook also suggested that Centrelink had used income figures for his wife that were estimates of fortnightly income provided to Centrelink. However, the ARO’s calculations were based on her actual income appearing in pay slips provided by her employer, and in total they were lower than the estimated figures referred to by Mr Westbrook.
Mr Westbrook also referred during the hearing to bank statements for the relevant period.[15] These showed fortnightly receipts of amounts less than the figures used by the ARO, but the receipts represented the net amounts paid to Mrs Westbrook after tax. The gross amounts paid to her during the relevant periods appeared from the pay slips. The ARO calculated the pension by reference to the gross payments, as she was required to do by the SS Act.[16]
[15] Exhibit A6, attachment 12 to the letter dated 18 February 2013.
[16] See s 1072 of the SS Act, which is set out in paragraph 24 above.
First period - fortnightly period from 27 March to 9 April 2009
As a general rule, this tribunal should not reconsider a matter which has already been determined by the tribunal in earlier proceedings.[17] The decision of Deputy President Bean in the previous proceedings in respect of the First Period appears to me, with respect, to be correct, on the evidence apparently before her. However, the evidence before me indicates that whilst Mrs Westbrook was receiving regular earnings, her income fluctuated during the Second Period, being the period of four fortnights immediately following the first period which was the subject of the earlier proceedings. The First Period and Second Period both fall within the period of 13 weeks which I think should be used to calculate Mrs Westbrook’s annual rate of income, and as the pensions are being assessed with the benefit of hindsight, I think it would be inappropriate to use different rates of income for the successive fortnightly periods. I have accordingly concluded that in the unusual circumstances of this case, the issue raised by the previous proceedings should be reviewed, for the reasons that fresh evidence will be available, and the justice of the case makes this appropriate.[18] Any such review should, also, of course, consider the relevance of work-related expenses and investment earnings, matters that do not appear to have been raised in the earlier proceedings.
[17] Re Michael and Secretary, Department of Employment, Science and Training (2006) 90 ALD 457 at [8]-[17]; Re Filsell and Comcare (2009) 109 ALD 198 at [55].
[18] See Re Matusko and Australia Postal Corporation (1995) 21 AAR 9 at 20.
Conduct of Centrelink officers
I mention for the sake of completeness that various documents prepared by Mr Westbrook indicate that Mr Westbrook believes in the past, that some Centrelink officers have been guilty of misconduct in their dealings with him which resulted in him suffering a stress-related illness.
In Wang v Minister, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2007] FCAFC 17, the appellants made certain assertions about the misconduct of officers of Centrelink and asserted in a notice of appeal to a Full Federal Court that the primary judge had ignored their allegations of misconduct. The Full Court pointed out that the Federal Court, unlike the superior courts of the States, is not a court of unlimited jurisdiction but has such jurisdiction as is conferred upon it by the Federal Parliament, together with accrued jurisdiction arising out of transaction and facts common to federal claims. The Court accordingly held that the primary judge was correct in deciding that he had no jurisdiction to deal with the appellants’ arguments based on the alleged misconduct.[19]
[19] [2007] FCAFC 17 at [11]-[13].
This tribunal also has no inherent jurisdiction. It derives its jurisdiction from in excess of 400 Acts of the Federal Parliament which expressly confer jurisdiction on it. The tribunal’s jurisdiction in the present proceedings is derived from s 179 of the Administration Act. This provides in effect that applications may be made to this tribunal for review of decisions of the SSAT. Section 43(1) of the AAT Act then provides relevantly, in effect, that for the purpose of reviewing a decision, this tribunal may exercise all of the powers and discretions that are conferred upon the person who made the decision, and that this tribunal is required to make a decision affirming, varying or setting aside that decision, and where the decision is set aside, making a decision in substitution for that decision or remitting the matter for reconsideration in accordance with any directions or recommendations of the Tribunal. It is well established that in conducting its review, this tribunal may consider all aspects of the reviewable decision, and hears the matter afresh, by reference to the material before it. However, in the absence of some express statutory power,[20] the tribunal has no general jurisdiction to oversee the conduct of officers of the Commonwealth or its agencies, and this forms no part of the tribunal’s function of reviewing the decision in issue in this matter.[21] It is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of this tribunal to inquire into the kind of conduct of Centrelink officers that has been asserted.
[20] For example, s 1237A of the SS Act requires that the right to recover the proportion of a debt that is solely due to administrative error made by the Commonwealth must be waived in certain circumstances, but the misconduct asserted by Mr Westbrook was not of that nature.
[21] See also Wang v Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2006] FCA 898 at [48], where Heerey J said at first instance that the Federal Court had no jurisdiction to try criminal offences such as fraud and conspiracy, that breaches of the SS Act do not confer private rights for damages, and nor is there any duty of care owed, and that the Federal Court had no jurisdiction of general oversight of the administrative efficiency of federal government entities.
DECISION
The decision under review is remitted to the respondent for reconsideration pursuant to s 42D of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth).
I certify that the preceding 36 (thirty -six) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Deputy President D G Jarvis .... [Sgd] ....
Associate
Dated 24 April 2013
Date of hearing 19 February 2013 Date final submissions received 20 March 2013 Applicant In person Advocate for the Respondent Mr A Parker Solicitors for the Respondent Centrelink Program Litigation and Review Branch
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