Webster v State of South Australia No. Scciv-03-764

WEBSTER v THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
[2003] SASC 347
Full Court: Doyle CJ, Prior, Mullighan, Debelle and Gray JJ

DOYLE CJ The appeal in this case raises the question of whether an appeal lies to the Full Court of the Supreme Court against a decision of a judge of the Supreme Court, reviewing a decision of a bail authority to grant bail, and deciding that the person should not be released on bail. If the appeal does lie, the question then arises of whether the judge erred.
The review and the appeal
On 2 June 2003 Mr Webster appeared before the Magistrates’ Court charged with a number of offences. At the time, a large number of other charges against Mr Webster were pending in the Magistrates’ Court.
Under the provisions of the Bail Act 1985 (SA) (“the Act”) Mr Webster was eligible for release on bail: see s 4. The Magistrates’ Court was a bail authority in relation to the offences: see s 5(1)(b). A Magistrate granted bail.
On 4 June 2003 the Director of Public Prosecutions filed an application for review of the decision to grant bail. That application was filed under s 14 of the Act.
On 5 June 2003 a judge of the Supreme Court heard the review. The judge revoked the bail granted and decided that Mr Webster should not be released on bail.
On 20 June 2003 Mr Webster filed a Notice of Appeal, purporting to appeal to the Full Court against that decision. An amended Notice of Appeal was filed by leave on 24 June 2003.
The Director has filed an application for an order dismissing the appeal as incompetent: see r 95.08 of the Supreme Court Rules.
The submissions for Mr Webster supporting the competence of the appeal involve a challenge to the correctness of a previous decision of the Full Court, and a challenge to firmly expressed views in two other decisions of the Full Court. Accordingly, the objection and appeal were heard by a court of five judges.
The Legislation
The Act was enacted in 1985.
Section 4 specifies persons who are eligible for release on bail. In s 5 the Act identifies the courts and persons who are, in the circumstances specified, “bail authorities” and able to grant bail. By s 5(1)(a) the Supreme Court is a bail authority. It is so constituted without reference to any particular circumstances, and accordingly is a bail authority in relation to any person eligible for release on bail. Other courts and persons are bail authorities only in the particular circumstances specified in relation to that court and person. The Act regulates the contents of a bail agreement, by which bail is granted, and the contents of a guarantee of bail. Part 3 of the Act regulates how application for bail is to be made, the matters to be considered in deciding whether to grant bail, and the terms on which bail can be granted. Part 4 provides for the review of decisions of bail authorities. Section 14(1) of the Act provides as follows:
“14. (1) A decision of a bail authority (not being the Supreme Court) is subject to review under this section.”
The section goes on to make more detailed provision relating to a bail review, and in particular requires the review to be heard “as expeditiously as possible.” Other incidental provisions are made in relation to a bail review. Part 5 of the Act deals with the enforcement and termination of bail. Part 6 of the Act contains miscellaneous provisions which it is not necessary to mention.
As can be seen from this summary, the Act comprehensively regulates eligibility for bail, the power to grant bail, the procedure for the grant of bail, the basis upon which applications for bail are to be determined, and the terms on which bail can be granted. The Act empowers the Supreme Court to review any decision of a bail authority unless the bail authority is the Supreme Court itself.
The Act makes no provision for an appeal against a decision of a bail authority or for an appeal against a decision by the Supreme Court on a bail review.
In a number of provisions the Act refers to “the Supreme Court”. There is no definition of that term, and no provision stating whether jurisdiction under the Act is to be exercised by a single judge or by the Full Court of the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court is continued in existence by s 6 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) (“the SCA”). By s 17 of the SCA the court is a court of law and equity, and has vested in it the jurisdiction that was formerly vested in or capable of being exercised by the courts of England, including the court of Queens Bench; and such other jurisdiction as is vested in or capable of being exercised by the court, and such other jurisdiction as is conferred upon the court by the SCA. Section 48 of the SCA provides in its opening part as follows:
“48 Subject to any express enactment, and to the rules of court, the jurisdiction vested in or exercisable by the court, shall be exercisable either by the Full Court or by a single judge sitting in court:…”
The section goes on to provide that certain matters should be heard by the Full Court. They include appeals from a single judge: proviso (1)(b). No other proviso is relevant to the present case.
Section 50 of the SCA is central to the present case. Relevantly, s 50 provides as follows:
“50. (1) Subject to the rules of court an appeal shall lie to the Full Court against every judgment, including every declaratory judgment entered pursuant to section 30B of this Act and any final assessment made thereon, order, or direction of a judge, whether in court or chambers, and also from the refusal of any judge to make any order:
Provided that
(1)    No appeal shall lie from…
(c)    any judgment or order which is by statute, or by agreement of the parties, final or without appeal...
……
(3)No appeal shall lie without the leave of the judge or of the Full Court from -
(a)an order on appeal from the Magistrates Court:
(b)    any interlocutory order or interlocutory judgment except in the following cases, namely: …
…
(ii)Where the liberty of the subject or the custody of infants is concerned…”
Section 63(1) of the SCA provides as follows:
“63. (1)     The practice and procedure in all criminal causes and matters, including the practice and procedure upon appeal, except as expressly altered by this Act, shall be the same as the practice and procedure in similar causes and matters before the passing of this Act.”
The issues
The first issue arises under s 50(1) of the SCA. The issue is whether the decision by the judge determining the bail review under s 14 of the Act is, for the purposes of s 50(1) of the SCA a “judgment…order or direction of a judge…”
The second issue arises under proviso (1) to s 50. It is whether, if the answer to the first issue is in the affirmative, the decision of the judge falls within proviso (1)(c) as a “judgment or order” that by the provisions of the Act (by implication, as there is no express provision in the Act) is “final or without appeal.”
There is a third issue. It is whether, if an appeal does lie, the decision of the judge is an “interlocutory order or interlocutory judgment” for the purposes of proviso (3)(b), but one in which “the liberty of the subject...is concerned” and hence appealable without leave. It did not seem to be disputed that if an appeal lay, the order of the judge was either a final order or an interlocutory order or judgment that concerned the liberty of the subject, and accordingly the leave was not required.
Finally, there are two subsidiary issues that need to be noticed.
The first is whether a decision by the Supreme Court acting as a bail authority under s 5 of the Act, as distinct from a decision made on a bail review, is appealable under s 50 of the SCA That issue does not arise directly.
The second is whether the Full Court is a bail authority for the purposes of s 5 of the Act, and accordingly able to hear an application for bail, notwithstanding a prior decision by a judge of the court, whether the judge exercised power as a bail authority under s 5 of the Act or exercised the power to conduct a bail review under s 14 of the Act. That is, could the Full Court exercise an original jurisdiction as a bail authority notwithstanding a prior decision by a judge of the court on an application for bail or on a bail review?
Is the decision a judgment or order for the purposes of s 50(1)?
It was not suggested in submissions before us that the decision by the Supreme Court on an application for bail, or on a bail review, is other than a judicial act done in the exercise of judicial power. When a judge of the Supreme Court considers an application for bail or a bail review, the judge is exercising the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: s 5(1)(a) of the Act. Accordingly, the decision in Gray v Sweatman (1987) 45 SASR 517 holding that in the particular circumstances a magistrate was not sitting as a court of summary jurisdiction when making a decision under the Act, and holding accordingly that there was no appeal from that decision under the relevant provision of the Justices Act 1921 (SA) is distinguishable and can be put to one side.
It follows that the judge’s decision on the bail review is capable of being regarded as a judgment or order for the purposes of s 50(1) of the SCA, unless there is some reason to read those words in s 50 as not extending to such a decision.
Two such arguments were advanced.
The first is that s 50 of the SCA has not been treated, and should not be treated, as applying to a decision on an application for bail, or on a bail review. It is argued that such a decision involves the exercise of criminal jurisdiction of a kind falling outside the reach of s 50. Implicit in this argument is a submission that s 50 should not be read as applying to decisions in “criminal causes and matters”, the language used in s 63 of the SCA, or perhaps more generally to decisions made in matters that are linked to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction.
The Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (“the CLCA”) regulates appeals and the reservation of relevant questions, arising out of a trial on information in the Supreme Court: see ss 350, 352 and 354A of the CLCA. It is clear that a decision by a Supreme Court judge on an application for bail, or on a bail review, cannot be the subject of an appeal under s 352 or s 354A, and will not give rise to a “relevant question” for the purposes of s 350. The submission is that while it is accepted that s 50 of the SCA does not refer to judgments and orders referred to in these provisions of the CLCA, nor does it refer to a wider category of judgments and orders.
The second submission, to which I will come later, is that the Act by implication in any event, excludes a right of appeal, and is to be read as making the decision of the judge “final or without appeal” for the purposes of proviso (1)(c) to s 50(1) of the SCA. On this submission, even if the decision of the judge on an application for bail or on a bail review is a judgment or order for the purposes of s 50(1), a right of appeal is excluded by proviso (1)(c).
My starting point is that, on its face, s 50(1) of the SCA is expressed in broad terms. The expressions “judgment”, “order” and “direction” are evidently intended to cover a wide range of judicial decisions. A provision that confers jurisdiction on a court is to be construed “with all the amplitude that the ordinary meaning of its words admits”: Roy Morgan Research Centre Pty Limited vCommissioner of State Revenue of the State of Victoria [2001] HCA 49; (2001) 207 CLR 72 at [11]. Accordingly, there is no reason to give a narrow reading to the expressions found in s 50(1) of the SCA. This is the case even though s 63 of the SCA (set out above) and the provisions of the CLCA referred to above make it clear that s 50(1) has little or no application to decisions made in connection with a trial on information in the Supreme Court, and is of limited application to “criminal causes and matters”.
Before the Act was enacted the Supreme Court exercised an original inherent jurisdiction in relation to the grant of bail to persons charged with an offence before any court of the State. An application for bail could be made to the Supreme Court, even if the court before which the person was charged had jurisdiction to grant bail. Such an application could be made to a single judge of the Supreme Court or to the Full Court, and in the latter event the Full Court was exercising the same original inherent jurisdiction, and not an appellant jurisdiction: see Tobin v Minister for Correctional Services (1980) 24 SASR 389 at 390-393. At least in South Australia, the application could be made by issuing an originating summons (or under the later Rules a summons) supported by an affidavit. The procedure of habeas corpus remained available but the simpler procedure of a summons supported by affidavit had supplanted habeas corpus as a matter of practice: Tobin at 392.
Before the enactment of the Act there was no decision in South Australia supporting the view that a decision by a Supreme Court judge on an application for bail was subject to appeal under s 50 of the SCA. The possibility of an appeal was referred to but not considered by the Full Court in Tobin at 392. In Panagiotidis v Jakacic (1986) 41 SASR 591 at 592, the Full Court again noted that when the Bail Act was passed the question of whether s 50 gave rise to a right of appeal to the Full Court was “unresolved”.
Observations have been made in decisions in other states, suggesting that a decision to grant or refuse bail, in the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, is not subject to appeal under the provisions in other states equivalent to s 50 of the SCA.
In Jure Maric v The Queen [1981] 2 NSWLR 100 at 102 Street CJ, with whom the other two members of the court agreed, said:
“The position, in my view, is clear that prior to the recent Bail Act there was no jurisdiction in the Supreme Court to entertain an appeal from a bail application.”
He referred with apparent approval to an observation that an expression such as “criminal causes and matters” in s 63 of the SCA was to be read widely, and apparently considered that a provision similar to s 63 indicated that no appeal lay.
In Beljajev and Anor v Director of Public Prosecutions(Victoria)and Anor, (unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Appeal Division, 8 August 1991) the court said (at 10) that “at common law an accused person seeking bail had no right of appeal against refusal of bail, or grant of bail on unacceptable conditions”. On the other hand in Lim v Gregson [1989] WAR 1 the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia held that s 58 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), a general appeal provision different from but not unlike s 50 of the SCA, conferred a right of appeal against a decision made under of a provision of the Criminal Code, which empowered the Supreme Court or a judge thereof to admit a person to bail: at 11, 23 and 34. The court so decided even though a contrary assumption had long been made: see at 7, 34. There was no local provision similar to s 63 of the SCA. In Jemielita v The Queen (1994) 12 WAR 362 the Full Court, in holding that a right of appeal existed in relation to a decision made under the Bail Act, 1982 (WA) followed the decision just referred to.
In Fernandez v Director of Public Prosecutions [2002] VSCA 115; (2002) 5 VR 374 the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria, while reversing the decision in Beljajev in part, referred to appeal rights as being “anomalous” in the context of the common law history of bail, bearing in mind the ability of the person in custody to make successive applications for bail: at [19].
While this survey of the case law suggests that, prior to the Act, s 50 of the SCA did not confer a right of appeal against a decision by a Supreme Court judge on an application for bail, existing authority is certainly not decisive on the question.
It is clear, as I have earlier indicated, that s 50 of the SCA has no application to an order made or refused in proceedings by way of information in this court, which proceedings involve the exercise of the original criminal jurisdiction of the court referred to in s 17 of the SCA: R v Garrett (1988) 49 SASR 435 at 439 Cox J, with whom the other two members of the court agreed. Decisions in such matters are regulated exclusively by the CLCA. On this point see also the analysis by Zelling J of the history of the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in criminal matters in the The Queen v Millhouse (1980) 24 SASR 555 at 560-566. In that decision the Full Court also held that s 49 of the SCA, which gives a judge “sitting in the exercise of any jurisdiction” power to reserve a case or point for consideration of the Full Court, did not apply to proceedings tried by way of information in the Supreme Court. The court relied in part on the provision in s 63 of the SCA to the effect that practice and procedure “in all criminal causes and matters” was to be unaltered by the passing of the SCA.
But it has also been recognised that s 63 does not operate to exclude all application of s 50 of the SCA to matters that might be regarded as criminal. In particular, the provisions of s 50 of the SCA apply to orders made by a judge of the Supreme Court on appeal from decisions made by magistrates in the exercise of summary criminal jurisdiction: Millhouse at 559, Mitchell J; Garrett at 445 and Panagiotidis at 591-592.
But Millhouse and Garrett were each concerned with a case in which the original criminal jurisdiction of the court was clearly being exercised, not with a decision in relation to bail. And in Millhouse the court was not concerned to decide whether or not the reference to “criminal causes and matters” in s 63, which was clearly treated as influential, extended to applications for bail.
Finally, I should add that in Panagiotidis at 592 King CJ expressed the view that it was undesirable
“… that the ultimate disposal of the question of bail should be delayed by the appeal process.”
He said that decisions as to bail relate to a “temporary and often fluid situation”, and that decisions could often be overtaken by events while an appeal was pending. I agree generally with that. These observations were made in the context of concluding that the procedure for bail review provided by the Act was intended as the exclusive remedy, and reflected an intention to exclude review by way of appeal. Clearly enough, in most situations an expeditious review involving a fresh consideration of the facts will be more appropriate than an appeal.
On the other hand, there are matters supporting the conclusion that s 50(1) of the SCA should be read as applying to decisions made by a judge on an application for bail or on a bail review.
Although an application for bail usually arises in the context of criminal proceedings, the application itself does not appear to invoke the traditional criminal jurisdiction conferred by s 17 of the SCA and reflected in the provisions of the CLCA. In particular, in deciding an application for bail, prior to the enactment of the Act, the Supreme Court was not exercising its jurisdiction to try an information. It was exercising a distinct inherent common law jurisdiction. Since the enactment of the Act, the Supreme Court is exercising a statutory jurisdiction conferred by the Act. As well, as the court noted in Tobin, the procedure of applying for bail in the Supreme Court, by issuing a summons supported by affidavit, was the successor to the earlier procedure of habeas corpus. The issue of the writ of habeas corpus has not been regarded as involving an exercise of criminal jurisdiction unless it acquired that character from the kind of proceedings that led to it being used. Nor is the grant of bail always linked to the exercise of a court’s general criminal jurisdiction. Bail can be granted to a person who is a witness in civil proceedings, and is arrested to ensure his or her attendance: see s 35 of the SCA and s 4 (1)(e) and (f) of the Act. On the other hand I note that in Lim v Gregson Malcolm CJ treated the jurisdiction to grant or refuse bail under the Criminal Code as a proceeding which was a “criminal proceeding” because it involved the exercise of “miscellaneous criminal jurisdiction” under the relevant rules: at 5-6. Similarly, in Fernandez Winneke P, with whom the other members of the court agreed, treated a decision under s 18A of the Bail Act 1977 (Vic), allowing an appeal by the Director of Public Prosecutions against a grant of bail, as “a matter of criminal practice and procedure” and, apparently, as a “criminal matter’ for the purposes of s 17 of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic).

