Watson, S. v Mam, T.A.M
[1995] FCA 357
•2 JUNE 1995
CATCHWORDS
ELECTIONS - Zone election held under the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth) - whether candidate declared to be elected had obtained an "absolute majority of votes" within Schedule 3 of the Act.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - phrase to be interpreted in the context created by the Act - presumption that legislature intends the same word to have the same meaning throughout a statute yields to context.
WORDS AND PHRASES - "absolute majority of votes".
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth) ss.131, 132, 134, 135, 136, 137 and 138; Schedule 3 clauses 1, 2 and 3; Schedule 4 clause 2(1).
Zone Election Rules Rules 23, 31, 35, 36, 40 and 41.
Clyne v. Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 150 CLR 1
McGraw-Hinds (Aust.) Pty. Ltd. v. Smith (1979) 144 CLR 633
Watson, Samuel v. Tomasina Anna May Mam and Australian Electoral Commission
No. QG187 of 1994
Cooper J., Brisbane, 2 June, 1995
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF A DISPUTED ELECTION
UNDER THE ABORIGINAL AND TORRES
STRAIT ISLANDER COMMISSION ACT 1989
No. QG187 of 1994
BETWEEN:
SAMUEL WATSON
Petitioner
AND:
TOMASINA ANNA MAY MAM
First Respondent
AND:
AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION
Second Respondent
JUDGE MAKING ORDER:Cooper J.
WHERE MADE: Brisbane
DATE OF ORDER: 2 June, 1995
MINUTES OF ORDER
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The petition filed on 13 December, 1994 be dismissed.
2. The monies paid into court by the petitioner as security for costs be repaid to the petitioner's solicitors together with any accretions thereto.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF A DISPUTED ELECTION
UNDER THE ABORIGINAL AND TORRES
STRAIT ISLANDER COMMISSION ACT 1989
No. QG187 of 1994
BETWEEN:
SAMUEL WATSON
Petitioner
AND:
TOMASINA ANNA MAY MAM
First Respondent
AND:
AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION
Second Respondent
CORAM: Cooper J.
PLACE: Brisbane
DATE: 2 June, 1995
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Background
On 8 February, 1994 an election under section 131 of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth) ("the Act") was held to elect a representative to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission ("ATSIC") for the Queensland (Metropolitan) Zone. On that day Mr. Ian Delaney was declared elected as zone representative. One of the candidates, Ms. Tomasina Anna May Mam petitioned the court pursuant to clause 2(1) of Schedule 4 of the Act for certain orders consequent upon the election and declaration of the poll.
On 21 October, 1994 in proceedings QG32 of 1994 the court declared that Mr. Delaney was not duly elected as the representative for the Queensland (Metropolitan) Zone and gave directions for the re-commencement of the scrutiny of the votes cast in the election. Relevantly the court directed :-
"3. THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:
(a) The Australian Electoral Commission by an authorised electoral officer re-commence the scrutiny of votes cast in the poll for the election of a zone representative for the Queensland (Metropolitan) Zone.
(b) In conducting the scrutiny where two or more candidates have an equal number of votes and each has received the fewest first preference votes, those candidates are to be excluded and each of those candidates' ballot papers are to be transferred to the unexcluded candidate for whom the next available preference is expressed.
(c) If, after the allocation of preferences in accordance with paragraph (b) above, no candidate has an absolute majority of votes, the process of excluding the candidate or candidates (if more than one with an equal number of votes) with the fewest votes and the transferring of each of that candidate's or those candidates' ballot papers to the unexcluded candidates for whom the next available preferences are expressed, is to be continued until one candidate receives an absolute majority of the votes."
On 4 November, 1994 Mr. David John Phillips, the authorised electoral officer of the Australian Electoral Commission ("the A.E.C.") for the election, re-commenced the scrutiny of the votes cast in the election. The scrutiny was conducted in accordance with the directions of the court with the following result :-
The First Round of Exclusion
The first preference votes marked on the ballot papers for the election were as follows:
SANDY 3
FISHER 1
WHARTON 1
GRAHAM 3
BLIGH 1
DELANEY 3
WATSON 2
MAM 6
No candidate having received an absolute majority of first preference votes and Fisher, Wharton and Bligh having an equal number of votes and each having received the fewest first preference votes, Mr. Phillips first excluded Fisher, Wharton and Bligh.
