Wang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Wang v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2004] FCA 108

MIGRATION – appeal under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) – questions of law to be stated as pure questions of law – whether discretionary power exercised according to policy without regard to merits – whether failure to take account of relevant considerations - whether irrelevant considerations – whether decision based on the existence of a fact that did not exist – whether evidence to support decision - whether decision illogical or irrational – whether failure to make findings and consider matters raised

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, s 44
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 200

Birdseye v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2003] FCAFC 232, applied

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Saxby Bridge Financial Planning Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 244; (2003) 202 ALR 450, applied

R v Moore; ex parteAustralian Telephone and Phonogram Officers’ Association (1982) 148 CLR 600, referred to

Madafferi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 220; 70 ALD 644; (2002) 118 FCR 326, referred to

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24, applied

Australian Telecommunications Corporation v Lambroglou (1990) 12 AAR 515, followed

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611, applied

Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280, applied

Muralidharan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 62 FCR 402, referred to

Our Town FM Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1987) 16 FCR 465, cited

Bustescu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1713 (1999); 57 ALD 161, distinguished

Ruddock v Vadarlis [2001] FCA 1865 at 11; (2001) 188 ALR 143; (2001) 115 FCR 229, referred to

XIANG DONG WANG v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

V 504 OF 2003

MARSHALL J
20 FEBRUARY 2004
MELBOURNE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 504 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

XIANG DONG WANG
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MARSHALL J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 FEBRUARY 2004

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 504 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

XIANG DONG WANG
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MARSHALL J

DATE:

20 FEBRUARY 2004

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The proceeding before the Court is “an appeal” pursuant to s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the AAT”), in which the AAT affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent to deport the applicant pursuant to s 200 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”).

  2. The…

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Details
Case
[2004] FCA 108
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Wang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, the primary issue before the court was whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) erred in law in affirming the decision to deport the applicant, a Chinese citizen, from Australia. The applicant, who had committed serious criminal offences as a minor, challenged the AAT's decision on several grounds, including that the AAT exercised its discretionary power unreasonably, failed to take relevant considerations into account, and did not properly assess the risks and hardships of deportation. The applicant further contended that the AAT's decision was based on an irrational or illogical assessment of the evidence. The court examined each of these arguments in detail to determine if the AAT had indeed erred in law.

The court found that the AAT did not err in law in several respects. It noted that the AAT had properly considered the applicant's criminal history and the risk he posed to the Australian community, which was a central consideration in the deportation decision. The court held that the AAT's decision was rational and based on the material presented before it. Moreover, the court determined that the AAT did not fail to consider relevant evidence or make findings as required by law. The AAT's assessment of the applicant's risk of re-offending, including the completion of a rehabilitation program, was deemed sufficient and within its jurisdiction. The court also dismissed the argument that the AAT's exercise of power was unreasonable, as the AAT's reasoning was found to be fair and within the bounds of what a reasonable decision-maker could have done.

In light of the above findings, the court concluded that the AAT did not commit any jurisdictional or legal errors in its decision-making process. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed with costs. The court's decision affirmed the AAT's authority to deport the applicant based on the serious nature of the crimes committed and the risk he posed to the community, despite the arguments raised by the applicant regarding the potential hardships of deportation and the AAT's consideration of mitigating factors.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The questions of law raised on the appeal allege that the AAT erred in law by:·exercising a discretionary power in accordance with a rule of policy without regard to the merits of the case;·taking irrelevant considerations into account in the exercise of the power under s 200;·failing to take relevant considerations into account in the exercise of the power under s 200;·exercising power so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power;·reaching a decision based on the existence of a fact and that fact did not exist;·reaching a decision that was irrational or illogical;·failing to consider the case put by the applicant and thereby failing to exercise jurisdiction.Factual background The applicant is a citizen of China. He was born on 29 March 1968 in China and migrated to Australia with his parents and younger sisters on 17 December 1985. He was then 17 years old. Between 8 March 1986 and 19 October 1986 the applicant committed several serious offences in three States. The offences included rapes, sexual intercourse without consent, indecent assault, breaking and entering and stealing. The applicant was sentenced to seven years imprisonment in each of South Australia and New South Wales and three years and four months imprisonment in Victoria. On 16 September 1997, a delegate of the respondent signed a deportation order in respect of the applicant, based on an offence committed by the applicant on 16 September 1986 in New South Wales. The offence was one of sexual intercourse without consent. The applicant appealed to the AAT in respect of the deportation order. On 25 July 2001, the AAT affirmed the decision to deport the applicant. The applicant then applied to the Court. The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the decision of the AAT and remitted the matter to the AAT for reconsideration. On 13 June 2003, the AAT affirmed the deportation decision. The applicant has appealed from that decision.Statutory Context Section 200 of the Act provides:“The Minister may order the deportation of a non-citizen to whom this Division applies.” Section 201 provides, so far as is material:“Where:(a) a person who is a non-citizen has, either before or after the commencement of this section, been convicted in Australia of an offence;(b) when the offence was committed the person was a non-citizen who:(i) had been in Australia as a permanent resident;(A)for a period of less than 10 years; or…(c) the offence is an offence for which the person was sentenced to death or to imprisonment for life or for a period of not less than one year;section 200 applies to the person.” It is not in contest that s 200 applies to the applicant. The 26 September 1986 offence resulted in the imposition of a 6 year sentence of imprisonment. At the time of the conviction the applicant had been resident in Australia for less than ten years. Section 499 permits the respondent to give “written directions” to “a person or body having functions or powers under this Act.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