I now attempt to draw these threads together. In this State, there is no decision holding that the reference to “judgment” and “order” cannot apply to a decision made on an application for bail under the inherent jurisdiction of the court, or to such a decision or a decision on a bail review under the Act. The question remains open. Judges of this court have made observations suggesting that s 63 of the SCA, which preserves existing practice and procedure “in all criminal causes and matters” has a fairly wide reach, but none of those observations were directed to the situation now before the court. Observations have been made in this State and elsewhere to the effect that, at least in relation to the common law position, the concept of a right of appeal against a decision relating to bail is anomalous, having regard to the ability of a person in custody to make repeated applications for bail, going from judge to judge. It has also been said that the situation in matters relating to bail is fluid, and that a remedy by way of appeal is inconvenient and inappropriate.
On the other hand, the decision of the High Court in Roy Morgan reminds us that, as a starting point, the words of a provision like s 50(1) of the SCA are to be read without any tendency towards restriction. It should also be said that while the ability to renew an application for bail at (common law), and the ability to seek a review under the Act, would in most situations make resort to an appeal unnecessary, there may well be situations in which the availability of a remedy by way of appeal would be beneficial. For example, if judges of the court were to take a different view on an issue of principle relating to the grant of bail, the appropriate way to resolve that, and possibly the only satisfactory way, would be by way of appeal under s 50, unless it were possible to reserve a case or point of law for consideration of the Full Court under s 49 of the SCA. If it is possible to invoke s 49, it is difficult to see why it should not be equally possible to invoke s 50. In short, the occasion to invoke a right of appeal in relation to a decision on bail might be rare, but one should be slow to conclude from that that such a right does not exist.
My conclusion is that at common law and under the Bail Act a decision by a judge of the Supreme Court in relation to bail can be a “judgement” or “order” for the purposes of s 50(1) of the SCA. I so conclude on the basis that the words used are wide in their reach, and there is no good reason to read them down so as to exclude a decision of the kind referred to. This conclusion may conflict with the tenor of observations previously made by judges of this court, but so far as I am aware my conclusion is not contrary to any decided case.
Does the Bail Act nevertheless make the decision “final or without appeal”?
In Panagiotidis this Court held that the Act excluded a right of appeal, because no right of appeal was provided by the Act, and because in the circumstances the inference should be drawn that Parliament’s intention was to exclude any right of appeal. Accordingly, the Bail Act was to be read as making a decision by a Supreme Court judge in relation to bail “final or without appeal” for the purposes of proviso (1)(c) to s 50(1) of the SCA: Panagiotidis at 592-593. Reduced to its essentials, the reasoning of King CJ was as follows. First the Act is a code in relation to bail. It makes no provision for appeals. It gives a quick and expeditious remedy by way of review. The Act provides specifically that there can be no review when the bail authority is the Supreme Court. Therefore, by implication, the remedy of review is intended to replace or negate any possible appeal, and the exclusion of a right of review in relation to a decision of the Supreme Court implies that there is to be no remedy in relation to such a decision.
Accordingly, King CJ held that even if a right of appeal would otherwise arise under s 50 of the SCA, the Act intended to exclude any such right.
The first question that arises is whether the Act is a code. In particular, what precisely does it mean to say that the Act is a code? A conclusion that the Act is a code is a conclusion that it governs exclusively the topic or subject matter that it regulates, and relevantly that the only remedies to be permitted in relation to that matter are the remedies provided by the Act.
Clearly enough the Act regulates the ability to grant bail, the procedure for seeking bail, the basis upon which applications for bail are to be considered, the enforcement and termination of bail and some miscellaneous matters. The intention of Parliament appears to be to regulate those fields comprehensively and exclusively. That would imply that the inherent jurisdiction to entertain an application for bail has been replaced or displaced, although, somewhat surprisingly, the Act is silent on the point. It would be odd if that earlier inherent jurisdiction survived the enactment of detailed provisions such as are found in the Bail Act. It would be equally odd and inconvenient if the earlier inherent jurisdiction were treated as surviving, modified in particular aspects of its exercise only to the extent necessary to give effect to the provisions of the Act.
For those reasons, I respectfully agree that, generally, the Act is a code on the topic of bail. By this I mean that the Act is a code on the topic of the power to grant bail, and the procedure to be followed in connection with the grant of bail, on the terms on which bail is to be granted and on enforcement and termination of bail.
However, to my mind at least, that leaves the question of whether any and what implication is to be drawn from the fact that the Act confers an expeditious remedy by way of review in s 14, and is silent on the question of a right of appeal to the Full Court from a decision of a judge of the Supreme Court.
It does not follow from the fact that the Act regulates exclusively some aspects of the law relating to bail, that it regulates exclusively all aspects of the law relating to bail.
In my opinion no particular inference should be drawn from the bare fact that the Act makes no reference to a right of appeal. There is no need for it to do so. The general provisions of s 50 are intended, surely, to make it unnecessary in a case like this to provide specifically for a right of appeal.
If Parliament intended that a decision by the Supreme Court under the Act is to be “final or without appeal”, that intention must be inferred from the provision of a remedy by way of bail review, and from the further provision that that remedy is not available when the bail authority is the Supreme Court. As I have already indicated, the conclusion by King CJ that these provisions did exclude any remedy by way of appeal, was influenced by his conclusion that a right of appeal in this area would be inappropriate and anomalous.
I must say, with respect, that I do not share that conclusion, although I unhesitatingly accept that the situations in which an appeal rather than a review would be an appropriate remedy will be very few indeed. However, I acknowledge that there is force in it, and that this is an issue on which minds can easily differ.
It is not difficult to conclude that Parliament intended the Statutory Review under s 14 of the Act to be the sole means of reviewing or correcting a decision on bail by a bail authority other than the Supreme Court. Although we did not hear detailed submissions on this point, my tentative conclusion from a survey of the relevant legislation is that there are situations in which a decision by a magistrate on an application for bail by a person charged with an offence would not be open to appeal under the Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA), and that a decision on an application for bail by an arrested witness in a civil action or criminal action would not be appealable under s 40 or s 42 of the Magistrates Court Act. Nor does there appear to be a right of appeal against a decision by a District Court judge on an application for bail by a person being tried on information before that court, or by a witness arrested to compel that person’s attendance for the purpose of a civil action or a criminal action: see s 43 of the District Court Act 1991 (SA), and the provisions of the CLCA. In that setting it is easy to conclude that Parliament enacted s 14 of the Act to provide a prompt remedy in relation to a decision by a bail authority other than the Supreme Court. It is equally easy to conclude that Parliament intended it as the only remedy in relation to such a decision.
The exclusion of a decision of the Supreme Court acting as a bail authority from s 14 is understandable. There appears to be nothing in the Bail Act to prevent a second or later application to the Supreme Court to review a decision of the bail authority, and so any change in circumstances can be accommodated by a further review application. This possibility was contemplated by King CJ in Panagiotidis: at 592. As well, and this is the more likely course of events, a further application for bail can always be made to the original or primary bail authority. Another reason why Parliament would not have provided for a review of a decision by the Supreme Court acting as a bail authority is that it would not be appropriate for one judge of the court to review the decision of another judge of the court. Bearing all that in mind, is it appropriate to conclude that Parliament intended not only to exclude a review of a decision by the Supreme Court as a bail authority, but also to exclude a right of appeal that would otherwise be available under s 50(1) of the SCA?
If the provisions made by s 14(1) of the Act are explicable on the basis outlined above, there is no obvious reason for inferring an intention to exclude a right of appeal. Nor, as I have said, am I persuaded to the view that a remedy by way of appeal would be inappropriate or anomalous in this area. There are situations in which an appeal would be an appropriate remedy. As I have said, no inference at all can be drawn from the bare fact that there is no express provision for an appeal. There was no need to do so.
