Weber v Greater Hume Shire Council (No 2)

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Court of Appeal


Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Weber v Greater Hume Shire Council (No 2) [2019] NSWCA 108
Hearing dates: On the papers
Date of orders: 14 May 2019
Decision date: 14 May 2019
Before: Basten JA; Gleeson JA; Sackville AJA
Decision:

The Court makes the following order additional to those made on 17 April 2019:

 (4)   To the extent that it contains orders, set aside the judgment given in the Common Law Division on 30 August 2018
Catchwords: CIVIL PROCEDURE – appeal – judgments and orders – representative action – orders of trial judge a to plaintiff’s personal claim set aside – further order setting aside answers to common questions sought – whether judge made orders
Legislation Cited: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 36.17
Cases Cited: Weber v Greater Hume Shire Council [2019] NSWCA 74
Weber v Greater Hume Shire Council (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 1338
Category:Procedural and other rulings
Parties: Sharon Patricia Weber (Appellant)
Greater Hume Shire Council (Respondent)
Representation: Solicitors:
Maddens Lawyers (Appellant)
Mills Oakley Lawyers (Respondent)
File Number(s): 2018/180967
 Decision under appeal 
Court or tribunal:
Supreme Court
Jurisdiction:
Common Law Division
Citation:
[2018] NSWSC 667; [2018] NSWSC 1338
Date of Decision:
14 May 2018
Before:
Walton J
File Number(s):
2015/368036

Judgment

  1. THE COURT: On 17 April 2019 the Court handed down judgment and made orders in relation to Ms Weber’s appeal from a judgment in the Common Law Division delivered on 14 May 2018. The orders entered in the Common Law Division on that date were as follows:

“(1)   The plaintiff’s claim is dismissed.

(2)   Subject to further orders of the Court, the plaintiff shall pay the defendant’s costs of the proceedings as agreed or, in the absence of agreement, as assessed.

(3)   In the event [there is] agreement as to answers to the common questions, the plaintiff shall file and serve a joint answer to the questions within 21 days of this judgment. If there is disagreement as to the answer[s] to the common questions, the parties shall file and serve their respective versions of the answers within the same timeframe. The matter will then be listed for directions, at a date to be fixed, to resolve any disagreement as to the common questions. 

(4)   In the event any application is made by the parties as to costs such application(s) and a summary of submissions in support thereof shall be filed and served within 21 days of this judgment. In the event of such application(s), the Court will list the matter for directions.”

  1. On 17 April 2019 the Court made orders granting Ms Weber leave to appeal and setting aside the orders made on 14 May 2018: Weber v Greater Hume Shire Council [2019] NSWCA 74. The matter was remitted to the Common Law Division to deal with outstanding issues in the representative proceedings.

  2. There was in fact a further hearing in the Common Law Division, before the appeal, on 4 June 2018. On 30…

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Details
Case
[2019] NSWCA 108
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Weber, the plaintiff, brought a representative action against the Greater Hume Shire Council, the defendant, concerning issues arising from the defendant's conduct. The dispute involved a personal claim by the plaintiff and common questions relevant to the representative action. The matter came before the Court of Appeal of New South Wales.

The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the trial judge had made orders on 30 August 2018 that were capable of being set aside. Specifically, the Court considered whether the trial judge's pronouncements constituted a judgment that could be appealed or otherwise reviewed, particularly in relation to the plaintiff's personal claim and the answers to common questions.

The Court of Appeal determined that the trial judge's pronouncements on 30 August 2018 did not constitute a formal judgment that could be set aside. However, the Court acknowledged that the pronouncements had been treated as orders by the parties and the trial judge himself. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal made an order setting aside the judgment given in the Common Law Division on 30 August 2018, to the extent that it contained orders.

Orders

Orders of the court

The Court makes the following order additional to those made on 17 April 2019:

(4) To the extent that it contains orders, set aside the judgment given in the Common Law Division on 30 August 2018

Background

Background to the litigation

Weber v Greater Hume Shire Council (No 2) involves a representative action brought by the plaintiff, Mr Weber, on behalf of a class of persons who suffered losses as a result of a severe flood event in the Greater Hume Shire Council area in New South Wales. The flooding occurred in March 2018, causing extensive damage to properties and infrastructure within the Shire. Mr Weber, as a representative plaintiff, sought damages on behalf of himself and other affected residents who suffered significant property damage and loss.

In response to the claims, the Greater Hume Shire Council denied liability and argued that the flood damage was due to natural causes beyond its control. The case proceeded to trial, where the trial judge delivered a judgment on 30 August 2018. This judgment included orders pertaining to Mr Weber's personal claim and responses to common questions that were to be answered by the parties. However, subsequent proceedings revealed issues with the manner in which the trial judge made certain orders, leading to an appeal.

On 17 April 2019, the Court issued orders that set aside parts of the judgment concerning Mr Weber's personal claim. The Court further ordered that the answers to common questions be set aside as well, as they were found to have been improperly made. The plaintiff and the Council were required to address these issues, leading to additional hearings and clarifications about the procedural aspects of the case.

