Webb and Salter

[2016] FCCA 1087

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WEBB & SALTER [2016] FCCA 1087

Catchwords:
FAMILY LAW – De facto relationship, application to initiate property proceedings out of time – reason for delay in commencing proceedings appropriately explained including periods of negotiation between parties’ lawyers prior to expiration of time – further issue raised by Court about the Wife’s lawyers continuing to act for her in the light of a solicitor who formerly worked for the Husband’s lawyers now working for the Wife’s lawyers – further risk of that same solicitor having given formal advice to the Husband while at her previous firm therefore risk of her being required to give evidence in the current proceeding as well as some possible issues relating to confidentiality.

Legislation:

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s.44(6)

Cases cited:
Billington & Billington (No.2) [2008] FamCA 409
Hedley v Hedley (2009) 235 FLR 58
Osferatu v Osferatu (2015) 301 FLR 295; (2016) 53 Fam LR 433
Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (a firm) [1999] 2 AC 222
Richardson v Richardson [2008] FamCAFC 107
Sharp v Sharp (2014) 50 Fam LR 567
In the Marriage of Whitford (1979) 24 ALR 424; (1979) FLC ¶90-612

Applicant: MR WEBB

Respondent: MS SALTER

File Number: CAC 1513 of 2015

Judgment of: Judge Neville

Hearing date: 15 February 2016

Date of Last Submission: 15 February 2016

Delivered at: Canberra

Delivered on: 23 February 2016

Written Reasons Provided: 9 May 2016

REPRESENTATION

Solicitor/advocate for the Applicant: Ms K. Fox

Solicitors for the Applicant: Farrar Gesini Dunn

Counsel for the Respondent: Ms J. Haughton

Solicitors for the Respondent: Infinity Legal

ORDERS

1. Leave be granted pursuant to S44(6) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) for the Applicant Husband to initiate these proceedings out of time.

2. The parties are to notify the Court, by way of email sent directly to Chambers, that the matter is ready to proceed to a Conciliation Conference within 14 days from the date of these Orders, that is by no later than close of business on 8 March 2016.

3. Upon confirmation to Chambers that the matter is ready to proceed to a Conciliation Conference, a date will be allocated and Orders setting the matter down for a Conciliation Conference will issue from Chambers.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Webb & Salter is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT CANBERRA

CAC 1513 of 2015

MR WEBB

Applicant

And

MS SALTER

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. On 14^th October 2015, the Applicant de facto Husband (“the Husband”) filed an Amended Initiating Application. Among other Orders he sought was that pursuant to s.44(6) of the Family Law Act1975 (Cth) (“the Act”), leave be granted to initiate this proceeding out of time. For the reasons that follow that Application should be granted.

2. In my view, of at least equal importance, is the Order sought in relation to the establishment of “information barrier protocols”, for reasons explained later.  Rather surprisingly, this Order sought by the Applicant Husband was barely dealt with or even referred to in the course of the recent hearing – other than in a rather sotto voce or at least an attenuated or staccato manner.  This is to say that there was a less than detailed discussion at the interim hearing.  Those orders, as already noted, seek that there be established “information barrier protocols” in relation to the lawyers who act for the de facto Wife (“the Wife”).  This part of the Application arises out of a solicitor now working for those solicitors who formerly worked in the offices of the Husband’s lawyers.  I will come back to this aspect of the matter presently.

The Submissions

1. It is apposite to set out in full the written submissions of both parties.

2. The Applicant Husband’s submissions were as follows (internal citations included but which, absent specific comment by the Court, need not be otherwise referred to; some typographical errors only have been corrected):

   1) The Applicant seeks orders pursuant to s90SM of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“FLA”). He initiated proceedings on 23 September 2015. The de facto relationship ended on or about 22 June 2013.[1] The Court’s leave is required to apply for the orders he seeks per s 44(6)(a) FLA. The test prescribed by s44(6) FLA is “identical in effect” to the test in s44(4)(a) FLA.[2] The applicable test poses two questions: whether “hardship” would be caused to the Applicant or a child if leave were not granted;[3] and whether the interests of justice favour granting or refusing leave.[4]

