FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Wenkart v Pantzer (No 6) [2003] FCA 1210
BANKRUPTCY – remuneration of trustee in bankruptcy – application by former bankrupt for extension of time in which to request that former trustee’s claim for remuneration be taxed – discretionary considerations – extension of time refused.
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 33(1)(c), 162(4)
Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth) regs 8.08, 8.09Bellin v Pattison (Trustee) [1999] FCA 51 referred to
THOMAS RICHARD WENKART v WARREN PANTZER
N 7051 of 2002
LINDGREN J
29 OCTOBER 2003
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 7051 of 2002
BETWEEN:
THOMAS RICHARD WENKART
APPLICANTAND:
WARREN PANTZER
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
LINDGREN J
DATE OF ORDER:
30 OCTOBER 2003
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicant’s motion brought by notice of motion filed on 12 December 2002, in so far as it is found in par 8 of that document, be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 7051 of 2002
BETWEEN:
THOMAS RICHARD WENKART
APPLICANTAND:
WARREN PANTZER
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
LINDGREN J
DATE:
29 OCTOBER 2003
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT (No 6)
(Application for Extension of Time)INTRODUCTION
These reasons for judgment relate to par 8 of a notice of motion filed on 12 December 2002 by the applicant (‘Dr Wenkart’). The respondent (‘Mr Pantzer’) is the former trustee of the estate in bankruptcy of Dr Wenkart. Mr Pantzer claims remuneration, relevantly, in respect of services rendered by him as trustee in the period from 30 January 2001 to 15 March 2002. On the latter date, the bankruptcy of Dr Wenkart was annulled on the passing of a special resolution at a meeting of his creditors under subs 73(4) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (‘the Act’): subs 74(5) of the Act. Being dissatisfied with the amount of Mr Pantzer’s claim, Dr Wenkart requested a taxing officer to tax the claim, but did so outside the 14-day period then allowed by reg 8.09(1) of the Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth) (‘the Regulations’).
By par 8 of his notice of motion, Dr Wenkart seeks an order that the time allowed by reg 8.09(1) be extended to a period of 14 days from the making of the order granting the extension.
It is not in dispute that the Court has power under s 33(1)(c) of the Act to grant the extension: cf Bellin v Pattison (Trustee) [1999] FCA 51 (‘Bellin’), esp at [27].
LEGISLATION
Section 162 of the Act provides for the fixing of the remuneration of a trustee of the estate of a bankrupt by resolution of the creditors, or, if they so resolve, by the creditors’ committee of inspection. Subsection 162(4) provides:
‘Where the remuneration of the trustee is not fixed by the creditors or the committee of inspection, the trustee is to be…
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- Case
- [2003] FCA 1210
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue the court had to decide was whether the applicant, Dr Wenkart, had demonstrated sufficient grounds to justify the extension of the time limit for initiating the appeal. This required an assessment of whether the delay in filing the appeal was unreasonable, and if there were any circumstances that warranted an extension of time under section 35A of the Judiciary Act 1903. The court also had to consider whether Dr Wenkart had acted with due diligence in pursuing the appeal and whether the delay had caused any prejudice to the respondent.
The court found that Dr Wenkart had not provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing the appeal. It was noted that Dr Wenkart had been aware of the need to lodge an appeal within the specified time frame but had failed to do so. The court held that there were no exceptional circumstances that would justify an extension of the time limit. Consequently, the court dismissed the application for an extension of time, concluding that it was not just and equitable to allow the delay. The court ordered that the application be dismissed with costs to be paid by the applicant.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant’s motion brought by notice of motion filed on 12 December 2002, in so far as it is found in par 8 of that document, be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: LINDGREN J
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