Warin & Warin
[2020] FamCA 796
•23 September 2020
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| WARIN & WARIN | [2020] FamCA 796 |
| FAMILY LAW – SUBPOENA – objection to responding – whether valid basis given – none given – authorities on apparent relevance test. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 79, 117(1) |
| Alister v R (1984) 154 CLR 404 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd [1998] FCA 1599 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Shell Co of Australia Ltd [1999] FCA 212 Beckert & Beckert [2018] FCCA 3847 Botany Bay Instrumentation & Control Pty Ltd v Stewart [1984] 3 NSWLR 98 Commissioner for Railways v Small (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 564 Dupont v Chief Commissioner of Police (2015) 53 Fam LR 278 Hatton v Attorney-General (Cth) (2000) 26 Fam LR 570 In the Marriage of Epstein (1993) 16 Fam LR 588 National Employers' Mutual General Insurance Association Ltd v Waind (1979) 141 CLR 648 Purnell Bros Pty Ltd v Transport Engineers Pty Ltd (1984) 73 FLR 160 R v Saleam (1989) 16 NSWLR 14 Ragg v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria (2008) 18 VR 300 Santos Ltd v Pipelines Authority of South Australia (1996) 66 SASR 38 Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Ltd (No 2) (1989) 21 FCR 306 Waind v Hill and National Employers’ Mutual General Association Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 372 Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (No. 4) [2010] FCA 1128 Wong v Sklavos [2014] FCAFC 120 |
| Harold H. Glass, Seminars on Evidence (Law Book Co of Australasia, 1970) |
| APPLICANT: | Ms Warin |
| RESPONDENT: | Mr Warin |
| FIRST SUBPOENA OBJECTOR: | Ms Inston |
| SECOND SUBPOENA OBJECTOR: | Mr Winsor |
| FILE NUMBER: | MLC | 7368 | of | 2020 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 23 September 2020 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Melbourne |
| PLACE HEARD: | Melbourne |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Wilson J |
| HEARING DATE: | 18 September 2020 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: | Dr R. Ingleby |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: | Vadarlis & Associates |
| COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Not applicable |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Sebastian Rubera & Associates |
| COUNSEL FOR THE FIRST SUBPOENA OBJECTOR: | Not applicable |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE FIRST SUBPOENA OBJECTOR: | Sebastian Rubera & Associates |
| COUNSEL FOR THE SECOND SUBPOENA OBJECTOR: | Mr S. Thomas |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE SECOND SUBPOENA OBJECTOR: | Rothwell Lawyers Pty Ltd |
Orders
I dismiss the application made by the objector Mr Winsor for an order that his costs of complying with the subpoena dated 15 July 2020 issued by the wife be paid by the wife;
I dismiss the objections raised by Ms Inston and order her to comply with the subpoena directed to her by 4pm on 8 October 2020;
I grant leave to the wife to issue a further subpoena to Mr Winsor on or before 1 October 2020;
by 4pm on 2 October 2020 the respondent must file and serve a statement of claim to his response, fully particularised, setting out all legal and equitable claims he advances in this case to a standard appropriate to pleadings in a proceeding in the Federal Court of Australia;
I make an order for the joinder of the first respondent’s trustee-in-bankruptcy as a party to this proceeding and I direct that the applicant’s solicitors serve a copy of these reasons upon the trustee-in-bankruptcy forthwith; and
All parties’ costs of and incidental to this application are provided for by s 117(1) of the Family Law Act.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Warin & Warin has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
FILE NUMBER: MLC 7368 of 2020
| Ms Warin |
Applicant
And
| Mr Warin |
Respondent
And
| Ms Inston |
First Subpoena Objector
And
| Mr Winsor |
Second Subpoena Objector
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
These reasons address the matter debated before me on 18 September 2020 in relation to objections to producing documents in response to a subpoena addressed to –
a)Mr Winsor, a certified practising accountant; and
b)Ms Inston.
By reason of the resolution of aspects of the contest between the representatives of the wife and Mr Winsor, the debate became one of costs. However, the solicitor for Ms Inston argued all substantive grounds. It is necessary to go to those in these reasons. Only he asked for these written reasons.
