Warren John McCorriston v Body Corporate for Q1 CTS 34498

[2021] FWC 2071

[2021] FWC 2071

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.394 - Application for unfair dismissal remedy

Warren John McCorriston
v
Body Corporate for Q1 CTS 34498
(U2020/222)

DEPUTY PRESIDENT LAKE BRISBANE, 15 APRIL 2021

Termination of employment - jurisdiction - small business employer - minimum employment period - minimum period not met.

[1] On 6 January 2020, 1 Warren John McCorriston (the Applicant) applied for an unfair dismissal remedy under section 394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the FW Act). On 15 June 2020,2 the Body Corporate for Q1 CTS 34498 (the Respondent) lodged a Form F3 – Employer’s Response, in which they raised two jurisdictional objections to the application.

[2] Namely, the Respondent raised that the Applicant was not protected by the unfair dismissal provisions as he had not served the minimum employment period, 3 and that in any case, the termination is wholly defensible as a case of genuine redundancy.4 The Respondent asked that their objections are decided before they would take part in conciliation of the matter.

[3] On 17 August 2020, the matter was allocated to me for determination of the threshold jurisdictional objection, that the Applicant did not serve the minimum employment period. By consent, this issue was decided ‘on the papers’ rather than following a hearing. As will become evident, it is not necessary to consider the further objection of genuine redundancy, which is usually heard together with the merits of an unfair dismissal matter, 5 because I have found the minimum employment period was not met, and ordered the application is dismissed.

[4] The parties agree that the Applicant served a continuous period of employment for the Respondent from the dates 14 January 2019 to 18 December 2019, a period of 11 months and 4 days. The minimum employment period issue therefore hinges on whether the Respondent is a small business employer, or not. Whether they are a small business in turn hinges on whether they have any associated entities. This decision deals with the minimum employment period and the stated component questions only.

Background

[5] The Respondent is a Body Corporate scheme providing for the management of 526 community titled apartments located on the Gold Coast. The Respondent entity was created under the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) (BCCMA).

[6] The Applicant was employed by the Respondent to perform the role of Body Corporate General Manager. The parties entered a contract of employment, which was signed and operative from 14 January 2019, and provided for a minimum fixed term to expire after two years from the date of commencement. 6

[7] On 2 December 2019, the Respondent’s committee board were asked to vote on a motion to terminate the Applicant’s employment. 7 A termination letter, with immediate effect and dated 18 December 2019, was issued to the Applicant. And on 24 December 2019, it was recorded that the board had resolved to carry out the termination by way of redundancy.8

[8] On 9 January 2020, the Applicant was arrested in the Gold Coast and extradited to New South Wales where he is being held in custody. Though the charges he is facing are completely unrelated to the current matter, the fact of his incarceration bears mentioning as it impacts upon this case’s unusually lengthy trajectory.

[9] As the Applicant was unable to answer his mobile phone or check emails, the application was dismissed under s.587 of the FW Act due to non-payment of the lodgment fee. 9 Upon the Unfair Dismissal Panel Head receiving submissions on the reason for non-payment, it was decided that the s.587 dismissal decision would be revoked, and the Applicant’s application permitted to be heard.10

[10] The difficulty in communicating with the Applicant, or indeed holding hearings and conferences, whether in person or by telephone, has necessitated generous time allowances for submissions, and informed the decision to determine this matter on the papers. Additionally, as the parties have learnt of the other’s respective arguments through the course of receiving submissions, I have allowed for more opportunities to reply than usual.

Evidence before me

[11] In making this decision, I note that the Applicant lodged submissions on 13 August 2020, 9 September 2020, 10 November 2020, 11 December 2020 and 16 March 2021. I also note that the Respondent lodged submissions on 19 August 2020, 31 August 2020, 11 September 2020, 15 October 2020, 30 November 2020, and 9 March 2021.

[12] Included within the above materials of the Respondent are affidavits of Peter Damien Frawley, and Kellie Leigh Wright. These affidavits and the documents annexed to them form the evidentiary backdrop for the Respondent.