The Second Round of Exclusion
Upon the exclusion of Fisher, Wharton and Bligh one of the ballot papers was set aside as expressing no preference for any continuing candidate and there were therefore two ballot papers showing a next available preference. After the distribution of those two votes the progressive totals were as follows:
SANDY 4
GRAHAM 3
DELANEY 3
WATSON 3
MAM 6
No candidate having received an absolute majority of votes and Graham, Delaney and Watson having an equal number of votes and each having received the fewest votes, Mr. Phillips next excluded Graham, Delaney and Watson.
The Final Count
Upon exclusion of Graham, Delaney and Watson four further ballot papers were set aside as expressing no preference for any continuing candidate and there were therefore five ballot papers showing a next available preference. After the distribution of those five votes the progressive totals were as follows
SANDY 6
MAM 9
Mr. Phillips then determined that Mam had received an absolute majority of votes. The votes for Sandy were not distributed because Mr. Phillips had determined that Mam had received an absolute majority of votes.
On 4 November, 1994, after completion of the counting of votes, Mr. Phillips declared Ms. Mam elected as the zone representative.
On 12 December, 1994 Mr. Samuel Watson, one of the unsuccessful candidates in the election, filed a petition pursuant to clause 2(1) of Schedule 4 of the Act. The petitioner alleged that on the facts as set out above, Ms. Mam did not have an absolute majority of votes and accordingly the declaration by Mr. Phillips that she was elected as zone representative was void. The petitioner sought the following relief :-
"1. Declare that the Respondent was not duly elected;
2. Declare that the election was absolutely void;
3. Order that a fresh election be conducted;
4. Make such further or other orders, declarations or directions as the Court deems meet."
On 24 February, 1995 the A.E.C. was granted leave to be joined as a party.
The election of zone representatives to ATSIC is provided for in Division 7
of Part 3 of the Act and Schedule 3 to it. So far as is presently relevant the Act provides :-
"131(1) The members of the Regional Councils of the regions included in a zone shall elect one of their number to represent the zone.
...
132(1) Zone elections shall be conducted in accordance with:
(a) the provisions of this Act; and
(b) the zone election rules in force at the end of the election period in relation to the last round of Regional Council elections.
(2) Subject to zone election rules made under section 138, zone elections shall be conducted by the Australian Electoral Commission.
...
134(1) If only one candidate is nominated for election at a zone election, the authorised electoral officer shall declare the candidate to be duly elected.
(2) If 2 or more candidates are nominated for election at a zone election, a poll shall be held.
135 Voting at zone elections shall be by secret ballot.
136(1) A voter shall cast a vote at a zone election by marking the ballot paper so as to show the order of the voter's preference for the candidates.
(2) A ballot paper is formal if and only if:
(a) the authorised electoral officer is satisfied that it is an authentic ballot paper;
(b) it indicates the voter's first preference for one, and only one, candidate; and
(c) it does not have upon it any identifying mark.
(3) A ballot paper that is formal shall be given effect according to the voter's intention so far as that intention is clear.
(4) In this section:
`identifying mark' means writing or another mark by which, in the opinion of the authorised electoral officer, the voter can be identified, but does not include writing or another mark placed on the ballot paper (whether or not in contravention of any law) by a person involved in conducting the election.
137 Votes cast at a zone election shall be counted, and candidates shall be elected, as provided in Schedule 3 and in the zone election rules."
Schedule 3 to the Act, so far as is relevant, provides :-
" METHODS OF DETERMINING SUCCESSFUL
CANDIDATES AT ZONE ELECTIONS
Absolute majority required for election
1. A candidate needs an absolute majority of votes to be elected.
Candidate with absolute majority of first preference votes elected
2. A candidate who receives an absolute majority of first preference votes is elected.
Distribution of preferences
3.(1) If there is no candidate who receives an absolute majority of first preference votes, the candidate who has received the fewest first preference votes shall be excluded, and each of that candidate's ballot papers shall be transferred to the unexcluded candidate for whom the next available preference is expressed.
