Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of NSW

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Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of NSW [2011] NSWSC 1492
Hearing dates:9, 10, 15 November 2011
Decision date: 15 November 2011
Jurisdiction:Common Law
Before: Walmsley AJ
Decision:

See paragraph [32]

Catchwords: Evidence - hypothetical - whether s 5D(3) Civil Liability Act subject to right to re-examine
Legislation Cited: Civil Liability Act 2002
Evidence Act 1995
Cases Cited: Chamberlain v Ormsby t/as Ormsby Flower [2005] NSWCA 454
Elbourne v Gibbs [2006] NSWCA 127
Hadid v Australis Media Ltd (unreported, Sperling J, NSWSC, 5 November 1996)
Hancock v Arnold, Dodd v Arnold [2008] NSWCA 254
Jeandin v Tzovaras [2011] NSWSC 1254
KT v PLG [2006] NSWSC 919
Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434
Telstra Corp Ltd v Bisley [2005] NSWCA 128
Texts Cited: J D Heydon, Cross on Evidence, (loose leaf) (2002) Lexis Nexis Australia
S Odgers, Uniform Evidence Law", 7th Ed (2008) Thomson Reuters Australia
Category:Interlocutory applications
Parties: Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd (Plaintiff)
Lionel Rupert Fowler (Plaintiff)
David Gauci (Plaintiff)
Ernest Hausler (Plaintiff)
Vitomir Kuzmanovic (Plaintiff)
Michelle Larden (Plaintiff)
Bruno Lopreiato (Plaintiff)
Alexander Lynch (Plaintiff)
Darryl Nix (Plaintiff)
Michael O'Brien (Plaintiff)
Michael G Passlow (Plaintiff)
Antol Plachozki (Plaintiff)
Paul Quigley (Plaintiff)
Richard Sheppard (Plaintiff)
Russell Sheppard (Plaintiff)
State of New South Wales (First defendant)
Sydney Catchment Authority (Second Defendant)
Representation: D Nock SC with K Odgers (Plaintiffs)
L King SC with C A Webster, S Gregory, N Newton (Defendants)
McLachlan Chilton (Plaintiffs)
Gild (Defendants)
File Number(s):2005/00269559

Judgment

  1. The fifteen plaintiffs in these proceedings had homes or businesses which were damaged or destroyed by a bushfire at one or other of Warragamba, Silverdale and Mulgoa, on 25 December 2001. They have sued the State Government for alleged wrongful acts by the National Parks and Wildlife Service and the New South Wales Rural Fire Service. They have also sued the Sydney Catchment Authority. They allege their very significant losses were due to negligence, breach of statutory duty and nuisance on the part of the two defendants.

  1. As against the National Parks and Wildlife Service and the Sydney Catchment Authority, the plaintiffs allege that they owed them a duty of care as occupiers. They do not allege the Rural Fire Service was an occupier, but they allege it owed them a general duty of care because of the functions it was performing and those functions which its statute obliged it to perform.

  1. The negligence is essentially put in two stages. At stage one, the negligence is said to be the failure by those three entities to assess the risk posed by a fire which started on 24 December 2001 at Mount Hall in the lower Blue Mountains, and the failure of the National Parks and Wildlife Service and the Rural Fire Service, whose obligation it was to fight the fire, to take proper steps to control it so it would not spread.

  1. The fifteen plaintiffs allege that had the defendants adequately assessed the risks posed by the fire, and done…

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Details
Case
[2011] NSWSC 1492
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Warragamba Winery Pty Ltd v State of NSW involved a dispute concerning the admissibility of certain evidence. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The primary issue before the court was whether section 5D(3) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) precluded the right to re-examine a witness on hypothetical evidence, particularly in the context of the admissibility of statements made by the witness in evidence or out of court.

The court had to determine if the statute, which generally bars the admission of evidence of a witness's statement about their intentions or actions in hypothetical situations, was subject to the right of re-examination under the Uniform Evidence Act. This required the court to examine the legislative intent behind section 5D(3) and how it interacted with the rules of evidence, particularly the right of re-examination. The court reviewed various authorities, including the Ipp Panel Report, which influenced the introduction of the section, and considered whether the exclusion of statements against interest in the statute highlighted the breadth of its application.

