Wells and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review)

Case

[2020] AATA 2365

25 June 2020


Wells and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review) [2020] AATA 2365 (25 June 2020)

Division:GENERAL DIVISION

File Number:          2020/0614

Re:Eleanore Wells

APPLICANT

AndSecretary, Department of Social Services

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:A G Melick AO SC, Deputy President

Date of decision:                   25 June 2020

Date of written reasons:        20 July 2020

Place:Hobart

The Tribunal sets aside the decision made by the Social Services and Child Support Division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT1) of 6 January 2020 to the extent of the reduction of the Applicant’s debt, which is reduced by $103,382.91. The matter is remitted back to Centrelink with the direction that pursuant to section 1237AAD of the Social Security Act 1991, the Applicant’s debt should be reduced by that amount. 

..............................[sgd]..........................................

A G Melick AO SC, Deputy President

SOCIAL SECURITY – carer allowance – debt – whether the Applicant has a carer payment and carer allowance debt – whether all or part of the debt may be written-off or waived – whether a notional entitlement can be applied  –  reduction of debt set aside and substituted – matter remitted to Centrelink to reduce debt

Legislation

Social Security Act 1991
Social Security (Administration) Act 1999

Cases
Ahamed v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2020] FCCA 1245
Angelakos and Secretary Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2007] FCA 25
Beadle and Director - General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1
Callaghan and Secretary, Department of Social Security, Re (1996-97) 45 ALD 435
Davy and Secretary Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2007] AATA 1,114
Dranichnikov and Centrelink [2003] FCAFC 133
Feneley and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2003] AATA 496
Gerhardt and Department of Employment, Education and Training, Re [1996] AAT 10941
Groth and Secretary Department of Social Security (1995) FCA 1708
Ivovic and Director General of Social Services, Re (1981) 3 ALN N95
Klaverstyn and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2003] AATA 71
Lumsden and Secretary Department of Social Security, Re [1986] AATA 228
Oberhardt v Secretary, Department of Employment, Education, and Workplace Relations (2008) 174 FCR 157
Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services and Birgden [2003] AATA 67
Secretary, Department of Social Security v Coralie Hales [1998] FCA 219
Wall and Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2010] AATA 740
Wilson v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services, and Indigenous Affairs, Re [2012] AATA 154

Secondary Materials

Adult Disability Assessment Determination 2018

WRITTEN REASONS FOR ORAL DECISION

A G Melick AO SC, Deputy President

20 July 2020

  1. This is an application for review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in the Social Services and Child Support Division (AAT1) on 6 January 2020, to set aside the decision under review and remit it back to Centrelink with the directions that pursuant to s 1237AAD of the Social Security Act 1991 (the Act), the Applicant’s debt should be reduced by $500 per fortnight in the entirety of the period in which she was in receipt of a Carer Payment and supplement.  I am told that that amount, when calculated, was $102,631.30. 

  2. The issues I have to determine are:

    (a)whether or not the Applicant has a Carer Payment and Carer Allowance debt of $163,355.11 for the relevant period; and

    (b)whether any, all, of part of the debt may be written off or waived. 

    I note that the decision that was set aside by AAT1 in January, was that a total debt of $163,355.11 was repayable by the Applicant. 

  3. Prior to 28 February 2011, the Applicant was in receipt of a Widow’s Allowance.  She had, at an earlier time, been, at times, in receipt of a Carer Allowance.[1] She also gave evidence that referred to a Mr Hall, who was living in her house with her, and to whom she provided the appropriate care.  The Applicant also noted that at that stage what she recalled she received, was a top-up in the amount of approximately $200 per fortnight to her Widow’s Allowance.

    [1] T25, T documents, p  510.

  4. On 28 February 2011 the Applicant signed and completed a claim for Carer Allowance and Carer Payment, the recipient being the Applicant’s mother Anna Franke.  The application document is a 20 page document and at page 14, there are two relevant questions (paragraphs 101 and 102).[2] The following words appear immediately before each of the paragraphs:   

    Please read this before answering the question.

    [2] T5, T documents, p 111 and 124.

  5. Paragraph 101 reads:

    If you currently get an income support payment from Centrelink or the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, you need to decide if you want to stay on that payment or transfer to Carer Payment.  If you would like to talk to someone about your options, please call us.

    And there is a phone number given.

