Webster & Webster
[2024] FedCFamC1F 448
•2 July 2024
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Webster & Webster [2024] FedCFamC1F 448
File number(s): SYC 3385 of 2023 Judgment of: BRASCH J Date of judgment: 2 July 2024 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – INTERIM PROPERTY – Where the wife sought a range of s 114(3) injunctions enjoining the husband from declaring or dealing with dividends and his loan account, conditional upon information being provided to her along with some permitted transactions -Where the wife has a serious issue to be tried – Where balance of convenience does not favour the granting of the injunctions – No orders made – Wife’s application dismissed – Costs reserved to trial. Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 75(2)(o), 114(3) Cases cited: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill [2006] HCA 46; (2006) 227 CLR 57
M v DB [2006] FamCA 1380; (2006) FLC 93-293
Palmer v Parbery [2019] QCA 27; (2019) 136 ASCR 26
Patterson v BTR Engineering (Aust) Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 319
Sieling and Sieling [1979] FamCA 23; (1979) FLC 90-627
Skyworks v 32 Drummoyne Road [2017] NSWSC 343
Tsiang & Wu and Ors [2019] FamCAFC 128; (2019) FLC 93-911
Waugh v Waugh [2000] FamCA 1183; (2000) FLC 93-052
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 52 Date of hearing: 28 June 2024 Place: Sydney Counsel for the Applicant: Mr North SC Solicitor for the Applicant: Broun Abrahams Burreket Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Cummings SC Solicitor for the Respondent: Pearson Emerson Family Lawyers ORDERS
SYC 3385 of 2023 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MS WEBSTER
Applicant
AND: MR WEBSTER
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
BRASCH J
DATE OF ORDER:
2 JULY 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The wife’s Application in a Proceeding filed 24 June 2024 is dismissed.
2.The parties’ costs of and incidental to the Application in a Proceeding filed 24 June 2024 is reserved to the trial Judge, and it is certified it was appropriate for both parties to engage Senior Counsel.
AND IT IS NOTED:
A.The parties are attending a mediation on 30 August 2024.
B.If the matter does not resolve, it is next listed for a Case Management Hearing on 20 September 2024.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BRASCH J:
These are my ex tempore reasons, which I will correct for any grammatical errors and to make the spoken word more amendable to writing.
On Friday just gone, being 28 June 2024, I heard the wife’s Application in a Proceeding wherein she sought to restrain the husband in relation to dividends declared and proposed to be declared by D1 Pty Ltd in favour of its sole shareholder the Webster Family Trust, and, the distributions made and proposed to be made to the husband as a beneficiary of the Webster Family Trust, without giving the wife 21 days’ notice of any such proposed transactions and save for some specific purposes (e.g. paying tax), which she permitted. I will turn to the specific form of the orders sought in due course.
The husband opposes the Application in a Proceeding and seeks its dismissal.
When the Application in a Proceeding was filed on 24 June 2024, the wife sought an urgent hearing before 1 July 2024 to deal with a dividend the husband proposed to declare on that date. However, by the time of oral submissions the urgency fell away with the wife’s Senior Counsel highlighting they were not seeking to enjoin the husband from declaring the 1 July 2024 dividend and appropriately accepted “the sky would not fall down” if I was unable to deliver judgment on 1 July 2024.
Background
The wife was born in 1959 and the husband in 1949.
The parties married in 1986 and separated on 10 February 2016. Obviously, this was a relationship of some 30 years with 8 years post-separation.
The parties have two adult children between them being Ms B and Mr C. The husband has three adult children from an earlier marriage, Mr E, Ms F and Mr G.
It is uncontroversial that the parties stand possessed of a handsome asset pool: just over $294 million on the wife’s case and almost $211 million on the husband’s. The wife contends, without demur at least before me on Friday, the husband controls 90 per cent of the asset pool. The wife seeks an adjustment of 50 per cent of the property pool on a final basis and the husband proposes she receive 30 per cent (Affidavit of the Husband filed 27 June 2024, paragraph 57). On a worst case for the wife, as the competing balance sheets currently stand, 30 percent of almost $211 million is $63.3 million, on a best case, 50 per cent of just over $294 million is a little more than $147 million.