Synopsis
For the reasons that follow, in my view –
a)Mr Winsor is not entitled to an order that his costs be paid by the wife;
b)I dismiss the objections raised by Ms Inston and order her to comply with the subpoena directed to her by 4pm on 8 October 2020;
c)I grant leave to the wife to issue a further subpoena to Mr Winsor;
d)by 4pm on 2 October 2020 the respondent must file and serve a statement of claim to his response, fully particularised, setting out all legal and equitable claims he advances in this case to a standard appropriate to pleadings in a proceeding in the Federal Court of Australia;
e)I join the first respondent’s trustee-in-bankruptcy as a party to this proceeding and I direct that the applicant’s solicitors serve a copy of these reasons upon the trustee-in-bankruptcy forthwith; and
f)the provisions of s 117(1) of the Family Law Act apply to all parties’ costs of and incidental to this application.
Relevant factual setting
It was common cause that the first respondent, Mr Warin, presented his own petition in bankruptcy on 17 July 2020.
In this proceeding the wife alleges that Ms Inston purchased the land and improvements known as B Street, D Town being the land more particularly described in certificate of title volume … folio … (“the property”) for $2.38m. The wife is seeking documents from Ms Inston because the wife alleges that Ms Inston, the new partner of Mr Warin, did not have the financial capacity to outlay the purchase price for the property. The mortgagee in Ms Inston’s purchase of the property was C Limited. C Limited is the registered proprietor of instrument of mortgage …. The wife’s subpoena to Ms Inston seeks documents concerning the loan application for mortgage finance from C Limited. The wife contends that Mr Warin provided some form of financial assistance in Ms Inston’s acquisition of the property. The wife has pointed to Mr Warin’s financial statement filed in this proceeding in which Mr Warin has recorded that Ms Inston’s weekly income is $1,000. The wife says that income could not support Ms Inston’s borrowings to purchase the property.
The wife contended in written submissions that C Limited had produced documentation in response to a subpoena directed to it. From the documentation produced by C Limited, submissions on behalf of the wife recorded the following –
a)Mr Warin paid C Limited funds on 15 July 2019 and on 19 September 2019;
b)C Limited’s records of Ms Inston’s annual income reveal $230,000 with savings of $1.6m;
c)the contract pursuant to which Ms Inston purchased the property recorded the settlement date as 27 June 2019; and
d)among C Limited’s documents was a certification by Mr Winsor, Ms Inston’s accountant, to the effect that Ms Inston’s net profit before tax was $230,000.
Relying on other evidence filed in this proceeding, submissions were advanced on behalf of the wife in relation to Ms Inston’s other income sources. That evidence included the following –
a)Ms Inston and her former partner settled their property dispute in such manner as each received $240,000;
b)Ms Inston’s income for child support purposes is $24,049 for the year 2020;
c)of the $240,000 received from her property settlement with her former partner, the sum of $100,000 was retained for the education of her two children;
d)she pays $35,000 for her daughter’s school fees which will come to an end in 2022; and
e)the wife contends that the $100,000 reserved for Ms Inston’s children’s education would have been depleted by now.
The wife’s submissions contained a statement to the effect that it was clear on the material before the court that Mr Warin is involved in the funding of the property. The submissions recorded the following –
26. On the basis of Affidavit material, Ms Inston, the sole registered proprietor of the property in which the Husband resides and which was purchased last year for $2.38 million plus on-costs of stamp duty, mortgage expenses and related expenses of $145,864 (page 90/111 of the C Limited Subpoena documents), on the balance of probabilities:
a.Cannot afford the repayments on $1,000,000 mortgage: mortgagee subpoena page 65;
b.Could not have had available to her the balance of $1,380,000 (plus on-costs) required to complete the purchase.
