Wealthsure Pty Ltd v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Wealthsure Pty Ltd v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd [2013] FCA 292

Citation: Wealthsure Pty Ltd v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd [2013] FCA 292
Parties: WEALTHSURE PTY LTD (ACN 097 405 108) v FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE LIMITED (ABN 67 131 124 448) and MR CHRISTOPHER AND MRS JULIE BOX
File number: WAD 459 of 2011
Judge: GILMOUR J
Date of judgment: 4 April 2013
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for a declaration pursuant to s 1337B (1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and s 21 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – whether there were three discrete claims or a single claim and cause of action – whether, if there was a single claim, the claim has been split
Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 912A(1)(g), (2), 945A, 947D
Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth) reg 7.6.02(3)
Cases cited:

Dealey v Clark (1831) 109 ER 936
Do Carmo v Ford Excavations Proprietary Limited (1984) 154 CLR 234
Melville v Dartmouth Projects Pty Ltd (unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Byrne J, 5 December 1997)

Mickovski v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd (2012) 91 ACSR 106
Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty Ltd v L Grollo& Co Pty Ltd [1973] VR 473
Sollimano v Nolan [1921] VLR 389

Wickham v Lee (1848) 12 QB 521

Date of hearing: 11 December 2012
Place: Perth
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 37
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr P McGowan
Solicitor for the Applicant: DLA Piper Australia
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr M Wise
Solicitor for the Respondents: Arslan Lawyers

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

WAD 459 of 2011

BETWEEN:

WEALTHSURE PTY LTD (ACN 097 405 108)
Applicant

AND:

FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE LIMITED
(ABN 67 131 124 448)
First Respondent

MR CHRISTOPHER AND MRS JULIE BOX
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GILMOUR J

DATE OF ORDER:

4 APRIL 2013 

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, to be taxed if not agreed.  

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

WAD 459 of 2011

BETWEEN:

WEALTHSURE PTY LTD (ACN 097 405 108)
Applicant

AND:

FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE LIMITED
(ABN 67 131 124 448)
First Respondent

MR CHRISTOPHER AND MRS JULIE BOX
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GILMOUR J

DATE:

4 APRIL 2013

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. The first respondent, Financial Ombudsman Service Limited (FOS), was established as an independent forum to resolve “Disputes” between “Applicants” and “Financial Services Providers” who are members of FOS.  The applicant (Wealthsure), is a member of FOS.  The Dispute pending before FOS and which is the backdrop to this case is one between the second respondents (the Boxes) as applicants and Wealthsure as the Financial Service Provider (the Dispute).  I have been informed that the Boxes, whilst they did not file a submitting appearance and did not…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 292
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Wealthsure Pty Ltd sought to challenge a decision of the Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd (FOS) regarding a dispute over financial planning advice provided by one of its employees. The Boxes, the complainants, alleged that the advice given by Mr Brown, an employee of John Hopkins Financial Services Pty Ltd (an authorised representative of Wealthsure), was defective. They claimed compensation for losses they incurred due to the alleged defective advice. The dispute involved multiple statements of advice provided over several years, leading to claims for compensation that evolved from an initial $270,000 to a total of $337,793. The central issue before the court was whether FOS had correctly treated the claim as three separate claims, each subject to a monetary cap of $150,000.

The court examined whether the Boxes had effectively split their claims to circumvent the jurisdictional limit set by FOS. It considered legal precedents and guidelines that prohibit claimants from dividing a single claim into multiple claims to avoid jurisdictional limits. The court found that the Boxes' claims, while evolving in amount, did not constitute a prohibited splitting of claims. Each set of advice and the subsequent advice were distinct transactions, and the claims arose from separate pieces of advice provided over different periods. Therefore, treating each set of advice and its associated claim as separate was consistent with legal principles and FOS's operational guidelines.

Based on the reasoning above, the court concluded that FOS had correctly treated the Boxes' claims as three separate claims, each subject to a $150,000 cap. The court dismissed Wealthsure's application and ordered Wealthsure to pay FOS's costs. This decision upheld the integrity of FOS's processes in handling disputes and ensuring compliance with jurisdictional limits.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