The parties’ wealth stems from the Webster Group. It is common ground that the Webster Group conducts business in and around City H and Region J. The Webster Group includes entities such as D1 Pty Ltd and the Webster Family Trust (“the Trust”). The husband is the Chairman of the Group.
In 2022, the husband made payments totalling $5.15 million to help his three brothers. Proceedings were not on foot at that time. The wife complains about this now and points to it as conduct which would support the injunctions she now seeks. She says she was not consulted about this at the time and only discovered the payments when the husband disclosed his personal CBA account statements in April 2024.
The wife commenced these proceedings by way of Initiating Application filed on 15 May 2023.
In December 2023, the husband gave notice to the wife of his intention to declare a dividend as follows:
The Directors of [D1 Pty Ltd] propose to pay a dividend of $50 million to its shareholder, the [Webster Family Trust], effective […] December 2023. The Trustee of the [Webster Family Trust] proposes to then distribute this in full to our client. This will provide our client with funds to pay out the mortgage on the [K Building] which has a current balance of about $28 million, and to provide him with funds to meet his other obligations as they arise. It will crystallise a liability of our client personally to pay top up tax of $12,113,524. The Directors of [D1 Pty Ltd] reserve their position as to further dividends being distributed to our client in the ordinary course of business.
(emphasis added)
(Affidavit of the Wife filed 20 June 2024, Exhibit MW-2-1)
The wife read that notice to mean the husband would pay out the mortgage on the K Building from that dividend. I agree that is a sensible reading on her part. The parties are agreed that the K Building will be transferred to the wife, unencumbered, as part of a final property adjustment. Accordingly, the wife took no steps to stop that transaction.
However, when the wife read the husband’s trial affidavit of April 2024, she said she became aware that the K Building mortgage was not paid out. Instead, the wife says the full amount was distributed from the Trust to the husband in his personal capacity “by way of payment to his loan account with the Trust” (Affidavit of the Wife filed 20 June 2024, paragraph 25). The husband seems to agree the mortgage was not paid out and the money (or parts thereof) sit in his loan account.
The husband caused a second letter to be sent to the wife on 20 December 2023, giving notice he intended to make gifts to the three adult children from an earlier marriage. Whilst no specific sums were mentioned, the wife deposed, “it was apparent that it would be a total sum in the millions of dollars” (Affidavit of the Wife filed 20 June 2024, paragraph 17).
In December 2023, the wife advised the husband she did not agree with matrimonial assets being used to make payments to the three children from the husband’s earlier marriage. The wife sought an undertaking he not do so. The husband declined saying there was no basis for the wife to oppose the gifts.
In mid-January 2024 the wife again confirmed her opposition to any gifting. The husband confirmed he would proceed with the gifts and advised the monies would be loaned back from the adult children to the Webster Group.
In February 2024 the wife asked for information about the $50 million dividend of December 2023. In reply, the husband confirmed it had been paid and the wife said he also disclosed for the first time (according to her) that the December 2023 $50 million was to be the first in a series of dividends totalling $200 million the husband proposed to declare starting with the one in December 2023 and then in July 2024, July 2025 and July 2026 (“the dividend policy”). The husband’s December 2023 letter (extracted above) did refer to making further distributions but in a general way, reserving the rights of the directors of the corporate entity to do so.
The wife complained this dividend policy was a significant change from how the husband had previously operated the Group and submitted it was designed to crystalise tax liabilities to reduce the pool available for distribution.
The husband said he had long permitted retained earnings to remain in the Webster Group to fund developments and to keep low levels of debt. However, he deposed:
It is no longer possible or prudent for me to pursue this business strategy following the commencement of these proceedings and in view of the property settlement I will have to effect with [Ms Webster].