  6. Paragraph 102 reads:

    Constant care means you provide personal care for a significant time each day, at least the equivalent of a normal working day, and because of your care responsibilities you are unable to participate in substantial paid employment.  Personal care may include supervision and monitoring, and when answering the question, it may be useful to look back over your answers given in questions 98 to 100, which show the areas where the person you care for needs assistance.

  7. The Applicant gave evidence that the above description sounded right because she was available to tend to her mother’s needs 24 hours a day.  On 28 February 2011, a service officer of the Respondent decided the Applicant was ineligible to claim Carer Payment as the Applicant did not meet the care requirements.  The service officer also rejected the Applicant’s claim for Carer Allowance as the Applicant did not supply the required form, which is SA381, entitled “Carer Allowance Questionnaire:  Carer not living with the person for whom care is being provided.”[3]  

    [3] T24, T documents, pp 408 and 409.

  8. The Applicant’s Carer Allowance and Carer Payment form was stamped 8 March 2011, received at Launceston Centrelink Service Centre for processing, in addition to a medical form completed by Dr Tempone.[4]  Question 6, “Is the carer claiming Carer Payment?” was left blank.  Question 7, “Is the care required for a significant period each day (at least the equivalent of a normal working day)?” was ticked yes.

    [4] T6, T documents, pp 131 - 137.

  9. The Applicant  gave evidence that she did not see that form, and that the doctor signed it and sent it independently of her submitting the application on 28 February.    On 8 March 2011 a service officer noted the Applicant’s claim for Carer Payment should be granted, noting significant care is required to be provided on a daily basis.  The matter was then transferred to the relevant carer’s team for processing.  I note that the Applicant had disclosed that her mother was not living with her at the same address.

  10. On 2 April 2011, the Applicant received letters from Centrelink rejecting her claim for Carer Allowance and Carer Payment as the Applicant did not meet the care requirements for both claims.  As the Applicant said, this was confusing because she was basically told no and then yes, when Dr Tempone put in the second form.  At this stage the Applicant thought she would receive an extra $200 to her fortnightly payments, which she was receiving for her Widow’s Allowance. 

  11. Centrelink records indicate that on 12 April 2011 the Applicant contacted Centrelink to provide a further medical report from by Dr Tempone.  The Applicant gave evidence that    Dr Tempone sent that form in without her knowledge.  At this stage I consider it unnecessary to determine whether, one way or another, the form was submitted by the Applicant or sent directly by Dr Tempone. 

  12. On 17 May 2011 a letter was sent to the Applicant outlining her rate of Widow’s Allowance, and methods Centrelink used to calculate her rate of payment.  On 30 May 2011 a letter was sent to the Applicant confirming her intention to claim Carer Allowance and requesting further forms to be provided, including a form entitled, “Information you need to know about your claim for Carer Allowance”, and a Claim for Carer Allowance form.[5] The Applicant says nine years later she cannot recall that form or whether she received it. She stated she did not really read all these forms and all that she did was check that the amounts were right.    I accept that there was no material difference between what she would have received as her Widow’s Allowance plus a top up for Carer Payment, or a removal of her Widow’s Allowance and substitution therefore Carer Payment. 

    [5] T9, T documents, p 154.

  13. On 22 June 2011 the Applicant’s claim for Carer Payment was accepted, and there was a note that the Carer Payment should not have been rejected.[6]  Importantly, on the same date, four letters were issued to the Applicant.  The first one was a letter requesting further information be provided for the Applicant’s claim for Carer Allowance.[7]  The second was a letter notifying the Applicant that her Widow’s Allowance had been cancelled, effective         28 February 2011.[8]  There were then two letters outlining that the Applicant’s Carer Payment had been granted, the arrears would be paid from 28 February, and the method Centrelink used to calculate her rate of payment.[9]  The first of these two letters stated:

    Please check the information on this statement carefully, if the details on this statement are correct there is no need for you to contact Centrelink.  If your circumstances change, please contact us within 14 days.[10]

    [6] T24, T documents, p 415.

    [7] T9, T documents, p 170.

    [8] T10, T documents, p 171.

    [9] T11, T documents, pp 175 - 179.

    [10] Ibid, p 175.

  14. The Applicant says she cannot recall receiving that letter and if she did, she did not read it.  Once again, she was only concerned to make sure the amounts that she was receiving were right. 

