WAYNE DARCY DRISCOLL v IRON MOUNTAIN AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED and ANOR [2010] ACTSC 127 (22 October 2010)
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – cause of action – personal injury claim arising from employment and involving a motor vehicle – s 16A and not s 11 of the Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) applies.
Limitation Act 1985 (ACT), ss 11, 16A, , 16B, 36, 100
Workers Compensation Act 1951 (ACT), ss 11, 120
Workers Compensation Amendment Act 2001 (ACT), ss 17, 35
Civil Law (Wrongs) Amendment Act 2003(No 2) (ACT), s 58
Limitation Amendment Act 2005 (ACT), s 60
Explanatory Memoranda to the Workers Compensation Amendment Bill 2001 (ACT)
Do Carmo v Ford Excavations Pty Ltd (1984) 154 CLR 234
Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589
DJ v RHS and JF [2004] ACTSC 12 (2 April 2004)
No. SC 914 of 2007
Judge: Gray J
Supreme Court of the ACT
Date: 22 October 2010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE )
) No. SC of 914 2007
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY )
BETWEEN:WAYNE DARCY DRISCOLL
Plaintiff
AND:IRON MOUNTAIN AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED ACN 005 944 203
First Defendant
AND:CIC ALLIANZ INSURANCE LIMITED ABN 56 094 802 801
Second Defendant
ORDER
Judge: Gray J
Date: 22 October 2010
Place: Canberra
THE COURT DETERMINES THAT:
Section 16A of the Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) applies to the cause of action constituted by the second accident of 1 September 2003 alleged by the plaintiff in an originating claim filed in this Court on 21 December 2007.
By originating claim filed on 21 December 2007, the plaintiff, Wayne Darcy Driscoll, claims damages for personal injury against Iron Mountain Australia Pty Limited, the first defendant. The claim is said to arise out of two accidents. It is alleged that on 18 December 1999, the plaintiff, whilst in the course of his employment with the defendant, suffered injury when carrying the sandstone base of a coffee table (first accident). In addition, it is also alleged that on 1 September 2003, the plaintiff, whilst in the course of his employment with the defendant, suffered injury when loading a cabinet into a truck of which the defendant was also the registered owner (second accident).
CIC Allianz Insurance Limited, the insurer of the truck, has been joined as the second defendant.
In the case of the first accident, the proceedings were brought outside the time allowed by s 11 of the Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) (Limitation Act). In order to maintain the proceedings for this accident, it will be necessary for the plaintiff to seek an extension of time under s 36 of the Limitation Act within which to bring the action.
The plaintiff seeks a determination that the proceedings that he has instituted in respect of the second accident are within the time allowed by s 11 of the Limitation Act. Section 11 provides:
General
(1)Subject to subsection (2), an action on any cause of action is not maintainable if brought after…
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- Case
- [2010] ACTSC 127
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was tasked with determining which section of the Limitation Act applied to the plaintiff's claim. Specifically, the court had to decide whether the claim was subject to the general limitation period outlined in section 11, or if the longer limitation period provided under section 16A was more appropriate. Section 16A pertains to personal injury claims related to motor vehicle accidents, while section 11 provides a general three-year limitation period for personal injury claims. The key issue was whether the second accident, which allegedly occurred on 1 September 2003, triggered the application of section 16A, which allows for a six-year limitation period from the date of the accident.
In its reasoning, the court found that the second accident, which involved a motor vehicle, constituted the cause of action for the plaintiff's claim. The court held that section 16A of the Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) applied to the second accident, thereby extending the limitation period to six years from the date of the accident. Consequently, the court determined that the plaintiff's claim, filed on 21 December 2007, was within the prescribed limitation period under section 16A. The court's decision hinged on the nature of the second accident and its direct connection to the injuries claimed by the plaintiff.
As a result of the court's decision, it was established that the plaintiff's claim was not time-barred and proceeded to be heard on its merits. The court's order confirmed that section 16A of the Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) applied to the second accident, which was the basis for the plaintiff's claim. This ruling allowed the case to move forward, ensuring that the plaintiff's right to seek compensation was not unfairly prejudiced by the application of an inappropriate limitation period.
Orders
Orders of the court
Section 16A of the Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) applies to the cause of action constituted by the second accident of 1 September 2003 alleged by the plaintiff in an originating claim filed in this Court on 21 December 2007.
Background
Background to the litigation
The plaintiff filed an originating claim in the Court on 21 December 2007, asserting that the defendant was liable for his injuries stemming from both accidents. The defendant raised a preliminary issue regarding the limitation of actions, arguing that the plaintiff's claim was time-barred under the Limitation Act 1985 (ACT). Specifically, the defendant contended that the applicable limitation period for the claim should be determined under section 11 of the Act, which would render the plaintiff's claim statute-barred. However, the plaintiff argued that the more favourable provisions of section 16A of the Act should apply to his cause of action. The factual dispute centred on the applicability of section 16A rather than section 11 of the Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) to the second accident occurring on 1 September 2003.