(Affidavit of the Husband filed 27 June 2024, paragraph 17)
In February 2024, the wife also asked about the gifts made to the adult children of the husband’s first marriage. In April 2024, the husband disclosed various documents, which indicated Trusts for the three adult children from his first marriage were established in early 2024. The husband also confirmed $13,143,477 was gifted to these adult children via their respective Trusts, and $11,943,477 was to be loaned back to the Webster Group. The wife also points to this transaction as conduct supporting the making of the injunctions sought. The wife proposes the gifts be added back to the pool (see Item 30 in Balance Sheet attached to the wife’s affidavit, albeit that is now an incorrect sum).
On 25 April 2024, the wife was served with the husband’s trial affidavit. I have already referred to that wherein the wife said this was when she became aware that the December 2023 dividend had not been used to pay out the mortgage encumbering the K Building, contrary to her reading of the husband’s first letter of December 2023 (extracted above).
The wife then asked for information about how the $50 million December 2023 dividend was applied. The husband responded on 8 May 2024 that the wife had:
Your client has misconstrued the statements made in our letter of […] December 2023 in respect of the $50,000,000 dividend paid by [D1 Pty Ltd] to the [Webster Family Trust] and the distribution of those funds to our client. Our client did not say that he intended to pay out the mortgage on the [K Building] immediately upon receipt of the distribution. (Emphasis in Original)
(Affidavit of the Wife filed 20 June 2024, Exhibit MW-2-13 at p. 49 of 57)
In his affidavit for this hearing the husband deposed:
I did not inform [Ms Webster] that I would be immediately paying out the mortgage on the [K Building], and I object to doing so before our final property settlement. The [Webster Group] is servicing the interest payments which are a tax-deductible expense.
(Affidavit of the Husband filed 27 June 2024, paragraph 61)
I consider both the husband’s 8 May 2024 letter and paragraph from his affidavit referred to in the previous two paragraphs to be weasel word responses on the husband’s part and conclude it was well open for the wife to read the first December 2023 letter from the husband to mean the K Building mortgage would be paid out from that dividend. However, the husband has not resiled from the position that the wife receive the building unencumbered. The K Building has not been alienated from the pool by the husband; the mortgage remains, as do sufficient funds to meet it.
The wife denied misconstruing the meaning of the husband’s December 2023 letter and asked that the balance of the December 2023 dividend be applied to the K Building mortgage. She also asked for information about how the husband would apply the July 2024 dividend. The husband deposed to this in his affidavit of 27 June 2024 at paragraphs 19 and 20.
In June 2024, the wife sought undertakings from the husband with respect to securing $28 million for the K Building mortgage and that he would not cause any further dividends be declared without providing the wife with 21 days’ notice. The husband declined saying almost $39 million of the $50 million December 2023 dividend remained undrawn from his loan account with the Trust.
The parties are due to attend a further mediation on 30 August 2024.
Material
The parties relied upon the documents set out in their Case Outlines.
Legal Principles
The application proceeded under s 114(3) of the Act which provides for the following exercise of discretion:
A court exercising jurisdiction under this Act in proceedings other than proceedings to which subsection (1) applies may grant an injunction, by interlocutory order or otherwise (including an injunction in aid of the enforcement of a decree), in any case in which it appears to the court to be just or convenient to do so and either unconditionally or upon such terms and conditions as the court considers appropriate.
In Tsiang & Wu and Ors [2019] FamCAFC 128; (2019) FLC 93-911, the Full Court summarised the relevant law in relation to injunctions in the following terms:
20. The grant of an injunction is discretionary and the basis on which such an order is made is well established. A purpose, as in this case, is to preserve the status quo pending resolution of the controversy. An applicant must demonstrate first that there is a serious issue to be tried. While that statement has been the subject of various iterations, in essence it requires the demonstration of an arguable case or as was said in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill [2006] HCA 46; (2006) 227 CLR 57 at [65], the applicant must “show a sufficient likelihood of success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo”.
21. Next the applicant must demonstrate that the balance of convenience favours making the order sought. As part of this, the applicant must show that there is a “danger” or risk of dissipation of or dealings with assets which will frustrate any judgment in favour of the applicant.
22. In Patterson v BTR Engineering (Aust) Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 319, Gleeson CJ said after discussing the discretionary nature of the remedy at 321–325:
... as a general rule a plaintiff will need to establish, first, a prima facie cause of action against the defendant, and secondly, a danger that, by reason of the defendant’s absconding, or of assets being removed out of the jurisdiction or disposed of within the jurisdiction or otherwise dealt with in some fashion, the plaintiff, if he succeeds, will not be able to have his judgment satisfied.