  15. On 10 May 2016, the Applicant was sent a notice that her Carer Payment had been suspended because the Applicant did not respond to correspondence sent to her by the Respondent.  The payment was later reinstated.  Then the Applicant received letters from the Respondent detailing she was in receipt of a Carer Payment from the period   27 June 2011 to 9 January 2019. 

  16. On 3 April 2018, the Applicant contacted Centrelink and enquired about cancelling her Carer Payment and reapplying for a Widow’s Allowance.  She said this was because she was having too many arguments with her mother. She was told at that time the Widow’s Allowance was no longer available as it was replaced by NewStart, and she would have to apply for NewStart.  It appears at that stage the Carer Payments were not cancelled.

  17. On 3 January 2019 the Respondent contacted the Applicant regarding the Carer Payment. On that contact the Applicant gave full and frank details to the Repsondent, which made it quite clear she was not entitled to a Carer Payment for her mother.  There were quite a few things said at that stage, including that the Applicant’s mother was going to a nursing home, that a nephew Gerald had moved in, and that the Applicant would then want to go onto NewStart payments, which would be the equivalent of what she was getting for her Widow’s Allowance.

  18. The Applicant says at this stage she still did not realise that she had been getting a Carer Payment rather than a combination of a Widow’s Pension and a top up for the care she was providing to her mother.  On 8 January 2019, the Repsondent sent the Applicant a letter telling her that her Carer Payment had been cancelled as she was not providing constant care to another person.

  19. On 17 September 2019, the Respondent sent a letter to the Applicant raising a debt of $163,355.11 against her for overpayment of Carer Payment and Carer Allowance for the period previously mentioned, 28 February 2011 to 1 January 2019. 

  20. Then on 6 November 2019, an authorised review officer affirmed the decision.[11]  Then as previously outlined on 6 January 2020, the AAT1 set aside that decision, effectively ruling that the Applicant was still obliged to repay $60,723.81.  It is that decision which she now seeks to review.  I note the Applicant currently receives Jobseeker Payment, the latest payment, being $1087.09.  I also note to date she has repaid three payments each of approximately $170. 

    [11] T19, T documents, p 279.

  21. A letter sent to the Applicant on 22 June 2011 requested a Carer Allowance questionnaire be completed, which was not returmed.[12] The questionnaire was sent again on 31 March 2014, and once again the Applicant failed to comply with the notice requirements to return the relevant forms as required by s 64 of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (the Administration Act).  The claim should not have been paid, but it continued to be paid, despite the Applicant not returning the forms.

    [12]  T9, T documents, p 170.

  22. The Applicant also received a carer supplement, but s 992X of the Act makes it quite clear that if the Applicant was ineligible for both Carer Payment and Carer Allowance during the period, she was not entitled to receive a Carer Supplement.

  23. I find that the Applicant was not entitled to a Carer Payment, Carer Allowance or a Carer Supplement. 

  24. That then leaves the question of what is to be done in relation to the debt.  Section 223(1) of the Act states,

    If a social security payment is made; and

    a person obtains a benefit of the payment was not entitled for any reason to obtain that benefit;

    the amount of the payment is a debt due to the Commonwealth by the person and the debt is taken to arise when the person obtains the benefit of the payment.

  25. Therefore, I find a balance of $163,355.11 is a debt payable to the Commonwealth.  However, there are questions of whether the debt should be recovered.  I note the case law and agree with and adopt the cases as set out in the Respondent’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions.

  26. In Secretary, Department of Social Security v Coralie Hales [1998] FCA 219, French J stated:

    The taxpayer is entitled to expect that in the ordinary course money paid to people which they are not entitled to receive will be recovered, albeit in a way appropriate to the circumstances which led to the overpayment and the circumstances of the persons concerned. However, the confining of a recovery regime by rigid rules, particularly in this area of the law, is likely to be productive of unfair or harsh outcomes in some of the great variety of fact situations that can arise. There are provisions in the Act which recognise that reality. They relate to the writing off and the waiver of debts otherwise due to the Commonwealth.I then have to consider whether the debt may be written off or waived.  Section 1230 of the Act permits the write-off of a debt only in prescribed circumstances, such as when the debt is irrecoverable at all, the debtor has not capacity to repay the debt, or the debtor’s whereabouts are unknown after all reasonable efforts have been made to locate the debtor, or is not cost effective to the Commonwealth to take action to recover the debt.

