Watts v Ware and MMI Insurance Group

[2000] QDC 412

DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:	Watts v. Ware & Anor [2000] QDC 412
PARTIES:	VICKI LEANNE WATTS (Plaintiff) v. STEPHEN WARE (First Defendant) & MMI INSURANCE GROUP (Second Defendant)
FILE NO/S:	Plaint 87 of 1999
DIVISION:
PROCEEDING:	Trial
ORIGINATING	District Court Southport
COURT:
DELIVERED ON:	5 May 2000
DELIVERED AT:	Brisbane
HEARING DATE:	2, 3 March 2000
JUDGE:	McGill DCJ
ORDER:	Judgment that the defendants pay the plaintiff $116,521 and costs to be assessed
CATCHWORDS:	EMPLOYMENT LAW – injury of employee – damages - neck
COUNSEL:	G.W. Diehm for the plaintiff P.L. Feely for the defendants
SOLICITORS:	Gall Standfield & Smith for the plaintiff McInnes Wilson for the defendant

1. The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident on 21 November 1996 when the vehicle she was driving was struck from behind while in a line of traffic, forcing her vehicle into the one in front: p.8. Liability is not now in issue (p.2), but there was a substantial dispute in relation to quantum. The plaintiff claims that in the accident she suffered a whiplash injury to the neck, which is not in issue, and that symptoms from this, particularly frequent headaches, sometimes severe, are continuing and are expected to continue indefinitely. The defendant’s medical experts however were of the opinion that the plaintiff is no longer suffering symptoms as a consequence of the accident, although they reached this conclusion by different routes. Dr. Martin, an orthopaedic surgeon, was of the opinion that the plaintiff is no longer suffering symptoms and that her complaints were due to the litigation. Dr. Reid, a neurologist, thought the plaintiff had genuine symptoms, but that they were not related to the accident.

2. About 15 minutes after the collision the plaintiff began to feel that her neck was becoming stiff, and that evening developed a headache: p.9. She went to a doctor the next day, with continuing headaches and some feeling of numbness and tingling down the arms into the fingers, with the problem more on the right side of the neck: p.9. The neck was x-rayed which did not reveal any abnormality, and her doctor initially suggested rest for a week; the plaintiff did so and took Panadol to control the pain, but then went back to the G.P. who referred her to specialists: p.10. She received physiotherapy which continued until early March 1997, stopping then because WorkCover stopped paying at that point. The physiotherapy relieved the symptoms but only on a temporary basis: p.10. The symptoms improved for about two years after the accident but then plateaued: p.10.

3. Since then the plaintiff has been free from symptoms when she is not actually doing anything, but quite a number of things do produce a stretching aching feeling in the right side of her neck which extends up into the face and the ear, and brings on a headache: p.12. Looking down for any length of time or keeping her head in an awkward position produces this result (p.11) as does continual sweeping or vacuuming, lifting unusually heavy objects (p.12) and driving for more than a short time. Because she has to do things during the day for one reason or another, the practical effect is that she does develop two or three headaches a day, which she tries to cope with by having a break and easing off on whatever is aggravating her (p.13), although if she does press on, the headache continues and becomes worse, a thumping sort of headache: p.13. She tries to minimise activities which aggravate the neck, by for example turning the body rather than the whole neck: p.14. She also has reduced the sort of things that she does around the home; she does not clean windows or do mowing (p.14) and she has given up a variety of active sports that she used to engage in: p.16. She cannot lie in bed for too long without developing a headache, and she has a problem if she stands in the one position for too long: p.15. Prior to the accident she had no problems with her health, particularly with her neck, or any particular problem with headaches: p.16.

Medical Evidence

1. The plaintiff has been seen by more than one specialist, but no reports were put in evidence from treating doctors. The plaintiff was seen by Dr. White, an orthopaedic surgeon, on 27 March 1998 for the purposes of a report: Exhibit 1. Dr. White found on examination no spasm in the neck, but some reduction in movements. Dr. White thought that on x-rays taken on 27 March 1998 there was a scoliosis, a marked loss of the normal lordosis and a slight narrowing of the C4/5 disc space (not noted in the report of the radiologist, Exhibit 5), which Dr. White conceded was of no significance in itself p.84. Dr. White at that stage thought the plaintiff had suffered a flexion and extension injury of a kind where the symptoms commonly settle within three months, although some go on to produce permanent pain and loss of function. He also thought there was a possibility of degeneration in the long term making the condition worse.