[13] The Applicant also filed a witness statement dated 10 November 2020. Much of this witness statement veers into underpayment issues, questioning the legitimacy of the Respondent’s motion to end his employ, complaints around being denied company access and other ancillary issues connected with the termination and fairness of process in general. I have only taken into account statements that are relevant to the issue of minimum employment period. However, as the Applicant is and has been incarcerated throughout this process, and he is represented by a lay representative, 11 I have taken submissions written in the first person to be statements of fact where appropriate. I do not consider that this approach unfairly prejudices the Respondent.

[14] Given that no witness has been subject to cross examination, the mentioned statements and materials have been largely accepted at face value. This case does not primarily revolve around a dispute as to the facts, but rather a dispute as to their application to the law.

[15] In addition to the above submissions and materials, there is also a multitude of correspondence between the parties. This correspondence is within the body of emails, and within formal PDF ‘letter’ attachments to emails. I have had regard to this correspondence in so far as it is material to the minimum employment period question.

Permission to be represented

[16] The Respondent has conducted this matter through Matthews Hunt Legal. Neither side has formally sought or objected to representation, though the fact of the Respondent acting through a representative has been known since at least 12 June 2020 when the response form was filed. I grant the Respondent permission to be represented in this matter by a legal practitioner on the basis of efficiency and complexity. 12

Submissions

Applicant

[17] The central argument of the Applicant is that the Respondent is not a small business, and that he has therefore served the minimum employment period, being 6 months. The Applicant says that in tallying the number of employees of the Respondent at the relevant times, the employee base of ‘Q1 Management Pty Ltd’ (Q1 or Q1 Management) should be counted as employees of the Respondent as an associated entity – according to the extended meaning as provided by s. 50AAA of the Corporations Act 2011 (Corporations Act).

[18] As set out below, the Respondent argues that the Corporations Act cannot be used to define an associated entity as the BCCMA states that the Corporations Act does not apply to bodies corporate. In reply, the Applicant argues that s.12 of the FW Act imports the definition of ‘associated entity’ from, but does not apply, the Corporations Act to a body corporate.

[19] The Applicant says that the Respondent and Q1 Management are associated for the following reasons:

“(a) In 2011, Q1 Management Pty Ltd purchased the exclusive on-site management rights.

(b) In 2011, the Caretaking and Letting Agreement was transferred to the Respondent by Deed of Assignment in 2011 (as per agreements submitted previously which shows the wide range of duties and responsibilities it has in managing the Q1 property for the Respondent).

(c) The Caretaker employs people to perform those duties and responsibilities who would otherwise need to be employed by the Respondent.

(d) The Caretaker has acted for the Respondent as if it was the Respondent (pages 4 and 5 of the Applicant’s statement of 10 November 2020 and relevant exhibits).

(e) Q1 Management Pty Ltd has a permanent member on the Q1 Body Corporate committee (exhibit A-6 attached to the Applicant’s statement of 10 November 2020).

(f) Q1 Management Pty Ltd owns Lot 308 and controls the occupancy levels and rental returns for the majority (over 300 of 526 Lots) of Lot owners (who comprise the Body Corporate for Q1 34498).”

Respondent

[20] The Respondent says that they are a small business, that either the BCCMA prevents the Commission from applying the test in s.50AAA of the Corporations Act, or that Q1 Management is not an associated entity for the purposes of s.50AAA.

[21] Specifically, and in relation to any argument that the Respondent is the principal of Q1 Management, the Respondent states that the body corporate:

“a. does not own, and never has owned, any shares in any company or entity;

b. does not have, and never has had, any related or associated entity;

c. does not have, and never has had, any subsidiary;

d. does not control, and never has controlled, any company or entity; and

e. is not controlled by, and never has been controlled by, any other company or entity.” 13

[22] Conversely, the Respondent say that Q1 Management does not control the Respondent as they only own 1 of the 526 lots, this allows Q1 to exercise just 26 out of 9841 contribution schedule lot entitlements. The Respondent agrees that Q1 Management performs the role as caretaker for the scheme, however, this is an independent contractor arrangement.

[23] The Respondent says that they are not the principal or associate of Q1 Management, or vice versa. Therefore, the two are not associated entities.

[24] It follows that the Applicant, having served less than 12 months as an employee, does not meet the minimum employment period to make an unfair dismissal application.

Applicable Law - Minimum Employment Period

[25] For the following reasons, I find that the definition of ‘associated entities’ found in s.50AAA of the Corporations Act is applicable to the present enquiry.

