Watkins v Queensland Rural and Industry Development Authority
[2021] FCA 1542
•30 November 2021
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Watkins v Queensland Rural and Industry Development Authority [2021] FCA 1542
File number(s): QUD 397 of 2021 Judgment of: GREENWOOD J Date of judgment: 30 November 2021 Date of publication of reasons: 8 December 2021 Catchwords: HIGH COURT AND FEDERAL COURT – consideration of the basis upon which the jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Australia is invoked – consideration of whether the application raised a matter of federal jurisdiction Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 7.01(1) Division: General Division Registry: Queensland National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 21 Date of hearing: 30 November 2021 Counsel for the Prospective Applicant: The prospective applicant appeared in person ORDERS
QUD 397 of 2021 BETWEEN: ROBERT OGILVIE WATKINS
Prospective Applicant
AND: QUEENSLAND RURAL AND INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ALSO KNOWN AS QRIDA
Prospective Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
GREENWOOD J
DATE OF ORDER:
30 NOVEMBER 2021
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application is dismissed.
2.The application fee paid by the prospective applicant is to be refunded.
3.No order as to costs.
4.Pursuant to s 23 and s 37P of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), rule 1.32 and rule 1.36 of the Federal Court Rules 2011, these orders and the reasons for judgment in support of these orders are made and published from Chambers.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GREENWOOD J:
These proceedings are concerned with an urgent application made by Mr Robert Ogilvie Watkins under r 7.01(1) of the Federal Court Rules (2011) (Cth). In making the application, Mr Watkins acted on his own behalf unassisted by legal representation. Rule 7.01(1) provides that if a matter is urgent, a person who intends to start a proceeding (a “prospective applicant”) may apply to the Court, without notice, as if the prospective applicant had started the proceeding and the application had been made in the proceeding, for an order (among other things) granting an injunction: r 7.01(1)(a).
Mr Watkins sent a letter to the Court addressed to the Queensland District Registrar of the Court seeking to have an urgent application under r 7.01(1)(a) listed “in order to seek an injunction against the Queensland Rural and Industry Development Authority (“QRIDA”), so as to prevent QRIDA from taking any action in a matter [in] which I believe … it has no jurisdiction or authority to act”.
Mr Watkins said that he required the injunction in order to allow the Commonwealth to “carry through with its due course of processing a claim for assistance, which I have made of the Commonwealth with regards to the matter”. The urgency of the applicant was said to be that QRIDA was threatening to take action “in the matter” shortly after 25 November 2021, and that “it wants me to comply with a request by the 25th of November 2021, which I believe is unlawful or irrelevant pursuant to the circumstances of the matter”.
By the application filed on 22 November 2021, Mr Watkins sought an order that the Court grant an injunction restraining QRIDA from taking any action pursuant to the Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (Qld); and an order restraining QRIDA from intervening in a “federal law matter, which has been referred to the Commonwealth for action” and an injunction in aid, in effect, of either the contended operation of (or contended contraventions of) s 69E of the Banking Act 1959 (Cth), paragraphs 51(ii), (xii), (xiii) and (xvi) of the Commonwealth Constitution and s 109 of the Constitution. I will return to those matters shortly.
The application (and supporting affidavit of Mr Watkins) fails to identify any element of federal jurisdiction and thus the application was necessarily dismissed at the conclusion of the hearing of the application on 30 November 2021.
In the course of hearing Mr Watkins, the Court sought to explain the difficulties inherent in the application having regard to the failure to identify any element of federal jurisdiction, quite apart from difficulties related to identifying in probative admissible form facts relevant to a question Mr Watkins was seeking to agitate.
In these reasons, I will briefly set out some of the principles relating to the jurisdictional difficulties confronting Mr Watkins.
The Federal Court of Australia exercises a jurisdiction to quell controversies (resolve disputes) between citizens (corporate and individual) and, put simply, between citizens and the Commonwealth (and Commonwealth officers and agencies) and, depending upon the particular circumstances, between citizens and a State and State agencies, in those cases where the Court is invested with jurisdiction, that is to say, in those cases where jurisdiction (understood as the “authority to decide”) is conferred on the Court. The Court does not have an unlimited jurisdiction “at large” to entertain any and every controversy a party might wish to bring to the Court.
Typically, a great many Acts of the Commonwealth Parliament confer jurisdiction on the Court in relation to matters arising under each such Act (that is, generally speaking, within the field of the subject matter of the Act). Typically, each such Act contemplates decisions made, steps taken or powers or discretions exercised (or to be exercised) that are brought within the Court’s review or involve applications that may be brought before the Court.
In the year ending 30 June 2021 alone, the Court’s jurisdiction was enlarged or otherwise affected by 19 Acts of the Commonwealth Parliament.
In the case of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), for example, jurisdiction is conferred on the Court “with respect to civil matters arising under the Corporations legislation”: s 1337B of that Act. The term “Corporations legislation” is defined in s 9 of that Act. More importantly, and of fundamental importance, s 39B(1A) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) provides that the Court’s original jurisdiction includes jurisdiction in any of the matters set out in that section including any matter “arising under laws made by the Parliament” (leaving aside for the moment the special position in relation to criminal prosecutions and any criminal matter): s 39B(1A)(c). Thus, the Court does enjoy a broad jurisdiction addressing almost all civil matters arising under laws of the Commonwealth Parliament and the jurisdiction extends to all matters in which a federal issue is properly raised as a part of a claim by a party or as part of a defence raised by a party to any claim.
Essentially, where the subject matter in dispute owes its very existence to an enactment of the Commonwealth Parliament, the Court has jurisdiction in the relevant matters.
