PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT COURT
OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
We Kando Pty Ltd v Western Downs Regional Council [2018] QPEC 65
PARTIES:
WE KANDO PTY LTD
(Appellant)v
WESTERN DOWNS REGIONAL COUNCIL
(Respondent)FILE NO/S:
2276 of 2016
DIVISION:
Planning and Environment Court
PROCEEDING:
Application in pending proceeding
ORIGINATING COURT:
Planning and Environment Court, Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
21 December 2018
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
8 November 2018 and supplementary submissions delivered on 16 November 2018
JUDGE:
Williamson QC DCJ
ORDER:
1. The Application in pending proceeding filed on 19 March 2018 is dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:
PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT – APPEAL – where applicant seeks a declaration in an applicant appeal about the proposed use of land for a Truck parking use – where the proposed use is not a use for which approval was sought in the development application the subject of the appeal – whether the proposed use is ancillary to existing lawful uses – whether the proposed use will be lawful – whether the court has power to grant the declaration – whether the discretion should be exercised under s.446 of SPA to treat the application as a fresh proceeding for a declaration.
LEGISLATION:
Planning Act 2016, ss. 163, 164, 165, 285, 286, 311
Planning and Environment Court Act 2016, ss. 7, 11, 47, 76
Sustainable Planning Act 2009, ss.446, 456, 461, 496
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, r.13
CASES:
Caravan Parks Association of Queensland Ltd v Rockhampton Regional Council [2018] QPEC 052
Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd v Best (1990) 170 CLR 516
Craig v The State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
Firefast Pty Ltd v Council of the City of the Gold Coast [1999] QPELR 200
Fraser Coast Regional Council v Walter Elliott Holdings Pty Ltd (2016) 212 LGERA 411
Grace Bros v Willoughby Municipal Council (1980) 44 LGRA 400
Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178
Leon Fink Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Film Commission (1979) 141 CLR 672
Lever Finance Ltd v Westminster London Borough Council [1971] 1 QB 222
Owners of Shine Kobe Maru v Empire Shipping Co Inc (1994) 181 CLR 404
Perivall Pty Ltd v Rockhampton Regional Council & Ors [2018] QPEC 46
COUNSEL:
K Wylie for the Appellant
J Lyons for the RespondentSOLICITORS:
Milne Legal for the Appellant
King & Company for the Respondent
Introduction
We Kando Pty Ltd, by its application in pending proceeding filed on 19 March 2018, seeks a declaration about the use of land situated at 27150 Warrego Highway, Baking Board (the land). The declaration sought is in the following terms:
“A declaration, pursuant to s.456(1)(e) of the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Q.) (SPA), that the parking of trucks (and associated trailers) on the Site, in terms described in paragraph 4 of the grounds below, is lawful, on the basis that such use is ancillary to the existing lawful uses permitted…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read We Kando Pty Ltd v Western Downs Regional Council and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2018] QPEC 65
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the statutory provisions of the State Planning Act 1997 (Qld), focusing on sections 446 and 496, which confer general powers upon the court, and section 456, which confers a specific power to grant declarations. The court found that the general powers under sections 446 and 496 do not include the power to grant declarations, as this power is specifically limited and qualified under section 456. Given that section 456 had been repealed, the court concluded that it did not have the power to grant the declaration sought by We Kando. The court also considered the transitional provisions in the Planning Act 2016 (Qld) and the Planning and Environment Court Act 2016 (Qld), which did not permit the continuation of section 456's power to grant declarations in this case.
ORDERS:
The Application in the pending proceeding filed on 19 March 2018 is dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Application in pending proceeding filed on 19 March 2018 is dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I would add to the above there is, in my view, no relevant context in SPA to suggest a ‘declaration’ is to be treated as being interchangeable with ‘order’ or ‘direction’ for the purposes of ss.446 or 496 of SPA. Rather, two parts of s.456 suggest an order and a declaration are different relief under SPA: (1) the heading to s.456, which states ‘Court may make declarations and orders’; and (2) section 456(7), which states the ‘court may also make an order about a declaration made by the court’. I am conscious that ss.446 and 496 of SPA are statutory provisions that confer a power upon the court, and those provisions do not contain express limitations such as to preclude the power to grant declarations. To construe these provisions subject to a limitation that is not express may, on one view, be contrary to an established principle of statutory interpretation. It is well established that statutory provisions containing a grant of power upon a court are to be construed broadly, and not by reference to unexpressed limitations. This is because the power granted to a court is to be exercised judicially, and in accordance with principle[5]. This however needs to be contrasted with a competing principle of statutory interpretation. In Leon Fink Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Film Commission (1979) 141 CLR 672 at 678 Mason J said: If it is accepted, contrary to my view, that ss.446 and 496 of SPA include a power to grant declarations, the powers conferred on the court by those provisions are fairly characterised as general powers. They are not subject to any express limitation or qualification. This can be contrasted with s.456 of SPA, which confers a specific power to grant declarations. The declarations power is subject to two express qualifications: (1) s.456 contemplates that the declaratory relief may be sought in a proceeding (other than an appeal) specifically brought for that purpose; and (2) the court’s power is limited to making declarations about one of five stated matters contained in subsections (1)(a) to (e) inclusive. The contrast between the general powers and the specific declarations power, in my view, is illustrative of the circumstances that engage the principle referred to in Leon Fink. The relevant principle requires the general powers to yield to the specific power. That is to say, the specific power (s.456) excludes the operation of the general powers (ss.446 and 496), which might have otherwise been relied upon as founding the power to grant a declaration. It is my view this represents the correct approach to be adopted to the proper interpretation of ss.446 and 496 of SPA[6]. [6]Where it is contended ss.446 and 496 of SPA confer a power on the court to make a declaration. We Kando did not rely upon ss.446 or 496 as the source of power for the relief it seeks. Rather, it relies upon s.456(1)(e) and (6) of SPA, which states: Section 456 of SPA is of no assistance to We Kando. The provision was repealed on 3 July 2017. As a consequence, its continued operation must be provided for in the transitional provisions of the PA, or the PECA. There are two relevant transitional provisions to which I was referred, namely s.311 of the PA, and s.76 of the PECA. Neither of these provisions provide for s.456 to continue after 3 July 2017 as a power to grant a declaration in an existing merits appeal under SPA. Further, these provisions do not contemplate that new proceedings may be commenced in the court under s.456 of SPA after 3 July 2017. Put simply, s.456 of SPA has been repealed, save for limited circumstances. Those limited circumstances do not apply to this case having regard to s.311 of the PA, and s.76 of PECA.