Fair Work Act provisions

[26] Section 382 of the Act requires that for a person to be protected from unfair dismissal they have completed a period of employment with their employer of at least the minimum employment period:

“382 When a person is protected from unfair dismissal

A person is protected from unfair dismissal at a time if, at that time:

(a) the person is an employee who has completed a period of employment with his or her employer of at least the minimum employment period; and

(b) one or more of the following apply:

(i) a modern award covers the person;

(ii) an enterprise agreement applies to the person in relation to the employment;

(iii) the sum of the person’s annual rate of earnings, and such other amounts (if any) worked out in relation to the person in accordance with the regulations, is less than the high income threshold.”

[27] Section 383 of the Act, set out below, prescribes that if the employee’s employer is a small business, the minimum employment period is one year:

“383 Meaning of minimum employment period

The minimum employment period is:

(a) if the employer is not a small business employer--6 months ending at the earlier of the following times:

(i) the time when the person is given notice of the dismissal;

(ii) immediately before the dismissal; or

(b) if the employer is a small business employer--one year ending at that time.”

[28] As stated, the parties agree that the Applicant served a continuous period of employment for the Respondent from the dates 14 January 2019 to 18 December 2019, a period of 11 months and 4 days. 14 What is in dispute is whether the Respondent was, at the relevant times, a small business employer as defined by s.23 of the Act:

“Meaning of small business employer

(1)  A national system employer is a small business employer at a particular time if the employer employs fewer than 15 employees at that time.

(2)  For the purpose of calculating the number of employees employed by the employer at a particular time:

(a)  subject to paragraph (b), all employees employed by the employer at that time are to be counted; and

(b)  a casual employee is not to be counted unless, at that time, he or she has been employed by the employer on a regular and systematic basis.

(3)  For the purpose of calculating the number of employees employed by the employer at a particular time, associated entities are taken to be one entity.

(4)  To avoid doubt, in determining whether a national system employer is a small business employer at a particular time in relation to the dismissal of an employee, or termination of an employee's employment, the employees that are to be counted include (subject to paragraph (2)(b)):

(a)  the employee who is being dismissed or whose employment is being terminated; and

(b)  any other employee of the employer who is also being dismissed or whose employment is also being terminated.” (emphasis added)

Corporations Act definition

[29] ‘Associated entity’ is defined in s. 12 of the Act to take on the same meaning as given by s. 50AAA of the Corporations Act.

“50AAA Associated entities

(1) One entity (the associate) is an associated entity of another entity (the principal) if subsection (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) or (7) is satisfied.

(2) This subsection is satisfied if the associate and the principal are related bodies corporate.

(3) This subsection is satisfied if the principal controls the associate.

(4) This subsection is satisfied if:

(a) the associate controls the principal; and

(b) the operations, resources or affairs of the principal are material to the associate.

(5) This subsection is satisfied if:

(a) the associate has a qualifying investment (see subsection (8)) in the principal; and

(b) the associate has significant influence over the principal; and

(c) the interest is material to the associate.

(6) This subsection is satisfied if:

(a) the principal has a qualifying investment (see subsection (8)) in the associate; and

(b) the principal has significant influence over the associate; and

(c) the interest is material to the principal.

(7) This subsection is satisfied if:

(a) an entity (the third entity) controls both the principal and the associate; and

(b) the operations, resources or affairs of the principal and the associate are both material to the third entity.

(8) For the purposes of this section, one entity (the first entity) has a qualifying investment in another entity (the second entity) if the first entity:

(a) has an asset that is an investment in the second entity; or

(b) has an asset that is the beneficial interest in an investment in the second entity and has control over that asset.

Interaction with the BCCMA – statutory interpretation of objects of legislation

[30] The Respondent submit, that by s.32 of the BCCMA, which succinctly states: “The Corporations Act does not apply to a body corporate”, the Commission cannot turn to s.50AAA of the Corporations Act to guide its enquiry into whether the Respondent had any associated entities.

[31] It is a settled rule of statutory interpretation that the stated purposes of an Act are instructive to interpreting each section of the Act. This rule is found in the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) at s. 14A, and in the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) at s. 15AA.

