Webster Family Superannuation PtyLtd v Kennedy

[2018] WASC 92

[2018] WASC 92

JURISDICTION

CITATION

:   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

:   WEBSTER FAMILY SUPERANNUATION PTY

LTD -v- KENNEDY [2018] WASC 92

CORAM

:   MASTER SANDERSON

:   15 MARCH 2018

:   15 MARCH 2018

:   26 MARCH 2018

:   CIV 2697 of 2017

HEARD

DELIVERED

PUBLISHED

FILE NO/S

BETWEEN

:   WEBSTER FAMILY SUPERANNUATION PTY

LTD

Plaintiff

AND

REBECCA JANE KENNEDY

Defendant

Catchwords:

Summary judgment - Failure of the defendant to file evidence in opposition to

application - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 14 r 1

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[2018] WASC 92

Result:

Judgment entered

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff

:   Mr J Healy

Defendant   :   In person

Solicitors:

Plaintiff

:   Cullen Macleod

Defendant   :   In person

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Nil

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[2018] WASC 92

MASTER SANDERSON

MASTER SANDERSON:

1

2

This  was  the  plaintiff's  application  for  summary  judgment.    At  the

conclusion  of the  hearing  I indicated  that  I would  enter  judgment in

favour of the plaintiff against the defendant.   I said that I would publish

reasons for my decision.  These are those reasons.

This action  was commenced  by the  plaintiff on  9 October 2017.   The

writ of summons was  indorsed with a statement of claim.   The plaintiff

pleads the  defendant is  the registered  proprietor of certain  property in

Nedlands.   On  6 December  2012  the  defendant entered  into  what  is

described  in  the  pleading  as  the  'first   mortgage'.    Pursuant  to  that

mortgage  the  plaintiff   advanced  the  principal  sum   of  $250,000  to

Gregory James Kennedy  the defendant's  father.   There  is  a  plea of  a

breach of  that mortgage by  the defendant's failure  to make repayment.

A notice of demand  was issued and it is  alleged the defendant failed to

comply with  the  notice of  demand.   A  further notice  of demand  was

issued   and    the   defendant    failed   to    comply   with   that    notice.

Accordingly, the  plaintiff says it  is entitled to an  order for delivery  up

of possession of the property and  judgment for the monies owing under

the first mortgage.

3

4

The plaintiff  pleads what  is described  as the  'second mortgage'.   This

was  entered  into  on   25 February  2014  and  was  for   an  amount  of

$200,000.    Once again,  the  money  was  advanced to  the  defendant's

father.  Once again, two notices of demand  were issued and once again,

neither was complied with.

The  plaintiff  then pleads  that  on  or  about  the  same day  the  second

mortgage was entered  into between the  plaintiff and the defendant,  the

defendant entered  into a  deed of  guarantee and  indemnity pursuant  to

which she guaranteed to  pay all monies owing from  time to time under

the  second  mortgage.    Again,  the  plaintiff  pleads  that  there  was   a

default  under the  guarantee  and  pleads that  a  notice  of demand  was

issued.  It has not been complied with.

5

The plaintiff then  pleads a third mortgage.   This was said to  have been

entered into  on or  about  13 November 2015.   Once  again the  monies

loaned pursuant to  that mortgage were loaned to  the defendant's father.

This time the amount was $200,000.   Once again, there was a failure to

make  payment and  two  demands  were  issued by  the  plaintiff  to the

defendant.  There was no compliance with either demand.   The plaintiff

then pleads a guarantee of the third mortgage by the defendant, a failure

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[2018] WASC 92

MASTER SANDERSON

to pay instalments as required by the third mortgage a notice of  demand

and a failure to meet that demand.

6

With  respect   to  both   the  second  and   third  mortgages   there  were

deficiencies   in   the  documentation.     With   respect   to  the   second

mortgage, there  were missing  details in  the schedule  to the  mortgage.

A  similar  problem  arose  with   respect  to  the  third  mortgage.    The

plaintiff pleads  that it was  an implied  term of both  mortgages that  the

missing  information  was  completed in  such  a  way  to  give  business

efficacy to  the agreements.   I  will have  something more  to say  about

this issue later in these reasons.

7

The  application  for  summary  judgment  was  issued   on  7 November

2017.     The  application   was  supported  by   a  number   of  affidavits

including  and  most  relevantly  an affidavit  of  Kelvin  Keith  Webster

sworn  6 November   2017.    As  at   the  date  the   summary  judgment

application  was brought  the  defendant  was represented  by  solicitors.

After  discussions between  the solicitors  consent  orders were  filed  on

14 November 2017.   These orders anticipated  the defendant would file

and serve any  affidavit evidence in response  to the plaintiff's summary

judgment application by 8 December 2017.   The orders also anticipated

the  filing  of  responsive  evidence  by  the  plaintiff   and  the  filing  of

submissions  by both  parties.   Consistent  with  the  consent orders  the

matter was  then listed for  a special appointment  on 27 February 2018.

Subsequent   to  the   entry   of  those   consent  orders   the   defendant's

solicitors applied to be removed from the record.  On 25 January 2018  I

made the order sought by the defendant's  solicitors.  The defendant was

present in court when that order was made.