Taking all those matters into account, my view is that it is not right to conclude that Parliament, by implication, intended to exclude a right of appeal otherwise available under s 50(1) of the SCA and intended to make a decision by the Supreme Court as a bail authority “final or without appeal”.
There remains the question of whether the court should now depart from the decision in Panagiotidis. The decision has stood for some time. The conclusion that there is no right of appeal has not, so far as I am aware, been productive of inconvenience or of injustice. No doubt this is because, in most situations, the ability to make a fresh application for bail or a fresh review application has provided sufficient protection. It can also be said that the point at issue is one on which minds might differ.
The practice of this court is not to depart from its earlier decisions unless satisfied that the decision is plainly wrong or that the interests of justice clearly require a departure from the earlier decision. See Nguyen and Others v Nguyen (1990) 169 CLR 245 at 258-269; Pooraka Holdings Pty Ltd v Participation Nominees Pty Ltd, McAuley and Another (1989) 52 SASR 148.
Having reflected on the matter, I consider, with respect, that the decision in Panagiotidis is plainly wrong. On reflection, I can find no reason at all to imply that Parliament intended to exclude a right of appeal. I accept that the matter is, in one sense, a matter of impression, but nevertheless I have formed a firm view. Moreover, although (as will appear) this is not a case in which the interests of justice require that a right of appeal be available, I can envisage situations in which an injustice might be done if the right of appeal were not available. The decision in Panagiotidis is not one on which people would have relied in organising their affairs. Departing from it should not cause any inconvenience.
For those reasons I would hold the decision in Panagiotidis wrong and conclude that an appeal lies. Accordingly, the objection to the competence of the appeal must fail.
I should also make the point that the present case is distinguishable from the circumstances before the High Court in Roy Morgan and before the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Fernandez. In each of those cases a right of appeal was available under the Victorian legislation unless a statute “expressly provided” otherwise. Those cases reflect a conclusion that, in particular circumstances, the absence of any reference to a right of appeal was not sufficient to conclude from that silence, that the relevant statute “expressly provided” that there should be no right of appeal.
The appeal on the merits
I can be relatively brief on the merits.
I would unhesitatingly dismiss the appeal.
The appellant has a significant criminal record. In recent times the appellant has been charged with a large number of offences, and many of these offences are alleged to have been committed while the appellant was on bail in respect of earlier charges forming part of the recent substantial sequence of charges. The appellant also faces a number of charges of breaching conditions of bail, or of not complying with the conditions of bail. Despite the personal factors that can be put in the appellant’s favour, and the fact that on a number of occasions he has answered his bail, and his needs for medical treatment, there are strong grounds for concluding from the appellant’s recent history that, if released, he would offend again, and that he would contravene or fail to comply with conditions of bail. This conclusion can be reached even through conditions attached to a grant of bail might reduce that risk somewhat. Far from finding any error in the approach of the judge who conducted the review, I consider that his decision to refuse bail was the only appropriate decision under the circumstances.
If delay in the proceedings against Mr Webster makes the refusal of bail oppressive, a fresh application for bail can always be made. Whether it would then be appropriate to grant bail would depend on all the circumstances.
Other matters
It might be suggested that when a judge of the Supreme Court conducts a bail review under s 14(1) of the Act the judge does not act as a bail authority for the purposes of s 5 of the Act. It might be argued that a bail authority is a person or court dealing with an application for bail, not with an application for review of a decision by a bail authority. It might then be argued that while a decision to grant or refuse bail was subject to review but not to appeal, the decision on a bail review was subject to appeal, not being subject to review. In light of my conclusion, it is not necessary to pursue this argument.
Finally, there remains the possibility that the Full Court can exercise the power of a bail authority because, by s 5(1)(a) of the Act, it is the Supreme Court that is the Bail Authority. It would be consistent with the common law position to conclude that an application under the Act can be made to a single judge and, if the applicant so wishes, to the Full Court, the second application not being an application by way of appeal or by way of review, but a further application for the exercise of original power or authority to grant bail. It is not necessary to decide whether that course can be followed. First, because no such application was made to the Full Court, although that is something that could easily be remedied. The main reason for so concluding is that even were the matter to be approached that way, I would unhesitatingly refuse to grant bail, and accordingly it is unnecessary to consider whether or not the power exists.
Conclusion
For those reasons I would dismiss the appeal.
PRIOR J: In Panagiotidis v Jakacic[1], this Court held that no appeal lies to the Full Court against a refusal of bail by a judge of the Supreme Court. The Court held that decisions of a judge of this Court with respect to bail are not subject to review. In so deciding, the Court held that the Bail Act 1985 is a code for the grant and refusal of bail. The Act was said to be “clearly intended to cover the whole field of law in relation to such matters and to exclude and supersede all other legal provisions relating to bail”[2].
[1] (1986) 41 SASR 591
[2] 41 SASR 591 at 592
King CJ pointed out that it was not contemplated that the ultimate disposal of the question of bail should be delayed by an appeal process. His Honour said there were sound reasons for this. Amongst other things, an appeal procedure is inappropriate in relation to bail decisions, which can often be overtaken by events while an appeal is pending. It was the view of this Court that,
“… for sound reasons, the legislature has decided to rely upon speedy review procedures in relation to bail decisions by the lower courts and to treat bail decisions by a Supreme Court judge as final unless varied in consequence of a fresh application. The Act is intended to be a code as to the circumstances in which bail decisions may be reviewed. There being no provision for review by way of appeal, any rights of appeal which might otherwise have existed are excluded”[3].
[3] 41 SASR 591 at 592 and 593
By these proceedings, the decision of a Supreme Court judge to refuse bail is sought to be the subject of a right of appeal pursuant to s 50 of the Supreme Court Act 1935. It is contended that Panagiotidis was wrongly decided and that recent case law confirms the right of appeal to a Full Court.
The principal authority relied upon in support of this contention is a decision of the High Court. In Roy Morgan Research Centre Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (Vic)[4], the High Court held that provisions in the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) did not expressly provide, within the meaning of s 17(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) that there was no appeal to the Court of Appeal of that State from an order made by a single judge of the Supreme Court refusing or granting leave to appeal from an order made by a non-presidential tribunal.
[4] (2001) 207 CLR 72
Subsequently, in Fernandez v DPP[5], the Court of Appeal in Victoria held that previous authority of that Court excluding a right of appeal to the Full Court from a single judge’s determination on a director’s appeal against the granting of bail was incorrect.
[5] (2002) VSCA 1115
It is submitted before this Court that the reasoning of both the High Court in Roy Morgan and the Victorian Court of Appeal in Fernandez calls for this Court to overrule the decision in Panagiotidis and uphold the right of an appeal to the Full Court against the single judge’s decision to refuse bail in this case.
In my view, there is nothing in any recent authority which calls for this Court to overrule the decision in Panagiotidis. In the two cases cited, the provision in s 17(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) was of critical significance. That provides:
“Unless otherwise expressly provided by this or any other Act, an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal from any determination of the trial division constituted by a Judge.”
It was the absence of an express provision in the Victorian Bail Act excluding a right of appeal that meant that, in consequence of s 17(2), there was a right of appeal from a decision of a single judge made pursuant to s 18A of the Bail Act 1997 (Vic). No provision similarly expressed is identifiable in the relevant laws of this State. Neither the Supreme Court Act nor the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) asserts a right of appeal from any decision of a single judge “unless otherwise expressly provided” by that or any other Act.

Section 50 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) has no application to the original criminal jurisdiction of this Court[6]. It is a provision which has very little application to proceedings of a criminal nature. However, to assume contrary to the compelling reasoning of this Court in R v Millhouse[7] with respect to s 49 of that Act, that s 50 has some application to some criminal matters, besides appeals from the Magistrates Court in criminal proceedings, is not to call for a conclusion that the reference to liberty of the subject within s 50(3)(b)(ii) creates an exception to the code provisions enacted in the Bail Act in 1985.
