Waraich and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Citizenship) - [2018] AATA 4524

Waraich and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Citizenship) [2018] AATA 4524 (5 December 2018)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number:2018/0571
Re:Randeep Singh Waraich
APPLICANT

AndMinister for Immigration and Border Protection
RESPONDENT

DECISION
Tribunal:Dr Damien Cremean, Senior Member
Date:5 December 2018
Place:Melbourne

The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and substitutes a decision that the Applicant is entitled to have the revocation of his Australian citizenship reversed.
[sgd]......................................................................
Dr Damien Cremean, Senior Member
Catchwords
CITIZENSHIP– decision to refuse application for citizenship by conferral – good character test – convictions for false and misleading statement – public interest – decision set aside and substituted
Legislation
Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) ss 34(2), 34(6), 34(7), 50
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 234(1)
Cases
Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith [1991] VR 63
McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury [2005] FCAFC 142
REASONS FOR DECISION
Dr Damien Cremean, Senior Member
5 December 2018

Mr Waraich (the Applicant) makes application for review of a decision of the Respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the Minister). The decision was made on 9 January 2018 under s 34(2) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) (the Act) to revoke his Australian citizenship. It was a decision made by the Minister personally.
The Minister refused his application on the basis that the Applicant was convicted of an offence under s 50(1) of the Act and of offences under s 234(1)(c) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Migration Act) and that it would be contrary to the public interest for Mr Waraich to remain an Australian citizen.
RELEVANT LEGISLATION
Relevantly, section 34(2) of the Act provides:
Citizenship by conferral
(2) The Minister may, by writing, revoke a person's Australian citizenship if:
(a) the person is an Australian citizen under Subdivision B of Division 2 (including because of the operation of section 32); and
(b) any of the following apply:
(i) the person has been convicted of an offence against section 50 of this Act, or section 137.1 or 137.2 of the Criminal Code , in relation to the person's application to become an Australian citizen;
(ii) the person has, at any time after making the application to become an Australian citizen, been convicted of a serious offence within the meaning of subsection (5);
(iii) the person obtained the Minister's approval to become an Australian citizen as a result of migration-related fraud within the meaning of subsection (6);
(iv) the person obtained the Minister's approval to become an Australian citizen as a result of third-party fraud within the meaning of subsection (8); and
(c) the Minister is satisfied that it would be contrary to the public interest for the person to remain an Australian citizen.
Section 50 of the Act provides:
False statements or representations
(1) A person commits an offence if:
(a) the person makes, or causes or permits to be made, a representation or statement; and
(b) the person does so knowing that the representation or statement is false or misleading in a material particular; and
(c) the person does so for a purpose of or in relation to this Act.
Penalty: Imprisonment for 12 months.
(2) A person commits an offence if:
(a) the person conceals, or causes or permits to be concealed, a material circumstance; and
(b) the person does so for a purpose of or in relation to this Act.
Penalty: Imprisonment for 12 months.
Section 234(1)(c) of the Migration Act provides:
(1)A person shall not, in connexion with the entry, proposed entry or immigration clearance, of a non-citizen (including that person himself or herself) into Australia or with an application for a visa or a further visa permitting a non-citizen (including that person himself or herself) to remain in Australia:
…
(c) deliver, or cause to be delivered, to an officer or a person exercising powers or performing functions under this Act, or otherwise furnish, or cause to be furnished for official purposes of the Commonwealth, a document containing a statement or information that is false or misleading in a material particular.
BACKGROUND
The Applicant was previously an Australian citizen and a national of India. He now holds an ex-citizen visa enabling him to leave Australia if he wishes, but not to return. He was born in Patiala, in the state of Punjab, India, on 25 September 1977.
He first arrived in Australia as Amardeep Singh on 9 February 1998 on a sub-class 560 student visa. However, on 20 June 2002 he departed Australia as an unlawful non-citizen. The Applicant then arrived back in Australia as Randeep Singh on 26 June 2004 on a sub-class 574 student visa. He had married his wife, Ms Preet Waraich, on 28 February 2004. The marriage was an arranged one. He returned to Australia as a dependent on his wife’s student visa.