...
It is not difficult to imagine situations in which justice and equity would require the granting of an injunction to prevent dissipation of assets pending the hearing of an action even though the risk of such dissipation may be assessed as being somewhat less probable than not.
23. As McDougall J in Skyworks v 32 Drummoyne Road [2017] NSWSC 343 said:
The Court is required to undertake a qualitative evaluation of all the evidence that is available, to see if there is a sufficiently serious risk of frustration to justify the making of a freezing order. Further, the two considerations [namely, (1) whether there is a good arguable case and (2) whether there is a real risk of judgment frustration] should be analysed together (as each may impact on the other), and with an appreciation of both the underlying purpose of the rule and the relative risks of granting or withholding relief – the customary discretionary calculus.
...
As to the determination of the existence of the risk and its magnitude, in Palmer v Parbery [2019] QCA 27 McMurdo JA (with whom Fraser and Gotterson JJA agreed) said:
The determination of whether there exists a sufficiently serious risk of the dissipation of assets involves the evaluation of future possibilities, rather than the ascertainment of historical facts. The risk of dissipation might justify an order although the probability of the risk eventuating is less than 50 per cent. But, as the risk of dissipation must be a real and not merely a theoretical one, it must have an evidentiary basis. Where a fact is alleged by the plaintiff in support of its case about the risk, but there is contrary evidence from the defendant, must the fact be proved to the court’s satisfaction as if the application for the freezing order was the trial of the case? In my view, a plaintiff need not do so. A freezing order is interlocutory in nature; it does not involve a final determination of the parties’ positions. Usually it is made in circumstances of urgency in which the court is unable to conduct an extensive and conclusive factual inquiry in a way which is fair to both parties. Where the factual basis for the plaintiff’s case about the risk of dissipation is disputed, the risk will commonly have to be evaluated with the recognition that the factual basis for it is in doubt. Nevertheless, the possibility of the plaintiff’s evidence being correct, considered with other facts and circumstances, might mean that there is a sufficiently serious risk of the frustration of the satisfaction of a judgment as to justify the making of a freezing order. ...
(Footnotes omitted)
It is the wife who bears the onus of satisfying the Court that the circumstances justify the making of the order (Sieling and Sieling [1979] FamCA 23; (1979) FLC 90-627 at 78,262). The wife proffered an undertaking as to damages, which factors into my discretionary decision making.
In oral submissions, the wife moved away from the idea that her orders were freezing orders: that “overstates it – she just wants to be kept informed”. However, that does not detract from the reality that the wife relies upon s 114(3) for the orders sought by her.
Serious issue to be tried
This is an interim hearing and not a determination of the final justiciable controversy. I only need be satisfied that there is a “sufficient likelihood of success” (Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill [2006] HCA 46; (2006) 227 CLR 57 at [65]); even a “weak” case may ultimately be successful at trial.
On a 30-year relationship productive of two children, no one suggested the wife failed to meet this consideration. I accept that to be so. Or, as said for the wife on Friday, “the only issue at trial is how much” she will receive. I am satisfied the wife has serious issue to be tried.
Balance of convenience
Critical to this question is whether there is any evidence before me that restraints are required to prevent the dissipation of assets which are the subject of the proceeding (Waugh v Waugh [2000] FamCA 1183; (2000) FLC 93-052 at [45]- [46]; M v DB [2006] FamCA 1380; (2006) FLC 93-293 at [46]- [49]. Cases such as those cited by the Full Court Tsiang & Wu (above) highlight the focus on asset dissipation is to ask whether any judgment in the wife’s favour (as is the case here) is at real risk of being frustrated. It is also clear that the risk must have an evidential basis (Tsiang at [27]).