[6] R v Garrett (1988) 49 SASR 435
[7] (1980) 24 SASR 555
In Tobin v Minister for Correctional Services[8], the inherent jurisdiction of the court to grant bail was affirmed in the absence of the statutory scheme now enshrined in the Bail Act. That decision cannot generate support for the existence of a right of appeal by reliance upon the general language within s 50(3)(b)(ii) of the Supreme Court Act. Any application of that provision beyond the civil side of this Court’s jurisdiction and into proceedings in a criminal cause or matter cannot qualify the later special Act with respect to bail. Any such possibility is ousted either because the terms of s 14 of the Bail Act are such that any bail decision of the Supreme Court is final and without appeal within (1)(c) of the proviso to s 50(1) or because any possible application of s 50(3)(b)(ii) is denied by Parliament’s later and special provisions.
[8] (1980) 24 SASR 389
The reasoning in Panagiotidis is not shown to be plainly wrong. In my view, any right of appeal which might otherwise have existed is excluded by the provisions in the later special Act with respect to bail. As King CJ put it in Panagiotidis, in the legislative scheme of the Bail Act there is “no room, ... for an appeal against the decision on review, or indeed against a decision of a Supreme Court Judge in an original application for bail[9].” The legislative scheme so enacted confers a right of review in some but not all cases. In the case of bail decisions by Supreme Court Judges, the situation as it was before the enactment of Bail Acts here and interstate is maintained. There is no appellate authority in this Court in respect of the grant or refusal of bail by a Judge of this Court[10].
[9] Panagiotidis 41 SASR 591 at 592
[10] Jure Maric v R (1981) 2 NSWLR 100 and Tobin v Minister for Correctional Services (1980) 24 SASR
There is nothing in the judgment of the High Court in Roy Morgan or the Court of Appeal in Fernandez to warrant a departure from the longstanding principles proclaimed in Panagiotidis.
The appeal should be dismissed as incompetent. If I am wrong about that and the appeal is competent, it should be dismissed for the reasons given by the Chief Justice.
MULLIGHAN J I agree that this appeal is incompetent for the reasons given by Debelle J and I also agree with the other members of the Court that if the appeal was competent it should fail on the merits.
DEBELLE J The facts and the reasons which led to this specially convened Full Court are recited in the reasons of the Chief Justice which I have had the advantage of reading. However, I do not agree with the conclusion of the Chief Justice as to the competence of this appeal. For the reasons which follow, I believe that the appeal is incompetent.
However, if I am wrong in that conclusion and the appeal is competent, I agree with the Chief Justice that the appeal should be dismissed. There is no merit in the application for bail. The appellant has an appalling history of re-offending while on bail. In my view, it is clear that Sulan J was entirely correct in deciding not to grant bail to the appellant.
The Issues
There are essentially two questions in this appeal. Each stems from the terms of s 50 of the Supreme Court Act 1935. The first arises under para (c) of the proviso to s 50(1), namely, whether a decision of the Supreme Court as a reviewing authority under the Bail Act is a judgment or order which is final or without appeal. The second stems from s 50(3)(b) which provides, among other things, that there is no appeal except by leave from an interlocutory order or interlocutory judgment except where the liberty of the subject is concerned.
The Scheme of the Bail Act
It is convenient to examine first the relevant provisions of the Bail Act, 1985. It establishes a régime for the expeditious handling of applications for bail and for review of decisions granting or refusing bail. However, to conclude that the Bail Act is a code begs the question whether the Bail Act precludes a right of appeal to the Full Court. The conclusion that it is a code for the grant and refusal of bail is a step in the reasoning but it is not itself conclusive of the issue. The resolution of the question whether the Bail Act precludes a right of appeal turns, I think, on the plain words of s 14 of the Act and on the overall scheme and policy of the Act.
Before examining the meaning of s 14, I consider the scheme of the Bail Act.
Section 5 of the Bail Act constitutes bail authorities. It is sufficient for present purposes to note that bail authorities include the Supreme Court and a court before which a person eligible to bail has been charged with the offence in respect of which that person has been taken into custody. Thus, bail authorities include the Supreme Court, the District Court and the Magistrates Court. They also include a police officer in circumstances where the applicant has been arrested but has not appeared before a court charged with the offence that led to the arrest.
Section 14 provides for the review of decisions of bail authorities. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note only s 14(1), (2) and (5):
“       14. (1) A decision of a bail authority (not being the Supreme Court) is subject to review under this section.
(2)    A review may be carried out under this section on the application of the Crown, the person applying for release on bail or, where the person applying for release on bail is a child, the child or a guardian of the child —
(a)     by the Supreme Court; or
(b)    where the decision subject to review is a decision of a member of the police force or a court constituted of justices — by a magistrate. …
(5)    The reviewing authority must hear and determine an application under this section as expeditiously as possible.”
Thus, the Bail Act provides for two reviewing authorities only. They are the Supreme Court and a magistrate. It is not apparent why s 14(2) refers to the Supreme Court in para (a) but to a magistrate in para (b). However, I do not think anything turns on that difference in expression. Thus, the Supreme Court and a magistrate are both bail authorities and reviewing authorities.
When considering the meaning and operation of s 14, it is necessary to note also s 15A of the Bail Act which provides a means of reviewing a decision of a magistrate where the magistrate has acted as a reviewing authority.
“ 15A. (1) Subject to this section, a decision of a magistrate on a review of a decision of a bail authority is subject to review by the Supreme Court.
(2) A review may be carried out under this section on the application of the Crown, the person applying for release on bail or, where the person applying for release on bail is a child, the child or a guardian of the child.
(3) A review under this section may only occur with leave of the Supreme Court (which should only be granted where it appears that there may have been some error of law or fact).”
Thus, the Bail Act provides for two sets of circumstances in which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review bail decisions by a magistrate. The first is where the magistrate has made a decision as a bail authority in which case there is a right to apply pursuant to s 14 for review of the magistrate’s decision. The second is where the magistrate has made a decision as a reviewing authority pursuant to s 14 in which case the applicant for the review must obtain leave of the Supreme Court to do so.
Two other aspects of the scheme of the Bail Act may be identified.
(1) The first is that the refusal of an application for release on bail does not preclude further applications for bail: s 12(2). Ordinary prudence dictates that a fresh application would not be made unless circumstances have changed in a way which would justify a fresh application. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a fresh application even in the absence of a change in circumstances.
(2) The second is that the scheme is intended to create an expeditious process. Section 14(5) provides that the reviewing authority must hear and determine an application under s 14 as expeditiously as possible. For example, an application for release on bail may be made to a police officer by a person who has been arrested and, if bail is refused, the applicant may promptly apply to a magistrate to review that decision. The decision of the magistrate may be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Both the magistrate and the Supreme Court must act expeditiously by reason of the terms of s 14(5). The prompt handling of applications for bail is also made possible by s 15 which provides for applications for review to be made to magistrates by telephone.
It is apparent, therefore, that the Bail Act is a code. Shortly stated, the code provides a scheme by which persons may apply for bail, for bail authorities to decide whether to grant or refuse bail, and for the review of those decisions. The essential aspects of the scheme are
•       that persons who are in custody may apply for bail;
•       according to circumstances, the application for bail may be made to a police officer, to a magistrate, to a judge of the District Court, or to a judge of the Supreme Court;
•       two only reviewing authorities exist – a magistrate and a judge of the Supreme Court;
•       magistrates have jurisdiction to review decisions of police officers or of a court constituted by Justices of the Peace;
•       the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review decisions of all bail authorities, a jurisdiction usually exercised by a single judge;
•       an application for review of a bail decision may be made by either the Crown or by the person applying for bail;
•       applications to review a bail decision must be heard and determined as expeditiously as possible;
•       the refusal of a bail application does not preclude further applications with the consequence that, if the fresh application is made to a bail authority other than the Supreme Court, there is a right to apply to the Supreme Court for review of that decision.
The review procedure provided by the Bail Act is a special procedure which stands separate and apart from the rights of appeal which already exist from decisions of magistrates and decisions of judges of the District Court to the Full Court of this Court: see s 40 of the Magistrates Court Act and s 43 of the District Court Act. The Bail Act provides a more certain and a quicker process of review. It is more certain in that it removes questions as to whether a decision on a bail review application is an interlocutory order or judgment. It also removes questions as to whether an appeal from the grant or refusal of bail is a civil or criminal proceeding. It is quicker in that the Act expressly requires bail review applications to be handled expeditiously. Bail review applications are heard as soon as the parties are ready whereas appeals under either the Magistrates Court Act or the District Court Act may take some time to be heard.