On 14 December 2006 the Applicant was granted a sub-class 880 permanent visa and was included in his wife’s skilled migration application as a dependent.
On or about 10 March 2009 he registered a change of name in Australia as Randeep Singh Waraich. On 14 November 2009 the Applicant under that name became an Australian citizen by conferral.
The Applicant lives with his wife and their two young children (aged 10 and 11) in Epping in Victoria. His wife is an Australian citizen. The two children were born in Australia.
The Applicant runs his own business under the name RD TINT which had early beginnings in his garage at home but has continued to grow. The business tints cars, homes and commercial businesses.
HEARING
At the hearing Mr Waraich was represented by Mr N Poynder of Counsel, instructed by Ms J Kenny of FCG Legal. The Applicant and his wife gave affirmed evidence. The Applicant contended that the decision of the Minister under review be set aside.
The T documents were received into evidence, as were the Supplementary T documents and the Further Supplementary T documents. A bundle of documents provided by FCG Legal was also received into evidence.
The Minister was represented by Ms M Jackson of the Australian Government Solicitor, who submitted that the decision under review should be affirmed.
The Applicant in evidence confirmed the contents of his Witness Statement dated 8 June 2018 as true and correct. His wife in evidence confirmed the contents of her Witness Statement, also dated 8 June 2018, as true and correct.
The Applicant called no other witnesses and relied on character references in the T documents. The Minister called no witnesses but cross-examined the Applicant and his wife.
Applicant’s Convictions
The Applicant on 27 November 2013 pleaded guilty in the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria to an offence under s 50(1) of the Act in making a statement in relation to an application for Australian citizenship knowing the statement to be false or misleading in a material particular (Citizenship offence).
On the same date he also pleaded guilty to two offences under s 234(1)(c) of the Migration Act in furnishing or causing to be furnished for official purposes a document containing a statement or information that was false or misleading in a material particular (Migration offences).
The Applicant was fined and ordered to pay a total of $5000.00 plus costs of $277.07. I understand these sums have been paid.
The Applicant says the Citizenship offence arose because he failed to declare he had been previously known as Amardeep Singh and I incorrectly answered that my first Australian visa was granted on 23 March 2004.
The Applicant says that Amardeep Singh was the name he was given at birth but he says it was under this name that he first came to Australia. Subsequently, while working on a farm in South Australia, his student visa was cancelled in the belief he says he was not complying with visa conditions. He was then detained by Immigration officials being held first on remand and later in detention.
Following this, he lodged an application for review of his visa cancellation with the (then) Immigration Review Tribunal which was successful. Later, on 30 December 1999, he lodged an application for a protection visa but this was refused.
After travelling to Western Australia with a previous girlfriend, he decided to return to India, because he learned his mother was unwell. This is subject to some doubt because in his Witness Statement he says I did not declare that I had previously applied for an Australian visa or that I had left the country to avoid being removed or deported. But I have no evidence to say his mother was not unwell in fact at the time. At the airport he stated that he was told by the officer that his bridging visa had expired. He claims he did not know about this. This would mean he was then an unlawful non-citizen.
As to one of the Migration offences the Applicant gives the explanation set out in the previous paragraph. As to the other of the Migration offences the Applicant says I did not declare my previous name or my previous immigration history. This was for fear that the visa would not be granted.
He returned to Australia on 2 October 2004 under the name Randeep Singh Waraich. The name Randeep he adopted after consulting an astrologer in India who advised changing his name from Amardeep to that name for better luck with a name starting with R. He added Waraich as a family name. He later registered the name Randeep Singh Waraich with the Victorian Department of Births Deaths and Marriages in March 2009.
Questions were asked in cross examination about this name change and it was pointed out there was no certificate of change or similar from India in evidence. It was suggested by the Respondent I should disbelieve him because of other claimed falsehoods put to him in other documents.