The Inston subpoena
By subpoena issued on 15 July 2020 the wife sought documents concerning Ms Inston’s acquisition of the property and C Limited’s financing of it. The relevant paragraphs of the subpoena were as follows –
2.All documents relating to and without limiting the description including but not limited to:
a.The real estate property known as B Street, D Town and being the property more particularly described in certificate of title Volume …, Folio … ("Property");
b.The mortgage to C Limited ("C Limited") lodged in dealing number … ("Mortgage") with the Victorian Registrar of Titles and affecting the property known as
c.The application for finance of the Property's purchase to C Limited by you or any person on your behalf;
d. All bank or loan statements relating to the Mortgage;
e.The source of funds relating to the acquisition by you of the Property;
f. The source of funds for payment of the Mortgage repayments.
On behalf of Ms Inston an elaborate but ultimately unsuccessful collection of propositions was advanced about each paragraph of the subpoena. Those propositions were as follows –
a)in relation to paragraph 2(a), it was oppressive, or an abuse of process or it was impermissible for fishing;
b)the same objections were taken in relation to paragraph 2(b);
c)the same objections were taken in relation to paragraph 2(c);
d)the same objections were taken in relation to paragraph 2(d);
e)the same objections were taken in relation to paragraph 2(e); and
f)the same objections were taken in relation to paragraph 2(f).
One other general ground of objection was asserted. It was that –
the documents requested which go beyond the statutory limitation period, fail to provide adequate particulars as to the dates of the documents required and fails to specify the category of documents required.
Legal test to be applied
In Waind v Hill and National Employers’ Mutual General Association Ltd,[1] the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made observations about the steps involved in responding to a subpoena. The decision in that case went on further appeal to the High Court of Australia[2] yet the three steps described by the Court of Appeal were not overturned by the High Court.
[1] [1978] 1 NSWLR 372.
[2]National Employers' Mutual General Insurance Association Ltd v Waind (1979) 141 CLR 648.
The “on the cards” test to the legitimate forensic purpose of a subpoena was coined by Gibbs CJ in Alister v R.[3] In other words, for the documents the subject of the subpoena to possess a legitimate forensic purpose, it must be “on the cards” that the document the subject of the subpoena would materially assist the party who has sought the document.
[3] (1984) 154 CLR 404, 414.
The legitimate forensic purpose requirement was restated, admittedly in the context of a criminal appeal, in R v Saleam.[4] The fact that the test was restated in that context does not diminish its importance for the purposes of litigation in this court. Rares J applied the test propounded in Alister v R in civil litigation in the Federal Court in Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (No 4).[5] I propose to apply that test in this case.
[4] (1989) 16 NSWLR 14.
[5] [2010] FCA 1128.
It is worth recording that in Beckert & Beckert[6] the test prescribed in Alister v R was adopted in the specific context of family law litigation in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. Of course, decisions from that court do not bind a Justice of this court. However, from the reasoning in that case it can be distilled that the test in Alister v R was applied by the Full Court of this court in Dupont v Chief Commissioner of Police.[7] Whether the metaphor “on the cards” presently enjoys currency may be a moot point having regard to the observations of Rares J in Lehman Brothers who held it does when compared with the observations of Bell J in Ragg v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria[8] who held that the metaphor had outlived its usefulness.
[6] [2018] FCCA 3847.
[7] (2015) 53 Fam LR 278.
[8] (2008) 18 VR 300.
The need for the document sought by subpoena to display apparent relevance was nomenclature favoured by the Court of Appeal in Waind. It was also favoured by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Wong v Sklavos[9] and also in Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Ltd (No 2).[10] In that case, the court quoted from Sir Athol Moffitt’s contribution in H. H. Glass’s 1970 Seminars on Evidence,[11] supportive of the holdings in Waind’s case in the Court of Appeal.
[9] [2014] FCAFC 120.
[10] (1989) 21 FCR 306.
[11] Harold H. Glass, Seminars on Evidence (Law Book Co of Australasia, 1970).
In my view the documents recorded in the subpoena addressed to Ms Inston meet the “apparent relevance” test. In Hatton v Attorney-General (Cth)[12] the Full Court of this court supported its conclusion about the application of the apparent relevance test in reliance upon the decisions in Waind, Botany Bay Instrumentation & Control Pty Ltd v Stewart,[13] Purnell Bros Pty Ltd v Transport Engineers Pty Ltd,[14] Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Ltd (No 2),[15] Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Shell Co of Australia Ltd,[16] Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd[17] and Santos Ltd v Pipelines Authority of South Australia.[18]
[12] (2000) 26 Fam LR 570.