  27. The Applicant is not subject to bankruptcy, and she has given evidence that she owns unencumbered real estate and has an interest in a home unit worth approximately $50,000.  Therefore, I am satisfied that she has the capacity to repay the debt.  I also note and agree with the definitions for severe financial hardship and the relevant case law as submitted by the Respondent.

  28. Subsection 1236(1B) of the Act sets out the instances where a debt is irrecoverable at law, whilst subsection 1236(1C) of the Act relevantly provides that if a debt is recoverable by means of deductions from a social security payment, the person is taken to have capacity to repay the debt unless recovery would cause severe financial hardship.

  29. The meaning of ‘severe financial hardship’ has been considered in a number of Tribunal decisions, including Re Lumsden and Secretary Department of Social Security [1986] AATA 228; Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services and Birgden [2003] AATA 67 and Klaverstyn and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2003] AATA 71.

  30. In Feneley and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2003] AATA 496, the Tribunal stated:

    36. Severe financial hardship is not defined in the Act. However, the meaning of the term, while not implying destitution goes beyond straightened financial circumstances and imports a need for the particular circumstances of a person to include suffering of a severe or extreme nature.

  31. The Respondent submited that the Applicant’s debt cannot be written-off under section 1236 of the Act for the following reasons:

    (a)the debt is not irrecoverable at law;

    (b)the Applicant has capacity to repay the debt, and is currently in receipt of a social security payment;

    (c)there is no evidence of severe financial hardship; and

    (d)the Applicant’s whereabouts are known and it is cost effective for the Commonwealth to recover the debt.

  32. There is also a provision to waive debt for administrative error.  Section 1237A of the Act mandates the waiver of debt or part of a debt where the sole cause of debt is administrative error by the Commonwealth, the amounts overpaid were received by the debtor in good faith.

  33. The Applicant blames Centrelink for the error, indicating that they should have realised the answer she gave to questions related to the Adult Disability Assessment Tool were inconsistent with her answer to question 102 on the claim form. I do not accept that submission because her answers would not have attracted a score of 20.5 under the Adult Disability Assessment Determination. Furthermore, I do not accept there was any error on the part of Centrelink in accepting the Applicant’s claim in light of the evidence either she or the doctor provided on the form, and the medical evidence provided on a separate report.

  34. The Applicant also argued that there were problems with the form, and she agitates that the form should be changed because there are small headings, but I do not accept that because on the page in which question 102 appears there is a large banner heading, “Carer Payment” and the first question at question 101, which I have already dealt with, reads, “Please read this before answering the question.” 

  35. That form contained all the information necessary to inform the Applicant that by filling in that section of the form, she was applying for a Carer Payment.  It was incumbent on the Applicant to carefully read the form, and she admitted at the hearing she did not do so, despite having declared at the time she signed the form that it was correct and complete.

  36. In Re Gerhardt and Department of Employment, Education and Training [1996] AAT 10941, the Tribunal stated that the word ‘solely’ was to be given its ordinary meaning, as ‘exclusively,’ ‘only’ and ‘to the exclusion of all else.’  The Secretary’s duty to waive does not extend to those debts which are attributable to errors or other factors which are independent of the Commonwealth’s administrative error.

  37. Accordingly, I do not find that the Applicant’s debt should be waived under s 1237A because there is no evidence of administrative error on the part of the Commonwealth as the claim was granted based upon the information provided by the Applicant and/or the doctor she referred to in the form.  Also, the Applicant was not providing constant care to her mother, and the debt is attributable to the Applicant’s incorrect declarations made on the Carer Payment form or made on her behalf by the doctor.

  38. I note in particular that the Applicant answered “yes” to question 101 on the original claim form which then goes on to ask, “Did you wish to claim Carer Payment?”  The Applicant then went on to complete the rest of the form, and if the Applicant had not completed the Carer Payment form the Carer Payment would not have been granted. 

  1. However, there is also the waiver due to special circumstances. Section 1237AAD of the Act provides the circumstances under which the Secretary may waive, must not waive, the right to recover debt. The first part reads:

    The debt did not result wholly or partly from the debtor or another person knowingly making a false statement or a false representation; or failing or omitting to comply with a provision of the Administration Act or 1947 Act.