I consider I should decline to disbelieve him on this point. I have no actual evidence to the contrary. But even if I did disbelieve him, it is not something which impacts on the facts. He has already been convicted of his offences. Nor does it have any impact on the public interest test pursuant to s 34(2)(c) of the Act as I see it.
On 26 June 2004, when his wife was applying for a student visa the Applicant was included as a secondary applicant but it was under the name Randeep Singh Waraich. He did not declare his previous immigration history because [he] was afraid of [his] visa application being refused.
Similar circumstances arose when the Applicant’s wife applied for a sub-class 880 general skilled migration visa on 8 September 2006. Again, the Applicant was a secondary applicant going by the name Randeep Singh Waraich. On this occasion, he admits I did not declare my previous name, or my previous visas, or my previous immigration history in the application. He says this was because I was afraid of the consequences of declaring the correct information, including refusal of visa application.
When he lodged his application for Australian citizenship on 8 May 2009 the Applicant says he declared his change of name from Randeep Singh to Randeep Singh Waraich but did not disclose his previous name of Amardeep Singh, nor did he disclose that he had previously held Australian visas before 2004.
The Applicant was found out after being interviewed by VicRoads when it was discovered that photos on licences for Amardeep Singh and Randeep Singh Waraich appeared to be of the same person, as they were, and the matter was referred to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship where he was interviewed on 24 April 2012 and again on 1 May 2012. He described the day he was confronted by Vic Roads as a big day in my life, by which I took him to mean also a bad day in his life. The Applicant says that he made full admissions at the interview and this is consistent with him acknowledging his wrongdoing by his guilty pleas. He said in evidence I fully accept responsibility for my actions and the resulting conviction [sic] and punishment.
Further, he said I regret my actions that lead to these convictions, and the consequences that my actions have had on my wife and children. He said I wish I could take back my decisions and I am ashamed of my decisions and I sincerely apologise for my actions.
CONSIDERATION
Applicant’s past behaviour
I regard the Applicant’s convictions as being for offences of a most serious kind. They relate to matters which are central to the proper functioning of the migration and citizenship systems. They were characterised by Counsel for the Minister as identity theft or a species of identity theft which she submitted has international consequences.
I have indicated I view the offences very seriously but I consider this tends to overstate their nature in that it is not evident to me that the Applicant stole anyone else’s identity to commit them. It always appeared to have involved him using different names. No other person whose identity was assumed seems to be involved and identity theft is a different matter. But I agree identity theft can have international consequences.
Having said that, I agree that the seriousness of the offences cannot be understated either. It simply cannot be allowed to be the case that persons should enter Australia and then become Australian citizens by false pretences.
The Applicant was fined heavily by the court as a result of his offences and he now feels great shame, particularly amongst the Indian community in Australia.
I accept the Applicant’s various statements of remorse and regret, which I regard as genuine, and I am quite satisfied that the Applicant will not re-offend. This also was the view of the sentencing magistrate.
So much is the Applicant’s remorse and regret so deeply felt, and so much has he been burdened by his own wrongdoing, that, at one stage, I accept, he attempted to take his own life by strangulation as he demonstrated in evidence. This was in 2014 and was witnessed by his wife.
There is, however, no justifying the offences as such and I do not intend to go behind the convictions to provide any excuse for them. Equally I do not intend to go behind them to make them appear worse than they are. The offences, very serious as they are, speak for themselves.
It seems that the Applicant’s history of offending began with his first falsehood in June 2004 in his wife’s visa application and then continued thereafter even with his application for citizenship. At that point he felt he must continue with it, lest he be found out. His Counsel described him as having told one big lie which he was then stuck with. This is supported by remarks of the sentencing magistrate regarding the statement the Applicant made in 2006 which contained falsehoods. The sentencing magistrate said she regarded him as perpetuating the lies that were told in the earlier statement.