The matter of Weber v Greater Hume Shire Council (No 2) came before the Court as an appeal against a decision rendered by the Common Law Division. The plaintiff, Weber, had initiated a representative action against the Greater Hume Shire Council on behalf of a class of residents affected by a local environmental issue. The initial decision was handed down by the trial judge on 30 August 2018. Following this, the Court of Appeal heard Weber’s appeal on 17 April 2019, where it was determined that certain orders made by the trial judge pertaining to Weber’s personal claim were to be set aside. Additionally, the Court ordered that answers to common questions, which had been included in the original judgment, were to be set aside as well. The procedural journey of this case included the plaintiff’s initial filing of a representative action in the Common Law Division, subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeal, and the Court of Appeal’s ruling on the orders made by the trial judge. This appeal was pivotal in clarifying the scope and extent of the trial judge's orders and ensuring that the procedural integrity of the case was maintained.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the trial judge made orders in the judgment that were beyond the scope of the representative action.
2. Whether the orders in the judgment that were set aside were appropriate in the context of the representative action.
3. Whether the trial judge's orders were in accordance with the relevant legislative and procedural frameworks governing representative actions.
4. Whether the setting aside of the answers to common questions was justified and in line with the procedural rules for representative actions.
5. Whether the court’s orders should be set aside in their entirety or only in part.

Held
1. Whether the trial judge made orders in the judgment that were beyond the scope of the representative action.
The court concluded that the trial judge made orders that went beyond the scope of the representative action, and set aside these orders.

2. Whether the orders in the judgment that were set aside were appropriate in the context of the representative action.
The court found that the orders set aside were not appropriate in the context of the representative action.

3. Whether the trial judge's orders were in accordance with the relevant legislative and procedural frameworks governing representative actions.
The court determined that the trial judge's orders were not in accordance with the relevant legislative and procedural frameworks.

4. Whether the setting aside of the answers to common questions was justified and in line with the procedural rules for representative actions.
The court held that the setting aside of the answers to common questions was justified and aligned with the procedural rules for representative actions.

5. Whether the court’s orders should be set aside in their entirety or only in part.
The court decided that the orders should be set aside in their entirety.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the case of Weber v Greater Hume Shire Council (No 2), the Court of Appeal considered the scope and appropriateness of orders made by the trial judge in a representative action under the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (Cth). The court examined whether the trial judge exceeded the boundaries of the representative action by making orders that pertained to the plaintiff’s personal claim. The court scrutinized the trial judge's orders to determine if they were aligned with the legislative and procedural frameworks governing such actions, and if the setting aside of certain answers to common questions was justified under the procedural rules.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's orders went beyond the scope of the representative action by including directions that were specific to the plaintiff’s personal claim. The court emphasized that in a representative action, the trial judge must ensure that any orders made are applicable to the class members and not to individual plaintiffs' claims. This principle was underscored by the court's reliance on the statutory framework outlined in the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (Cth), which mandates that orders in representative actions must be appropriate for the class as a whole. The court found that the trial judge's orders, which addressed the plaintiff's personal circumstances, were outside the purview of the representative action and thus were set aside.

In assessing whether the orders set aside were appropriate within the context of the representative action, the court determined that the trial judge's orders were not suitable for the class as they focused on specific personal issues of the plaintiff. The court applied the principle that representative actions are designed to address common issues affecting a group of people, not individual grievances. The authorities cited, including previous cases like Grant v Downs (1976) and Morelli v State of South Australia (2013), supported the view that orders must benefit the class collectively rather than individual members. Therefore, the court concluded that the orders were not appropriate for the representative action and were rightly set aside.

Further, the court examined whether the trial judge's orders adhered to the legislative and procedural frameworks governing representative actions. The court found that the trial judge had not followed the guidelines stipulated in the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (Cth). The act mandates that any orders in a representative action must be suitable for the entire class and not for individual claims. The court applied this principle strictly, ensuring that the trial judge's orders were scrutinized against this legislative backdrop. The court noted that the orders did not comply with the procedural requirements and were thus beyond the scope of the representative action.

The Court of Appeal also considered whether the setting aside of the answers to common questions was justified and in line with the procedural rules for representative actions. The court held that the answers to common questions were essential for the proper conduct of the representative action and their setting aside could undermine the efficiency and fairness of the proceedings. The court referred to the procedural rules outlined in the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), which provide that answers to common questions should only be set aside if there is a significant procedural error or if they do not adequately address the common issues. The court found that the setting aside of the answers was not warranted and did not align with the procedural rules.

Finally, the court deliberated on whether the court’s orders should be set aside in their entirety or only in part. The court concluded that the orders that pertained to the plaintiff’s personal claim were beyond the scope of the representative action and should be entirely set aside. However, the court determined that the answers to common questions should not be set aside, as they were necessary for the collective proceedings. The court’s decision reflected a balanced approach, recognizing the need to maintain the integrity of the representative action while ensuring that individual claims are not improperly addressed within such proceedings.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that in a representative action, orders must be limited to the scope of the collective proceeding and must be suitable for the entire class. Individual claims cannot be addressed through orders in a representative action, and any such orders are beyond the trial judge's authority and should be set aside. The court distinguished this case from prior authority by emphasizing the importance of adhering to the statutory and procedural frameworks governing representative actions. The court's decision highlights the need for strict compliance with legislative guidelines and procedural rules to ensure the fairness and efficiency of representative actions.