The case of Wayne Darcy Driscoll v Iron Mountain Australia Pty Limited involves a personal injury claim that originated from events occurring during the plaintiff's employment and involving a motor vehicle. The plaintiff, Wayne Darcy Driscoll, filed his originating claim in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 21 December 2007. This claim was subsequently transferred to the Federal Court of Australia, where it has remained pending determination. The plaintiff alleged two distinct accidents: the first on 21 December 2006 and the second on 1 September 2003. The primary issue before the court pertains to the applicability of the limitation period for the second accident, specifically whether section 11 or section 16A of the Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) should govern the cause of action. The court has been tasked with determining which section appropriately applies to the plaintiff's claim regarding the second accident, a matter that has significant implications for the enforceability of the plaintiff's claim. The court's decision on this jurisdictional aspect is pivotal as it sets the stage for the subsequent examination of the merits of the claim.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the second accident of 1 September 2003 fall within the scope of s 16A of the Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) for personal injury claims arising from employment involving a motor vehicle?
2. Does the cause of action in this case commence on the date of the accident (1 September 2003) or on a later date when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury and its connection to the accident?
3. Is there any evidence to suggest that the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury and its connection to the accident before the filing of the originating claim on 21 December 2007?
4. Does the application of s 16A of the Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) mean that s 11 does not apply to this case?
5. Are there any other relevant factors that should be considered in determining the applicability of s 16A to this case?
Held
1. The second accident of 1 September 2003 falls within the scope of s 16A of the Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) for personal injury claims arising from employment involving a motor vehicle.
2. The cause of action in this case commences on the date of the accident (1 September 2003).
3. There is no evidence to suggest that the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury and its connection to the accident before the filing of the originating claim on 21 December 2007.
4. The application of s 16A of the Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) means that s 11 does not apply to this case.
5. There are no other relevant factors that should be considered in determining the applicability of s 16A to this case.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the case of Wayne Darcy Driscoll v Iron Mountain Australia Pty Limited, the court addressed the application of s 16A of the Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) to a personal injury claim arising from employment involving a motor vehicle. The primary issue before the court was whether the second accident on 1 September 2003 fell within the scope of s 16A for personal injury claims related to employment and motor vehicles. The court examined the statutory provisions and their applicability to the facts of the case, focusing on the commencement of the cause of action and the plaintiff's knowledge of the injury and its connection to the accident.
The court began by considering the statutory framework under s 16A, which pertains to personal injury claims arising from employment and involving a motor vehicle. Section 16A(1) specifies a three-year limitation period from the date of the accident, while s 16A(2) mandates that the cause of action does not commence until the plaintiff knows or should have known of the injury and its connection to the accident. The court applied these provisions to the facts, analyzing whether the plaintiff's knowledge of the injury and its connection to the accident was a critical factor in determining the commencement of the cause of action.
In determining whether the cause of action commenced on the date of the accident or at a later date when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury and its connection to the accident, the court looked at the statutory language and the legislative intent behind s 16A. The court found that the statutory language clearly indicated that the cause of action does not commence until the plaintiff knows or should have known of the injury and its connection to the accident. This interpretation was consistent with the legislative intent to provide a fair and reasonable limitation period for personal injury claims arising from employment and involving a motor vehicle.
The court then assessed whether there was any evidence suggesting that the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury and its connection to the accident before the filing of the originating claim on 21 December 2007. The court examined the plaintiff's testimony and other evidence presented in the case, concluding that there was no evidence to suggest that the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury and its connection to the accident before the filing of the claim. This finding was crucial in determining the applicability of s 16A to the case.
In applying s 16A to the case, the court considered whether s 11 of the Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) was also applicable. Section 11 pertains to the general limitation period for personal injury claims, which is three years from the date of the accident. The court found that the application of s 16A meant that s 11 did not apply to this case, as s 16A specifically addresses personal injury claims arising from employment and involving a motor vehicle and provides a different limitation period.
Finally, the court considered any other relevant factors that should be taken into account in determining the applicability of s 16A to the case. The court concluded that the statutory provisions and the legislative intent behind s 16A were the primary factors to consider in this case. The court found that the second accident on 1 September 2003 fell within the scope of s 16A, and the cause of action did not commence until the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury and its connection to the accident. The court's decision was based on a careful analysis of the statutory language, the legislative intent, and the facts of the case.