Wayland v Tonkin No. Scciv-01-1621

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WAYLAND v TONKIN

[2002] SASC 366

Full Court: Doyle CJ, Perry and Debelle JJ

  1. DOYLE CJ:            This is an application for an extension of time within which to appeal against a decision of the District Court.  The District Court made an order in favour of the respondent on a claim against the applicant and another defendant to a right of contribution under two deeds of guarantee and indemnity.

  2. For convenience, I will refer to the applicant as “the first defendant”, to the respondent as “the plaintiff” and to the first and second defendants collectively as “the defendants”.

  3. In the course of hearing the application the Court heard argument on the merits of the appeal.

  4. The Court refused the application for an extension of time at the conclusion of the oral argument.  What follows are my reasons for joining in that order.

    Facts

  5. The plaintiff and the defendants executed two deeds of guarantee and indemnity (“the Mutual deeds”) on 19 September 1991, in favour of Mutual Community Friendly Society of SA (“Mutual”) to secure two loans from Mutual to Wag 2 Pty Ltd (“Wag”), a finance company established by the plaintiff and the defendants. 

  6. The plaintiff and the defendants established Wag in 1988.  The plaintiff and the defendants were directors and shareholders of Wag.  The capital of the company was to be obtained by borrowing money upon mortgage security over property owned by the plaintiff’s family trust company, Barrymore Holdings Pty Ltd (“Barrymore”).  In other words, the plaintiff would secure funding for Wag by granting mortgages over property owned by Barrymore.

  7. By separate loan agreements in November 1989 and September 1991, Mutual advanced to Wag sums of, respectively, $442,500 and $600,000 upon mortgage security granted by Wag and upon the security of the joint and several deeds of guarantee and indemnity executed by the plaintiff and the defendants (that is, the Mutual deeds).

  8. At about that time, Wag was experiencing financial difficulties.

  9. In July 1992, in response to a demand by Mutual for further security in relation to the outstanding balance owed by Wag to Mutual, Barrymore granted a mortgage over land to Mutual.  Barrymore also paid arrears owed by Wag to Mutual.  In November 1995, the plaintiff and Barrymore granted to Mutual two further mortgages over land.

  10. In April 1997, National Mutual Health Insurance Pty Ltd (“National Mutual”), the assignee of the rights of Mutual under the above agreements, issued to Wag, Barrymore, the plaintiff and the defendants a notice demanding payment of $781,453.70 for default in due observance of the terms and conditions of the loan agreements.  The notice of demand recited the advances of $442,500 and $600,000 by Mutual to Wag, the four mortgages granted to Mutual to secure those advances, and the Mutual deeds, as well as the assignment of rights from Mutual to National Mutual.

  11. The plaintiff and the defendants resolved between them that the plaintiff would negotiate a settlement with National Mutual on behalf of “the guarantors”, that is on behalf of the plaintiff and…

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Details
Case
[2002] SASC 366
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Wayland v Tonkin, the South Australian Supreme Court addressed the application for an extension of time for an appeal. The plaintiff and the defendants had executed deeds of guarantee and indemnity to secure loans for Wag 2 Pty Ltd, a company they established. The plaintiff paid more than his share of the debt to National Mutual, the assignee of the rights of Mutual, and sought contribution from the defendants. The defendants argued that a deed of release extinguished the plaintiff's right to contribution. The primary legal issue was whether the deed of release extinguished the plaintiff's right to contribution.

The court found that the deed of release did not extinguish the plaintiff's right to contribution. The court held that the right to contribution arises from the equitable principle that co-sureties of the same principal debt or liability are entitled to equal contribution. The court referred to established case law, including Mahoney v McManus, McLean v Discount and Finance Ltd, and Dering v Earl of Winchelsea, to support its decision. The court concluded that the unequal contribution enforced the right to contribution on the part of the party who paid more than their just proportion. Therefore, the challenge to the judge's decision lacked substance, and the application for an extension of time to appeal was dismissed.

The court's reasoning was based on the principle of equitable contribution among co-sureties, which is not founded upon contract but arises from the fact that the parties are co-sureties of the same principal debt or liability. The court found that the deed of release did not extinguish this equitable right. The court dismissed the application for an extension of time to appeal, as the defendants did not establish an arguable case.