   2)   Establishing hardship requires more than that the right to commence proceedings has been lost.[5] It is the consequences of the loss of that right that are relevant in determining hardship, which in turn call for a consideration of whether the Applicant has as “prima facie claim worth pursuing or a ‘real’ probability of success.”[6]  The de facto relationship was for approximately 4.5 years[7].  The parties had 1 child together who lives with the Applicant for 50% of the time[8] (which may increase if the Respondent’s health deteriorates). The Applicant has minimal income.[9] The Applicant seeks 40% of the net asset pool. The financial statements suggest that the net asset pool is between $357,000 and $454,000 including superannuation, of which the Applicant has approximately $46,000 (consisting primarily of a motor vehicle and superannuation). The Applicant asserts substantial contributions to the pool, and in particular in relation to the former matrimonial home.[10] In considering hardship, the question of whether an Applicant has a prima facie case is to be considered on the basis of the evidence put forward by the Applicant.[11] The “stronger the applicant’s prima facie claim, the greater the likelihood of hardship if leave were refused.”[12] In this case, the potential loss to the Applicant is estimated to be approximately $96,000 to $135,000.[13] It is submitted that on the basis of the Applicant’s material, the Court would find that the Applicant has a strong prima facie claim for more of the net asset pool than he currently has, such that to deny him leave in his current circumstances would cause him (and potentially the child) hardship within the meaning of Section 44(6) FLA.

   3) As to the second question posed by Section 44(6) FLA, relevant factors include the length of the Applicant’s delay in commencing proceedings, whether there is an adequate explanation for that delay, and any prejudice occasioned to the Respondent as a result of the delay.[14] It is submitted that the Applicant’s three-month delay in filing his application is relatively short,[15] and is eminently understandable in light of the matters set out in his material.[16]

   4)   The Respondent was aware that the Applicant wished to discuss property settlement matters as early as one month after separation in July 2013.[17] She knew that he remained interested in doing so as at 4/5 June 2015, approximately 2 weeks before the expiration of the standard application period.[18] Having sought legal advice in response to the Applicant’s 5 June 2015 letter, the Respondent did not reply until some six weeks later, after the expiration of the standard expiration date. Her response rejected the Applicant’s proposal to negotiate as to property settlement matters on the basis that the standard application period had expired. It is submitted that the Court would infer that the Respondent has engaged in a course of action designed to create the Applicant’s present impediment to seeking property settlement orders, namely, he finds himself having to seek leave from the Court to file an application out of time. It is submitted that this militates in favour of granting the Applicant leave pursuant to s 44(6) FLA.

   5)   As the Applicant’s material succeeds in demonstrating both hardship and a prima facie case, the only prejudice that will be imposed upon the Respondent is the possibility of a hearing in relation to property settlement.[19] The opportunity to attend a conciliation conference would ameliorate that financial burden. It is submitted that in the circumstances of this case, the interests of justice favour granting leave.

   [1] See the Applicant’s Affidavit filed on 23 September 2015 at [4] and Applicant’s Affidavit filed on 29 January 2016 at [3], the Respondent’s Affidavit filed on 11 December 2015 at [3] and the Respondent’s Response filed 11 December 2015 at [Part D]

   [2]     McCoy & Chancellor [2014] FamCAFC 62 at [28] (May, Strickland, and Kent JJ).

   [3]     Montano & Kinross [2014] FamCAFC 231 at [11] (Murphy J); at [46] (Ainslie-Wallace J); at [47] (Tree J).

   [4]     Tamaniego & Tamaniego [2010] FamCAFC 254 at [162] (O’Ryan J).

   [5]     Montano & Kinross [2014] FamCAFC 231 at [13] (Murphy J); at [46] (Ainslie-Wallace J); at [47] (Tree J).

   [6]     Sharp & Sharp [2011] FamCAFC 150 at [17]-[19] (May and Ainslie-Wallace JJ).

   [7]     See the Initiating Application filed  23 September 2015 at [Part D], the Respondent’s Response filed 11 December 2015 at    [Part D]   and the Applicant’s Affidavit filed on 29 January 2016 at [3]

   [8]     See Applicant’s Affidavit filed on 29 January 2016 at [18]

   [9]     See Applicant’s Affidavit filed on 23 September 2015 at [33], Applicant’s Affidavit filed on 29 January 2016 at [48] and Applicant’s Financial Statement filed 23 September 2015 at [Part D]

   [10]    See Applicant’s Affidavit filed on 29 January 2016 at [20-28]

   [11]    Jacenko & Jacenko (1986) FLC 91-776 at 75,643 (Nygh J); 75,648 (Walsh and Fogarty JJ).

