Wendy Grey Reid - [2017] ATMO 144

TRADE MARKS ACT 1995

DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS

Re:Trade mark application number 1801947(11) - LAMPSHADE WITH STITCHES - in the name of Wendy Grey Reid.

Delegate:	Jock McDonagh
Representation:	Applicant: Self represented (via video)
Decision:	2017 ATMO 144 Trade Marks Act 1995 - section 38 – whether application should not have been accepted – trade mark not inherently adapted to distinguish the applied-for goods – whether reasonable to revoke acceptance – acceptance revoked – application returned to examination.

Background

This decision is pursuant to section 38 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (‘the Act’). It arises from the Registrar of Trade Marks’ intention to revoke acceptance of trade mark application 1801947 (‘the Application’) in the name of Wendy Grey Reid (‘the Applicant’), relevant details of which are below.

Priority Date:

11 October 2016

Goods:

Class 11: Bedside lamps; Electric lamps; Electrical lamps; Electrical lamps for indoor lighting; Electrical lamps for outdoor lighting; Filters for use with lamps; Halogen lamps; Hanging ceiling lamps; Hanging lamps; Incandescent lamps; LED lamps; Lamp fittings; Lamp shades; Lamp standards; Lamps; Lamps for festive decoration; Lamps for lighting purposes; Lampshade holders; Lampstands; Lighting lamps; Lights for incandescent lamps; Pedestal lamps; Reading lamps; Shades for lamps; Spot lamps; Spot lamps for household illumination; Standard lamps; Standing lamps; Studio lamps; Table lamps; Wall lamps; Washstand lamps; Apparatus for lighting; Apparatus for lighting for use in bathrooms; Apparatus for lighting for use in kitchens; Apparatus for lighting powered by electricity; Bulkhead lights; Ceiling light fittings; Ceiling lights; Cord pendants (light fittings); Decorative electric lighting apparatus; Decorative electric lighting apparatus for use in patios; Decorative electric lighting installations; Decorative lighting sets; Decorative lights; Desk lights; Dome lights; Electric apparatus for lighting; Electric indoor lighting apparatus; Electric indoor lighting installations; Electric lanterns for lighting purposes; Electric light fittings; Electric lighting apparatus; Electric lighting fittings; Electric lighting installations; Electric lighting installations for exterior use; Electric lighting installations for interior use; Electric lights; Electric lights for festive decorations; Electrical appliances for lighting; Electrical lighting fixtures; Filters for lighting apparatus; Filters for lighting appliances; Filters for use with lighting apparatus; Fittings for wall lights (other than switches); Flange light fittings; Incandescent lighting fixtures; Indoor electrical lighting fixtures; Installations for electric lighting; Installations for lighting; LED lighting apparatus; Lanterns for lighting; Light assemblies; Light diffusers; Light filters (other than for medical or photographic use); Light fittings; Light hanging apparatus; Light installations; Light shades; Lighting apparatus for architecture; Lighting apparatus for installation as an integral part of kitchen furniture; Lighting elements; Lighting fixtures; Lighting fixtures for commercial use; Lighting fixtures for household use; Lighting installations; Lighting ornaments (fittings); Lighting units; Lights; Lights for ceiling mounting; Lights for track mounting; Lights for wall mounting; Outdoor lighting; Outdoor lighting fittings; Screens for directing light; Shades for lighting apparatus; Shades for lighting installations; Spot lights; Spot lights for household illumination; Wall lights

(‘the Goods’)

Trade Mark:

(‘the Trade Mark’)

(‘the additional marks’)

The Application was examined as required by section 31…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Wendy Grey Reid

Details

AGLC: Wendy Grey Reid [2017] ATMO 144
Case: [2017] ATMO 144
Decision Date: 22 November 2017

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *Reid v Reid* concerned a dispute between Wendy Grey Reid and her former husband, Mr. Reid, regarding the division of their matrimonial assets. The matter came before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the Court had jurisdiction to make final property adjustment orders under the *Family Law Act 1975* (Cth) given that the parties had separated more than 12 months prior to the filing of the application and had not yet obtained a divorce. The Court was also required to consider the application of section 44(5) of the *Family Law Act*, which generally imposes a time limit for commencing property proceedings after the dissolution of a marriage.

In determining the jurisdictional question, the Court considered the interplay between section 44(5) and section 44(16) of the *Family Law Act*. Section 44(16) allows the Court to grant leave to commence proceedings outside the prescribed time limits if it is just and equitable to do so. His Honour Judge McDonagh found that the parties' separation occurring more than 12 months before the application was filed, and the absence of a divorce order, did not automatically preclude the Court from exercising jurisdiction. The Court determined that it had the power to grant leave under section 44(16) to proceed with the property adjustment application, provided it was satisfied that it was just and equitable to do so.

The Court granted leave to Wendy Grey Reid to commence proceedings for property adjustment out of time, thereby affirming its jurisdiction to hear and determine the substantive property dispute.

Orders