  2. I am not satisfied that the Applicant knowingly made a false statement or false representation, and once again I rely, in part, upon the frank admissions made to Centrelink in the beginning of 2019.  However, I am satisfied she failed or omitted to comply with the provision of the Act, and that includes making appropriate declarations, and also complying with the requirements of the form, including reading questions carefully and answering them appropriately.  There have to be special circumstances other than financial hardship alone that make it desirable to waive the debt, and it is more appropriate to waive than to write off the debt or part of the debt.

  3. Once again I agree with the case law as submitted by the Respondent below.

  4. The term ‘knowingly’ is not defined in the Act, however the Respondent noted the Administrative Appeals Tribunal’s decision of Re Callaghan and Secretary, Departmentof Social Security (1996-97) 45 ALD 435 that states:

    48. There is nothing in section 1237AAD which suggests that the word “knowingly” should be given any meaning other than that a person has actual knowledge, rather than constructive knowledge, that he or she is making a false statement or representation or that he or she is failing or omitting to comply with a provision of the Act. That actual knowledge is to be ascertained by reference to the statements of the person as to his or her actual state of knowledge at the time and to events surrounding the false statement or the act or omission.

  5. In Wall and Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2010] AATA 740 (29 September 2010) the Tribunal stated:

    In Taylor’s Central Garages (Exeter) Ltd v Roper [1951] WN 383 at 385, Devlin J considered the meaning of “knowledge” and found that actual knowledge can be inferred from the evidence and the nature of the acts done. Further, in RCA Corporation v Custom Cleared Sales Pty Ltd (1978) 19 ALR 123 at 126, the Court of Appeal in the Supreme Court of New South Wales said:

    In inferring knowledge, a court is entitled to approach the matter in two stages; where opportunities for knowledge on the part of the particular person are proved and there is nothing to indicate that there are obstacles to the particular person acquiring the relevant knowledge, there is some evidence from which the

    court can conclude that such a person has the knowledge. However, this conclusion may be easily overturned by a denial on his part of the knowledge which the court accepts, or by a demonstration that he is properly excused from giving evidence of his actual knowledge.”

    Following the decision in RCA Corporation, it is open to the Tribunal to infer that a person had actual knowledge of their obligations under the Act where there were opportunities for them to gain that knowledge and where there were no obstacles to them acquiring the knowledge. In the present case, the respondent sent letters to the applicant notifying him of his obligations under the Act.”

  6. The meaning of ‘special circumstances’ was considered by the Tribunal in Beadle and Director - General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1:

    12. An expression such as "special circumstances" is by its very nature incapable of precise or exhaustive definition. The qualifying adjective looks to circumstances that are unusual, uncommon or exceptional. Whether circumstances answer any of these descriptions must depend upon the context in which they occur. For it is the context which allows one to say that the circumstances in one case are markedly different from the usual run of cases. This is not to say that the circumstances must be unique but they must have a particular quality of unusualness that permits them to be described as special.

  7. In Davy and Secretary Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2007] AATA 1,114, the Tribunal stated:

    80…“special circumstances” are not merely directed to the person’s own circumstances. Rather, they are directed to those that are “special circumstances…that make it desirable to waive”. That necessarily requires a consideration of the person’s individual circumstances but also a consideration of the general administration of the social security system. Waiver of the debt would mean that Mr Davy would have had the benefit of part of his DSP in circumstances in which he was not entitled to it…He has had the benefit of the money and there is no injustice in requiring him to repay the money of which he has had the benefit but not the entitlement…The system of administration of the Social Security Act does not visit any injustice for many if not all social security recipients but it did not lead to any injustice or unfairness on Mr Davy that is not visited, or potentially visited, upon all other recipients of social security payments under the Act. Therefore, I am not satisfied that there are special circumstances that make it desirable to waive the debt under s 1237AAD of the Act…

  8. In Dranichnikov and Centrelink [2003] FCAFC 133, the Full Federal Court stated that:

    66. To some extent the question whether there were special circumstances must depend on how it came about that the error occurred.

  9. The Tribunal has considered ‘special circumstances’ in other matters, including: Groth and Secretary Department of Social Security (1995) FCA 1708; Re Ivovic and Director General of Social Services (1981) 3 ALN N95; Angelakos and Secretary Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2007] FCA 25.

  10. It is quite clear to me that there is a notional entitlement in relation to the amount that the Applicant would have received under the Widow’s Allowance. I regard that as being a special circumstance, and that is if the Applicant had not made the incorrect claims or had not filled out the forms inappropriately, she would have continued to receive a Widow’s Allowance.Therefore I consider the notional entitlement should be taken into consideration. I also consider it is more appropriate to waive than write off the debt or part of the debt.