This unduly lengthy examination of the scheme of the Bail Act assists in determining the meaning and effect of s 14(1). It is convenient to repeat that provision.
“ 14. (1) A decision of a bail authority (not being the Supreme Court) is subject to review under this section.”
In my view, the expression “(not being the Supreme Court)” is intended to exclude from review decisions of the Supreme Court as a bail authority. The intent of s 14(1) could equally well have been expressed in these terms:
“A decision of a bail authority (other than the Supreme Court) is subject to review under this section.”
Or it might have been in the following terms:
“A decision of a bail authority, except where the bail authority is the Supreme Court, is subject to review under this section.”
Each of those alternatives is to the same effect. The clear intent of s 14(1) is that, when the Supreme Court is sitting as a bail authority, its decision is not subject to review. That is expressly stated. The Act does not provide any other form of review nor does it provide that an appeal lies to the Full Court from the decision of a single judge. Even if I am wrong in stating that s 14(1) expressly states that there is no appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court as a bail authority, it is manifestly clear that the necessary implication of s 14 is that decisions of the Supreme Court, when sitting as a bail authority, cannot be the subject of appeal.
It is also the clear intent of the Bail Act that decisions of a judge of the Supreme Court acting as a reviewing authority are not the subject of appeal. It would be manifestly absurd if the decision of a judge of the Supreme Court acting as a bail authority was final and not subject to appeal but the decision of the same judge acting as a reviewing authority was subject to appeal.
That is the plain meaning and effect of the words used in s 14. That conclusion is reinforced by the underlying policy of the Act to provide for prompt and expeditious handling of bail applications and prompt and expeditious disposition of applications to review decisions made by bail authorities. I have already noted how the process of review of decisions on bail applications stands separate and apart from the usual appellate process. I do not think that Parliament intended that there should be a further right to appeal to the Full Court after a magistrate has reviewed the decision of a police officer refusing bail and after a Supreme Court judge has reviewed the decision of the magistrate. Similarly, I do not think it was intended that, after the Supreme Court has reviewed a bail decision of a magistrate or of a District Court judge on a bail application, that a further right of appeal should lie to the Full Court.
This conclusion is also reinforced by the fact that s 12(2) preserves the common law right to make a fresh application for bail: see R v Adam [1924] SASR 252; R v Snow [1950] St R Qd 1; R v Pett (1957) 75 WN(NSW) 434n decisions referred to with approval in Beljajev v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (unreported, Full Court of Supreme Court of Victoria, 8 August 1991). As the Full Court demonstrated in Beljajev, rights of appeal are anomalous in the context of bail where the facts are dynamic and frequently changing. The Full Court observed that the right to make a fresh application is “entirely consistent with the needs of a factual situation, that, to a greater or lesser extent, will be undergoing change. It is self-evident that an appellate process, which necessarily involves a lapse of time, is not readily compatible with a dynamic situation which has its remedy available in the form of a fresh application on short notice”. The capacity to make a fresh application is, therefore, a more satisfactory means of dealing with changed circumstances than the appellate process. In short, the Bail Act provides both the capacity for review and the right to make a fresh application. Given those facts, it is I think beyond argument that Parliament would have intended that there should be available, in addition to all of this, a right of appeal to the Full Court which does not enable as prompt a resolution as a fresh application or an application for review.
Some further, albeit limited, support for this conclusion is to be found in s 14(5) which requires the reviewing authority to hear an application under s 14 as expeditiously as possible. That injunction does not apply in terms to an appeal to the Full Court pursuant to the Supreme Court Act. The rules of court provide a process for setting down appeals. The Full Court cannot be convened readily to deal with applications as soon as they are made. Even if s 14(5) of the Bail Act is put to one side, it is plainly necessary that bail review applications should be dealt with promptly. While, no doubt, every step would be taken to convene a court as quickly as possible, a number of practical difficulties exist to prevent expeditious hearing of the review applications. This only serves to emphasise that the Bail Act provides a scheme with limited rights of review.
I acknowledge that I have done no more than spell out in greater detail what the Full Court and, in particular, King CJ said more briefly and with greater clarity in Panagiotidis v Jakacic (1986) 41 SASR 591. I respectfully agree with that decision.
The first question in this case turns on the meaning of the proviso to s 50(1) of the Supreme Court Act. The relevant provisions of s 50(1) are in these terms:
“ 50. (1) Subject to the rules of court an appeal shall lie to the Full Court against every judgment, including every declaratory judgment entered pursuant to section 30B of this Act and any final assessment made thereon, order, or direction of a judge, whether in court or chambers, and also from the refusal of any judge to make any order:
Provided that—
(1) No appeal shall lie from—
…
(c)any judgment or order which is by statute, or by agreement of the parties, final or without appeal.”
The terms “judgment”, “order” or “direction” of a judge in s 50(1) are wide enough to include an order made under the Bail Act describing whether or not a person is entitled to bail. The terms of the proviso allow for a statute which either expressly or by necessary implication provides that a judgment or order is final or without appeal. The clear implication of s 14(1), if not its express terms, is that there will be no review of a decision of the Supreme Court when acting either as a bail authority or as a reviewing authority.
I do not think that the decision of the High Court in Roy Morgan Research Centre Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (Vic) (2001) 75 ALJR 1342 requires a contrary conclusion. In that case, the question for decision was whether s 148(1) of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act (1998) (Vic) expressly excluded a right of appeal. Section 17(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) provided:
“Unless otherwise expressly provided by this or any other Act, an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal from any determination of the Trial Division constituted by a Judge.”
It was held that s 148(1) did not expressly preclude a right of appeal. Section 50(1) of the Supreme Court Act of this State is different in terms and effect from s 17(2) of the Victorian Supreme Court Act.
I turn to the second question, namely, whether s 50(3)(b)(ii) provides a right of appeal. The relevant provisions of s 50(3) are in these terms:
(3) No appeal shall lie without the leave of the judge or of the Full Court from— …
(b)any interlocutory order or interlocutory judgment except in the following cases, namely: …
(ii)Where the liberty of the subject or the custody of infants is concerned. …”
Once it has been decided that s 14(1) expressly or by necessary implication precludes any appeal to the Full Court, there is nothing upon which s 50(3)(b)(ii) can operate. To the extent that there may be an inconsistency between the two statutory provisions, the Bail Act is a later statute than the Supreme Court Act and its provisions have a special operation in respect of bail whereas the Supreme Court Act is of quite general application. Section 50(3)(b) applies generally to interlocutory orders or interlocutory judgments. There is plenty of work for that provision to do notwithstanding the fact that orders under the Bail Act do not come within s 50(3)(b). This is, I think, an occasion where a later and special statute impliedly repeals an earlier general Act and the maxim, generalia specialibus non derogant applies.

The appellant relied on the decision in the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia in Lim v Gregson [1989] WAR 1 and in Jemielita v The Queen (1994) 12 WAR 362. The legislative scheme in Western Australia differs from that in this State so that those decisions do not assist in the resolution of the issues in this appeal. In Lim v Gregson, the legislation under consideration was s 573 of the Criminal Code (WA). The Code was silent on appeals against the refusal of an application for bail, neither granting a right of appeal nor denying one. In Jemielita, the relevant legislation was the Bail Act 1982 (WA), which too neither granted nor denied a right of appeal. In both cases therefore, recourse could be had to s 58 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), which allowed for a general right of appeal from a decision of a judge of the Supreme Court to the Full Court. This stands in stark contrast to the Bail Act of this State, which contains extensive provisions relating to review of bail decisions, whether granting or refusing bail.
The provisions of s 364 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act are not relevant and do not require a contrary conclusion. Section 364 provides a person appealing against a conviction with a right to apply for bail pending the hearing and determination of the appeal against conviction or, where a new trial is directed, until the commencement of that trial. It is a separate provision enacted before the Bail Act. It does not constitute a review of an earlier decision. Instead, it enables a fresh application to be made.
For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal as incompetent.
GRAY J
Introduction
This is an appeal from a decision of a Supreme Court judge to revoke bail.
The competence of this appeal has been challenged. The question raised is whether an appeal lies to the Full Court of the Supreme Court against a Supreme Court judge’s decision allowing an application to review a decision of a bail authority to grant bail. The determination of this challenge raises the question of the proper construction of provisions of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) and the Bail Act 1985 (SA).