2. Dr. White saw the plaintiff again on 17 January 2000 where the examination results were similar, although there was a little more neck movement found, the reduction being one quarter rather than one third. There was still a loss of normal lordosis shown in x-rays which Dr. White thought indicated that the neck was painful. He thought that the condition was stable and permanent, given the time which had elapsed since the injury, and amounted to a 5% loss of whole body which was assessed essentially on a subjective basis rather than on the basis of tables: p.86. Dr. White thought that there was little chance of improvement in the future.

3. The plaintiff was seen by Dr. Martin, an orthopaedic surgeon, on 14 June 1999 for the purposes of a report to the solicitors for the defendant: Exhibit 10. Dr Martin, on examination, found no restriction of neck movement on any plain, and no tenderness to palpation, and thought the various x-rays taken in 1996, 197 and 1998 showed no abnormality, including that on 27 March 1998. Dr. Martin was of the opinion that there were no ongoing effects from the accident, and that the allegation of symptoms could not be supported by any evidence of injury. He thought her complaints of pain were not genuine: p.107.

4. The plaintiff was seen by an occupational therapist, Mr. Barratt, on 6 July 1999 for the purposes of a report: Exhibit 6. The complaints to Mr. Barratt were similar to those given by the plaintiff during evidence before me. As a result of some testing of functional capacity, Mr. Barratt assessed the plaintiff as being restricted to work of sedentary physical demand level. Mr. Barratt thought that the plaintiff’s presentation and observed movement dysfunction were consistent with her complaints and did not suggest any exaggeration. Mr. Barratt thought that the plaintiff’s work should be confined to a period not above three hours per day, and that working an eight hour day would cause significant neck pain and headaches. Mr. Barratt thought that a pain management course might be of assistance to the plaintiff, and that a workplace assessment would also be helpful.

5. The plaintiff was seen for the purposes of a report by Dr. Langley, an orthopaedic surgeon, on 9 July 1999: Exhibit 7. Again, the history was similar to the complaints given during evidence. Dr. Langley found at the examination that there was reduction in movement of flexion and extension, lateral flexion and rotation, with movements reduced by less than half the normal range. Dr. Langley thought the plaintiff had suffered a fairly severe cervical sprain which had left her with permanent impairment of 15% of the whole person, which was based on the reduction of various movements in the neck according to the AMA tables: p.72. He did not think that the disc would be assisted by surgery, but there would be a need for intermittent physiotherapy. He thought the plaintiff would be able to do the sort of work she was then doing, part time clerical work.

6. The plaintiff was seen by Dr. Boyce, a neurologist, on 24 November 1999 for the purposes of a report. Dr. Boyce thought that the result of an MRI scan on 31 December 1996 showed a loss of normal cervical lordosis, and an early protrusion of the C6/7 disc. Subsequently on 28 February 2000 a consultant radiologist, Dr. Anderson, examined the MRI films and thought that there was some minimal bulging of the posterial longtitudanol ligament at C6/7 level which Dr. Anderson regarded as a development variant, that is a growth on the ligament rather than any defect in the disc: Exhibit 14. Dr. Boyce could not really comment on this without seeing the films again, and he did not have them. He would have preferred to see them again himself, but was prepared to acknowledge the expertise of Dr. Anderson: p.90. Dr. Boyce thought that the neck was being held in a rigid position on examination and was markedly tender to palpation, with restriction in neck movement. She had cervical muscle spasm: p.91. Dr. Boyce thought the plaintiff had suffered a significant whiplash injury, leaving her with chronic musculo- ligamentus sprain which would be a long term impairment in the order of 10% of the whole body, assessed to reflect the persisting headaches: p.89. The headaches of which the plaintiff complained were typical for a persisting problem after a whiplash injury: p.94. He did not hold out much hope for improvement, but did not think there was much prospect of the condition becoming worse either.