It seems that he commenced his false pretences because he was concerned that, because of his history, his wife’s visa application might not succeed. At that time his wife did not know the true state of affairs. So this was a false pretence practised upon his wife as well. He agreed in cross examination that honesty is an important part of marriage relationships. However I am not clear about why this question was put to him on behalf of the Minister or how the answer is relevant to me.
It should be said, however, that by pleading guilty to the offences he thereby saved the court and authorities considerable hearing time and expense. This is I consider reflected in the sentence he was given. The sentencing magistrate made mention of the Applicant’s pleas of guilty and by law a plea of guilty is taken into account by a sentencing court.
There is however no reason why I should not regard the Applicant’s pleas of guilty as also relevant in the exercise of my discretion. No authority was cited to me to show I may not do so and I consider it relevant in the context of remorse shown by the Applicant. Also relevant to the exercise of my discretion is the period of time which elapsed between the Applicant first being interviewed and subsequently convicted.
Lapse of time between interview and conviction
Mrs Waraich in her Statement refers to this delay, in the order of nearly four years. She says Randeep and I experienced a lot of stress and anxiety during this time because of the uncertainty surrounding whether he would be charged and convicted. She calls this period an extremely stressful time. She says that due to this delay [m]y mental health has suffered; she says she in an artist, but the stress from the ongoing uncertainty and my fears for my family’s future has affected my creativity. She adds also that it has affected my ability to care for my children and concentrate on their development ----I feel like my world has fallen apart.
I have no doubt, having heard and seen them give evidence, that over this lengthy period of time both the Applicant and his wife have indeed suffered considerable stress and anxiety and that as a result the household itself, with the children, has been adversely affected.
I note that this delay was the subject of adverse comment by the sentencing magistrate who said I might also add that my decision to have the matters amounting to a fine today have taken into account substantial delay in the prosecution of these proceedings. Her Honour explained I accept the delay, Mr Waraich, is through no fault of yours. You were interviewed and made admissions in 2010, and you have now had the matters finally dealt with in court three years later in November 2013. In the course of that three –year period, I accept that you have genuinely had concern about your own citizenship and what will befall you and your family as a result of these proceedings. Earlier her Honour had said: [t]here is no relevant explanation why you were not charged until 2012, but I do accept that that delay has been substantial and unexplained.
A report from Ms Danielle Atherton, registered psychologist, dated 14 January 2014, refers to the Applicant having scored in the extremely severe category on the anxiety scale and in the severe category on the depression and stress scales. I consider this important.
As regards the children I note there is a report on file from Caitlin Arthur, psychologist, dated 26 March 2014 in relation to the Applicant’s daughter (then aged 7 years) which refers to her anxiety symptoms (including tearfulness and reduced appetite) which had their onset in September 2013, at which time [she] learned that her father’s citizenship may be cancelled and he may be deported to India.
Then, after the stress and anxiety of that period was over, the Applicant was finally taken to court where he was fined quite heavily. In one sense he has already paid dearly for his offending but I do not take the view that this should be the end of the matter. It is proper of the Minister to consider the question of revocation of his citizenship.
The Applicant was of course fortunate that the sentencing magistrate took a lenient view but at the same time it must be said that no other convictions are recorded against the Applicant and I was not told of anything which may be pending. This means that, except for his convictions in this matter, the Applicant has been otherwise law-abiding as would be expected by the Australian community.
I am not satisfied I should qualify this statement any further to reflect matters put to the Applicant in cross-examination based on claimed inaccuracies or errors in documentation going back over years I consider again it was overstatement by Counsel for the Minister to say that every signed application this Applicant has made is tainted by fraud. Fraud has a different denotation or connotation. Specifically, and more accurately, the Applicant has been convicted of four charges involving false and misleading declarations on his student visa, permanent skilled visa and citizenship applications.

