[2008] HCATrans 154
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Perth No P1 of 2008
B e t w e e n -
ALISON HARMIONI WEATHERALL
Applicant
and
INSURANCE COMMISSION OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
KIRBY J
HAYNE J
KIEFEL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 18 APRIL 2008, AT 10.00 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR B.L. NUGAWELA: May it please the Court, I appear with MR N.P. LINDSAY for the applicant. (instructed by S C Nigam & Co)
MS K.R. WOOD: May it please the Court, I appear for the respondent. (instructed by Lavan Legal)
KIRBY J: Yes, Mr Nugawela.
MR NUGAWELA: Your Honours, there are divergences in the common law of Australia in the assessment of damages for future loss of earning capacity in personal injury actions as to the proper approach to be taken where a defendant fails to discharge its burden of proving retained exploitable earning capacity. Unlike New South Wales, in Western Australia the divergence starts with the premise that, even after proving the total inability to perform pre‑accident work, a plaintiff ought show that no other suitable work is open to her even before any evidentiary burden is said to shift to a defendant to show suitable work in alternative occupations, the state of the labour market and likely earnings to be derived there from.
In this case, your Honours, it is beyond controversy that, as the learned trial judge found, the plaintiff had lost her pre‑accident earning capacity. The learned trial judge rejected the suggestion of clerical capacity. The honourable Court of Appeal found that the plaintiff had no relevant clerical skills or experience and could not work in the suggested alternative capacity in an automated suburban photographic laboratory.
The divergence further widens in WA because, even where a defendant fails to provide evidence of available suitable alternative employment or earnings to be derived from that, a trial judge in WA is regarded as having a much wider range of findings open to her than would otherwise have been the case in assessing the plaintiff’s residual earning capacity. That has been established by the Full Court in our State in a case called Bowen v Tutte in 1990.
What in practice, your Honours, this means is that in Western Australia, even where a defendant does not discharge its evidentiary burden, it will almost be beyond challenge if a learned trial judge selects an arbitrary or very high percentage deduction ‑ ‑ ‑
KIRBY J: You say it is arbitrary, and there is a bit of truth in that criticism, but discounts for contingencies have been around as long as there have been damages in personal injury cases. It is the nature of peering into the future and trying to work out what is a just award of damages for the injury that is done that is imponderable. Courts have really been honest when they have faced up…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the statutory provision, which limited the amount of compensation payable for permanent impairment to a proportion of the worker's pre-injury earnings, applied to the worker's claim. This required the Court to determine the proper construction of the legislation and its application to the specific circumstances of the worker's injury and subsequent claim for compensation.
The High Court analysed the language of the relevant statutory provision, considering its purpose and the legislative intent behind it. The Court examined previous interpretations of similar provisions and applied established principles of statutory construction. Ultimately, the Court found that the statutory limitation on compensation was applicable to the worker's claim, meaning the compensation payable was capped according to the formula set out in the legislation. The appeal was therefore dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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