7. The plaintiff was seen by Dr. Reid, a neurologist, for the purposes of a report on 27 January 2000: Exhibit 12. Dr. Reid found the plaintiff emotional during the consultation, and indeed at times while giving her evidence the plaintiff became emotional in the witness box. Dr. Reid found an absence of muscle spasming, and a full range of cervical and shoulder joint movements. Dr. Reid did think the plaintiff had suffered a strain to the soft tissues of the neck but that there was no objective evidence of a more serious injury, and clinical examination was normal. She thought the plaintiff’s symptoms (which she regarded as genuine and distressing: p.112) were due to cranio-cervical muscle spasming related to travelling long distances and other life style pressures and stresses. Dr. Reid acknowledged that there was a lack of lordosis on the x-rays, but said that this reflected simply a muscle tightening which may be voluntary as well as involuntary: Exhibit 13.

Analysis

1. Apart from the difference in analysis, the main difference between the defendant’s experts and the plaintiff’s experts was as to the outcome of the examination in relation to movement of the neck. Unfortunately, only one of the doctors, Dr. Langley, used an inclinometer to measure these movements, so that he was able to provide me with figures not only as to the observed degree of movement present, but as to the extent of movement which he regarded as normal and against which he was assessing the movement present: p.67. This would have been particularly helpful if Dr. Martin or Dr. Reid had made some comparable measurements, or been able to quote similar figures. If the doctor simply asks the patient to move the neck in various planes as far as possible, and makes a subjective comparison with the extent of movement and normal movement, there is room for variation as to the actual amount of movement observed, and I suspect as to the extent of movement which is regarded by the doctor as normal. These differences were not examined in any detail in the evidence, and in view of this circumstance, and the fact that there may be with a condition of this nature some variation from day to day anyway, it is difficult for me to attribute any particular significance to this difference of views

2. It is at least inconsistent with the notion that the plaintiff was putting on an act in order to impress the defendants’ doctors, and this is consistent with her evidence being essentially genuine. A subtle cheat might refrain from faking symptoms of this nature when being examined by doctors thought likely to be unsympathetic, but the plaintiff did not in the witness box give me the impression of even potentially falling into that category; she was at times in her evidence frank in a way which was not always helpful to herself, and as was pointed out by her counsel in addresses, there were times when her evidence was obviously not an exercise on her part of trying to maximise her case. Dr. Reid thought the plaintiff was genuine in her complaints but that they sprang from a different cause, and I think that is of some significance.

3. This is not a case where the plaintiff appears to be left with minimal movement in any particular direction, and the examination results in the case of the plaintiff’s doctors are broadly consistent, except perhaps for Dr. Boyce who seems to have seen the plaintiff on a day when the neck was unusually stiff. That would be consistent with the plaintiff’s having had a bad day on that occasion. I think the more likely explanation is that the plaintiff was on the other occasions displaying much the same degree of movement, and that Dr. White and Dr. Langley regarded this as involving some limitation of movement, but Dr. Martin and Dr. Reid did not.

4. The next issue I think really involves consideration of the question of credibility, in view of the opinions expressed by Dr. Martin. My assessment of the plaintiff, made with the benefit of all of the evidence, is that the plaintiff’s evidence is generally reliable and that her complaints of continuing problems in the neck, and frequent headaches, are genuine. There was some inconsistency in the plaintiff’s evidence, particularly between herself and her husband as to who had been responsible for mowing that part of their property which was regularly mown prior to the time of the accident. The plaintiff was adamant that she had always done this, (p.26-7) whereas her husband’s evidence was to the effect that he did it more often than not, perhaps 70% of the time: p.45. I suspect that this may have something to do with different perceptions about the amount of effort being put into what may have been an unpopular job, but I think that, unless the plaintiff’s husband’s evidence is just completely unreliable, it does show some lack of reliability on the part of the plaintiff. This, I think, would induce me to treat her evidence with some degree of caution, something I commonly do anyway, but that in itself is not sufficient to cause me to have serious doubts about the reliability of the plaintiff; it does not make me doubt, for example, that she is currently suffering significant symptoms of neck pain and headaches. It also does not make me doubt that these symptoms have been continuous since the accident, and that I think is of some significance in relation to the other difference of opinion between the medical witnesses. That is a sufficient basis for rejecting the opinions of Dr. Martin, which were based on the proposition that the plaintiff’s symptoms were not genuine.