For completeness, it should be noted that the Court has jurisdiction in some indictable criminal matters and some matters of summary criminal jurisdiction. It is not necessary to examine those matters any further as no aspect of the application by Mr Watkins engages any aspect of the Court’s criminal jurisdiction.
The factual matters at the centre of the application by Mr Watkins concern events in November 2018 and December 2018 relating to negotiations Mr Watkins conducted with Westpac Banking Corporation (“Westpac”) in relation to a contended settlement, discharge and release of all debts owed by Mr Watkins on his own behalf and on behalf of five entities within what is called the “Robert Watkins Group” (the “Group”), including an entity which is trustee for the R & K Watkins Family Trust. Mr Watkins says that on 12 December 2018, he entered into an arrangement for the payment to Westpac of $1.8 million in settlement of the debts of the Group (including on his own behalf). He says that the arrangement was made with a particular officer of Westpac. He says that the payment was then made but later another officer of Westpac asserted that further monies remained owing to Westpac. The Farm Business Debt Mediation Act 2017 (Qld) (the “FBDM Act”) provides that a mortgagee must not take enforcement action under a farm mortgage unless, relevantly, an exemption certificate is in force for the farm mortgage: s 12. A “mortgagee”, for a farm mortgage, means a person to whom a farmer owes a farm business debt secured by the farm mortgage: s 4, Schedule 1, FBDM Act. A “farm mortgage” means a mortgage of a farm property and the term “farm property” has an extensive definition: s 4, Schedule 1, FBDM Act. If a mortgagee intends to take enforcement action under a farm mortgage, the mortgagee must serve an enforcement action notice on the farmer and give a copy of the notice to the QRIDA, a body established under the Rural and Regional Adjustment Act 1994 (Qld): s 14. The notice is required to state that the farmer may ask for mediation of the mortgagee’s claim to be owed a farm business debt. However, a mortgagee for a farm mortgage may apply to the QRIDA for a certificate exempting the mortgagee from the obligation to offer mediation under the FBDM Act before taking enforcement action in relation to the farmer’s default under the farm mortgage: s 48. Westpac has made such an application to the QRIDA and Mr Watkins has received a notice from QRIDA calling upon him to show cause as to why an exemption certificate ought not to be granted to Westpac under Division 2 of Part 4 of the FBDM Act.
Mr Watkins contends that there is no debt. That matter is in dispute with Westpac. Mr Watkins has had exchanges with QRIDA about that matter previously including on 18 May, 25 May, 1 June and 25 June 2021. By the present application, Mr Watkins seeks to restrain QRIDA from granting an exemption under the FBDM Act. He does so on the footing that he has raised, by email, the issues he has with Westpac, with Senator, the Hon Simon Birmingham, the Minister for Finance. Senator Birmingham responded on 15 November 2021 advising Mr Watkins that he had referred his email to Senator, the Hon Jane Hume, the Minister for Superannuation, Financial Services and the Digital Economy and Minister for Women’s Economic Security, on the footing that “banking matters” fall within the portfolio responsibilities of Senator Hume.
The referral, by itself, to either or both of Senator Birmingham and Senator Hume of issues as between Mr Watkins and Westpac does not confer federal jurisdiction on the Federal Court of Australia simply because a citizen has sought to engage with elected Members of the Senate who have particular portfolio responsibilities within the Executive.
As to the Banking Act, Mr Watkins says that the Court’s jurisdiction is invoked in relation to a matter engaging s 69E of that Act. Section 69E provides, relevantly, that if the operation of the Banking Act would result in an acquisition of property from a person otherwise than on just terms, and the acquisition would be invalid because of paragraph 51(xxxi) of the Constitution, the Commonwealth is liable to pay the person compensation of a reasonable amount as agreed between the Commonwealth and the person, and in the absence of agreement, a reasonable amount of compensation as determined by the Federal Court of Australia. No aspect of the facts raised by Mr Watkins involves a matter arising under s 69E of the Banking Act.
As to paragraphs 51(ii), (xii), (xiii) and (xvi) of the Constitution, those subparagraphs of paragraph 51 are concerned with identifying the heads of legislative power with respect to which the Commonwealth may make valid laws for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth. They do not confer upon a citizen any basis for an application to a Court or a basis for a civil remedy.
As to s 109 of the Constitution, that provision recognises that there may be areas of legislative power within which the Commonwealth might enact a valid law of the Commonwealth and within the same field, a State Parliament might enact a law of a State. The role of s 109 is to make clear that to the extent of any inconsistency between two such laws, the law of the Commonwealth is paramount. Again, this section has nothing to do with conferring rights upon a citizen, or defaulting a State or a State instrumentality out of or from exercising any power conferred under a State Act simply because a matter involving a citizen and a bank is referred to Members of the federal Parliament exercising Executive Authority in relation to banking matters.
As the Court indicated to Mr Watkins in the course of the hearing, his interests are probably best served by seeking to engage with QRIDA in relation to the show cause notice with a view to seeking to establish a basis upon which Westpac might be encouraged to engage in mediation with Mr Watkins about the matters in issue between him and Westpac. Alternatively, it may be necessary to take steps to resolve in a properly constituted proceedings the question of whether a debt is due and payable to Westpac by Mr Watkins or any of the entities within the Group.
So far as the present application is concerned, the application was dismissed on 30 November 2021 and an order was made that the application fee paid by Mr Watkins to the Court be refunded. The application was brought within the Corporations National Practice Area of the Court but it does not properly fall within that NPA. A fee paid by Mr Watkins on the footing that the application was within that NPA, was misconceived. Accordingly, an order was made for the refund of those application fees to him.
I certify that the preceding twenty‑one (21) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Greenwood. Associate:
Dated: 8 December 2021
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