JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
CITATION: WATER CORPORATION -v- McKAY [2010] WASC 210
CORAM: KENNETH MARTIN J
HEARD: 17 JUNE 2010
DELIVERED : 17 AUGUST 2010
FILE NO/S: GDA 2 of 2010
BETWEEN: WATER CORPORATION
Appellant
AND
RODERICK DOUGLAS McKAY
KATHLEEN GLENYS McKAY
Respondents
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : INFORMATION COMMISSIONER OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :MR S BLUEMMEL
Citation :RE McKAY and WATER CORPORATION [2009] WAICmr 35
Catchwords:
Freedom of information - Appeal against disclosure orders of Information Commissioner - Public interest provision considered for exempt documents
Legislation:
Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA), s 85
Land Administration Act 1997 (WA)
Public Sector Management Act 1994 (WA)
Water Agencies (Powers) Act 1984 (WA)
Water Corporation Act 1995 (WA), s 30(1)
Result:
Appeal dismissed
Category: A
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant: Mr L E James
Respondents : Mr T Houweling & Ms J P See
Solicitors:
Appellant: Kott Gunning
Respondents : Cornerstone Legal
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
Manly v Ministry of the Premier and Cabinet (1995) 14 WAR 550
Ministry for Planning v Collins (1996) 93 LGERA 69
Re Edwards and Electricity Corporation [1999] WAICmr 13
Re McKay and Water Corporation [2009] WAICmr 35
Re Ryan and City of Belmont [2000] WAICmr 42
Re Waterford and Department of Treasury (No 2) (1984) 5 ALD 588
KENNETH MARTIN J:
Overview
This is an appeal against a decision of the Information Commissioner (IC) pursuant to s 85 of the Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA) (FOI Act). The IC allowed the respondents access to the full content of valuation reports by licensed valuers which were commissioned by the appellant in respect of portions of the respondents' rural land at Ravenswood. The valuation reports are of November 2007 and March 2008 respectively.
On 30 December 2009, the IC determined that the full content of the two reports (referred to at [13] of the IC's reasons for decision) was not exempt from access, as the appellant had asserted - by reference to cl 6(1) of sch 1 to the FOI Act.
By s 85(1) of the FOI Act, an appeal lies to the Supreme Court on a 'question of law' arising out of any decision of the IC on a complaint relating to an access application.
Under sch 1, cl 6 of the FOI Act (which concerns the deliberative processes of an agency), matter will be exempt from disclosure, broadly speaking, if its disclosure would reveal opinions, advice or recommendations to an agency in the course of the agency's deliberative processes and where the disclosure of the matter would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest.
No argument was put on the appeal that the components out of the two valuation reports which had been redacted by the appellant and which are the focus of this disclosure dispute, do not fall squarely within the description of being part of the appellant's 'deliberative processes'.
The core issue in contention then, by…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Water Corporation v McKay and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2010] WASC 210
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the IC had erred in law when he concluded that the public interest did not support exempting the documents from disclosure. The primary issue was whether the disclosure of the valuation reports would undermine the agency's negotiating position, which would be contrary to the public interest. This hinged on whether the documents were still relevant to the negotiations or if they had become obsolete due to the passage of time and the cessation of negotiations.
The court found that the IC had not erred in his assessment of the public interest. The IC had correctly applied the law by considering the ongoing relevance of the documents to the negotiations. The court upheld the IC's reasoning that the documents were no longer relevant to the negotiations as they had stalled or broken down, and the valuations were outdated. The court also noted that the agency had not provided persuasive evidence that disclosure would harm the public interest by undermining the negotiations.
The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the IC's decision that the documents should be disclosed to Mr. McKay. The reasoning was that the documents were no longer pertinent to the negotiations, and thus, the public interest did not support withholding them from disclosure. The court held that the IC's judgment on the public interest was within his jurisdiction and should stand unless there was a clear legal error, which was not present in this case.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
On 30 December 2009 the IC published his reasons confirming the decision expressed under the preliminary view: see Re McKay and Water Corporation [2009] WAICmr 35. This appeal was lodged on 20 January 2010. The IC concluded that the first limb of cl 6(1)(a), as to the deliberative process of an agency, was established (at [31] ‑ [32]). That aspect of the decision embodied an uncontroversial view that the deliberative processes of an agency concern its 'thinking processes' and the process of reflection: see [23], referring to Re Waterford and Department of Treasury (No 2) (1984) 5 ALD 588. There is no challenge to that aspect of the IC's decision. Nor is there any challenge to the approach of the IC towards his assessment as to the applicable legal burden and the standard of proof carried by the appellant. At [25], the IC referred, appropriately, to observations made by Owen J (as he then was) in Manly v Ministry of the Premier and Cabinet (1995) 14 WAR 550, 573, to this effect:In my opinion it is not sufficient for the original decision‑maker to proffer the view. It must be supported in some way. The support does not have to amount to proof on the balance of probabilities. Nonetheless, it must be persuasive in the sense that it is based on real and substantial grounds and must commend itself as the opinion of a reasonable decision‑maker. In the present context, then, the appellant carried an onus to make good by reference to sch 1, cl 6(1)(b) of the FOI Act, the basis of the exemption it relied upon and particularly to show that a disclosure of the matter forming part of the deliberative processes of the appellant, ie the redacted components of the two valuations, 'would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest'. In assessing the public interest threshold under sch 1, cl 6(1)(b), the IC at [34] referred to Templeman J's decision in Ministry for Planning v Collins (1996) 93 LGERA 69 at 13. There his Honour had observed:In reaching a decision on the public interest question, the Commissioner must make a judgment. And unless it is shown that the Commissioner has erred in law in so doing, that judgment will stand even though the court hearing an appeal from the Commissioner pursuant to s 85(1) of the Act might have reached a different conclusion. The IC then reasoned as to cl 6(1)(b) that:I recognise that there is a public interest in the agency carrying out negotiations to acquire land by agreed purchase without the risk of those negotiations being undermined by the disclosure of sensitive information. In general, I consider that it would be contrary to the public interest to prematurely disclose documents while deliberations in an agency are continuing, if there is evidence that the disclosure of such documents would adversely affect the decision-making process, or that disclosure would, for some other reason, be contrary to the public interest. In general, I consider that the public interest is best served by allowing deliberations to occur unhindered and with the benefit of access to all of the material available so that informed decisions can be made. At the time of the agency's initial decision in July 2008, there were ongoing negotiations between the agency and the complainants and the agency was concerned that disclosure of the valuation reports would reveal the parameters of its negotiating range. The agency contended that such disclosure would undermine its negotiating position, which would be contrary to the public interest. In my view, it might well be contrary to the public interest to disclose an actual negotiating range, however I am not persuaded that disclosure of valuation reports would necessarily disclose an agency's negotiation range. …The agency currently submits that Documents 16 and 17 were obtained as part of its ongoing deliberative processes. The agency has also informed me that there have been no negotiations with the complainants since September 2008, although negotiations may be recommenced. The complainants advise me that negotiations with the agency have stalled or broken down. In my opinion, the latter is the more realistic view.In light of that, and in view of the agency's submission that the valuations in Documents 16 and 17 are out of date, it appears to me that, although the agency's deliberations to determine the value of the Land and the price it is willing to pay for the Land may be ongoing, those current deliberations no longer relate to the particular valuation amounts in Documents 16 and 17. Consequently, I am not persuaded that disclosure of those amounts could damage negotiations between the parties because those negotiations are no longer on foot. Nor, in my view, could they damage future negotiations because the valuation amounts are now out of date [36] ‑ [39].