(2) If there is then no candidate who has an absolute majority of votes, the process of excluding the candidate who has the fewest votes, and transferring that candidate's ballot papers to the unexcluded candidates for whom the next available preferences are expressed, shall be repeated as often as necessary until one candidate receives an absolute majority of votes.
(3) A candidate who receives an absolute majority of votes at any stage of the process described in this clause is elected."
The Submissions of the Parties:
The petitioner submits that the expression "absolute majority of votes" in
schedule 3 means an absolute majority of the votes cast in the election ie. 50% plus one (1) of the votes cast. In support of such a construction the petitioner relies on certain comments made by me in the earlier petition proceedings filed by Ms. Mam and the dictionary definitions of "majority", "absolute majority" and "absolute".In the earlier petition the result of the first scrutiny as conducted by Mr. Phillips, was that Ms. Mam and Mr. Delaney each ended up with nine (9) votes. Mr. Phillips, as he had done during the count, drew lots to resolve the situation of equality and declared Mr. Delaney elected as zone representative. The drawing of lots was not a procedure countenanced by the Act. The petitioner therefore was entitled to a declaration that Mr. Delaney was not elected. However she had also sought a declaration that she was duly elected as zone representative. It was not possible on the agreed statement of facts to progress the scrutiny to a conclusion in accordance with the court's direction. In those circumstances I said (at 22 of my Reasons for Judgment in QG32 of 1994):-
"It is not possible on the agreed statement of facts to determine to whom the ballot papers of Ms. Graham and Messrs. Delaney and Watson would be transferred or whether they would have been spent at that stage. However, it is clear that Mr. Delaney would have been excluded and the result of the election would have been different. Also, on this construction of the Act and clause 3 of Schedule 3, the petitioner could not establish in these proceedings that she achieved an absolute majority of the votes cast. Therefore she would not be entitled to a declaration that she was duly elected. If Graham, Delaney and Watson were excluded and their votes, or some of them, transferred to Mr. Sandy and the petitioner or either of them, it would have resulted in one or the other achieving an absolute majority, or neither achieving an absolute majority because their votes were equal or individually less than an absolute majority of the votes, notwithstanding that one had more votes than the other. In the event that neither Mr. Sandy nor the petitioner achieved an absolute majority, neither would have been entitled to be returned as the elected zone representative and the election would then have failed in terms of Rule 14(2)(a)(ii) of the Zone Election Rules. In accordance with Rule 14(1), a supplementary election would have been held."
I further said (at 27) :-
"...The operation of section 23(b) of the Acts Interpretation Act in interpreting clause 3 of Schedule 3 allows the scrutiny to be taken to a conclusion, it allows for the giving effect to second and subsequent preferences, and is consistent with the maintenance of the safeguard that to be elected one candidate must obtain an absolute majority of the votes cast. If the scrutiny does not produce a candidate with such a level of popular support from the zone electorate, then the Act recognises that the election has failed and provides for a fresh election."
And concluded (at 28) :-
"Mr. Phillips did not conduct the scrutiny in the manner required by clause 3 of Schedule 3 interpreted in accordance with section 23(b) of the Acts Interpretation Act. In fact, he conducted the scrutiny in a way not authorised by the Act, Schedule 3 to it, or the Zone Election Rules and in a manner contrary to the statutory requirements. Section 132 of the Act requires that the election be conducted in accordance with Schedule 3. In the method used to conduct the scrutiny and in the return of Mr. Delaney as elected when he did not receive an absolute majority of the votes, Mr. Phillips acted in contravention of the Act. The conduct, although bona fide and in error, was an `illegal practice' within clause 1 of Schedule 4 of the Act. The conduct has resulted in Mr. Delaney being returned as the elected zone representative when he was not elected in accordance with the provisions of the Act."
The arguments advanced on the hearing of this petition were not made on the hearing of the earlier petition. It was not submitted by any party in the earlier petition that an absolute majority of votes was other than an absolute majority of the votes cast in the election. My comments at page 22 of the earlier reasons are obiter dicta, it being unnecessary to go further than to find that Mr. Delaney did not receive a majority of the votes counted in accordance with the Act and Schedule and that the agreed facts would not allow the scrutiny to progress to a conclusion. I therefore regard the question of construction of the phrase "absolute majority of votes" to be an open one which is to be determined in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the ordinary canons of statutory construction and with the benefit of argument.
Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the term "votes" in section 137 of the Act meant all of the votes cast in the election. He submitted that conformably with the presumption that in a statute the same word is always used with the same meaning, especially when used more than once in the same section (Clyne v. Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 150 CLR 1 at 10, 15, 23), "votes" in clause 1 of Schedule 3 means all the votes cast. Further, he submitted that "absolute majority of votes" as used in clause 1 of Schedule 3 is presumed to have the same meaning in clauses 1, 3(2) and 3(3) of the Schedule. Thus it was submitted, for a candidate to satisfy the requirements of clause 1 - "a candidate needs an absolute majority of the votes to be elected" - the candidate must achieve an absolute majority of the first preference votes as provided for in clause 2 or, after the distribution of preferences, an absolute majority of the votes cast in the election.
Counsel for the petitioner also referred the court to the definition of "majority" in the Oxford English Dictionary (2nd Ed.) at 233 :-
"The greater number or part; a number which is more than half the whole number; spec. the larger party voting together in a deliberative assembly or electoral body.'
and that of "absolute majority" :-
"A number of votes received by one candidate which is more than half the total number polled, or than half the number of electors."
He also referred to the definition of an "absolute majority" in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary (3rd Ed.) at 1262 :-
"A majority that includes more than half of the votes cast or of the possible voters."
The petitioner submitted that to be elected Ms. Mam had to obtain in excess of ten (10) first preference votes or, after the distribution of preferences, had to obtain in excess of ten (10) votes. As Ms. Mam satisfied neither qualification it was submitted that she had not achieved an absolute majority of votes within the meaning of clause 1 of Schedule 3 to the Act.
The A.E.C. submitted that "an absolute majority of votes" in clause 3(3) means more votes than the combined total number of votes for all other candidates not yet excluded at any stage of the process of exclusion described in paragraph 3. The A.E.C. submits that such a construction is supportable on either of two bases :-
(i) The ordinary and natural meaning of the words "absolute" and "majority" as applied in an electoral context give the phrase the meaning contended for; or
(ii) The context in which the words are used in the Act, including not only Schedule 3 but other provisions of the Act, require the meaning contended for by the A.E.C. to be given to the phrase.
The A.E.C. further submitted that the clear legislative intention underlying Schedule 3 to the Act was to provide a means by which a zone representative will be elected. An interpretation which is reasonably open on the language used and which is more likely than a competing alternative interpretation to result in some, rather than no candidate being elected, it was submitted, ought to be preferred.
The first respondent, Ms. Mam, by her counsel submitted that the issue for determination was whether she had received "an absolute majority of votes" within the meaning of clause 3 of Schedule 3. She submitted that "votes" in clauses 3(2) and (3) consist of the first preference votes received by unexcluded candidates together with the votes transferred to those candidates by way of distribution of preferences. Because the zone elections are conducted under a system of optional preferential voting, it was submitted that the total "votes" received by unexcluded candidates after the distribution of preferences may be less than the total number of valid votes cast in the election. It was further submitted that it was an inevitable feature of the optional preferential voting system that an "absolute majority" of votes within the meaning of clauses 3(2) and (3) in any particular case may be less than half the number of persons who cast valid votes in the election.
Conclusion:
Although the parties all made reference to dictionary definitions, there was in substance no difference in their view that an absolute majority means not less than 50% plus one (1). The issue was the meaning of the phrase in conjunction with the phrase "of votes" in the context of Schedule 3 of the Act. Put simply, the question is "which votes?".
