Washband v Queensland Police Service

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:  Washband v Queensland Police Service [2009] QDC 243
PARTIES:  Paul Edward WASHBAND
(Appellant)
and
QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE
(Respondent)
FILE NO/S:  D 81/2009
DIVISION:  Criminal
PROCEEDING:  Appeal
ORIGINATING 
COURT: 
Magistrates Court, Townsville
DELIVERED ON:  31 July 2009
DELIVERED AT:  Townsville
HEARING DATE:  23 July 2009
JUDGE:  Durward SC DCJ
ORDERS:  1. Appeal allowed.
2. The appellant to be re-sentenced in respect of the
period of disqualification imposed.
3. The respondent to pay the appellant’s costs of and
incidental to the appeal.
CATCHWORDS:  APPEAL – sentence – whether 10 month period of
disqualification from holding or obtaining drivers licence
validly imposed – whether manifestly excessive.
NOTICE OF INTENTION TO ALLEGE PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS – statutory construction – Justices Act 1887 section 47 - whether wrong description of previous offence – whether Notice invalidated – consequence of invalidity in determination of period of disqualification - whether nature of proceeding (ex officio or by appearance) relevant..
PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS – whether s 47 (6) Notice invalid – whether open to magistrate to act on allegation of previous conviction otherwise provided to him.
Justices Act 1886 s 47 and s 142; Transport Operations (Road
Use Management) Act 1995 s79(1), s79(2), s79A(3),
s86(2)(f), s86(2)(B), s86(5); Traffic Act 1949 ss16, 20 and
54;Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 s382.
Croft v Trusz; ex parte Croft (1966) QWN 14; Steinberg v
Lundgaard (2001) QCA 332; Hughes v Hopwood (1950)
QWN 21; House v R (1936) 55 CLR 504.
COUNSEL:  D Honchin for the appellant
Ms K Wakefield for the respondent
SOLICITORS:  Nelson Lawyers for the appellant
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for the
respondent
THE CHARGES 
  1. On 13 March 2009 in the Magistrates Court at Townsville the appellant was convicted and fined $600 on the summary charges and disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for a period of ten months, in respect of an offence of Driving a Motor Vehicle whilst over the General Alcohol Limit but not over the Higher Alcohol Limit (.057%) - made pursuant to s 79(2)(a) of the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1966 ("TORUM") - and an offence of Using a Handheld Mobile Phone whilst the Motor Vehicle was Moving. Both offences were committed in Townsville on 26 February 2009.

  2. The appellant had been served with a Notice to Appear pursuant to section 382 of the Police Powers & Responsibilities Act 2000 (“PPRA”) in respect of an appearance in court on 13 March 2009. The officer who issued the Notice to Appear was Constable A Bye (a matter relevant to one secondary issue that was raised by the appellant).

  3. A Notice of Intention to Allege Previous Convictions (“Notice”), made pursuant to s 47 of the Justices Act 1886 (“the Act”) and dated 28 February 2009, was served on the appellant on that date in respect of the offence of Driving a Motor Vehicle over the General but under the High Alcohol Limit, that is the subject charge. The Notice,…

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Details
Case
[2009] QDC 243
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the appeal of Washband v Queensland Police Service, the appellant contested the sentence imposed by the Magistrates Court, arguing that the ten-month period of imprisonment was excessive and that the magistrate had erred in his sentencing decision. The court was required to determine whether the sentence was manifestly excessive or if the magistrate had acted under a misapprehension of fact or on some wrong principle when imposing the sentence.

The court examined the legal principles governing appeals against the exercise of discretion on sentence, referencing the cases of Hughes v Hopwood and House v R. It concluded that for an appeal to succeed, there must be a manifest error in exercising the discretion, and it is not sufficient for the appellate court to simply disagree with the primary judge's decision. The court found that there was a significant error in the Notice, which was entirely vitiated and could not be relied upon in the prosecution of the appellant. The court determined that even if the magistrate had relied on the Notice, the result would be the same because the Notice was a nullity, and the magistrate was in error in imposing the greater penalty.

The court allowed the appeal and made an order to this effect. The court did not need to consider the other grounds of appeal or the secondary issue regarding the description of the respondent in the appeal material, as the significant error in the Notice was sufficient to warrant the appeal's success. The appellant's argument regarding the description of the respondent was not necessary to determine the outcome of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The principles governing appeals against the exercise of discretion on sentence are well established. In Hughes v Hopwood (1950) QWN 21 (at p31), Macrossan CJ stated that an appeal court is not entitled to interfere unless it “… can find that the sentence is manifestly excessive or that there are some circumstances which show that the magistrate acted under a misapprehension of fact or on some wrong principle in awarding sentence.” Similarly, in House v R (1936) 55 CLR 504 (at p505), Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ stated that “… it is not enough that the judges comprising the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. CONCLUSION There having been a significant error made in the Notice was vitiated entirely. It those circumstances it could not have been relied upon on the prosecution of the appellant in the Magistrates Court. The appellant submits that the Magistrate relied on the Notice. I am not sure that that is correct. The Notice was not tendered as an exhibit on the hearing. The Magistrates Court file, to which reference was made in the course of the hearing before me, does not contain a copy of the Notice. The only copy of the Notice provided to me was exhibited to an affidavit by the appellant filed by leave on the day of the hearing of the appeal. If the Notice was not before the Magistrate, and it is not apparent from the transcript of the proceedings nor from his Honour’s decision that it was, then it could hardly be said that he relied upon it. What he did rely on, it seems to me, was the Traffic Record which refers correctly to the more serious offence of driving over the general limit and over the high limit. It seems to me that the Traffic Record was the source of his Honour’s knowledge of that previous conviction. In any event, even though his Honour may not have had before him or otherwise had relied upon a relevant Notice, in the absence of a valid Notice he could not rely on his knowledge of the previous conviction for the purpose of making a greater penalty than that to which the appellant would otherwise have been liable. If he did in fact make reference to the Notice, the same consequence would ensue. The Notice was a nullity and the learned Magistrate was in error in imposing the greater penalty, whether he had the Notice or otherwise. In the premises I do not need to consider the other grounds of appeal. THE SECONDARY ISSUE Mr Honchin for the appellant made a submission that the complainant was not properly described or named in the respondent’s material files on the appeal. I have in this judgment adhered to practice in referring to the respondent in these proceedings as “Queensland Police Service”, on the basis that the complainant was a police officer acting in the execution of his duty whilst employed by the Queensland Police Service. Mr Honchin took issue with the description of the respondent as “Queensland Police Service” and submitted that the proper description comprised the rank, initials and name of the police officer who made and signed the Notice to Appear, that is Constable A. Bye. The respondent was not in a position to respond to the submission, it having been raised orally on the hearing. I gave the parties liberty to provide further submissions if the necessity arose. The thrust of the submission by Mr Honchin was directed to the issue of costs, but in the circumstances I do not need to consider and determine the submission on the merits. FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established