Webster and Anor and Glover and Anor (No.2)

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WEBSTER & ANOR & GLOVER & ANOR (No.2) [2018] FCCA 3340
Catchwords:
FAMILY LAW AND CHILD WELFARE – The Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and related legislation – Property and maintenance of parties – whether the agreement made between the parties is a Part VIIIAB financial agreement.

Legislation:

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss.90KA, 90SA(1), 90SM, 90MC(1), 90MC(2), 90UC(2)(a), 90UL, 90UN, UC

Berkley and Stanfield [2018] FCWA 119
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336
Gartside v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1968] 1 All ER 121
CPT Custodian Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2005) 224 CLR 98
Meehan v Jones (1982) 149 CLR 571
Warner & Cummings (2017) 319 FLR 10
First Applicant: MR WEBSTER
Second Applicant: S PTY LTD
First Respondent: MS GLOVER
Second Respondent: R PTY LTD
File Number: BRC 11228 of 2016
Judgment of: Judge Jarrett
Hearing dates: 21 and 22 August 2017
Date of Last Submission: 3 November, 2017
Delivered at: Brisbane
Delivered on: 16 November 2018

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicants: Mr K.C. Fleming QC
Solicitors for the Applicants: Damien Greer Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr R. Galloway
Solicitors for the Respondents: APA Lawyers

ORDERS

  1. Within 21 days of the date of these orders, the parties bring in:

    (a)an agreed form of declaration to give effect to the reasons of the court delivered on 16 November, 2018;

    (b)an agreed form of any other orders to give effect to the reasons of the court delivered on 16 November, 2018 or any agreed form of declarations;

    (c)agreed direction for the further conduct of these proceedings.

  2. All outstanding applications otherwise be adjourned to a date to be fixed pending receipt of the declarations, orders, and directions provided for in order (1) hereof.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Webster & Anor & Glover & Anor (No.2) is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT BRISBANE

BRC 11228 of 2016

MR WEBSTER

First Applicant

S PTY LTD

Second Applicant

And

MS GLOVER

First Respondent

R PTY LTD

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 6 March, 2017 this Court ordered that:

    1. The question of whether the De Facto Financial Agreement signed by the parties on 1 July 2010 is binding be tried separately.

  2. Orders were made for the filing of a Statement of Claim, a Defence and a Reply.

  3. It is only the first applicant and the first respondent that are immediately interested in the determination of the separate question.  Their corporate interests (the second applicant and the second respondent) are not H Pty Ltd concerned with a determination of that question.  Accordingly, for convenience, I shall refer to the first applicant simply as the applicant and the first respondent simply as the respondent. 

  4. The applicant delivered a Statement of Claim on 17 March, 2017.  The respondent delivered a Defence and Cross-Claim on 5 April, 2017.  The applicant delivered a Reply to the defence and an…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCCA 3340
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Webster and Anor and Glover and Anor (No.2)*, Judge Jarrett of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia was required to make orders giving effect to previous reasons delivered on 16 November 2018. The proceedings concerned a dispute between the parties, the precise nature of which is not detailed in the provided text, but which involved the court's prior findings.

The central legal issue before the court was how to give effect to its earlier decision, particularly in relation to the requirements of section 90G of the *Family Law Act 1975* (Cth) concerning financial agreements. This involved considering the evidentiary weight of certificates provided by legal practitioners and the onus of proof in establishing compliance with the legal advice provisions of the Act.

Judge Jarrett's reasoning, as evidenced by the reference to *Wallace & Stelzer* and *Hoult v Hoult*, focused on the principle that a certificate of legal advice, when read in conjunction with a recital in the financial agreement, creates a prima facie case of compliance with section 90G(1)(b). The onus then shifts to the party challenging the agreement to adduce evidence that casts doubt on the provision of such advice. The court emphasised that the inquiry is whether advice was given, not the specific content of that advice, and that a certificate can provide a sufficient evidentiary foundation for this finding.

The court ordered that within 21 days, the parties were to bring in an agreed form of declaration to give effect to the court's reasons of 16 November 2018, along with any other agreed orders or declarations, and agreed directions for the further conduct of the proceedings. All other outstanding applications were adjourned pending the receipt of these agreed documents.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

Within 21 days of the date of these orders, the parties bring in:

(a) an agreed form of declaration to give effect to the reasons of the court delivered on 16 November, 2018;

(b) an agreed form of any other orders to give effect to the reasons of the court delivered on 16 November, 2018 or any agreed form of declarations;

(c) agreed direction for the further conduct of these proceedings.

2.