[13] [1984] 3 NSWLR 98.
[14] (1984) 73 FLR 160.
[15] (1989) 21 FCR 306.
[16] [1999] FCA 212.
[17] [1998] FCA 1599.
[18] (1996) 66 SASR 38.
If nothing else, the weight of authority seems to indicate that the prevailing test is the “apparent relevance” of the document sought by subpoena. In my view, the documents sought in the Ms Inston subpoena meet that test. The test prescribed by Treyvaud J in In the Marriage of Epstein[19] of whether a document is “sufficiently relevant” seems to have been overtaken by other later authority so as to render it of questionable accuracy.
[19] (1993) 16 Fam LR 588.
The decision of Sir Frederick Jordan in Commissioner for Railways v Small[20] continues to enjoy currency despite its vintage. The law in this country has proceeded since that case on the basis that a subpoena that is drawn too widely will generally be construed as having no forensic purpose. Further, from Small’s case it has been the routine practice that courts will not require the recipient of a subpoena that is widely cast to fossick among his, her or its documents to “fish” for documents that may answer the description in the subpoena.
[20] (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 564.
Consideration
I do not accept that any of the objections asserted on behalf of Ms Inston have been made out.
First, all of the documents sought meet the “apparent relevance” test. It is readily apparent that documents in Ms Inston’s possession or power and which is the subject of attention in paragraph 2 of the subpoena address her acquisition of the property. On one version of the evidence, she earned a modest annual salary. On another she earned $240,000 per annum. The documents sought in the subpoena will shed light on how she funded her acquisition of the property. If her financial circumstances were such that she was, or was arguably, unable to finance or service the loan from C Limited then the obvious question follows, namely the source of the money to purchase the property. The wife suspects Mr Warin improperly applied joint funds or funds that should be brought to account in this s 79 application somehow in the acquisition of the property. The documents sought in the subpoena will assist in that quest. The documents bear apparent relevance.
Next it is necessary to examine whether any validity exists to Ms Inston’s contentions about each paragraph. Given that the same complaint is made in form and substance to each paragraph of the subpoena some overlap in the following comments apply.
Paragraph 2(a) is said to be oppressive or an abuse of process. That is because of the matters alleged in repeat form in subparagraphs 2(a)-(e) of the notice of objection. In my view, here the objector is approaching the task of construing the subpoena with an eye keenly attuned to the existence of defect of drafting. Paragraph 2(a) of the subpoena asks for the production of all documents relating to the property. Ms Inston either has those documents or she does not. I do not accept that she will be put to the trouble of forming a judgment about whether a document does or does not meet the description set out in paragraph 2(a). After all, by that paragraph the wife seeks all documents relating to the property. That is not a complicated activity to undertake. Ms Inston is a finance professional. I have no doubt she is well able to understand what she must identify to comply with paragraph 2(a). I reject the submission that paragraph 2(a) requires her to embark upon a fishing expedition, at least not in the vein of which Sir Frederick Jordan spoke in Commissioner for Railways v Small.
The same comments apply to the rest of the subpoena. Those paragraphs are not oppressive, an abuse of process or fishing.
None of the objections are meritorious. The notice of objection is dismissed in relation to the subpoena to Ms Inston.
Subpoena to Mr Winsor
The subpoena directed to Mr Winsor was in different terms. It was as follows –
2.All documents relating to and without limiting the description including but not limited to:
a.Correspondence regarding the sale by Ms Warin ("Wife") or Mr Warin ("Husband") of the real estate property known as F Street, D Town ("Property");
b. Any funds received by you from the sale of the Property;
c.The sum of $340,000 or any other sum sent to you by G Pty Ltd, Solicitors on behalf of either the Wife or Husband in the period 1 September 2017 to 31 January 2018 or at any other time;
d.Any monies you have received, held or now hold in trust for the Wife or Husband or any entity related to them.