I consider this case is marked out in several ways as different to many others which are reviewed by the Tribunal in the migration and citizenship areas where often applicants have long records of convictions including for assault, theft, driving, burglary and drug offences.
It is or may be a fact that by reason of his convictions the Applicant has exposed himself to deportation proceedings if he is not any longer an Australian citizen. It is a possibility at this stage, and it was definitely not ruled out by the Minister’s Counsel. Nonetheless, I specifically do not take this into account in the exercise of my discretion. I do not consider it would be relevant to do so. This is not a deportation case.
I do take into account however, the impact on the household including the children if I affirm the decision under review. It is true as the Minister contends that if the decision is affirmed the family will not be deprived of the Applicant who will then be on an ex-citizen visa as he is now. The family will not suffer financially given that he is the sole provider and the children will not be deprived of the presence of their father.
Counsel for the Minister maintained that this is not the right time to consider the impact on the family. However as the holder of an ex-citizen visa the Applicant will not be able to leave Australia with his family and return. Should the family leave Australia, they will be able to return home, but not him. The Minister submitted that the only detriment this could point to would be a lack of travel rights for the Applicant and that accordingly I should give this consideration minimal weight.
However, it is not out of the question that his family may one day want to go to India to visit friends or relatives or may decide that the children should go to India to explore their cultural origins. He will not be able to go with them and return. I fail to see why this is not something of importance to consider. No authority was cited to me showing why I should not consider it or why I should give it only minimal weight.
Contribution to the community
I consider it proper also to have regard to the Applicant’s history of good works in the Australian community, particularly amongst the Indian population here. There are numerous references on file attesting to the Applicant’s good character and good works. This also was the subject of the sentencing magistrate’s remarks—You are a responsible member of the community. You are involved in appropriate cultural activities. You have undertaken community work.
In light of these remarks, and my own view of the Applicant, the statement by Counsel for the Minister that the Applicant is unequivocally not of good character stands in considerable contrast and in my view founders as unsustainable considering all the evidence.
One reference in particular I mention is the statement recorded in Victorian Hansard for 12 December 2012 by Mr Ondarchie MP for Northern Metropolitan, who rose in the Legislative Council of the Victorian Parliament to acknowledge the great work of Randeep Singh Waraich and his wife Preet in investing in a new showroom for their business, RD Tint, in Epping.
Another I mention is a statement recorded in Commonwealth Hansard for 5 December 2013 by Mr Watts MP for Gelibrand, who rose in the House to acknowledge the excellent work done by Jaswinder Sidhu and the Sikh community in and around my electorate [in running] the breakfast club and the free kitchens –referred to as ‘langars’…in Melbourne’s West. This must be understood in light of the letter on file from Mr Jasvinder Singh dated 5 January 2014 where referring to the Homeless Children and Breakfast Program he writes of the Applicant that Randeep has provided breakfast items in this program on a regular basis. Randeep also discussed a plan to start similar projects in Northern suburbs.
Application of s 34(2)(c) of the Act
Section 34(2) of the Act gives a discretion to the decision maker as to whether or not to revoke a person’s citizenship. This is clear from use of the word may. No authority was cited to me as helpful guidance on the matters I may or may not take into account in the exercise of that discretion.
It is clear that the Applicant does fall within both sections 34(2)(a) and (b) but I am not satisfied that he falls within section 34(2)(c) and I make the finding that his case does not fall within that last provision.
It is true that the Applicant has been convicted of very serious offences but, despite this, a number of factors satisfy me that, in all the circumstances, the Applicant’s Australian citizenship should not be revoked as a matter of discretion.
Such factors include the substantial delay in prosecuting him which has unreasonably tormented him and his wife and their family over a long period of time. I take into account his pleas of guilty before the court. Further I accept that his remorse and regret are genuine and deeply felt. Also though, I take into account the fact that he was heavily fined by the court and that he had no prior convictions. I regard this as meaning that the Applicant has otherwise been a law-abiding member of the Australian community, Moreover, I have no reason to expect that the Applicant will re-offend, which the sentencing magistrate was confident about, and it was not argued in any event that there would be any risk of such.
I consider I could rest my decision at this point but such factors also include the possible impact upon his family of the Applicant’s citizenship standing as revoked and his good works in the Australian community generally.
Contrary to public interest versus in the public interest
Further or alternatively, as regards section 34(2)(c) of the Act, I am not satisfied that it would be contrary to the public interest for the Applicant to remain an Australian citizen. As I have said I make a finding that his case does not fall within that provision. In articulating her submissions on public interest, Counsel for the Minister submitted that it is imperative that the Tribunal not elevate factors into the public interest which are in reality factors relevant to the Applicant, such as the psychological effect of the uncertainty of his residency status and the effect on his family. The Minister submitted that these factors ought to be considered as individual factors which do not weigh into the public interest. Therefore, the Minister submitted, the factors weighing in favour of the public interest in not revoking the Applicant’s citizenship are not strong. Counsel for the Minister cited Director of Prosecutions v Smith [1990] VR 63 in support of this submission, where the Victorian Court of Appeal held that the interest involved is the interest of the public as distinct from the interest of an individual or individuals (at 64).