All outstanding applications otherwise be adjourned to a date to be fixed pending receipt of the declarations, orders, and directions provided for in order (1) hereof.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The relevant principles that bear on this issue were conveniently summarised by Judge Neville in Warner & Cummings (2017) 319 FLR 10 where his Honour said:112. First, in Wallace & Stelzer, the Full Court (Finn, Strickland & Ryan JJ) said, at [101] – [103] (emphasis added):[: Wallace & Stelzer (2013) 283 FLR 126; (2013) FLC 93-566. See also the general discussion by the Full Court (Ryan, Murphy and Aldridge JJ) in Piper & Mueller (2015) FLC 93-686 regarding, inter alia, the sufficiency of the certificate. There was no mention or discussion of Piper & Mueller in submissions filed on behalf of the Applicant in the current matter; the Respondent’s submissions did refer to both of these Full Court decisions.]:[101] The person who seeks to establish that a financial agreement is binding carries the onus of proof (Hoult & Hoult (2013) FLC 93-546. Applied to the facts in this case, this means that it fell to the wife to establish that the parties received legal advice in accordance with s 90G(1)(b). As a consequence of recital W and by tendering the signed agreement and the certificates, prima facie the wife was able to discharge her legal onus.[102] However, once the husband put in issue whether the required legal advice had been provided, there was an onus on him to adduce evidence which would disprove or at least throw into doubt the inference or conclusion to be drawn from recital W and the certificates (being that legal advice had been given) (Hoult at [62] and [261]). Therefore, it was necessary for the parties to give evidence about the provision of advice, and evidence was also adduced from their respective solicitors.[103] Although there appeared to be some suggestion in the husband’s case before us that in a case such as the present the court is required to consider the accuracy of the legal advice provided, we did not understand that issue to be ultimately pressed. But in any event we note that in the recent Full Court decision of Logan & Logan [2013] FamCAFC 151, and relying on Hoult, it was held that the only enquiry necessary is as to whether advice was given, and not as to the content of that advice.113. Secondly, in Hoult v Hoult, the Full Court (Thackray, Strickland and Ainslie-Wallace JJ) noted the following in relation to the issues of, inter alia, the burden of proof, the operation and effect of “the certificate”, and the discretion of the Court under s.90G(1A) (the correlative provision to s.90UJ(1A) in Part VIIIAB of the Act).114. At [62], Thackray J said (Strickland and Ainslie-Wallace JJ agreeing):… once the party seeking to rely upon the agreement produces in evidence the certificate signed by the other party’s solicitor, there is a forensic obligation on the other party to adduce evidence which would disprove, or at least throw into doubt, the inference or conclusion to be drawn from the certificate (especially when read with the recital in the agreement to the same effect).115. At [96] - [98], his Honour said (emphasis added particularly in relation to the accepted use made of recitals):[96] … I am unable to accept the view his Honour expressed at [88] that “the certificate is, without more, insufficient to satisfy the onus of establishing that the relevant s.90G requirements have been met”. The certificate, when read with Recital N, should have been treated as prima facie evidence of compliance with the legal advice component of s.90G(1).[97] Put another way, employing Windeyer J’s formulation in Purkess v Crittenden (supra at 171), the production of the certificate, read together with the recital, should have given rise to “an inference, a presumption of fact or a presumptio hominis” that the requisite advice had been given.[98] … the production of the certificate (especially when read with the recital) had caused the evidentiary burden to pass to the wife. The inference properly to be drawn from the certificate (read with the recital) is that the advice required by s.90G had been given, even though there was no evidence of the content of that advice….116. Then in relation to the specifics of “advice”, Thackray J said, at [100] – [101] (emphasis added):[100] … the trial Judge did not pose the correct question. He set out to ascertain the content of the legal advice, whereas he needed only to be satisfied that the advice referred to in s.90G(1)(b) had been given. Thus, when his Honour found that the certificate provided “an insufficient evidentiary foundation”, it seems his Honour was requiring the husband to provide a foundation for something that did not have to be proved.[101] The certificate, read with the recital, provided a sufficient evidentiary foundation for finding there had been compliance with the requirements of the Act. The question whether that foundation had been undermined by other evidence became confused with the question of the precise content of the advice. It is possible, if the questions had not been confused, that the answer would have been the same, but it would be unsafe to make that assumption.117. In a similar vein, at [279], the joint judgment of Strickland and Ainslie-Wallace JJ recorded that:[FN 68: At [288], their Honours also confirmed, by reference to the Full Court’s decision in Parker that s.90G(1A)(c) “is not confined to “technical” breaches.”]It also must not be forgotten that, as Justice Thackray has correctly pointed out in paragraph 100 above, it was only necessary for the trial judge to be satisfied that the advice referred to in s 90G(1)(b) had been given, and the certificate can be a sufficient evidentiary foundation for that finding; it was unnecessary for the trial judge to ascertain the “content of the legal advice”, and that was the error his Honour made.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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