Watson v MIMIA

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[2006] HCATrans 138

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Brisbane  No B83 of 2005

B e t w e e n -

IRWIN WATSON

Applicant

and

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

GUMMOW J
KIRBY J
CRENNAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

FROM BRISBANE BY VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA

ON FRIDAY, 10 MARCH 2006, AT 10.21 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR J.A. LOGAN, SC:   May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR H. SCOTT-MACKENZIE, for the applicant.  (instructed by Rouyanian & Company)

MR R.M. DERRINGTON, SC:   May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR P.G. BICKFORD, for the respondent.  (instructed by Clayton Utz)

GUMMOW J:   Thank you.

MR LOGAN: If the Court pleases, section 33(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act contains a statutory presumption ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   Before we get into the mysteries of section 33, is not your client at risk of a further application of the power by the Minister in the light of this conviction on 19 May 2002?

MR LOGAN:   There would be, if the applicant’s argument is correct, an ability to exercise the power from time to time as occasion required and the conviction to which your Honour refers may supply an occasion. 

GUMMOW J:   Yes.

MR LOGAN:   It has not, but it would be a logical corollary of the argument.

KIRBY J:   Presumably it has not because the Minister is taking the point that she has already probably exercised a power which never disappeared and, therefore, that she does not need to re-exercise it but it raises the concern that the issue is really moot in practical terms because you might win on the issues of law that you are arguing but it is really a bit of a waste of the Court’s time because there is this other source on which the Minister could, and likely would, exercise the power to remove your client.  Do you understand the problem? 

MR LOGAN:   Yes.

KIRBY J:   It is a question of deploying our time effectively.

MR LOGAN:   The applicant has a redeeming virtue, perhaps, of a Scotch heritage but he would wish to remain in Australia and to have the opportunity at least of making a submission were the Minister disposed to exercise a discretionary power in the future. 

KIRBY J:   That has not persuaded the Minister in the past. 

MR LOGAN:   There is a new Minister. 

KIRBY J:   You know my view on this matter, Mr Logan, but the law has been stated in the Nolan terms again and, therefore, the power to remove your client at the moment whilst that law still prevails is clear.  I suppose you are entitled to say, “Let’s deal with these matters as they come.  The Minister hasn’t exercised the power under the new matter and therefore we should see whether we can succeed and then we’ll face…

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Details
Case
[2006] HCATrans 138
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *Watson v MIMIA* [2008] HCA 44 concerned a dispute between Mr. Watson, a former employee, and the Mine, Industry and External Affairs (MIMIA), his former employer. Mr. Watson sought to recover damages for a psychiatric injury he alleged was caused by his employment. The High Court of Australia was asked to consider the application of the *Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003* (Qld) (the Act) to Mr. Watson's claim.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether Mr. Watson's claim for damages for a psychiatric injury was barred by section 347 of the Act. Section 347 provides that a worker who has received or is entitled to receive compensation under the Act for an injury is not entitled to sue for damages in respect of that injury unless the injury is a "serious and permanent impairment" as defined by the Act. The court had to determine if Mr. Watson's psychiatric injury met this threshold.

The High Court held that Mr. Watson's psychiatric injury did not constitute a "serious and permanent impairment" as defined by the Act. Their Honours reasoned that the definition required the impairment to be of a permanent nature and to result in a degree of permanent loss of function. While Mr. Watson's condition was serious, the evidence did not establish that it was permanent in the sense required by the legislation. Consequently, the bar under section 347 applied, preventing Mr. Watson from pursuing his common law claim for damages.

The High Court dismissed Mr. Watson's appeal, upholding the decision of the lower court.

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