However, I cannot see that the decision in that case is directly applicable to the present one. I note that the decision, in particular the court’s discussion on public interest, arose in the context of the interpretation of specific provisions under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic). Therefore, it is not clear to me in the context of a citizenship case that there is a defined or established notion of individual versus public interest factors which I should consider. In other words, it was not made clear to me why the remarks in Smith apply in the citizenship area
The Full Federal Court’s judgment in McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury [2005] FCAFC 142 supports a different contention in any event, where Tamberlin J noted that the concept of the public interest is a multi-faceted notion (at 15). Furthermore, the court considered the term public interest more generally at 14:
[8] The reference to “the public interest” appears in an extensive range of legislative provisions upon which tribunals and courts are required to make determinations as to what decision will be in the public interest. This expression is, on the authorities, one that does not have any fixed meaning. It is of the widest import and is generally not defined or described in the legislative framework, nor, generally speaking, can it be defined. It is not desirable that the courts or tribunals, in an attempt to prescribe some generally applicable rule, should give a description of the public interest that confines this expression.
[9] The expression “in the public interest” directs attention to that conclusion or determination which best serves the advancement of the interest or welfare of the public, society or the nation and its content will depend on each particular set of circumstances.
Applying the interpretation in McKinnon, I consider it is not contrary to the public interest for the Applicant to remain an Australian citizen given the significant contributions he has made to Australian society over the years and to the wellbeing of less fortunate members of the community - particularly the Indian community in Australia.
Furthermore, I consider it is not contrary to the public interest for the Applicant to remain an Australian citizen given his investment in Australia and the Australian community by way of establishing a household here with his wife and fathering children here, as well as establishing a successful business. By doing the last, I consider that he has added to revenues which ultimately affect the public good. Taking these considerations into account, I find that as per McKinnon the Applicant has clearly served the advancement of the interest and welfare of the public.
I also note, however, that section 34(2)(c) is expressed in terms of it being contrary to the public interest for a person to remain an Australian citizen. It is not expressed in terms of it being in the public interest for a person no longer to remain an Australian citizen. The difference between these two formulations is significant and critical. Some submissions or remarks of Counsel for the Minister I consider blurred this distinction and did not faithfully observe it.
Nor was it explained to me how deterrence is an aspect of it being contrary to the public interest that an applicant should remain an Australian citizen. No case was cited to me on a role for deterrence under section 34(2)(c) as I would have expected and that could be because of the way it is expressed.
Furthermore, deterrence in this matter was, I consider, achieved at the time of the criminal court sentencing. This matter is not a criminal case. Despite the Minister citing the Court’s comments, it is not evident to me that the sentencing magistrate intended her comments to be referred to in support of a view that the Applicant be deterred further by revocation of his citizenship.
I can of course see that it is important in a general way to maintain the integrity of both the migration and citizenship regimes as aspects of the public interest. But I can only see their integrity being maintained via section 34(2)(c) in a particular case only if in the context of that case it is contrary to the public interest for an offender to remain an Australian citizen.
In that regard it is not enough in my view merely to point to an offender’s convictions as if it was self-evidently so. Section 34(2)(c) is not expressed in a way which allows that. Merely being convicted does not make it self-evidently contrary to the public interest for a person to remain an Australian citizen. There may be very many good reasons why it is in fact in the public interest for a convicted person to remain an Australian citizen.
It is not however a question under section 34(2) (c) of what is in the public interest but only of what is contrary to it. More needs to be shown than merely convictions to show it is contrary to the public interest for a convicted person to remain an Australian citizen and that in my view was not shown by the Minister in this case.
I consider it not contrary to the public interest for the Applicant to remain an Australian citizen by ensuring he is not or may not be singled out in his household or in the community as the only one in his household who is not an Australian citizen by reason of offences committed years ago and for which there were unexplained delays.
I consider it not contrary to the public interest for the Applicant to remain an Australian citizen if he admits he has engaged in wrongdoing, as he has, and has paid the price for it and if also he has no prior or subsequent convictions and no prospect of re-offending.
It was submitted, finally, that I should take special note that the decision under review was made by the Minister personally. Reference was made to some remarks of Justice Downes in this regard. However his remarks do not alter my approach in any way. It remains a question of whether section 34(2)(c) of the Act is satisfied or not. That remains the question even taking special note that it was the Minister’s own personal decision.
CONCLUSION
My analysis leads me inevitably to the conclusion that the decision under review must be set aside. Accordingly, I set aside the decision under review and substitute a decision that the Applicant is entitled to have the revocation of his Australian citizenship reversed.

81. I certify that the preceding 80 (eighty) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the written reasons herein of Dr Damien Cremean, Senior Member

[sgd]......................................................
Associate
Dated 5 December 2018

Date of hearing

Counsel for the Applicant

13 August 2018

Mr N Poynder

Solicitors for the Applicant

Solicitors for the Respondent

Ms J Kelly, FCG Legal Pty Ltd

Ms M Jackson, Australian Government Solicitor