The wife complains about the $5.15 million the husband gave to his brothers in 2022. It is hard to see how that sum, on either the husband’s or the wife’s pools (on a range of about $211 million to $294 million) would frustrate any judgment in the wife’s favour. It will be a matter for the wife if she seeks to add back the amount or seeks a s 75(2)(o) adjustment. If she does and succeeds, there are ample funds for her relief. I acknowledge Mr North’s submissions to the effect that why should the wife wait for the exercise of discretion [at trial], but I am exercising a different discretion now and looking at the legal principles to which I have already referred.
The wife also complains about the new dividend policy and contends it is designed to bring circa $12 million in taxation liabilities into the pool for each $50 million dividend. The parties joint balance sheet attached to the wife’s affidavit commencing at page 15 includes the December 2023 top up tax liability at Item 39. In her orders for the interim hearing on Friday, the wife proposed the husband be at liberty to pay taxation on declared dividends going forward. As the matter progresses to trial, each party will have various options open to them to argue how these liabilities ought be treated by the trial judge. In the meantime, and mindful of what McMurdo JA said in Palmer extracted above, I cannot conclude on this interim basis that lawful tax liabilities on declared dividends “mean that there is a sufficiently serious risk of the frustration of a satisfaction of a judgment as to justify the making of a freezing order …”. Again, if the trial judge finds an artifice about this, then there are ample funds available to make appropriate orders.
The husband’s conferral of more than $13 million on his adult children from an earlier marriage largely sits as a debt in the company books via the loan back to the company of almost $12 million. The husband says he was squaring up benefits made to all five of his children. Whatever the case may be found at trial, whilst those sums are not modest by any standard, they too will not frustrate any judgment in the wife’s favour. The wife proposes they be added back. It appears on the balance sheet that someone, I assume the husband, is also proposing gifts the wife made to their two children be added back too. The trial judge will have the advantage of evidence being tested and will have a range of options to deal with these gifts/loans if found to be, for example, a contrivance, wanton or reckless, or the husband evening up the position of all five of his children. The transcript from a case management hearing before a different Judge on 28 February 2024 shows the wife's [legal] representative accepted - entirely appropriately - the trial judge would have options with respect to these gifts depending on the findings made. If the wife is right, then there is more than enough in the pool to accommodate an add back or adjustment to the wife.
The husband’s new dividend policy is not something that may arise again until July 2025 and therefore, I do not consider it to be just or convenient to deal with a dividend declaration in a year’s time, which may become redundant if the parties settle their matter at mediation or have a trial. Even if final orders are not made prior to July 2025, I would simply be guessing about the parties’ circumstances that may prevail in 12 months or what might then be just or convenient. There is much force in the husband’s Senior Counsel asking “why are we even here” when it became clear the wife did not seek to enjoin the husband from causing the July 2024 dividend to be declared.
The wife also complains about various assets of the husband having decreased in value – for example, the husband’s vehicle was purchased for $485,000 at some unknown time but is now on the balance sheet at $450,000, a decrease of $35,000. She complains two vessels are worth less than the purchase price. Chattels decreasing in value is not unusual. I do not put any store on what the wife says about these chattels in terms of this present application.
I also consider the form of the orders sought by the wife are onerous and thereby cause prejudice to the husband. A linchpin of injunctions such as those under s 114(3) is to do the least that is required or to do no more than is required. The wife’s orders are as follows:
2. Until further order, pursuant to section 114(3) of the Family Law Act the Husband be and hereby is restrained from:
2.1. Doing any act or thing to cause or permit any dividend that is declared from [D1 Pty Ltd] to the [Webster Family Trust] to be distributed to any person or entity other than the husband and/or wife without first giving the solicitors for the wife 21 days’ written notice of the terms of any resolution that he would propose to support;
2.2. transferring or assigning, withdrawing from or in any way dealing with funds as may be held from time to time in his loan account or beneficiary account with the [Webster Family Trust] including any distribution that may be added to the account after the date of these Orders, other than:
2.2.1. payment of monies to discharge the indebtedness secured by mortgage over the property situation and known as [L Street], [City H] in NSW ([K Building]) owned by [D2 Pty Ltd] as trustee for [D2 Pty Ltd No 2 Trust];
2.2.2. payment of any tax liability incurred by the husband as a result of distributions received from the [Webster Family Trust];
2.2.3. transfer of monies to any interest bearing account in his personal name (interest bearing account) provided that the provisions of this order, in relation to dealing with his loan account, shall thereafter apply in the same terms to the interest bearing account and in this event he shall forthwith provide to the solicitors for the wife copies of all documents demonstrating the account to which funds are credited; and
2.2.4. any payment for which he has given written notice of [no] less than 21 days to the solicitors for the wife particularising the intended payee and the purpose of the payment;
2.3 taking any steps to cause [D1 Pty Ltd] to pay any dividends without providing 21 days’ written notice to the Wife as to the intended application of those funds; and
2.4. doing any act or thing to cause or permit further encumbrance or increased indebtedness secured by mortgage over the [K Building] without giving the solicitors for the wife no less than 21 days’ written notice.