5. Both Dr. Martin (p.103) and Dr. Reid (p.113) expressed the view that whiplash injuries not sufficiently severe to produce signs detectable on x-rays or other scans in a person with a healthy neck (that is someone who did not have pre-existing degeneration) were seen to resolve reasonably quickly except in those cases where the person concerned was a plaintiff in litigation. They gave examples of people who suffered neck injuries in sporting accidents and who recovered. Contrary evidence was given by Dr. White (p.83). Dr. Reid also said that the sort of symptoms with which the plaintiff presented were not uncommon symptoms for people who had not suffered any whiplash injury, but who were simply experiencing difficulty coping with various stressors in their lives.

6. That is not necessarily much comfort to the defendant, since it does not matter very much whether the plaintiff’s continuing symptoms are being caused by some physical injury to the nerves or other tissues in the neck, or caused by an unconscious response to the symptoms initially produced by the strain, and now in effect self perpetuating. On this scenario, the plaintiff would be constantly expecting pain in the neck and headaches, and being understandably concerned and distressed about this and frustrated by the restrictions that this imposes on her life, responds to these difficulties and stressors by developing pain in the neck and muscle contraction headaches. Such headaches would not be in the scientific sense caused by the accident in that they were not produced by a physical injury suffered in the accident, but in the legal sense they would still be caused by the accident because they were a consequence which in fact followed from its having occurred, and amount to pain and suffering and loss of function which the plaintiff would not have suffered if she had not injured her neck in this accident.

7. Dr. Reid suggested that they were related to travelling long distances and other life style pressures and stresses, but the difference between the situation before the accident and the situation after the accident seems to me to be that after the accident the plaintiff had to cope with those difficulties with the added burden of frequent headaches, which would have made it much harder to cope, particularly because there was diminished capacity for recreational relaxation. I think it is unlikely that there has been a coincidental development of neck pain and headaches of a similar kind to those produced by the whiplash sprain, for other reasons after the whiplash injury fully healed, or as it was healing.

8. It is not uncommon for courts to be faced with this sort of conflict of medical evidence, in circumstances where a person has suffered a relatively minor injury to the neck or back, where there is no indication of anything of significance detectable by any form of objective diagnostic testing, and where the condition is one which ordinarily clears up fairly rapidly, at least in the absence of litigation. It is not uncommon to be presented, in situations such as this, with the sort of conflict of evidence that arose in this case, with some doctors maintaining that it is the case that some people who suffer these apparently minor injuries do not get better and do have continuing symptoms flowing from the injuries, apparently indefinitely, whereas other doctors maintain that that only occurs where there is some particular reason for the symptoms to be prolonged, or for the patient to want to assert that they have been prolonged.

9. Sometimes this conflict between medical experts is presented more thoroughly than otherwise; I have in another case been provided with a small selection of conflicting research papers on the subject, at least one of which suggested that, although a small proportion of patients who suffer soft tissue injuries were still complaining about symptoms some years later, this was much the same as the proportion of people who had not suffered such an injury, but who had developed symptoms of that nature in the back (or neck as the case may be) after that period. It does seem to be the case that a lot of people in the community develop neck or back pain at some stage or other. That sort of study would support the analysis of the defendants doctors in the present case. Other doctors point to studies which do appear to show that there can be subtle injuries to the spine which can produce symptoms persisting indefinitely, although nothing very much will show up on ordinary diagnostic testing. Dr. Reid said that there is a large body of literature saying all sorts of things: p.112. In circumstances where there is a deal of scientific debate on the subject, it is difficult for the courts, particularly a trial judge who has to deal with a particular case on the basis of the evidence led in that case, to arrive at any clear conclusion with any great degree of confidence.

1. Fortunately (perhaps) all I have to do is to decide whether or not I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the plaintiff is currently suffering the symptoms of which she complains, and that those symptoms were caused in law by the injury that she suffered in the motor vehicle accident on 21 November 1996. If that is so, it follows that the defendant is liable for damages in respect of those symptoms, having accepted liability for the accident, and hence any injury caused by that accident. For the reasons that I have given, I accept that the plaintiff is suffering those symptoms, and I find that they were caused in law by the relevant accident. Indeed, I think that the weight of the evidence favours a conclusion that they were directly caused, that is that they are continuing symptoms from a physical injury, and I so find.

2. That is probably of greater significance in terms of what is likely to happen in the future, since if the symptoms are essentially a self perpetuating reaction to the original accident there would always be the possibility that something could happen to break the cycle, and hence some realistic hope of recovery. However, the medical evidence from those doctors who accepted the possibility of continuing physical problems from an injury of this nature was quite pessimistic about the prospects of recovery, and on that basis I think it is realistic to approach the future on the basis that any such prospect of recovery is effectively cancelled out by the prospect of some deterioration in the more long term future. It may be that in time the plaintiff will learn to cope better with her symptoms and that will make them less disabling in a practical sense.