[32] The primary object of the BCCMA, and the path to its achievement, are stated at ss.2 and 3 as:

“2 Primary object

The primary object of this Act is to provide for flexible and contemporary communally based arrangements for the use of freehold land, having regard to the secondary objects.

3 How primary object is to be achieved

For the achievement of its primary object, this Act provides for—

(a) the establishment of community titles schemes; and

(b) the operation and management of community titles schemes.

[33] Section 4 lists the secondary objects of the BCCMA, which for brevity I will not reproduce below; suffice to say, the BCCMA does not set out “to establish a framework for dealing with unfair dismissal”. 15

[34] The Respondent has provided case authorities for the proposition that the Corporations Act does not apply to bodies corporate. 16 These cases are consistent with the stated objects of the BCCMA, and the cited extracts provide authority for the proposition that the Corporations Act does not affect how bodies corporate are to be managed.

[35] In other words, in considering the provided case authorities, it appears that s.32 of the BCCMA is aimed internally to ensure bodies corporate are not subject to duties, penalties, or other regulations imposed upon companies established under the Corporations Act. The question at hand is whether the Commission (an external body) can apply the definition of ‘associated entity’ to an unfair dismissal dispute involving a body corporate. This is not a question the BCCMA appears to answer, and in keeping with the BCCMA’s stated objectives, rightly so.

Does the Corporations Act ‘apply to’ the Respondent as a body corporate?

[36] There is force in the Applicant’s argument that s.12 of the FW Act does not have the effect of applying the Corporations Act to the Respondent – or indeed, any party to an unfair dismissal application.

[37] The reference to the Corporations Act should be interpreted according to the usual rules of statutory interpretation when it comes to extrinsic material. The Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)provides at s.15AB(1)(b) that extrinsic material may be used:

“to determine the meaning of the provision when:

(i) the provision is ambiguous or obscure”

[38] Subsection 15AB(2) provides that:

“the material that may be considered in accordance with that subsection in the interpretation of a provision of an Act includes:

(g) any document… that is declared by the Act to be a relevant document for the purposes of this section”

[39] Section 12 of the FW Act is ambiguous insofar as it does not provide a definition of ‘associated entity’ itself. Use of s.50AAA of the Corporations Act “is declared by the (FW Act) to be a relevant document for the purposes of (interpretation).”

[40] Parliament chose to draft s.12 of the FW Act as referring to the Corporations Act rather than reproducing the same text within the FW Act. This may have been with the purpose of allowing for a dynamic definition should the Corporations Act be amended. Regardless of the reasons, s.12 merely imports a definition, it has the effect of placing that same text within the FW Act. It does not apply the Corporations Act to bodies corporate involved in unfair dismissal litigation.

Interpretation of State and Federal law under the Australian Constitution

[41] The FW Act is an Act of the Federal Parliament of Australia, it finds its legislative source of power in section 51(xxxvii) of the Australian Constitution, which allows the Federal Parliament to make laws on topics referred to it by the States. The State of Queensland referred the necessary power for the FW Act to have effect in the State by the enactment of the Fair Work (Commonwealth Powers) and Other Provisions Act 2009 (Qld).

[42] The Constitution provides for scenarios where State and Federal laws are inconsistent with each other at s.109:

“109 Inconsistency of laws

When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid.”

[43] The effect of s.109 above is that even if the BCCMA purported to limit the Commission’s ability to use the Corporations Act’s definition of an associated entity, that aspect of the BCCMA’s operation would be invalid insofar as it is inconsistent with the FW Act.

[44] For the preceding reasons, I consider that the Commission is not prevented from applying the definition of associated entity as provided by s.50AAA of the Corporations Act and surrounding sections.

Consideration

[45] I find that the Respondent had one employee, being the Applicant, at the time of the Applicant’s dismissal. 17 In concluding this, I have accepted that the Respondent’s committee members are not employees, but volunteers, and that all other persons or businesses who perform work for the Respondent have done so as independent contractors.18

[46] It follows that whether the Applicant has served the minimum employment period is determined by whether the Respondent is a small business employer, which is in turn determined by whether the Respondent and Q1 Management are associated entities as defined.

[47] The following is an application of the definition of associated entity as imported from s.50AAA of the Corporations Act:

Are they related bodies corporate?