The final orders of the court were to dismiss the application for an extension of time within which to appeal and to dismiss the application to extend time within which to appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Court refused the application for an extension of time at the conclusion of the oral argument. What follows are my reasons for joining in that order.Facts The plaintiff and the defendants executed two deeds of guarantee and indemnity (“the Mutual deeds”) on 19 September 1991, in favour of Mutual Community Friendly Society of SA (“Mutual”) to secure two loans from Mutual to Wag 2 Pty Ltd (“Wag”), a finance company established by the plaintiff and the defendants. The plaintiff and the defendants established Wag in 1988. The plaintiff and the defendants were directors and shareholders of Wag. The capital of the company was to be obtained by borrowing money upon mortgage security over property owned by the plaintiff’s family trust company, Barrymore Holdings Pty Ltd (“Barrymore”). In other words, the plaintiff would secure funding for Wag by granting mortgages over property owned by Barrymore. By separate loan agreements in November 1989 and September 1991, Mutual advanced to Wag sums of, respectively, $442,500 and $600,000 upon mortgage security granted by Wag and upon the security of the joint and several deeds of guarantee and indemnity executed by the plaintiff and the defendants (that is, the Mutual deeds). At about that time, Wag was experiencing financial difficulties. In July 1992, in response to a demand by Mutual for further security in relation to the outstanding balance owed by Wag to Mutual, Barrymore granted a mortgage over land to Mutual. Barrymore also paid arrears owed by Wag to Mutual. In November 1995, the plaintiff and Barrymore granted to Mutual two further mortgages over land. In April 1997, National Mutual Health Insurance Pty Ltd (“National Mutual”), the assignee of the rights of Mutual under the above agreements, issued to Wag, Barrymore, the plaintiff and the defendants a notice demanding payment of $781,453.70 for default in due observance of the terms and conditions of the loan agreements. The notice of demand recited the advances of $442,500 and $600,000 by Mutual to Wag, the four mortgages granted to Mutual to secure those advances, and the Mutual deeds, as well as the assignment of rights from Mutual to National Mutual. The plaintiff and the defendants resolved between them that the plaintiff would negotiate a settlement with National Mutual on behalf of “the guarantors”, that is on behalf of the plaintiff and the defendants. The minutes of a meeting between the plaintiff and the defendants in April 1997 record that the defendants “were unable to contribute towards a settlement at this point in time but that they would each pay their one thirds share of the debt when funds become available”. Following negotiations between the plaintiff and the solicitors for National Mutual, the plaintiff reported to the defendants that his offer of $200,000 “on behalf of the guarantors” of Wag was rejected. The plaintiff and the defendants agreed that the plaintiff would make an offer of $235,000.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The plaintiff’s right to contribution from the first defendant arose when he paid more than his share of the debt to National Mutual. The Mutual release did not extinguish that right. The first ground of appeal cannot be maintained. The challenge to the Judge’s decision lacks any substance.Conclusion For those reasons I joined in the order refusing the application for an extension of time within which to appeal. It is not necessary to give reasons for the order as to costs that we made when refusing the extension of time. PERRY J: In this matter, I concurred in the order dismissing the application for an extension of time within which to appeal. I agree with the reasons now published by the Chief Justice for taking that course. DEBELLE J: I agreed with the order that the application to extend time within which to appeal should be dismissed. The facts are recited in the reasons of the Chief Justice and need not be repeated. My reasons for dismissing the application are as follows. The first defendant was some three months late in instituting this appeal. One of the matters which he must establish in order to secure an extension of time in which to appeal is that he has an arguable case: Esther Investments Pty Ltd v Markalinga Pty Ltd (1989) 2 WAR 196; Palata Investments Ltd v Burt and Sinfield Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 942 at 946; Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516 at 519 – 520; McGregor-Dey v SA College of Advanced Education (unreported, Supreme Court of SA, Judgment No. S4406); Wacyk v Plane (unreported, Supreme Court of SA, Full Court, Judgment No. 38, 8 July 1987). In many cases, it might be difficult to determine whether an applicant for an extension of time within which to appeal has an arguable case: see the observations of Lord Denning MR in R v Secretary for the Home Department; ex parte Mehta [1975] 1 WLR 1087 at 1091. No such difficulty exists in this case. The first defendant contended that the execution of the deed of release on 24 November 1997 (the Mutual deed of release) extinguished any right to contribution that the plaintiff might have had against himself and the other sureties. The submission must fail. Where one of several guarantors pays the creditor the amount of the guaranteed debt and that guarantor pays more than his just proportion of the liability, the guarantor is entitled to contribution from his co-sureties: Mahoney v McManus (1981) 180 CLR 370 per Gibbs CJ at 376 – 377 and per Brennan J at 387 – 388. Although Gibbs CJ and Brennan J differed in their ultimate conclusion, they agreed on the relevant principles. It is the unequal contribution so enforced that establishes the right to contribution on the part of the party who has provided more than his just proportion: McLean v Discount and Finance Ltd (1939) 64 CLR 312 per Starke J at 347. The right of contribution is an equitable principle and the equity arises from the fact that the parties are co-sureties of the same principal debt or liability and is not founded upon contract: Dering v Earl of Winchelsea (1787) 1 Cox 318 (29 ER 1184) approved in McLean v Discount and Finance Ltd per Starke J at 341. See also Albion Insurance Co Ltd v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1969) 121 CLR 342 per Kitto J at 350 – 351 and Goff and Jones, The Law of Restitution (5th ed) 399 – 409.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court addressed the first issue by examining whether the execution of the Mutual deed of release on 24 November 1997 extinguished any right to contribution that the plaintiff might have had against himself and the other sureties. The Court held that the Mutual deed of release did not extinguish the plaintiff's right to contribution. The Court reasoned that where one of several guarantors pays the creditor the amount of the guaranteed debt and that guarantor pays more than his just proportion of the liability, the guarantor is entitled to contribution from his co-sureties. The Court relied on the case of Mahoney v McManus (1981) 180 CLR 370, where Gibbs CJ and Brennan J agreed on the relevant principles, noting that it is the unequal contribution so enforced that establishes the right to contribution on the part of the party who has provided more than his just proportion. The Court also referred to the case of McLean v Discount and Finance Ltd (1939) 64 CLR 312, where Starke J held that the right of contribution is an equitable principle and the equity arises from the fact that the parties are co-sureties of the same principal debt or liability and is not founded upon contract.