Assessment

1. The plaintiff was born on 25 March 1967, so she was 29 at the time of the accident and is now almost 33: p.8. She is married with two children who are now 8 and almost 6. She was prior to the accident doing clerical work for a hardware company on the basis of filling in for permanent employees who were previously away, and has since the accident done some more of that work, although with some difficulty; she actually started doing some of the work again in February 1997, although she said that this was because she had agreed to do it to replace a particular employee who had arranged to go on an overseas holiday, and did not want to let anyone down. She is currently working 16 hours per week in this kind of work, on two 8 hour shifts. The medical evidence supported the view that it would be easier for her to cope if she worked fewer hours per day on more days (p.71, 61), but I suspect that the present arrangement fits in better with the employer’s requirements. The employer is quite impressed with her as an employee, and would be happy to provide her with a full time position if she required one: Exhibit 22.

2. The plaintiff’s symptoms have considerably affected the sort of things that she can do, and she regularly has some pain, the amount of pain reflecting the extent to which she is able to avoid those things that aggravate the pain. She manages by taking Panadol, on an average of about 3 per day. No doubt she has good days and bad days, and I suspect that on the good days she is not troubled very much by the symptoms, but on the bad days they would be more distressing, and that her life is more disrupted by the need to avoid things which will aggravate her condition. Various percentages were advanced by the doctors, assessed in a variety of ways, as a measure of overall disability; I think that the differences in approach merely show why it is unhelpful to try to assess a neck injury like this as a percentage. In all the circumstances, I assess damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenities in the sum of $24,000 of which I apportion $8,000 to the past. That will carry interest at the rate of 2% per annum for 3.3 years.

Economic Loss

1. The plaintiff stopped work as a result of the accident, and received workers' compensation payments from 22 November until 2 February 1997: Exhibit 17. The plaintiff then started to do relief work from 3 February, increasing her hours from 27 October 1997, but decreasing them again in about mid 1998, and again in 1999 because she was finding it difficult to cope: Exhibit 17, and see p.18. In the latter part of 1999 however, her hours were again increased somewhat, because of financial pressure.

2. The plaintiff had left full time employment in order to have children, and was frank about the absence of any definite plans to return to full time employment, although there was the prospect of her doing so once her children were properly settled at school. Her mother has assisted her with looking after the children on the days she has worked, and would be available to do so as required, even if the plaintiff were working full time. Although the plaintiff lives in a relatively remote location, she and her husband apparently are desirous of moving closer to the city, which would reduce the burden of travel and the difficulty which this poses for her in terms of aggravating her symptoms, making the working days longer, and making her more nervous. She may well therefore be better able to cope in the future with work, and be able to do more of it than she is at the present time.

3. The plaintiff sought damages calculated, broadly speaking, on the basis that but for the injury the plaintiff would have been working 20 hours per week from February 1997 until mid 1997, and 27 hours per week thereafter. The plaintiff was working about 28 hours per week at the time of the accident, but had previously been working fewer hours per week (Exhibit 16, Exhibit 17), and, given the nature of the work that she was doing, I think there is no guarantee that but for the accident she would definitely be working at the rate of 27 or 28 hours per week for the whole of the period since then. Indeed, given the nature of the work that she was doing, essentially filling in where required in the employer’s organisation, I think it most unlikely that the work would have involved that degree of regularity.

4. If she became a permanent full time employee the position would be different, but I think it more likely that there would have been something like the sort of variation in the hours worked that has in fact occurred. There is nothing in either of the statements of the representative of the employer, which became Exhibits 21 and 22 and which were tendered on behalf of the plaintiff, which supported the view that the plaintiff would have been doing work at that rate for the whole of that period, although he did say in Exhibit 22 that extra hours of work in the casual position would have been available up to 38 hours per week depending on her willingness to work at one of several stores.