[48] The definition of ‘related bodies corporate’ is provided by s.50 of the Corporations Act as:

“50 Related bodies corporate

Where a body corporate is:

(a) a holding company of another body corporate; or

(b) a subsidiary of another body corporate; or

(c) a subsidiary of a holding company of another body corporate;

the first‑mentioned body and the other body are related to each other.”

[49] The evidence before me is that Q1 Management is an independent contractor of the Respondent. 19 I accept this evidence as true based on the provided Caretaking and Letting Agreement,20 which was assigned to Q1 Management,21 and establishes an independent contract of engagement.

[50] I also note the Community Management Statement for the Respondent scheme, 22 and the title search of the Respondent scheme.23 These documents tend to support the Respondent’s proposition that the Respondent scheme is compliant with the BCCMA in so far as it exists for the benefit of lot holders, and not with the purpose of conducting business.24

[51] Additionally, I take note of the Australia Securities and Investments Commission extract snapshot of Q1 Management. 25 This document shows that the Respondent is not a shareholder, director, or secretary of Q1 Management. The company structure as a visual representation is annexed to this decision as ‘Annexure A’.

[52] The Applicant points to a large number of letting arrangements between lot owners and Q1 Management, 26 which may allow Q1 to control “between 25% and 35% of” votes by proxy arrangements.27 Even if Q1 were able to cast these votes in any way they wanted, this number falls well short of the “one-half” prescribed by the Corporations Act to demonstrate a subsidiary relationship.28

[53] I also note r.128(4) of the Body Corporate and Community Management (Standard Module) Regulation 2020 (Qld), which limits a single entity to holding only 5% of the lot holder’s proxy votes at a body corporate meeting. This implies that either the Applicant is mistaken about his assertion, or that Q1 cannot validly exercise more than 5% of lot holders votes.

[54] Nothing before me indicates that the Respondent and the Q1 Management satisfy any relationship as described by s.50 (a), (b), or (c). Indeed, the Applicant agrees that Q1 Management was contracted by the Respondent for “site management”. 29

Does either control the other?

[55] The Respondent is controlled by a Committee which has been elected in accordance with the BCCMA Regulations. 30 The evidence before me is that there are 7 committee members,31 that Q1 Management (as Caretaker) and the Body Corporate Manager are non-voting members of the Committee.32

[56] I also find that Q1 Management owns a single lot of the 526 constituent lots within the scheme. 33 Thus, Q1 Management may exercise a proportionate vote in the control of the Respondent, but it cannot be said that they control the Respondent.

[57] Further, Q1’s use of lot holder’s votes is subject to the letting contracts between Q1 and the respective lot holders, it is unlikely this meets the definition of ‘control’ as defined by the Corporations Act. This is because where there is an “exercise (of) capacity for the benefit of someone other than (Q1 Management’s) members… (Q1 Management) is taken not to control (the Respondent)”. 34

[58] I cannot conclude that the letting contracts allow Q1 to assert their own will and desires. Indeed, it is more likely that a proxy vote can only be exercised if the intended outcome is for the benefit of the lot holder – as is typical in proxy relationships. 35 However, as no evidence of these contracts has been adduced, this is a neutral consideration.

[59] No evidence is before me to suggest that the Respondent controls Q1 Management. It follows that I have not found either entity controls the other.

[60] As I have found that neither the Respondent or Q1 Management control each other, it is unnecessary to separately consider s.50AAA(4).

Do either have qualifying investments, and significant influence, and a material interest in each other?

[61] As found above, Q1 Management holds a single lot of the 526 constituent lots within the Respondent scheme. This cannot, logically or numerically, be characterised as empowering Q1 Management with ‘significant influence’ over the Respondent.

[62] No evidence is before me to suggest that the Respondent has influence over Q1 Management outside their rights under the independent contractor arrangement. Again, this cannot be characterised as ‘significant influence’.

[63] The Applicant has submitted that Q1 Management manages up to 300 of the lots within the scheme, 36 which affords Q1 employees the right to use the associated carparks as staff carparks. He has also stated that Q1 and the Respondent share costs for security, cleaning and maintenance services.37 This is not demonstrative of Q1 controlling the Respondent; the Full Bench has previously made the distinction between the day-to-day running of a business and control of the entity itself.38

[64] As an aside, this same distinction is also instructive in the relationship between the Respondent and Strata Influence Pty Ltd, which is the company engaged as the Body Corporate Manager for the Respondent. Influence over day-to-day operations does not, per se, equate to significant influence of the entity.