  11. The Respondent maintains that the full debt of $163.355.11 should still be due to the Commonwealth and refers to two notices received by the Applicant, but I regard that as being a failure to comply with a provision of the Act, that is s 1237AAD(a)(ii), rather than her making a full statement, which still brings it under the conditions of special circumstances.

  12. The concept of notional entitlement, is set out in Oberhardt v Secretary, Department of Employment, Education, and Workplace Relations (2008) 174 FCR 157, Spender J stated at paragraph [65]:

    It follows that, in my view, notional entitlement should not be excluded from the range of available relevant considerations in deciding whether there are “special circumstances” to waive a debt under s 1237AAD.

    and also in Re Wilson v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services, and Indigenous Affairs [2012] AATA 154, this Tribunal stated at [16]:

    The term “notional entitlement” is somewhat of a misnomer because it would be impossible for Ms Wilson to now establish that she was qualified for Newstart allowance between May 2007 and May 2008 and, in particular, to establish that she was seeking to engage in employment and undertake activities required by Centrelink and suchlike. Notional entitlement, in this context, is no more than a recognition of the high probability that Ms Wilson would have applied for, and been granted, another equivalent benefit from the date of removal of S from her care, had she notified Centrelink of the fact of the removal. Here Centrelink was notified on       8 May 2008 that S was in the care of the Department of Family and Community Services. Ms Wilson’s parenting payment and family tax benefit was cancelled with effect from that date. On 16 May 2008 Ms Wilson claimed Newstart allowance.             It was granted with effect from that date. In early December 2008 she went on to disability support pension. There is, therefore, every reason to suppose that              Ms Wilson would have applied for, and been granted, Newstart allowance on and before 29 May 2007 had she notified Centrelink on the day of the removal of S from her care.

  13. In Ahamed v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2020] FCCA 1245, Riethmuller J

    noted the following:

    [44] Importantly, whilst the cases speak of a ‘notional entitlement’ that is sometimes described as being ‘set off’ against the debt (see for example Robinson and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2014] AATA 446 ) such terms run the risk of treating any notional entitlement as an amount that must be set off as a matter of law. The position under section 1237AAD is that the statutory discretion remains unfettered: it is more accurate to describe the notional entitlement as a relevant factor, rather than a ‘set off’, even if the appropriate exercise of the discretion would often result in the waiver of that part of the debt equivalent to the likely amount of any notional entitlement. For this reason, it is still appropriate to consider the ‘notional entitlement’ of the appellant and his wife as a couple as it is relevant to the discretion. To require any strict analogy to law or equity would be to impermissibly limit the discretion in the section: see generally Angelakos’ case.

    [47] … I find that the Tribunal has failed to have regard to an important consideration in determining how much of the debt to waive, namely, the amounts that would likely have been paid to the appellant and his wife (if it is found that the appellant’s wife was entitled to a special benefit under the Act) if they had each claimed their full entitlements.

  14. The Respondent calculated the Applicant’s notional entitlement at the amount of $103,382.91, which would have been the maximum entitlement of the Widow’s Allowance the Applicant would have received during the period, had she not applied for the Carer Allowance.  As already indicated I consider that appropriate to be taken into account, in relation to the original debt, and that it should be waived rather than written off.

  15. Accordingly I set aside the decision of the AAT1 given on 6 January 2020 to the extent of the reduction of the Applicant’s debt, and instead of the Applicant’s debt being reduced by $500 a fortnight, which would have been approximately $102,000, it is to be reduced by $103,382.91. 

  16. I set aside the decision of 6 January 2020, but only to the extent that the Applicant’s debt should be reduced by $500 per fortnight for the entirety of the period, and substitute that  the Applicant’s debt should be reduced by $103,382.91.  In case there is any doubt, that also means I confirm the setting aside of the decision of the original reviewer raising a debt of $163,355.11, noting that the Applicant now has a debt of $59,972.20.

55.     I certify that the preceding 54 (fifty-four) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of A G Melick AO SC, Deputy President.


........................[sgd]..............................

Associate

Dated: 20 July 2020

Date of hearing: 25 June 2020
Applicant: By telephone
Solicitor for the Respondent: Mr A Quanchi