5. I think the submissions made on behalf of the plaintiff overstate the effect of the evidence, and I am not persuaded that the plaintiff would have been working to that extent for the whole of that period. The plaintiff did say, and I am prepared to accept, that there was some work she had been offered since the accident which she had turned down because of her contending problems with the neck and headaches (p.21), and I am prepared to accept that the plaintiff has worked less up until now than she would have worked had the accident not occurred, but not to that extent that would be appropriate to make an assessment for past loss other than on a global basis, although it obviously should include the equivalent of the net workers' compensation payments for the period when they were paid; in all the circumstances I think an appropriate overall assessment is $7,500. I allow interest on $6,750 at 4% for 3.3. years.

6. With regard to the future, I think it probable that the plaintiff would have returned to full time employment at some stage, although obviously it is difficult to know just when. That might have occurred in connection with a move to a house closer to Brisbane, where full time employment would be less burdensome in terms of travelling. The evidence shows that had the plaintiff wanted to return to full time employment she would have been able to do so (Exhibit 22) as she was highly regarded by her long term employer, and the plaintiff’s evidence was to the effect that she probably would have had in mind working to about age 55. I suspect that in time, the plaintiff will be able to work more, particularly if she and her husband move closer to Brisbane and hence closer to the place where she works, but I think it quite unlikely that she will now return to full time employment.

7. Given the uncertainties involved, it is not practicable to calculate an amount of future economic loss. If but for the accident the plaintiff would have returned to full time employment and worked in such a position until she was 55, but because of the accident the plaintiff would be doing on average not much more than the level of work she is currently doing, future economic loss in the general vicinity of $100,000 would be appropriate, even after making some allowance for the vicissitudes of life, but I think that that figure needs to be reduced because of the possibility that, had the accident not occurred, the plaintiff would not have been working full time for at least part of that period, particularly the earlier part. There must also be some uncertainty about the level of work the plaintiff will actually do, notwithstanding her present difficulties. At the present time she has significant travel costs which reduce her effective net income, but the family is proposing to move closer to the city so this feature is likely to become less significant. Counsel for the plaintiff in his submissions accepted a substantial discount on the figure calculated on the current net loss per week, and I think that was realistic. In the circumstances I will assess future economic loss in the sum of $50,000.

[31] There was also a claim for loss of superannuation benefits, and it is appropriate to
allow this in the conventional way at 6% of the total amount for economic loss.

Other Matters

1. It was agreed that it was appropriate to make an allowance of $2,350 for gratuitous care provided by the plaintiff’s mother. There was some variation in the evidence about the extent of the care provided by the plaintiff’s husband; no doubt it would have been fairly substantial during the first few months after the accident, but I think that, particularly since the plaintiff’s condition has stabilised, it is rather more limited, and I think even less than the two hours per week which was the basis of the submission on behalf of the plaintiff. On the whole I think an appropriate allowance for gratuitous care by the husband is $7,000. Interest on the total of gratuitous care will be allowed at 2% for 3.3 years. I think it reasonable to allow a lump sum for future gratuitous care, of $10,000.

2. Special damages are agreed at $5,921 not including the allowance for Panadol, in respect of which I will allow for the past $1,000. It is also agreed that the amount on which interest is to be allowed is $600 plus the allowance for Panadol, which means interest on $1,600 at 5% per annum for 3.3 years. Some allowance should also be made for future costs in the way of pain killers and occasional physiotherapy and some small allowance for the possibility of surgery if the condition gets significantly worse, a possibility raised in the first report of Dr. White. On the whole of the medical evidence only a very small allowance should be made for this possibility, but it is not entirely insignificant. I think that the amount of $5,000 was reasonable in all the circumstances for this head of damage.

Summary

A: Pain, suffering and loss of amenities	$24,000
B: Interest on $8,000 at 2% for 3.3. years	$528
C: Past economic loss	$7,500
D: Interest on $6,750 at 4% for 3.3 years	$891
E: Future economic loss	$50,000
F: Loss of superannuation benefits	$3,450
G: Past gratuitous care	$9,350
H: Interest at 2% for 3.3 years	$617
I: Future gratuitous care	$8,000
J: Special damages	$6,921
K: Interest on $1,600 at 4% for 3.3 years	$264
L: Future costs	$5,000
Total:	$116,521

I therefore will give judgment that the defendants pay the plaintiff the sum of $116,521 including $2,300 by way of interest. I will publish these reasons and invite submissions as to the appropriate order for costs. Unless some other order is appropriate, I will order the defendants to pay the plaintiff’s costs of the action to be assessed.