The appellant, Andrew Gary Stanley Webster was granted bail by a magistrate. The Crown made application to review that decision. Bail was revoked by a Supreme Court judge. Mr Webster now seeks to set aside the order revoking bail by way of appeal.
The facts and background to this case are set out in the judgment of Doyle CJ. They are repeated only to the extent necessary for an understanding of my reasons for concluding that this court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal and for my concurrence with an order that the appeal be dismissed.
Bail
The concept of bail evolved to give effect to the presumption of innocence and the right to liberty:
When the administration of justice was in its infancy, arrest meant imprisonment without preliminary inquiry till the sheriff held his tourn at least, and, in more serious cases, till the arrival of the justices, which might be delayed for years, and it was therefore a matter of the utmost importance to be able to obtain a provisional release from custody…
The sheriff was the local representative of the Crown, and in particular he was at the head of all the executive part of the administration of criminal justice. In that capacity he, … arrested and imprisoned suspected persons, and, if he thought proper, admitted them to bail. The discretionary power of the sheriff was ill defined, and led to great abuses, which were dealt with by the Statute of Westminster.[11]
[11] Stephen JF. A History of the Criminal Law of England. London: Macmillan & Co, 1883. Vol 1 at 233 –234.
The earlier process of the release of a subject into the custody of a surety has been replaced by an accused having conditional liberty upon giving an undertaking on appropriate terms to appear before the court when called on to do so[12]. Bail has been more recently defined as:
[t]he right to be released from custody granted to a person charged with an offence, on the condition that he or she undertakes to return to the court at some specified time, and any other conditions that the court may impose.[13]
[12] Bail Act, section 6
[13] Nugh P, Butt P (eds). Butterworths Australian Legal Dictionary. Sydney: Butterworths, 1997.
Common law and statutory rights to bail implicitly acknowledge that the liberty of the person is one of the cornerstones of a free democratic society. In R v Hall[14] Iacobucci J of the Canadian Supreme Court observed:
… Liberty lost is never regained and can never be fully compensated for; therefore, where the potential exists for the loss of freedom for even a day, we, as a free and democratic society, must place the highest emphasis on ensuring that our system of justice minimizes the chances of an unwarranted denial of liberty.
In the context of the criminal law, this fundamental freedom is embodied generally in the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, and further in the specific right to bail. When bail is denied to an individual who is merely accused of a criminal offence, the presumption of innocence is necessarily infringed. This is the context of this appeal, one in which the “golden thread” that runs through our system of criminal law is placed in jeopardy. And this is the context in which laws authorizing pre-trial detention must be scrutinized.
Section 11(e) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms calls particularly on courts, as guardians of liberty, to ensure that pre-trial release remains the norm rather than the exception to the norm, and to restrict pre-trial detention to only those circumstances where the fundamental rights and freedoms of the accused must be overridden in order to preserve some demonstrably pressing societal interest.
The duty to protect individual rights lies at the core of the judiciary’s role, a role which takes on increased significance in the criminal law where the vast resources of the state and very often the weight of public opinion are stacked against the individual accused. Courts must not, therefore, take lightly their constitutional responsibility to scrutinize the manner by which the legislature has authorized the detention of the accused in the absence of a conviction.
These observations although made in the context of a particular statutory regime, restate the rationale underlying the approach of common law jurisdictions to bail. The same fundamental principles have been recognised in International Covenants[15]. These observations are relevant to a consideration of the issues arising in the present case.
[14] (2002) 217 DLR (4^th) 536
[15] See the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Article 9 – see also United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures (The Tokyo Rules) Rule 6
There has been debate about the source of the power of the Supreme Court to grant bail prior to the enactment of the Bail Act. It has been suggested that bail originated in the Habeas Corpus Acts of 1640 and 1679. It has also been said that the power formed part of the inherent power of the Supreme Court. The issue was settled in Forrest v Huffa[16] where Bray CJ observed:
It therefore becomes necessary to examine the true nature and origin of the power of this court to bail persons refused bail in the Magistrate’s Court. Is it merely an incident of the criminal jurisdiction of this Court and restricted to cases which will or may ultimately come before it, as Mr Scarfe contends? I entertain no doubt that it is not. This Court has the jurisdiction formally vested in or capable of being exercised by the Court of Queen’s Bench (Supreme Court Act 1935-1967, s 17(2) (II)). Amongst the powers of the court of Kings Bench, exercise from at least the seventeenth century, is the power to bail. Coke says in his chapter on the Court of King’s Bench, 4 Inst., c.7, p.71: ‘Also this court may bail any person for any offence whatsoever’. The terms of the Habeas Corpus Act (1679) 31 Car. II, c.2, are wide enough to include a power to bail persons committed in respect of any offence including summary offences.
…
The jurisdiction of this Court to entertain this application is, in my view, inherent, and is not a mere incident of its criminal jurisdiction, but proceeds from its general power to protect the liberty of the subject, and no argument against that jurisdiction in the present case based on the provisions of the Justices Act can succeed which would not also destroy it in the case of persons charged with indictable offences.
[16] (1968) SASR 341 at 342-343. See also Ex Parte Lewis (1972) 3 SASR 145
The importance of the liberty of the subject has been recognised by the Bail Act. The Act creates a presumption in favour of a grant of bail for an accused person[17]. The Act provides a comprehensive scheme regulating bail including the review of decisions of magistrates and District Court judges[18]. The Act does not provide for a review of a decision of a Supreme Court judge[19]. A question that arises in the present case is whether the Bail Act on its proper construction excludes any right of appeal from a decision of a Supreme Court judge revoking bail on the hearing of an application for review.
[17] Bail Act, section 10
[18] Bail Act, Part IV
[19] Bail Act, section 14(1)
The Legislation
Section 50 of the Supreme Court Act invests the Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction:
Subject to the rules of court an appeal shall lie to the Full Court against every judgment, … order, or direction of a judge, whether in court or chambers, and also from the refusal of any judge to make any order:
Provided that—
(1) No appeal shall lie from—
…
(c)any judgment or order which is by statute, or by agreement of the parties, final or without appeal.
…
(3) No appeal shall lie without the leave of the judge or of the Full Court from—
…
(b)any interlocutory order or interlocutory judgment except in the following cases, namely:
(ii)Where the liberty of the subject … is concerned:
(iii)Where an injunction … is granted or refused:
…
In Roy Morgan v State Revenue (Vict)[20] Gaudron, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ observed:
Section 17(2) [of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vict)] is a provision which confers jurisdiction upon a court and it is, on that account alone, to be given no narrow construction. Rather, it is to be construed with all the amplitude that the ordinary meaning of its words admits. It follows that the conclusion that there is express provision to the contrary will seldom, if ever, be available in the absence of explicit words excluding the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to hear an appeal from any determination of the Trial Division when constituted by a judge[21].
As section 50 of the Supreme Court Act is a provision which confers jurisdiction upon a court it is not “on that account alone” to be given a narrow construction.
[20] (2001) 207 CLR 72 at 78
[21] Section 17(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vict) provides:
“Unless otherwise expressly provided by this or any other Act, an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal from any determination of the Trial Division constituted by a Judge”
Counsel for Mr Webster submitted that the Supreme Court judge’s order revoking bail was an order within the meaning of section 50 of the Supreme Court Act. It was said that there was a right of appeal from that order. It was emphasised that Mr Webster was presumed innocent and that his liberty was directly affected by the order of the judge. It was contended that the Bail Act did not expressly or by necessary implication exclude an appeal from the decision of a Supreme Court judge refusing bail or revoking a grant of bail.
The order of the judge in the present case revoking bail would appear to be an order within the meaning of section 50 of the Supreme Court Act. Regardless of whether the order is characterised as interlocutory or final, because it affected the liberty of the subject, in the ordinary course an appeal would lie as of right. However consideration must also be given to the proviso to section 50 that no appeal shall lie from an order which is by statute “without appeal”.
Counsel for the Crown submitted that the Bail Act was a complete code regulating bail. It was contended that the Bail Act excluded any right of appeal. It was said that by necessary implication an order of a Supreme Court judge was not subject to appeal.