It should be observed at the outset that the Constitution of FOS and its TOR which bind the parties to a Dispute contractually, do not employ the word “complaint”. Rather the words “Dispute” and “Claim(s)” are used. The Operational Guidelines, where they employ the word “complaint” do so as synonymous with the word “claim” and in contra-distinction to the word “dispute”. That FOS was established to resolve Disputes is expressly acknowledged in cl 1.1 of the TOR. However, the monetary cap provided for under cl 9.7 of the TOR applies to “a claim”, and under the related Sch 1 it is described as the “Amount per claim”. The Operational Guidelines make this distinction clear at para 9.7. I will refer to this in more detail below. Background Financial planning advice was given by Mr Brown, an employee of John Hopkins Financial Services Pty Ltd, which is an authorised representative of Wealthsure. Mr Brown provided three relevant Statements of Advice (SoA) to the Boxes. They contained financial planning advice: (a)SoA dated 3 November 2005, recommending that the Boxes:(i)redraw $110,000 on their current home loan;(ii)establish a Macquarie Property Access Loan of $150,000 in Mr Christopher Box's name; and(iii)invest the above sums in various property management funds.(b)On 27 June 2006, recommending that the Boxes invest $50,000 in the Rewards Group Sandalwood Project using $45,000 borrowed as part of the Rewards Group Lending Facility. (c)On 29 March 2007, recommending the Boxes:(i)redeem their investment in the Cromwell Diversified Property Trust;(ii)draw down a further $80,000 from their Macquarie Access Loan; and(iii)invest the total amount of $226,000 into various property management funds. Separate remuneration by way of up front and trailing commissions were payable to Wealthsure in respect of the investments recommended in each SoA. Broadly described, the Boxes allege that the financial planning advice variously given to them was defective. They say that the advice did not properly explain various risks to them, that the risks were inappropriate for their financial circumstances, and that the investments recommended to them were illiquid and were limited in diversity. They initially claimed the sum of $270,000 by way of compensation for losses. During the course of the complaint handling at FOS the losses were updated several times. FOS initially identified the claim as one which might exceed its jurisdiction. The completed form returned to FOS from the Boxes claimed an increased amount of $316,091, which FOS acknowledged in its letter to Wealthsure of 6 October 2010. FOS then sought to clarify the amounts that were claimed, and in an email to Wealthsure’s solicitors of 7 April 2011, explained that FOS considered these to be the subject of not one but three separate claims arising in respect to each separate SoA:CLAIM 1 – Advice provided in SOA dated 3 November 2005 LOSS = $70,489CLAIM 2 - Advice provided in SOA dated 18 July 2006 LOSS = $69,928CLAIM 3 - Advice provided in SOA dated 29 March 2007 LOSS = $197,376The total of the three claims was $337,793. FOS further explained in this email that these three separate claims were each subject to the compensation cap of $150,000. The content of this email was relevantly confirmed directly to Wealthsure by letter dated 11 May 2011. It contains what Wealthsure describes as the “Splitting Decision”, meaning that, as Wealthsure apprehends it, the one claim for $337,793 has been treated by FOS as three separate claims totalling that figure.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

There was no splitting of claims as contended by Wealthsure. It follows that FOS was correct in the approach it ultimately adopted in treating the Dispute as comprising three separate claims each subject to a monetary cap of $150,000. Conclusion The application will be dismissed. Wealthsure will be ordered to pay the costs of FOS.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Wealthsure points to the fact that the Boxes’ complaint as originally received was for one amount, $270,000, and then after further dealings with FOS it became $316,091 and subsequently $337,793.Consideration The issue of claim splitting usually arises in inferior courts which have a monetary jurisdictional limit. Typically, legislation or rules relating to courts of limited financial jurisdiction include a prohibition on a litigant “dividing” or “splitting” a claim into two, commencing two proceedings in the one court, each for a part of the claim, and thereby avoiding the jurisdictional limit of the court. This would clearly be an abuse of process. The critical question is whether, in the particular instance, a plaintiff has “divided” a single claim or cause of action. That question has been considered in a number of cases. The general principles are that:(a)a plaintiff does not contravene the rule by bringing two complaints where the claims arise out of distinct and independent transactions: Sollimano v Nolan [1921] VLR 389 at 393;(b)in order to contravene the rule, the action said to be split must be “one and entire”: Dealey v Clark (1831) 109 ER 936;(c)if a second cause of action can be maintained without depriving the plaintiff of his remedy in the first cause of action, the rule will not be contravened: Dealey v Clark;(d)the fact that the same causes of action could be joined in one proceeding in a superior court does not prevent the plaintiff from bringing separate proceedings in an inferior court: Wickham v Lee (1848) 12 QB 521; and(e)the issue of goods supplied and delivered on a running account is a particular rule resting on whether the parties intended that the obligation to pay the pre-existing debt is extinguished each time a new balance is struck (thus giving rise to a new and singular obligation to pay: Melville v Dartmouth Projects Pty Ltd (unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Byrne J, 5 December 1997); Pioneer Concrete (Vic) Pty Ltd v L Grollo& Co Pty Ltd [1973] VR 473. Upon the alleged facts, the Boxes would have alternative claims for breach of contract, tortious negligence and breach of statutory duty. Nonetheless, it is apparent that only one claim could be brought to FOS in respect of one complete set of facts. As I set out above, the Operational Guidelines provide under para 9.7 that FOS will not permit a joint claim in contract or tort to be “split” and treated as multiple claims (with a cap applying to each claim). However, that is not this case. Section 945A of the Corporations Act, as it was prior to amendments made in July 2012, provides: 945A Requirement to have a reasonable basis for the adviceThe providing entity must only provide the advice to the client if:(a) the providing entity:(i)determines the relevant personal circumstances in relation to giving the advice; and(ii)makes reasonable inquiries in relation to those personal circumstances; and (b)having regard to information obtained from the client in relation to those personal circumstances, the providing entity has given such consideration to, and conducted such investigation of, the subject matter of the advice as is reasonable in all the circumstances; and(c)the advice is appropriate to the client, having regard to that consideration and investigation.