Watters v Queensland Rail

[2000] QCA 51

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Watters v Queensland Rail [2000] QCA 51

PARTIES:

NEIL GARRY WATTERS
(plaintiff/respondent)
v
QUEENSLAND RAIL
(defendant/appellant)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 4626 of 1999
SC No 187 of 1996

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General civil appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Rockhampton

DELIVERED ON:

3 March 2000

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

16 February 2000

JUDGES:

McPherson JA, Thomas JA and Byrne J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made

ORDER:

Appeal dismissed with costs to be assessed

CATCHWORDS:

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – POSTPONEMENT OF THE BAR – EXTENSION OF PERIOD – CAUSE OF ACTION IN RESPECT OF PERSONAL INJURIES – KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL FACTS – MATERIAL FACTS OF A DECISIVE CHARACTER – Plaintiff train driver suffering from work-induced hearing loss – stood down from duties due to change in employer's attitude to enforcement of safety standards – serious economic loss not previously known – whether a material fact of a decisive character – economic consequences of injury capable of being material fact – Electricity Commission of NSW v Plumb (1992) 27 NSWLR 364 discussed and not followed – whether worthwhile cause of action existed before economic loss incurred – whether defendant prejudiced by destruction of personnel records

Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) s 30(1), s 31(1), s 31(2)

Byers v Capricorn Coal Management Pty Ltd [1990] 2 Qd R 306, followed
Do Carmo v Ford Excavations Pty Ltd (1984) 154 CLR 234, considered
Electricity Commission of New South Wales v Plumb (1992) 27 NSWLR 364, discussed and not followed
Taggart v Workers Compensation Board of Queensland [1983] 2 Qd R 306, followed

COUNSEL:

Mr SC Williams QC for the appellant
Mr RJ Douglas SC, with him Mr AS Mellick for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Queensland Rail Legal Services for the appellant
Rees R & Sydney Jones for the respondent

1. McPHERSON JA: I agree with the reasons of Thomas JA for dismissing this appeal with costs. Essentially the question is whether the "nature and extent" of the personal injury was known to the plaintiff or within his means of knowledge before 1996. If so, it was a "material fact" relating to a right of action within the meaning of s 30(1)(a). In determining whether it was of a "decisive character" within s 30(1)(b), the matter falls to be judged, among other things, according to whether an action would have resulted in an award of damages sufficient to justify bringing it: s 30(1)(b)(1). Read in combination, these two provisions ordinarily mean that the quantum of damages likely to be recovered for economic loss is a relevant consideration in determining whether the limitation period should be extended. So much is implicit, if not explicit, in several of the Queensland decisions on the question. But there is no point in my simply repeating matters that are already dealt with so completely in the reasons for judgment of Thomas JA. The appeal should, as his Honour says,…