Watson v Kriticos (Costs of Summary Judgment Application)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Watson v Kriticos (Costs of Summary Judgment Application) [2021] FCA 917  

File number: NSD 970 of 2019
Judgment of: PERRAM J
Date of judgment: 5 August 2021
Catchwords: COSTS – application for lump sum indemnity costs – application to dispense with Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 40.13
Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 40.13
Cases cited:

Capic v  Ford Motor Company of Australia Limited (Costs Forthwith) [2019] FCA 1065

Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 801; 46 FCR 225

New Resource Holdings Pty Ltd v Lunt (No 4) [2009] WASC 29

Watson v Kriticos (Summary Judgment) [2021] FCA 261

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Intellectual Property
Sub-area: Patents and associated Statutes
Number of paragraphs: 28
Date of last submissions: 30 July 2021
Date of hearing: Determined on the papers
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr G Campbell
Solicitor for the Applicant: Heathfield Grosvenor Lawyers Pty Ltd
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr D J Ananian-Cooper
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Plastiras Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent did not appear

ORDERS

NSD 970 of 2019
BETWEEN:

DALE CAMERON WATSON

Applicant

AND:

STEPHEN CON KRITICOS

First Respondent

WHITEWATER WEST INDUSTRIES LTD

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

PERRAM J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 AUGUST 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Order 6 of the orders made 24 March 2021 be vacated and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:

(a)Rule 40.13 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) be dispensed with;

(b)The First Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs of the interlocutory application dated 7 July 2020 on an indemnity basis in accordance with Orders 1(c)-(e);

(c)Those costs be assessed on a lump sum basis, such lump sum to be reduced by 10% following the assessment;

(d)The matter be referred to a Registrar to fix the sum resulting from Order 1(c).

(e)The First Respondent pay the sum fixed in accordance with Order 1(d) forthwith.

2.The First Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs of the interlocutory application filed 1 July 2021 as taxed, assessed or agreed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

PERRAM J:

  1. By an interlocutory application filed 1 July 2021 the Applicant seeks a lump sum costs order in the sum of $62,392.93 being its costs in defending the application by the First Respondent for summary judgment on certain claims for relief in the Further Amended Originating Application (‘FAOA’) and the striking out of certain paragraphs of the second further amended statement of claim (‘2FASOC’): Watson v Kriticos (Summary Judgment) [2021] FCA 261 (‘Summary Judgment Reasons’). At that time the First Respondent was ordered to pay the Applicant’s costs of the interlocutory application. Alternatively, the Applicant seeks an order that r 40.13 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (‘FCR’) be dispensed with to enable him to apply for a taxation of his costs. The Applicant says that the figure of $62,392.93 reflects a…

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Details
Case
[2021] FCA 917
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Watson v Kriticos, the Applicant, Mr Watson, sought costs following a summary judgment application and a strike-out application. The First Respondent, Mr Kriticos, was partially successful in his strike-out application, leading to the Applicant's application for indemnity costs under the Federal Court Rules 2011. The Applicant argued that the First Respondent's submissions demonstrated a misunderstanding of the nature of a summary judgment application, and that the First Respondent's success in the strike-out application justified an indemnity costs order. The court was required to determine whether the First Respondent's success warranted indemnity costs and whether the First Respondent's submissions evidenced a misunderstanding of the summary judgment application process.

The court found that the First Respondent was partially successful in his strike-out application, and that it was appropriate to treat the summary judgment application separately. The court also found that the First Respondent's submissions demonstrated a misunderstanding of the nature of a summary judgment application, and that the issues raised in the summary judgment application were complex and required a close reading of the material and testimony. The court concluded that it was just to order the First Respondent to pay the Applicant's costs on an indemnity basis, reduced by 10% following assessment.

The court further ordered that the First Respondent pay the Applicant's costs of the interlocutory application filed on 1 July 2021 as taxed, assessed or agreed. The court noted that entry of orders was dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011. This decision highlights the importance of understanding the nature of a summary judgment application and the consequences of misunderstanding the process. It also demonstrates the court's willingness to order indemnity costs where appropriate.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Order 6 of the orders made 24 March 2021 be vacated and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:

(a) Rule 40.13 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) be dispensed with;

(b) The First Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs of the interlocutory application dated 7 July 2020 on an indemnity basis in accordance with Orders 1(c)-(e);

(c) Those costs be assessed on a lump sum basis, such lump sum to be reduced by 10% following the assessment;

(d) The matter be referred to a Registrar to fix the sum resulting from Order 1(c).

(e) The First Respondent pay the sum fixed in accordance with Order 1(d) forthwith.

2. The First Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs of the interlocutory application filed 1 July 2021 as taxed, assessed or agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

As to (a), I accept that the First Respondent was partially successful in relation to his strike out application. Consequently, in my view it is just to treat the summary judgment application separately from the strike out application. Summary judgment application The following discussion assumes a familiarity with the Summary Judgment Reasons. The First Respondent sought summary judgment on:(a)the allegation that the First Respondent agreed to give the Applicant a 12.5% ownership interest in the patents or patent applications;(b)the allegation that the patents and patent applications were impressed with a trust in the Applicant’s favour (and a parallel allegation that the First Respondent owed the Applicant a fiduciary duty);(c)the estoppel case; and(d)the misrepresentation case. I canvassed the issues arising from (a) and (b) in the Summary Judgment Reasons at [19]-[36]. Having set out a number of paragraphs of the First Respondent’s written submissions so that they could speak for themselves I concluded at [37]:And so it goes on. I will not set out any further extracts from the balance of the 17 pages dealing with this issue. It suffices to say that it is apparent that the submissions misconceive the nature of a summary judgment application. The question of what was said in the telephone call between the Applicant and the First Respondent and what this meant in light of their previous communications (and maybe even their subsequent communications – I need not decide), is a matter which will depend on a close reading of the material, the testimony of both the Applicant and the First Respondent and their respective cross-examinations. The idea that such an issue could be determined on an application for summary judgment is facile. That discussion had begun with the observation at [33] that the First Respondent’s submissions ‘may engender a suspicion that the submissions may not have quite grasped the nature of an application for summary judgment. This suspicion is not diminished by what then follows’. The word ‘facile’ should be noted. I canvassed the issues arising from (c) and (d) at [38]-[48] and pointed out that the Applicant accepted that part of his misrepresentation case did not arise because the First Respondent admitted the existence of the agreement. This was obvious from the form of the pleadings. I rejected this aspect of the summary judgment application because it was moot. Put another way, it is a waste of time to be considering whether to dismiss a case which is not being advanced. In relation to the representations alleged to have been made on 9 and 10 December 2014, I concluded that this was factually tied to the 12.5% interest issue. As such this aspect of the summary judgment application was doomed for the same reason as the argument in (a). I noted at [48]:Thus, the second contention bespeaks in microcosm the larger problem affecting the present application: it serves only to point up the existence of a genuine dispute about and upon the evidence which has been or may yet be led, and in this way forecloses any conclusion that there is no question to be tried or that the relevant portions of the FAOA and 2FASOC enjoy no reasonable prospects of success or disclose no reasonable cause of action. I note for completeness that this conclusion disposes also of the First Respondent’s ancillary argument that the claim in respect of the Whitewater Representation should be dismissed or struck out because, according to the First Respondent, that representation had a reasonable basis: (RS [212]; Amended Defence [163]). This too is an issue not appropriately dealt with in the context of the present application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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