Only one ground of objection was raised in relation to that subpoena namely paragraph 2(d). It had the hallmarks of an objection framed in the manner taken on behalf of Ms Inston.
The wife stated in paragraph 27 of her written submissions dated 14 September 2020 that the quest for documents in paragraph 2(d) was not pursued. By her amended submissions dated 16 September 2020, a new paragraph 27 appeared as follows –
27.Mr Winsor’s objections are limited to the documents in d). The subpoena is not pursued in relation to those matters, save as required for funds which were applied to Ms Inston’s purchase of B Street, D Town.
It must fairly be said that paragraph 2(d) in its original form was wide. In my view it was too wide especially having regard to the fact that Mr Winsor had performed accountancy services for Mr Warin for over 30 years. In its amended form the new paragraph 2(d) is more specific. At first blush it seems sufficiently narrow and confined. That said, I have not heard Mr Winsor on point. He may persist in his objection.
I had given some thought to not requiring an amended subpoena to be prepared filed and served with its attendant costs and delays but instead requiring a letter to be sent by Mr Vadarlis to Mr Winsor’s solicitors with the new version of paragraph 2(d). That would lend itself to speed and cost efficiency. However a subpoena is a solemn document carrying with it consequences for any failure to comply. Plus, the simple letter setting out the amended version of paragraph 2(d) did not address the state of play that was in play prior to the wife’s amended submissions when paragraph 2(d) of the subpoena was unamended. Logically, it seemed to me two stages needed consideration. The first was to consider the position of the wife and Mr Winsor as the wife’s subpoena stood prior to the 16 September amended submissions. The second was to consider the position of the wife and Mr Winsor consequent upon the wife’s foreshadowing of a more precise construction of paragraph 2(d) of the subpoena. To those I now turn.
Mr Winsor, accountant, swore an affidavit on 20 August 2020. In it he deposed to having acted as the accountant for Mr Warin for “at least 35 years” (his words). He said his accountancy practice records were, at least in some parts, electronic. He said he ascertained that in relation to the documents sought in the subpoena directed to him, the relevant files were not in electronic form. He said that he ascertained that to answer the subpoena he would be required to physically retrieve the files that answered the description in the subpoena then examine those documents. He said his charge out rate was $350 per hour and that he estimated the task of combing through his firm’s files to answer the subpoena would take 10 days, each of 7.5 hours at the multiplier of $350 per hour, which he calculated to be $37,500. In other words, he proposed to render a fee of $37,500 just to respond to the subpoena. I do not accept that contention. In my view Dr Ingleby was correct in his submission that a recipient of a subpoena is bound by a duty to comply with the subpoena and in the absence of court order is not entitled to demand upfront payment of professional costs before doing so. In any event, his task of complying with the subpoena did not involve his exercising care and skill of an accountancy nature as to attract his personal charge out rate totalling $37,500. The task could have been performed by a clerk.
Mr Winsor made a further affidavit. It was dated 7 September 2020. In it he stated he acted as the accountant for 21 companies with which Mr Warin was associated in some way and that Mr Winsor estimated he had hundreds of boxes in storage in archives containing files for those 21 companies for which he had performed accountancy services over 35 years.
Mr Winsor’s solicitor, Belinda Lee Glare, made an affidavit on 17 September 2020 in which she put into evidence her communications with Mr Vadarlis once Mr Vadarlis had served his 14 September 2020 submissions. In essence, she deposed to the following –
a)she learned for the first time at 9:36pm on 14 September 2020 that the wife was not pursuing documents in relation to paragraph 2(d) of the wife’s subpoena;
b)on 15 September 2020 her firm wrote to Mr Vadarlis stating that she would seek costs of $9,859.82 being Mr Winsor’s costs of preparing the objections, preparing submissions and preparing for the hearing;
c)on 16 September 2020 Mr Vadarlis wrote to Mr Winsor’s solicitors stating that the costs claimed of $9,859 were disproportionately large;
d)later in the morning on 16 September 2020 Mr Winsor’s solicitors wrote to Mr Vadarlis stating that Mr Winsor would accept payment of costs of $8,000, such offer being open until 11am that day in default of which counsel would be briefed;
e)at close to 7pm on 16 September 2020 Mr Vadarlis rejected the proposal put by Mr Winsor’s solicitors; and
f)at near 7:45pm on 16 September 2020 Mr Winsor’s solicitors emailed Mr Vadarlis offering to substantiate the claim to costs of $8,000.