   [12]    Tamaniego & Tamaniego [2010] FamCAFC 254 at [159] (O’Ryan J).

   [13]    Net asset pool x 40% less existing assets of $46,000.

   [14]    Whitford & Whitford (1979) FLC 90-613 at 78,146 (Asche and Pawley SJJ; Strauss J).

   [15]    Particularly when compared to the 18 year delay in Slocomb & Hedgewood [2015] FamCAFC 219.

   [16] See [10]-[15] and [30]-[31] of his first affidavit and [5]-[19] of his second affidavit.

   [17]    See [8] of the Applicant’s second affidavit.

   [18]    See the Respondent’s Affidavit filed December 2015 at [9]

   [19] Slocomb & Hedgewood [2015] FamCAFC 219 at [48] (May, Ainslie-Wallace and Johnston JJ).

3. The Respondent Wife’s submissions were as follows (some typographical errors only have been corrected):

   1)   The date of cohabitation is disputed.  The Applicant says it was in December 2008 while the Respondent says it was in March 2009.

   2)   The month of separation is not disputed.  The Application says it was on 22 June 2013 and the Respondent concedes a date “in or about June 2013”.

   3)   There is one child of the relationship namely X born (omitted) 2010.

   4)   Section 44(5)  of the Family Law Act 1975 (the “Act”) provides that any application must be filed “within the standard application period” of 2 years.

   5)   Section 45(6) provides that for an application in relation to property, the court may grant leave for the applicant to apply if the court is satisfied hardship would be caused to the party or a child if leave were not granted.

   6)   The power should not [sic] be exercised liberally in order to avoid hardship but nevertheless in a manner which would not render nugatory the requirement that proceedings should be instituted within time.[20]

   [20] Whitford & Whitford (1979) FLC 90-612

   7)   It is the consequences of the loss of the right to commence proceedings that constitutes the hardship that Court must consider.  To be made within the “standard application period”, the application had to be made by 23 June 2015 on the Applicant’s case and 1 July 2015 on the Respondent’s case.

   8)   The tests for an extension of time are referred to in Sharp & Sharp[21] and Star & Star[22].

   [21] [2011] FamCAFC 150

   [22] [2013] FamCA 91

   9)   The Applicant has to:

   a)   Persuade the Court that its discretion should be exercised[23];

   [23] Whitford & Whitford (1979) FLC 90-612

   b)   Demonstrate hardship which involves considering whether he has an arguable case;

   c)    Establish that he has a prima facie claim worth pursuing or a “real” possibility of success; and

   d)   Establish that there is an adequate explanation as to why the claim was allowed to elapse.

   10)    The Court may also have regard to any prejudice the respondent may suffer if leave is granted[24].

   [24] McDonald & McDonald (1977) FLC 90-317

   11)    Where the costs which the applicant will have to bear himself or herself are about as much or more than what the applicant is likely to be awarded on a property claim, ordinarily hardship would not result if leave to institute proceedings were not granted.[25]

   [25] Whitford & Whitford (1979) FLC 90-612

   12)    There has been no adjustment of the financial and property relations of the parties since they separated in June 2013 and their relationship was less than five years.

   13)    If the Applicant had savings at cohabitation of up to $35,000, there is no evidence from him that it was paid towards the pool available for distribution now.

   14)    The Respondent’s evidence is that he brought into the relationship $48,000 by way of debts and drew down on the mortgage about $40,000 to buy cars he retained for his own use. He paid nothing by way of capital sum to reduce the mortgage during the relationship.

   15)    The Applicant says he paid weekly sums which were not significant and would not be unlike paying rent had he lived elsewhere.  He contributed little towards utilities.

   16)    The Applicant was unemployed for much of the relationship so his contributions to the joint account were significantly less than that of the Respondent who remained in full-time work.

   17)    He owned no real property of his own so had the benefit of a home being provided for him by the Respondent.