[65] As the definition in s.50AAA(5) and (6) requires that a ‘significant influence’ is found, and given I have found that neither entity has significant influence over the other, it is unnecessary to consider the other prongs of s.50AAA(5) and (6). This includes the Applicant’s assertion that Q1 Management Pty Ltd has a qualifying investment in the Respondent by purchasing the on-site management rights. 39

Does a third entity control both the Respondent and Q1 Management?

[66] No evidence has been produced to suggest this is a relevant consideration.

Conclusion

[67] The Respondent and Q1 Management are not associated entities as so defined. It follows that the Respondent was a small business employer at the relevant time, and subsequently that the Applicant has not served the minimum employment period.

[68] Having not served the minimum employment period, the Applicant is without jurisdiction to claim an unfair dismissal remedy, and his application is dismissed.

[69] I order that the application be dismissed.

DEPUTY PRESIDENT

Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer

<PR728664>

Annexure A

 1   The Applicant lodged the application three times, on the 6, 7 and 8 January 2019. As each date is within the statutory time limit for application, further discussion is immaterial to this Decision.

 2   The reasons for the delay between the application and response are detailed in the ‘Background’ section of this Decision.

 3   See FW Act, ss.382(a) and 383.

 4   See FW Act, ss.389 and 385(d).

 5   See FW Act, s.396(d).

 6   Respondent’s Further Response Submissions, 31 August 2020, R2, Item 12.

 7   Ibid, R3.

 8   Ibid, R4.

 9   [2020] FWC 1039.

 10   [2020] FWC 2456.

 11   Dr Laurina Yam is clearly well educated, but lay in the sense that she is not a lawyer or industrial advocate by trade.

 12 FW Act, s.596(2)(a).

 13   Respondent’s Further Response Submissions, 31 August 2020, p 2.

 14   See FW Act, ss.384 and 22.

 15 FW Act, s.381(1)(a).

 16   Somerset Park [2018] QBCCMCmr 53 (31 January 2018); Jewel Whitsunday [2014] QBCCMCmr 306 (26 August 2014) and Presidents Club Tennis [2013] QBCCMCmr 470 (26 November 2013).

 17   Respondent’s Further Response Submissions, 31 August 2020, p 3.

 18   Ibid.

 19   Affidavit of Peter Damian Frawley, signed 28 August 2020, [3]; Affidavit of Kellie Leigh Wright, signed 31 August 2020, [4].

 20   Affidavit of Kellie Leigh Wright, signed 31 August 2020, KW-4.

 21   Ibid, KW-5

 22   Ibid, KW-2.

 23   Ibid, KW-3.

 24   See BCCMA, s.96.

 25   Affidavit of Peter Damian Frawley, signed 28 August 2020, PF-1.

 26   Ibid.

 27   Witness Statement of Warren McCorriston, dated 10 November 2020, p 4.

 28   Corporations Act, s. 46(a)(ii).

 29   Submissions of Applicant, 9 September 2020, p 1.

 30 BCCMA, s.100; Affidavit of Kellie Leigh Wright, signed 31 August 2020, [11].

 31   Respondent’s Further Response Submissions, 31 August 2020, p 3.

 32   Ibid; Body Corporate and Community Management (Standard Module) Regulation 2020 (Qld), r.12.

 33   Respondent’s Submissions, 11 September 2020, p. 2, [9].

 34   Corporations Act, s. 50AA and sub-s.(4).

 35   “A person with authority to vote at a company general meeting or class meeting in the interest of the person who appoints the proxy”, Encyclopaedic Australian Legal Dictionary, LexisNexis, accessed 31 March 2021, ‘proxy’.

 36   Applicant’s submissions, 16 March 2021, p. 3.

 37   Witness Statement of Warren McCorriston, dated 10 November 2020, p 4-5.

 38   Jay Leung v Brian Burgess as Trustee for Brian Burgess Family Trust, Binnia Downs Meat Co. Pty Ltd as Trustee for MCP Carr Investment Trust (in Partnership) t/a Kogarah Inn [2015] FWCFB 5255, [16].

 39   Witness Statement of Warren McCorriston, dated 10 November 2020, p 4.