WCM v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   WCM -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2015] WASCA 55

CORAM:   BUSS JA

NEWNES JA
MAZZA JA

HEARD:   28 NOVEMBER 2014

DELIVERED          :   28 NOVEMBER 2014

PUBLISHED           :  19 MARCH 2015

FILE NO/S:   CACR 167 of 2014

BETWEEN:   WCM

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :STAUDE DCJ

File No  :IND GER 38 of 2012

Catchwords:

Preliminary appeal against decision prior to conviction pursuant to s 26 of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) - Appeal notice lodged out of time - Whether Court has power to extend time to appeal - Whether preliminary appeal competent - Whether trial should have been adjourned by reason of s 133(7) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA)

Legislation:

Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 3, s 10(3), s 23(1), s 24, s 25, s 26, s 28, s 30
Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), s 3, s 133(3), s 133(4), s 133(7)
Criminal Law (Mentally Impaired Accused) Act 1996 (WA)
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 61(1)(b)

Result:

Preliminary appeal dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr A E Monisse

Respondent:     Mr L M Fox

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Not applicable

Respondent:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Allbeury v The Corruption and Crime Commission [2012] WASCA 84; (2012) 42 WAR 425

Christianos v Young (1993) 3 WAR 303

Davern v Messel [1984] HCA 34; (1984) 155 CLR 21

Sankey v Whitlam [1978] HCA 43; (1978) 142 CLR 1

Santos v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 216

The State of Western Australia v WCM [2014] WASCA 38

  1. REASONS OF THE COURT:    On 28 November 2014, at the conclusion of the hearing, this court unanimously dismissed WCM's appeal against a decision made by Staude DCJ refusing separate trials in respect of an indictment that contained multiple counts.  The court said that reasons for the decision would be published later.  These are our reasons.

Background

  1. The appellant was originally charged on an indictment in the District Court dated 18 December 2012 with 34 counts of sexual offending against six complainants aged between the ages of 3 and 15 years.  The offences were alleged to have occurred between 31 December 1976 and 1 January 1995.  Counts 1, 3 and 4 related to VC, counts 2 and 6 related to MK, counts 5, 7 and 8 related to SC, counts 9 to 15 related to AC, counts 16 to 28 related to MS, and counts 29 to 34 related to DC (the first indictment). 

  2. On 29 January 2013, Staude DCJ ordered severance of some of the counts, but not others. Both the State and the appellant appealed against these orders pursuant to s 26 of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) (CAA). On 12 November 2013, this court allowed the State's appeal and dismissed the appellant's appeal: The…

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Details
Case
[2015] WASCA 55
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of WCM v The State of Western Australia involved an appeal by the accused against a decision made prior to conviction, specifically under section 26 of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA). The appeal notice was lodged outside the mandated timeframe, raising questions about the court's authority to extend this time limit and the competency of the preliminary appeal. Additionally, the court examined whether the trial should have been adjourned under section 133(7) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA). The central legal issues revolved around the strict time constraints imposed by section 26(5) of the CAA and the absence of an explicit power for the court to extend these deadlines. Furthermore, the court considered the implications of starting the appeal after the trial was scheduled to begin, which, according to previous case law, mandates dismissal of the appeal.

In addressing these issues, the court highlighted the statutory provisions of section 26, which delineate the conditions for a preliminary appeal. It noted that the right to appeal could be exercised by both the prosecutor and the accused, but it was limited to specific orders regarding separate trials. The court underscored the mandatory nature of the seven-day period within which an appeal must be initiated, as well as the dismissal requirement if the appeal is commenced after the trial is scheduled to start. The court also examined the consequences of a dismissed preliminary appeal on subsequent appeals against conviction. The absence of an express provision for extending the time limit for lodging an appeal was deemed significant, as it underscored the legislative intent to maintain strict adherence to the specified timeframes.

The reasoning of the court was grounded in the statutory language and legislative intent behind section 26 of the CAA. The court found that the strict time constraints were a deliberate legislative choice and that there was no implicit power for the court to extend these deadlines. Consequently, the court ruled that the preliminary appeal was not competent due to the late filing of the appeal notice. Additionally, the court concluded that there was no basis to adjourn the trial under section 133(7) of the CPA, as the appeal did not meet the statutory prerequisites. The appeal was dismissed on the grounds that it was lodged beyond the permissible timeframe, and no grounds were found to extend the deadline or to justify an adjournment of the trial.

In light of the above, the court dismissed the preliminary appeal and upheld the original decision. The trial proceeded as scheduled, and the accused was required to address the substantive charges in the subsequent trial. The court's decision reinforced the importance of adhering to statutory timeframes for preliminary appeals and the limited circumstances under which a court may intervene to extend such deadlines.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The focus of the appeal in the present case is upon s 26 of the CAA, which is in these terms:26. Separate trial decision, preliminary appeal against(1)If an accused is charged in one indictment with 2 or more offences -(a)the prosecutor may appeal to the Court of Appeal against any order made by a judge of a superior court that there be a separate trial of any of the charges; and(b)the accused may appeal to the Court of Appeal against a refusal by a judge of a superior court to order that there be a separate trial of any of the charges.(2)If an accused is tried at one trial with 2 or more offences charged in one indictment and is convicted of any of those offences, an appeal by the accused under this Part against that conviction on any ground that relates to the joinder of the charges in the indictment cannot be allowed on that ground if the accused has already appealed under subsection (1)(b), except on the basis of any relevant matter that emerged at any time after the decision that was the subject of that appeal.(3)If 2 or more accused are charged on indictment with an offence - (a)the prosecutor may appeal to the Court of Appeal against any order made by a judge of a superior court that there be a separate trial of any of the accused; and(b)any accused may appeal to the Court of Appeal against a refusal by a judge of a superior court to order that there be a separate trial of any of the accused.(4)If an accused is tried with one or more other accused in one trial and is convicted of any offence, an appeal by the accused under this Part against that conviction on any ground that relates to the joinder of the accused in the indictment cannot be allowed on that ground if the accused has already appealed under subsection (3)(b), except on the basis of any relevant matter that emerged at any time after the decision that was the subject of that appeal.(5)An appeal under this section against a decision must be commenced within 7 days after the date of the decision and before the day on which the accused’s trial is listed to start.(6)If an appeal under this section is commenced on or after the day on which the accused’s trial is listed to start, the appeal must be dismissed.(7)On an appeal under this section against an order or a refusal to make an order, the Court of Appeal may confirm the order or refusal, or set it aside and make any order that could have been made on the application for a separate trial. (emphasis added) There are a number of features of s 26 of the CAA to be noted:1.The right of preliminary appeal may be exercised by both the prosecutor and the accused person. 2.The right is limited to orders made by a judge of a superior court in respect of:(a)whether to order a separate trial of any of the charges in an indictment which contains two or more charges; or(b)whether to order a separate trial of any of the accused in an indictment which charges two or more persons.3.Where a preliminary appeal is taken by the accused and dismissed, an appeal against conviction cannot be allowed on any ground that relates to the joinder of the charges or the accused, unless a relevant matter has emerged after the decision that was the subject of the preliminary appeal.4.A preliminary appeal may not be commenced unless the two preconditions in s 26(5) of the CAA are satisfied. One of the preconditions is that the appeal must be commenced within seven days after the date of the decision.5.There is no express power for the court to extend the seven‑day time limit.6.If a preliminary appeal is commenced on or after the day on which the accused's trial is listed to start, the appeal must be dismissed. See Santos v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 216 [93] ‑ [110].7.The Court of Appeal may confirm the order or refusal, or set it aside and make any order that could have been made on the application for a separate trial.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established