Before me on 18 September Mr Thomas of counsel pressed for payment of his client’s costs. Mr Thomas said those costs were $8,800 whereas Dr Ingleby pointed up that the last version put by Mr Winsor’s solicitors was $9,859.82
Against that factual backdrop certain propositions follow.
First, nowhere did Mr Thomas contend that Mr Winsor was entitled to any costs in his personal capacity. As far as his evidence went, he provided no more than an estimate that if he engaged in the task of wading through hundreds of boxes of archived files he would exhaust days of time for which he estimated he required reimbursement of $37,500. To my mind, that was an absurd proposition.
The costs of Mr Winsor’s solicitors fit into a different category. To better understand the evolution of events and the way in which a stalemate was reached it is necessary to examine the events chronologically.
Once the wife’s subpoena was served on Mr Winsor it seemed that Mr Winsor performed a preliminary assessment of the case (or otherwise) of responding to the subpoena which in turn involved his assessment of whether the records sought were stored electronically or manually. Mr Winsor soon concluded that the bulk of the documentation covered by the subpoena was not stored electronically. He appeared to have done an elementary calculation of the likely time to be spent to perform his task of complying with the subpoena. The assessment he reached was 10 days with a commensurate cost, meaning his time lost, equating to $37,500.
Rather than Mr Winsor’s solicitors communicating with Mr Vadarlis by letter, email or telephone to say Mr Winsor would be consumed for 10 days undertaking the task set by the subpoena, instead, Mr Winsor’s solicitors on 29 July 220 prepared Mr Winsor’s notice of objection. That notice is formulaic, mimicking the form prepared the day earlier by Ms Inston’s solicitors. A fair comparison of the notice of objection to the Ms Inston subpoena with the notice of objection to the Mr Winsor subpoena indicates almost complete correspondence. To the extent that Mr Winsor’s solicitors expended time and effort in preparing Mr Winsor’s notice of objection, any such time and expenditure was minimal. The Mr Winsor notice of objection resembled a cut and paste of the Ms Inston notice of objection. I am unwilling to accept that professional costs of $9,859.82 were expended on that activity.
The fact that counsel was briefed to seek those costs is beside the point. Costs of $9,859.82 could not possibly have been sustained. There being no evidence of any other sum properly claimable for costs, I dismiss Mr Winsor’s application for costs. Lest it be said that a component of the sum sought by Mr Winsor for costs can be underpinned by the costs of preparing two Mr Winsor affidavits and the affidavit of Belinda Glare, none address the issue of the cost of $9,859.82 being referrable to preparing Mr Winsor’s notice of objection.
That left the steps associated with what seems to be the true extant issue in the wife’s search for documentation held by Mr Winsor. It seems that the Mr Winsor subpoena is to now be read as a request for Mr Winsor “to produce from his possession, custody or control all documents relating to any monies received, held or now held in trust for the wife or husband or any entity related to them which were applied to the purchase by Ms Inston in her acquisition in 2019 of B Street, D Town.”
According to the authorities surveyed above, I am persuaded that documents evidencing funds received, held or now held in trust by Mr Winsor meet the apparent relevance test and therefore would require production if expressed properly in a subpoena.
However, the Mr Winsor subpoena as it is presently cast is not expressed in those terms. It should be in those or comparable terms. If it is so cast, Mr Winsor should be given an opportunity to respond.
In those circumstances I give leave to the wife to issue a fresh subpoena to Mr Winsor, such subpoena to be issued within 7 days. Otherwise I make the orders set out above.
I certify that the preceding forty-four (44) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Wilson delivered on 24 September 2020.
Associate:
Date: 24 September 2020
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