   18)    There is no evidence to suggest that any work he did on the property made a significant improvement to the value of the Respondent’s property, or at all and it is not conceded that the Applicant performed the work on the property to the extent that the Applicant deposes. There is no evidence to suggest that there was any agreement that in doing such work the Respondent expressly or by implication agreed to give him an interest in the property.

   19)    The Respondent says that he was only named on the mortgage three months prior to the end of the relationship and only because the mortgage was refinanced to include a new vehicle. Since separation the Applicant has only contributed minimally to the mortgage and only for a period of two or three months while the Respondent had the fill time care of the child of the relationship.

   20)    The Respondent had the primary care of the four year old child of the relationship until recently and for whom the Applicant pays only about $22 per week child support instead of the $80 he is assessed to pay. There is currently a significant child support debt owed by the Applicant to the Respondent.

   21)    The legal costs of having his current lawyer represent him in any property proceedings will likely be much greater than any amount he may be entitled to receive if leave were given for him to apply out of time.

   22)    The Applicant may have a remedy against his current solicitors if they are responsible for his failure to file within the required time period.

   23)    It is conceded that the delay has not incurred any significant hardship for the Respondent however subsequent to the separation she has refinanced her mortgage.

   24)    There is no satisfactory explanation for the Applicant’s failure to lodge within the standard application period and it is noted that the Respondent had complied with the Applicant’s request for financial disclosure but no such disclosure was forthcoming from him.

   25)    Having regard to the evidence of the Applicant taken at its highest, the length of the relationship; his financial contributions to the relationship compared to what he got out of it and the fact that the Respondent now has a greater mortgage as a result of the relationship and the costs of the proceedings compared to any potential order that may be made in the Respondent’s favour, leave should not be granted to the Applicant to file out of time. There is no injustice to the Respondent in refusing that leave.[26]

   [26] Gallo v Dawson [1990] HCA 30.

Consideration & Disposition: The Out of Time Application

1. As is apparent from the detailed submissions, summarised, the primary arguments of the parties were as follows.

2. The Applicant’s submissions focussed, inter alia, on the fact that there was, relatively speaking, reasonably regular contact between the parties’ lawyers regarding property settlement, as well as discussion about parenting matters as well.  As such, so the argument ran, the Wife could not claim that she was unaware of the Applicant’s intention to seek orders in relation to property.  It may be that this aspect of the argument was a quasi-estoppel point, although that was not formally put. 

3. The Applicant also contended that precisely because he was endeavouring to resolve the matter without resort to litigation, and because the main focus was on parenting matters, the formal or procedural aspects of the property side of things was not a priority.

4. The Wife’s argument was to the effect that because the Husband was legally represented, there can and should be no allowance for either slackness or indeed negligence in not filing an Application in relation to property within the prescribed time.  As well, the Wife said that she had organised her finances on the basis that there were no Orders sought in relation to property.

5. Further, it was submitted that, in any event, the Husband’s claim ought to be against his lawyers because of their alleged negligence and should not be visited on the Wife.

6. Respectfully, this was a rather “brassy” or bold submission which, in the light of comments made below, should not have been made.  The old adage about people in glass houses not throwing stones has some application here – on which more shortly.

7. The principles to “out of time” applications are well known.  They are summarised in cases beginning with Whitford (1979) 24 ALR 424; and are further elaborated in the more recent Full Court decisions in Richardson v Richardson [2008] FamCAFC 107, Hedley v Hedley (2009) 235 FLR 58, and Sharp v Sharp (2014) 50 Fam LR 567.

8. These authorities note, among other things, the need to explain the following matters:

   i)the reason or reasons for the delay in bringing the Application,

   ii)issues of “hardship” in the event that leave was not granted,

   iii)the impact on or prejudice to the Respondent if leave were to be granted,

   iv)the reasonableness of the claim (rather than the likelihood of its success), and

   v)the proper and separate exercise of discretion even where an adequate or reasonable explanation for the delay has been given.

9. One further matter noted by Cronin J in Hedley (at [211]) was that in relation to any relevant prejudice to the Respondent as a result of the delay, such a consideration may ultimately be the subject of a submission in the substantive proceedings, and be ameliorated and “factored into the ultimate deliberation.”