After considering the arguments and authorities, the court found that there was no basis to read down the provisions of section 5D(3) in a manner that would allow for the re-examination of hypothetical evidence. The court held that the statute applied comprehensively to both in-court and out-of-court statements, and there was no authority to support the proposition that re-examination could override the statutory bar. Consequently, the court disallowed the evidence in question, as it would have been admissible only if not for section 5D(3).

The court's final order was that the evidence identified as hypothetical during the voir dire would not be admitted. This decision reinforced the application of section 5D(3) in its intended scope, without exception for the right of re-examination.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Mr Nock also referred me to the 7th Edition of Uniform Evidence Law (Odgers), paragraph 1.2.3500, which says of re-examination: However neither the Australian Law Reform Commission report, nor the extract from Cross, nor the extract from Odgers, deals precisely with section 5D(3). Prior to 2002, evidence of the type Mr Nock wants to get in could have got in. In that year, a report into the common law in New South Wales was conducted by a panel chaired by Ipp J, as he then was. It became known as the Ipp panel. And when it reported to the New South Wales government in that year, the panel said on this issue: Following that report, section 5D(3) was inserted in the Civil Liability Act and similar sections were enacted in other states and territories of Australia. The subsection itself is as follows: It has been said in a medical negligence context that a patient's assertion as to what he or she would have done in hypothetical circumstances may, of itself, carry little weight: Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434 at paragraphs 15-17 per Gleeson CJ; paragraphs 44-45 per McHugh J; paragraphs 86-87 per Gummow J; paragraphs 157-158 per Kirby J; and paragraph 221 per Callahan J. In Elbourne v Gibbs [2006] NSWCA 127, another medical negligence case, at paragraph 67 Basten JA described evidence of what a patient would have done if warned of a medical risk as indisputably relevant. But as his Honour observed in Chamberlain v Ormsby , trading as Ormsby Flower [2005] NSWCA 454 at paragraph 137: See also Hancock v Arnold, Dodd v Arnold [2008] NSWCA 254 at 67 per Basten JA. In a non-professional context it has been held that the section applies as well: Telstra Corporation Limited v Bisley [2005] NSWCA 128 at [26] per Hodgson JA. There was consideration of the meaning of the word "statement" (see s 5D(3)(b)), in KT v PLG [2006] NSWSC 919, in particular at [42]-[44], where her Honour held it applied to what was said in evidence, as well as what was said out of court. Her Honour said (at [43]): Mr King has this morning drawn my attention to Jeandin v Tzovaras [2011] NSWSC 1254, at paragraph 100, where McDougall J noted that s 5D(3) does not apply to statements against interest (see exceptions in (b)). The fact that the legislature specifically excluded the operation of s 5D(3) only to statements against interest, emphasises the breadth of reach of s 5D(3). There is, I think, no warrant to read down the provisions of s 5D(3) in the way Mr Nock submitted would be appropriate. He was unable to cite any authority for the proposition. I think that is not surprising, given the breadth of the words used. The approach he urged on me would, I think, be inconsistent with the section. Insofar as the evidence in re-examination would, but for s 5D(3) have been admissible, I consider that I should not allow the evidence in. Accordingly, I disallow the evidence on the voir dire identified as the hypothetical evidence.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In a non-professional context it has been held that the section applies as well: Telstra Corporation Limited v Bisley [2005] NSWCA 128 at [26] per Hodgson JA. There was consideration of the meaning of the word "statement" (see s 5D(3)(b)), in KT v PLG [2006] NSWSC 919, in particular at [42]-[44], where her Honour held it applied to what was said in evidence, as well as what was said out of court. Her Honour said (at [43]): Mr King has this morning drawn my attention to Jeandin v Tzovaras [2011] NSWSC 1254, at paragraph 100, where McDougall J noted that s 5D(3) does not apply to statements against interest (see exceptions in (b)). The fact that the legislature specifically excluded the operation of s 5D(3) only to statements against interest, emphasises the breadth of reach of s 5D(3). There is, I think, no warrant to read down the provisions of s 5D(3) in the way Mr Nock submitted would be appropriate. He was unable to cite any authority for the proposition. I think that is not surprising, given the breadth of the words used. The approach he urged on me would, I think, be inconsistent with the section. Insofar as the evidence in re-examination would, but for s 5D(3) have been admissible, I consider that I should not allow the evidence in. Accordingly, I disallow the evidence on the voir dire identified as the hypothetical evidence.