Counsel for the Crown contended that the issue of competence had been foreclosed against Mr Webster by an earlier decision of the Full Court in Panagiotidis v Jakacic[22]. Attention was drawn to the practice of this court to only depart from an earlier Full Court decision when satisfied that the interests of justice require a departure or if it is satisfied that the earlier decision is plainly wrong[23]. In Panagiotidis King CJ, with whom White and O’Loughlin JJ agreed, observed:
The Bail Act, 1985, is, in my opinion, a code for the grant and refusal of bail. It makes elaborate provision as to the persons eligible for bail, the authorities which may grant bail, applications for bail, procedures to apply in relation to such applications, the criteria to be applied in determining such applications, and bail agreements and guarantees. The Act is clearly intended to cover the whole field of law in relation to such matters and to exclude and supersede all other legal provisions relating to bail.

The Act makes careful provision for review of bail decisions (Part IV), but makes no provision for appeals. The decisions which are made subject to review are decisions of bail authorities other than the Supreme Court. Decisions made by the Supreme Court are not subject to review. A bail decision of the Supreme Court is ordinarily made, of course, by a single judge and this must be taken to have been within the contemplation of the legislature. The reviewing authority is enjoined to hear and determine an application for review "as expeditiously as possible" (s 14(5)) and s 16 provides for release on bail to be deferred for up to 72 hours pending such review. It will be seen then that the Act provides a code for the review of decisions as to bail. Decisions of a judge of the Supreme Court are not subject to review. Other decisions are subject to review by a judge of the Supreme Court and such review is intended to be conducted expeditiously.

There is in the above scheme of things no room, in my opinion, for an appeal against the decision on review, or indeed against a decision of a Supreme Court judge on an original application for bail. It is not contemplated that the ultimate disposal of the question of bail should be delayed by the appeal process. There are sound reasons for this. There is at stake the liberty of a citizen who is likely to have a presumption of innocence in his favour. Bail decisions necessarily relate to a temporary and often fluid situation. The present case is an example. The decision as to bail by the Magistrate, and the review thereof by the Judge, were made before there had been a preliminary hearing of the charges. Subsequently Panagiotidis was committed for trial to the Supreme Court and he was to be arraigned on the day following the hearing of the appeal. This sequence of events illustrates how inappropriate an appeal procedure is in relation to bail decisions. Such decisions would often be overtaken by events while the appeal was pending. It appears to me that, for sound reasons, the legislature has decided to rely upon speedy review procedures in relation to bail decisions by the lower courts and to treat bail decisions by a Supreme Court judge as final unless varied in consequence of a fresh application. The Act is intended to be a code as to the circumstances in which bail decisions may be reviewed. There being no provision for review by way of appeal, any rights of appeal which might otherwise have existed are excluded.

I am of opinion that no appeal lies to the Full Court against the decision complained of. The appeal should therefore be dismissed as incompetent.
Counsel for the Crown adopted this reasoning as the substance of the respondent’s submission to this court.
[22] (1985-1986) 41 SASR 591
[23] Nguyen v Nguyen (1990) 169 CLR 245, Pooraka Holdings Pty Ltd v Participation Nominees Pty Ltd (1988-1989) 52 SASR 148.
Consideration of the Issue
In Roy Morgan Kirby J discussed the intersection of the two Acts there in question. He said:
Therefore, the main task of an Australian court, required to examine the intersection of s 148 (1) of the VCAT Act and s 17(2) of the Supreme Court Act, is to discover how, from the language, purpose, history and practical operation of the two Acts (viewed in the context of constitutional and other legal norms), they were meant to operate together.[24]
[24] (2001) 207 CLR 72 at 90
Kirby J then turned to an examination of the provisions of the relevant Victorian statutes. A similar approach is helpful in the present case.
There is an intersection between the Supreme Court Act and the Bail Act. The Bail Act addresses the liberty of the person. It contains detailed provisions for the dealing with applications for bail and for the review of decisions of magistrates and District Court judges. It does not seek to extend the review process under the Bail Act to decisions of Supreme Court judges[25]. Section 50 of the Supreme Court Act grants jurisdiction to this court to hear appeals from orders of a judge of this court.
[25] Bail Act – section 14
The Bail Act can operate as a code addressing all aspects of bail including rights of review from decisions of magistrates and District Court judges but leave open a right of appeal against the decision of a Supreme Court judge. Viewed in this way both the Bail Act and the Supreme Court Act allow a reconsideration of a decision giving rise to a loss of liberty of a person accused of a crime. No tension arises between section 50 of the Supreme Court Act and the Bail Act.
The Bail Act is designed to protect and support the liberty of the person not to unduly or unnecessarily restrict that protection or support. It is accepted that a loss of liberty as a result of a decision of a magistrate or a District Court judge is reviewable by a Supreme Court judge pursuant to the terms of the Bail Act. A conclusion that a loss of liberty as a result of a decision of a Supreme Court judge is subject to an appeal is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Bail Act. This conclusion would operate to protect the presumption of innocence, protect the liberty of a subject, and would ensure that no disparity of treatment or injustice results.
An analysis of the Bail Act does not disclose any express provision denying a right of appeal from a decision of a Supreme Court judge on an application for bail or an application to review a grant or refusal of bail. Such a denial does not arise by necessary implication from the provisions of the Bail Act.
The Supreme and District courts exercise an extensive concurrent criminal jurisdiction. Within that concurrent jurisdiction accused persons in comparable circumstances may seek bail in different courts. On the Crown’s contention in one case a loss of liberty could be reconsidered by way of review and in the other no review or appeal would be available. There would be no reconsideration. This situation may give rise to disparity and a consequent injustice.
A situation may arise where bail has been granted and on review in the Supreme Court the grant of bail is set aside. Bail may be refused in the first instance by a Supreme Court judge. In either circumstance a person presumed innocent will have lost their liberty and on the Crown’s contention have no right of appeal or other review. Further applications for bail may be made but absent a change of circumstance there will be in practice little or no prospects of success. This situation may be contrasted to that of another person in comparable circumstances but convicted of the offence charged. That person would have appeal rights with respect to any loss of liberty arising from the sentence imposed. This too may give rise to disparity. A person who is presumed innocent should at the very least be accorded equivalent rights to review any loss of liberty.

In Panagiotidis King CJ drew attention to the summary nature of bail proceedings and the need for the prompt disposal of applications for bail. However matters of procedure must not be allowed to inhibit the proper protection of the liberty of a person who is presumed innocent. The disposal of appeals from decisions of Supreme Court judges would cause no particular inconvenience or difficulty. The appellate process can be “streamlined” by appropriate rules of court. The preparation and hearing of the appellate process is likely to be straightforward.
As earlier observed the loss of liberty of a person presumed innocent is a matter of grave importance. To conclude that no appeal lies from such a decision of a Supreme Court judge would appear to run counter to principles underlying the protection of fundamental human rights. The interests of justice require a departure from the decision in Panagiotidis. I am satisfied that the decision is plainly wrong. The appeal is competent.
On the issue of the merits of the appeal I agree with the reasons of Doyle CJ that the appeal should be dismissed.
JUDGMENT CITATIONS LISTED IN ORDER OF APPEARANCE IN JUDGMENT
1 Stephen JF. A History of the Criminal Law of England. London: Macmillan & Co, 1883. Vol 1 at 233 –234.
2     Bail Act, section 6
3Nugh P, Butt P (eds). Butterworths Australian Legal Dictionary. Sydney: Butterworths, 1997.
4 (2002) 217 DLR (4^th) 536
5See the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Article 9 – see also United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures (The Tokyo Rules) Rule 6
6 (1968) SASR 341 at 342-343. See also Ex Parte Lewis (1972) 3 SASR 145
7     Bail Act, section 10
8     Bail Act, Part IV
9     Bail Act, section 14(1)
10 2001) 207 CLR 72 at 78
11 Section 17(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vict) provides:
“Unless otherwise expressly provided by this or any other Act, an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal from any determination of the Trial Division constituted by a Judge”
12 (1985-1986) 41 SASR 591
13 Nguyen v Nguyen (1990) 169 CLR 245, Pooraka Holdings Pty Ltd v Participation Nominees Pty Ltd (1988-1989) 52 SASR 148.
14 (2001) 207 CLR 72 at 90
15     Bail Act – section 14

369

[2003] SASC 347

2 October 2003