8

When  the   matter  came   on  for   hearing  on  27 February   2018,  the

defendant, now self-represented,  had filed no evidence in  opposition to

the  application.     Over   strenuous  opposition   from  counsel   for  the

plaintiff I granted the defendant  an adjournment.  I ordered that she file

any affidavit material on which she sought  to rely by 13 March 2018.  I

then listed the matter  for a special appointment on  15 March 2018.  By

this stage  the  submissions of  the plaintiff  had been  filed and  were  in

possession of the  defendant.  At  that hearing, I took  the opportunity to

explain to the defendant that she needed to file some material if she was

to resist the plaintiff's application for summary judgment.

9

When the matter came  on for hearing on 15 March 2018, the  defendant

had  not  filed  any   affidavit  material.    She  had   not  even  filed  any

affidavit explaining  why she had  filed no affidavit material.   From the

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[2018] WASC 92

MASTER SANDERSON

bar table  she  indicated she  had been  under considerable  pressure and

had  experienced  technological   difficulties.    But,  the   fact  remained

having  been given  an extension  of  time to  file  evidence she  had  not

done so.

10

Order 14 r 1 of the Rules  of the Supreme  Court 1971  (WA) requires a

plaintiff to  verify on oath  the statement of  claim and swear  that in the

belief  of  the   deponent  there  is  no  defence   to  the  claim.     Strictly

speaking that is all  that need be done.   Thereafter the onus shifts to  the

defendant to  establish there is an  arguable defence to  the claim.   As is

generally the case in mortgagee actions the  plaintiff in this instance had

annexed    to   the    affidavit    of   Mr Webster    all    of   the    relevant

documentation.  Having looked  at that documentation there is no  doubt

it is consistent with the pleaded claim.  There  is nothing in the evidence

to suggest the  defendant did not  enter into the  mortgages as alleged or

that the money was  not advanced or that someone  had taken advantage

of  her  position.    I  mention  this  point  because  it  is   clear  from  the

documents money was  advanced not to the defendant  but to her father.

While there is nothing  sinister in that fact alone,  it is enough to require

careful    scrutiny    of   the    documents    to    ensure   there    was    no

unconscionable conduct.   But without some  evidence as to what  might

have been  the unconscionable  conduct it  is the  documents themselves

which  must  throw  up  some   matters  requiring  further  investigation.

Here no such matters are obvious on the face of the documents.

11

There are however two matters which require further comment.  In both

the  first  and  second  mortgages  the  plaintiff's  solicitors  inserted  the

relevant dates  into the  schedules after  the defendant  had executed  the

documents.     It  was   the  plaintiff's  position   that  the   solicitors  had

authority  to   take  those  steps.     This  submission  was   put  on  three

grounds.  First,  the mortgages provided  the plaintiff and  its agents - in

this  case   its  solicitors  -   had  a  power   of  attorney  to   execute  any

document  or do  any  act necessary  or  expedient  to give  effect  to the

mortgages.   The  plaintiff says  the  power of  attorney was  sufficiently

wide to allow the solicitors to fill in the blanks in the schedules.

12

Second, the  defendant signed an  irrevocable authority in  favour of  the

plaintiff  and   its   agent  authorises   them  to   insert  dates   and  make

amendments to  give effect  to the  mortgages.   Third, the plaintiff  says

the  law  is  such   that  courts  will  regard  a   party  as  having  implied

authority to  fill in blanks  when what  is done is  nothing more than  the

common intention of the parties.

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[2018] WASC 92

MASTER SANDERSON

13

These submissions should be  accepted.  There is nothing to suggest  the

plaintiff took  advantage of  the defendant's  position in  a way  that was

unconscionable.  The filling in of  the gaps in the mortgage was nothing

more than consistent with the agreement which had been reached.

14

In  relation   to  the  third   mortgage,  the  plaintiff's   solicitors  did  not

complete the  dates in the schedule  to the mortgage.   The plaintiff  says

the reason for this is that despite demand the defendant failed or refused

to complete her certificate of identity verification and  deliver that to the

plaintiff.   Accordingly the third  mortgage was not in  registerable form

and was  not in fact  registered.   But really there  can be  no doubt as  to

the  enforceability  of  that  mortgage.     There  was  a  clear  agreement

between the  parties and the  mortgage was signed  by the defendant.   It

was  the  breach  by  the  defendant  of  her  obligation  to  complete  the

certificate   that   might   render   the   mortgage   unenforceable.

The

defendant  cannot   take  the   benefit  of   her  breach  of   a  contractual

obligation.   She  was clearly  bound  by the  agreement and  there is  no

argument as to its enforceability.

15

For these  reasons I  entered judgment as  sought by  the plaintiff.   I did

extend  the  time  within  which  the  defendant  was   to  deliver  up  the

property to 60 days from the date of judgment.

I certify that  the preceding paragraph(s)  comprise the reasons for  decision of

the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

DG

ASSOCIATE TO MASTER SANDERSON

26 MARCH 2018

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