10. On balance, I favour the Applicant’s arguments. The delay has been explained (as noted earlier in these reasons). The time lapse or delay is very modest, being some three months or thereabouts. The prejudice to the Respondent, if there is any, as also just noted, may be reasonably ameliorated during any final hearing. Accordingly, the Order for leave to proceed under s.44(6) of the Act should be made. But this is not the end of the matter.

Consideration & Disposition: Confidential Information Issue

1. As earlier indicated, further Orders were sought by the Applicant in relation to “information barrier protocols” in the Respondent’s office because of a lawyer formerly employed in the Applicant’s solicitors’ office now working in the small firm of lawyers who act for the Respondent Wife.  Before considering the facts, some brief comment on principle is apposite.  The recent Full Court decision in Osferatu v Osferatu outlines relevant principle.  It is sufficient to record the following from that decision. 

1. First, at [20], the Full Court (Finn, Ainslie-Wallace & Aldridge JJ) said:[27]

   There are three established categories on the basis of which solicitors may be restrained from acting against their client or former client.  They are: breach of confidence, breach of fiduciary duty and the inherent jurisdiction of a court over its officers and to control its process.  Each category has its own principles which guide its operation.  The third category may be involved in conjunction with either of the first two so there is clearly an overlap; nonetheless, the basis for the exercise of the jurisdiction in each is different (Kallinicos v Hunt [2005] NSWSC 1181).

   [27] The NSW Supreme Court decision referred to here, Kallinicos, is reported at (2005) 64 NSWLR 561.

2. Secondly, at [22] and [23], the Full Court further observed, in the light of earlier authorities:

   [22] The manner in which a client’s confidential information is to be protected in family law proceedings was clearly explained by the Full Court in McMillan and McMillan (2000) FLC 93-048 where the Full Court extensively reviewed existing authorities in the Family Court and in many other courts.  The following statement of Frederico J in Thevenaz v Thevenaz (1986) FLC 91-748 at 75,447 was expressly adopted by the court:

   Thus “a practitioner who wishes to cease acting for one party and to continue to act for the other party will be restrained from doing so by the court if there is any evidence that confidential communications have been made to him by the party for whom he is ceasing to act.  In such a case the court will not weigh conflicting evidence as to confidence.  It will act upon the evidence of the client who swears that he has made the confidential communication”. (Reference omitted).

   [23] The following passage from Thevenaz was also expressly adopted by the Full Court in McMillan:

   It is my view that in this case [the lawyer] should not continue to act on behalf of [the wife].  It may well be that the risks were he to do so are more theoretical than practical.  However, it is asserted and not contradicted that material in the files does relate to confidences exchanged in the course of the former firm previously acting on behalf of both parties and would embarrass the husband.  It is of the utmost importance that justice should not only be done but should appear to be done.  In the circumstances of the present case, there is a risk which may well be merely theoretical but still exists, that justice might not appear to be done.

3. Thirdly, at [28] and [29], the Court set out the detailed comments of Coleman J in Billington & Billington at [43], and from the leading decision of the House of Lords in Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (a firm):[28]

   [28] Billington & Billington (No.2) [2008] FamCA 409; Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (a firm) [1999] 2 AC 222 at 236.

   [28] … In Billington & Billington (No 2) [2008] FamCA 409 Coleman J said at [43]:  

   As the authorities make clear, the jurisdiction to grant relief of this kind "is to be exercised with caution". The court understands caution to be exercisable in relation to the totality of the evidence, and the matters relevant to the exercise of the jurisdiction, and not to be referrable only to the interests of the party seeking the relief. Relevant in that context is the need to give appropriate weight to the public interest in a litigant not being deprived of the lawyer of his or her choice without due cause. Also relevant in this context is the cost and inconvenience of requiring the wife to retain new lawyers. Quite apart from the work required to be undertaken by solicitors familiar with the case to adequately represent the wife's interests before the Full Court, realistically, were new solicitors now to be instructed, a far greater level of reading and preparation would be required, and at greatly increased expense to the wife.