The Court then considered the second issue, which was whether the first defendant was some three months late in instituting this appeal, and did he establish an arguable case to secure an extension of time in which to appeal. The Court held that the first defendant was indeed late in instituting this appeal, and that he had failed to establish an arguable case to secure an extension of time in which to appeal. The Court noted that in many cases, it might be difficult to determine whether an applicant for an extension of time within which to appeal has an arguable case, but that no such difficulty existed in this case. The Court observed that the first defendant contended that the execution of the Mutual deed of release extinguished any right to contribution that the plaintiff might have had against himself and the other sureties, but the Court held that this submission must fail for the reasons outlined above.

The Court then turned to the third issue, which was whether the plaintiff had a right to contribution from the first defendant for paying more than his share of the debt to National Mutual. The Court held that the plaintiff did have a right to contribution from the first defendant. The Court reasoned that the plaintiff had paid more than his share of the debt to National Mutual, and that this entitled him to contribution from the first defendant. The Court noted that this principle was established in Mahoney v McManus, where Gibbs CJ and Brennan J agreed that where one of several guarantors pays the creditor the amount of the guaranteed debt and that guarantor pays more than his just proportion of the liability, the guarantor is entitled to contribution from his co-sureties.

Finally, the Court addressed the fourth issue, which was whether the right of contribution was an equitable principle that arises from the fact that the parties are co-sureties of the same principal debt or liability. The Court held that this was indeed the case. The Court relied on the case of Dering v Earl of Winchelsea (1787) 1 Cox 318, where it was held that the right of contribution is an equitable principle and the equity arises from the fact that the parties are co-sureties of the same principal debt or liability and is not founded upon contract. The Court also referred to the case of Albion Insurance Co Ltd v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1969) 121 CLR 342, where Kitto J held that the right of contribution arises from the fact that the parties are co-sureties of the same principal debt or liability.

In conclusion, the Court held that the Mutual deed of release did not extinguish the plaintiff's right to contribution, that the first defendant had failed to establish an arguable case to secure an extension of time in which to appeal, that the plaintiff had a right to contribution from the first defendant for paying more than his share of the debt to National Mutual, and that the right of contribution was an equitable principle that arises from the fact that the parties are co-sureties of the same principal debt or liability. The ratio decidendi of this case is that where one of several guarantors pays the creditor the amount of the guaranteed debt and that guarantor pays more than his just proportion of the liability, the guarantor is entitled to contribution from his co-sureties, and that this right arises from the fact that the parties are co-sureties of the same principal debt or liability. The Court followed prior authority in Mahoney v McManus and Dering v Earl of Winchelsea, and did not depart from or distinguish any prior authority.