Any consideration as to the proper meaning and effect of the phrase "absolute majority of votes" in Schedule 3 to the Act must take place in the context created by the Act itself. By section 132 zone elections are to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the relevant zone election rules. Subject to any rules made under section 138 of the Act, the elections are to be conducted by the
A.E.C.If a poll is necessary because two or more candidates nominate for election, the voting is to be by secret ballot (section 135). A voter is to cast one vote by marking the ballot paper to show the voter's order of preference for the candidates (section 136(1)). However, a ballot paper will be formal if the voter indicates his or her preference for one and only one candidate (section 136(2)(b)). The section therefore provides for optional preferential voting. That this is so is made clear in Rule 23 of the Zone Election Rules. If the ballot paper is formal in that it complies with the provisions of section 136(2), the voter's intention will be given effect to so far as the intention is clear (section 136(3)). Thus, where partial but not all preferences are marked on a ballot paper, those partial preferences will be given effect to so far as they are clear.
Such votes as are cast at a zone election are to be counted as provided in Schedule 3 to the Act and in the relevant zone election rules (section 137). Candidates are to be similarly elected (section 137).
Scrutiny of the votes is dealt with in part 4 of the Zone Election Rules. The result of the poll must be ascertained by scrutiny (rule 31). The relevant rules touching on the scrutiny under Zone Election Rules prior to the Zone Election Rules (Amendment No. 1) were :-
"35. As soon as practicable after the close of the poll the Electoral Commissioner must, in the presence of the scrutineers in attendance (if any) and any other persons authorised by the Electoral Commissioner to be present:
(a) open the container relating to a zone referred to in subrule 30(1)
and take out the ballot-paper envelopes; and
(b) examine each envelope and:
(i) if the Electoral Commissioner is satisfied that the voter's declaration has been completed and signed by a voter who has not voted more than once in the poll - accept the ballot-paper contained in the envelope for further scrutiny; and
(ii) if the Electoral Commissioner is not so satisfied - reject the ballot-paper contained in the envelope without opening the envelop; and
(c) place the ballot-paper envelopes containing ballot-papers rejected under subparagraph (b)(ii) in a parcel and:
(i) seal the parcel; and
(ii) endorse on the parcel a description of its contents and the election to which it relates; and
(iii) sign and date the endorsement; and
(d) place the ballot-paper envelopes containing ballot-papers accepted for further scrutiny under paragraph (b)(i) with the declaration facing downwards, and then without further examining the declaration or permitting any other person to do so, withdraw from each envelope the ballot-paper contained in it and, without unfolding the ballot-paper or permitting any other person to do so, place the ballot-paper in a securely fastened container; and
(e) place the ballot-paper envelopes from which the ballot-papers have been withdrawn in a parcel and:
(i) seal the parcel; and
(ii) endorse on the parcel a description of its contents and the election to which it relates; and
(iii) sign and date the endorsement; and
(f) open the container referred to in paragraph (d) and take out the ballot-papers; and
(g) deal with the ballot-papers in accordance with Schedule 3 to the Act.
36.(1) If a scrutineer objects to a ballot-paper as being informal, the
officer conducting the scrutiny must mark the ballot-paper `Admitted' or `Rejected' according to his or her decision to admit or reject the ballot-paper.
(2) Nothing in this rule prevents the officer conducting the scrutiny from rejecting any ballot-paper as being informal although it is not objected to.
...
40. In conducting a recount, the Electoral Commissioner has the same powers as if the recount were the scrutiny, and may reverse any decision in relation to the scrutiny as to the allowance and admission or disallowance and rejection of any ballot-paper.
41. The officer conducting a recount may, and at the request of any scrutineer must, mark the ballot-paper `Admitted' or `Rejected' according to his or her decision to admit or reject the ballot-paper."
Importantly, Rules 36, 40 and 41 provide for the rejection of informal ballot papers from the count or recount. Thus, the ballot papers which are counted in accordance with Schedule 3 of the Act are only those ballot papers which are not rejected as informal. This may or may not be all of the ballot papers marked and cast as votes by the persons eligible to vote in the election. Therefore the votes available to be counted and the votes to which Schedule 3 refers are the votes contained in the formal ballot papers.
Clause 1 of Schedule 3 is not concerned with the counting of votes. It merely states what is necessary for the election of a candidate. Its purpose is to exclude a simple majority or "first past the post" as sufficient for election. It requires an absolute majority of the votes at the conclusion of a count conducted in accordance with Schedule
3.