   [29] These are serious and weighty considerations which must, of course, be balanced against the competing interests of the client which were described by Lord Millett in Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG (A Firm) [1999] 2 AC 222 at 236 as follows:

   …It is of overriding importance for the proper administration of justice that a client should be able to have complete confidence that what he tells his lawyer will remain secret.  This is a matter of perception as well as substance.  It is of the highest importance to the administration of justice that a solicitor or other person in possession of confidential and privileged information should not act in any way that might appear to put that information at risk of coming into the hands of someone with an adverse interest.

4. Finally, at [32] and [33], the Full Court said, again by reference to the House of Lords decision in Prince Jefri (emphasis added):

   [32] The next step involves a consideration of the risk that the relevant confidential information will be disclosed.  The risk of disclosure “must be a real one, and not merely fanciful or theoretical.  But it need not be substantial”:   Prince Jefri at 237.

   [33] How is this to be determined?  It is by the consideration of the risk and of any protective measures taken or proposed by the solicitor or his or her new firm.  The evidentiary burden on this issue falls squarely on the lawyer or the firm to which he or she has moved.  As Lord Millett said in Prince Jefri at 237-238:

   Once the former client has established that the defendant firm is in possession of information which was imparted in confidence and that the firm is proposing to act for another party with an interest adverse to his in a matter to which the information is or may be relevant, the evidential burden shifts to the defendant firm to show that even so there is no risk that the information will come into the possession of those now acting for the other party. There is no rule of law that Chinese walls or other arrangements of a similar kind are insufficient to eliminate the risk. But the starting point must be that, unless special measures are taken, information moves within a firm. In MacDonald Estate v. Martin, 77 D.L.R. (4th) 249, 269 Sopinka J. said that the court should restrain the firm from acting for the second client “unless satisfied on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that all reasonable measures have been taken to ensure that no disclosure will occur.” With the substitution of the word “effective” for the words “all reasonable” I would respectfully adopt that formulation.

5. In the light of this outline of principle, I note two matters in particular in relation to the facts in the current proceeding. 

6. First, the Respondent’s law firm is a quite small enterprise.  Of course, this is not said in any pejorative way.  Because of its modest size, I would have the greatest difficulty seeing how adequate information barriers could be erected in such a small office.

7. Secondly, perhaps more relevantly and concerningly, in the light of the Respondent’s submission insinuating that there may be some particular fault on the part of the Applicant’s lawyers and their advice, it was suggested (in reply) that the lawyer who gave at least some of that advice to the Husband is in fact the young lawyer now working with the Wife’s lawyers.[29]  Whether that be correct or not, the prospect of that young lawyer giving evidence in this case (whether for or against the Applicant) would, in my view, place the Wife’s firm in an untenable position.  This “risk”, of itself, would be enough (in my view) to prevent the Wife’s [original] firm continuing to act for her.

   [29] For more abundant caution, I note that the lawyer in question referred to in these reasons is not the lawyer who appeared at the hearing of this matter on behalf of the Father, nor was she the lawyer instructing Counsel for the Mother.

8. Further, it would also seem (I do not put it higher than a comment at this stage) that upon this young lawyer commencing work for the Wife’s firm no conflict check was relevantly done, and as would usually occur, and one might expect would occur as a matter of proper practice.  If that be so, and it might be a necessary inference, questions of fault might then be laid at the door of the Wife’s solicitors for such failure.  But these are matters of evidence for another occasion.

9. In the circumstances I have outlined, I would have very great difficulty, on the Court’s own motion, not making an order for the Respondent’s solicitors to show cause why they should not be restrained from continuing to act for her.  The risks to all, in my view, are both patent and significant.  But this too is for another day.

10. Finally, given the modest size of the pool, I need to place on record my frequent lament at how much this matter must have cost the parties up to this point.  Given how modest the size of the asset pool is, such a concern (not to mention a commercially savvy or prudent decision) is all the more critical.

11. In addition to granting leave under s.44(6) FLA, the matter will be referred to a conciliation conference within 14 days upon the lawyers for the parties confirming to the Court that there are no practical or procedural impediments to that course. If that notice is forthcoming, Orders will be made in Chambers to give effect to this course. If other procedural Orders are necessary, such as in relation to disclosure, then Orders to that effect can also be made. The Court will wait to receive confirmation from the parties before making Orders as indicated.

I certify that the preceding twenty-seven (27) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Neville

Date:       9 May 2016