3. Until further order the provisions of order 2 shall not apply to restrict drawings that the husband may choose to make from his loan account from the [Webster Family Trust] up to an aggregate of $1,000,000.
(Application in a Proceeding filed 24 June 2024)
As properly accepted by the wife’s Senior Counsel, there was no maths to the $1 million aggregate in proposed Order 3. He said I could make it a larger amount, but I would just be plucking figures out of the air and will not do so. It is also not clear on the face of the order how long that aggregation covers, but I was told in submissions that it was from the date of the order (if made) to trial – but the matter is not set down for trial yet. I can well imagine that $1 million may not go very far when the husband has a recreational vehicle worth $16 million with operating costs of $3 million on the wife’s case.
I also accept the husband’s submission that proposed order 2.3 is fraught as follows:
It is the degree to which he would be required to precisely identify the ultimate application of those funds that would cause him difficulty on a day-to-day basis, given that the funds will necessarily be applied for his living and other expenses including legal and accounting fees. The difficulty is unwarranted.
(Husband’s Outline of Case filed 27 June 2024, paragraph 4.1.3)
I again accept what the husband submitted about proposed order 2.2.4:
The difficulty for the Husband is order 2.2.4, in the sense that it is unnecessarily onerous, even taking into account the provisions of proposed order 3 which would allow the Husband to draw funds to a “aggregate” of $1million (over what period or how regularly is unexpressed) without the requirement of 21 days’ notice.
...
Other than ordinary business expenditure, the Husband requires access to his loan account for his living expenses. There is no principled justification for requiring the Husband to give 21 days’ notice to the Wife of the use of his loan account for meeting his living expenses. The Husband has no income source.
(Husband’s Outline of Case filed 27 June 2024, paragraphs 4.1.5, 4.1.9)
I am also not satisfied the wife would suffer hardship if I declined to make the injunctions sought by her. No submission to that effect were made, nor in the circumstances, could they be.
Disposition
Whilst I accept the wife has a serious issue to be tried, for the reasons given above, she has failed to persuade me that the balance of convenience favours the making of the injunctions, even on the proffering of an undertaking as to damages. I am not persuaded that it is just or convenient within the meaning of s 114(3) of the Act to grant the injunctions. Accordingly, I will dismiss the wife’s Application in a Proceeding filed 24 June 2024.
However before I do so, I return to the wife's oral submissions wherein it was said that calling her orders ‘freezing orders’ was "overstating it” and the wife “just wants to be kept informed”.
There was, respectfully, a paternalistic approach to the husband's affidavit that he has been very generous to the wife during the relationship and post-separation and by inference, she should just trust him - but that generosity comes from matrimonial assets in which the wife has some interest. Further, his generosity (on his case) with matrimonial assets does not negate the desirability of the husband in keeping the wife informed of his dealings; as said, she has an interest in the pool.
Both parties have ongoing obligations to make full and frank disclosure. Having sat through the hearing on Friday morning, the husband could be under no doubt that the wife wants to be informed about proposed material dealings with dividends and the loan account in a timely fashion and in advance.
He would be well advised to do so.
For these reasons, I make the Orders as set out at the start of these Reasons.
I certify that the preceding fifty-two (52) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Ex Tempore Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Brasch. Associate:
Dated: 4 July 2024
0
8
1