The provisions relating to the counting of the votes are contained in clauses 2 and 3 of Schedule 3. The count is commenced by a consideration of the first preference votes. Any candidate who receives more than half of the votes is elected (clause 2). If there is no candidate who receives an absolute majority of first preference votes the count is to proceed in accordance with the process contained in clause 3.
Clause 3 of the schedule has two distinct features. The first is that at each stage of the process the candidate with the fewest votes is excluded. The second is that the votes continue to be counted until the preferences, if any, expressed on the ballot paper are exhausted for want of an available preferred candidate to which the vote may be transferred. The combined effect of the exclusion of the lowest polling candidates and optional preferential voting is that, at some point, a reduction is likely in the number of votes available for the count as ballot papers become exhausted.
Clause 3(2) requires that the exclusion of the lowest polling candidate and the transfer of the unexhausted ballot papers to available candidates "shall be repeated as often as necessary until one candidate receives an absolute majority of votes". Clause 3(2) does not envisage that the process ceases when it becomes impossible for any candidate to obtain more than half of the number of first preference votes originally counted. The sub-clause envisages that at some point as between two remaining candidates one will receive an absolute majority of the unexhausted votes. Schedule 3 does not provide for a tied vote at the end of the process. In such a case, in the absence of rules to break the tie, the election will fail.
Once one candidate has more than half of the unexhausted votes that absolute majority cannot be defeated by the transfer of the ballot papers of any other candidate. In my view clause 3(3) is intended to cover the situation where an absolute majority of the votes represented by the ballot papers which have not previously been exhausted is obtained by one candidate at any stage of the process described in clause 3. That is, at any stage of the distribution of preferences.
The presumption that the legislature intended the same word to have the same meaning throughout a statute readily yields to the context (Clyne at 15; McGraw-Hinds (Aust.) Pty. Ltd. v. Smith (1979) 144 CLR 633 at 643). In my opinion this is such a case. Once it is appreciated that the counting of the votes is a process in which candidates and ballot papers are being progressively excluded or exhausted, it is apparent that the context in which the word "votes" is used in section 137 of the Act is different to the context of the use of the word in clauses 3(2) and 3. In section 137 the word is used to signify all of the votes cast which become subject to the count. In clauses 3(2) and (3) the word is used in the context of a count being conducted where ballot papers are being exhausted and thus being removed from the count. The "votes" under consideration in clauses 3(2) and 3 are referred to after and in contra-distinction to "first preference" votes the subject of clauses 2 and 3(1).
The effect of the Zone Election Rules and section 136 of the Act is to limit the votes identified in section 137 to those contained in a formal ballot paper. Relevantly for present purposes those are the votes which express at least one preference. Those are the votes referred to in clause 2 of Schedule 3 which are to be counted first. Thereafter the word "votes" in clause 3(2) and (3) refers to the votes on unexhausted ballot papers which are dealt with in accordance with the process described in clause 3. Clause 1 means no more than at some stage of the count a candidate needs to obtain an absolute majority of the votes which have not been exhausted to be elected.
The process applied by Mr. Phillips was in accordance with the directions of the court and Schedule 3 of the Act. In the circumstances set forth in the agreed statement of facts, Ms. Mam obtained an absolute majority of votes within the meaning of clause 1 of Schedule 3 to the Act and was thereby elected as zone representative.
It follows in my view that the grounds of objection taken in the petition are incorrect and that the petition ought to be dismissed.
On the hearing of the petition counsel for Ms. Mam noted that her name was spelt incorrectly in the petition which has been carried through into other court documents. I have of my own motion amended the heading to delete the "h" in "Thomasina".
I will hear the parties on the question of costs.
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The petition filed on 13 December, 1994 be dismissed.
I certify that this and the preceding sixteen (16) pages are a true copy of the reasons for judgment herein of his Honour Justice Cooper.
Date: 2 June, 1995
Associate
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr. D. Rangiah
Solicitors for the Applicant: Aboriginal Legal Service
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr. P. Applegarth
Solicitors for the First Respondent: Ready & Tonkin
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr. M. Swan
Solicitors for the Second Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Date of Hearing: 17 May, 1995
Place of Hearing: Brisbane
Date of Judgment: 2 June, 1995
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