This ground is without substance and the question should be answered in the negative. One only has to consider the comments of the various sentencing judges, set out in the reasons of the AAT, to examine the nature of the offences. Further, there was evidence of an imprecise risk of recidivism. In those circumstances it defies reality to suggest that there was no evidence that the applicant was a risk to the Australian community.No evidence The sixth alleged question of law was:“Did the Tribunal err in law by reaching a decision that there was no evidence or other material to support?” The decision of the AAT, that was alleged to have been made without evidence or other material to support, was that the applicant’s risk to the community required deportation. This ground misrepresents the conclusion of the AAT. Its conclusion was that the outcome of the balancing exercise supported the affirmation of the decision to deport the applicant. The risk to the Australian community was found, on a rational and proper basis by reference to the material before the AAT, to outweigh other considerations favourable to the applicant. No error of law was committed in the AAT’s approach to the resolution of its task. The sixth alleged question of law is answered in the negative.Irrational/illogical The seventh alleged question of law was:“Did the Tribunal err in law by reaching a decision that was irrational or illogical?” The ground in support merely recasts the question as an answer to the question in the applicant’s favour. No question of law is truly raised on this topic. It is another example of a complaint, in effect, about the AAT’s alleged failure to give proper consideration to evidence before it. For the same reasons identified on the “unreasonableness” question, this question is answered in the negative, assuming that it is a proper question of law. As the Full Court said in Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280, a wrong finding of fact will not demonstrate an error of law.Failure to make findings The only question of law of any substance raised on the appeal is that identified in the final question. That question was:“Did the Tribunal err in law by failing:(i) to consider, and(ii) to make findings about,the case put by the Applicant as required by the [AAT Act] and thereby fail to exercise its jurisdiction?” Counsel for the applicant conceded that if they were unable to establish the second placitum of this ground, the first could not be successfully raised. I consider that the second placitum is not answerable favourably to the applicant and therefore will only deal with that aspect of the question. The grounds in support of this alleged question of law were as follows:· the AAT erred in law by failing to make findings about the risks and hardships that the applicant would or would be likely to suffer if deported to China, and· the AAT erred in failing to make findings about the risks of the applicant re-offending.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MARSHALL J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MARSHALL J

On the assumption that it does raise a question of law, it is without merit because the question of completion or otherwise of the CORE program was treated by the AAT as a central consideration on the issue of the likelihood that the applicant would re-offend on release.Failure to take into account relevant considerations The third question of law allegedly raised by the applicant was:“Did the Tribunal err in law by failing to take relevant considerations into account in the exercise of the power under s 200 of the Act?” The ground in support of that question referred to various considerations said not to have been considered by the AAT. This is not a proper question of law as it “seems to [me] to be intended to call into question whether the Tribunal failed to give proper consideration to the evidence before it”: Saxby at [152]. As pointed out in Birdseye at [11], the existence of a question of law is the subject matter of the appeal itself. At [13], it was emphasised that a question does not become one of law simply because it is framed using expressions such as “whether the Tribunal erred in law”. The framing of a question in that way cannot make it a question of law. Further, even if the AAT failed to take into account “relevant considerations”, it does not lead to the conclusion that jurisdictional error occurred. An administrative tribunal will only err in that way if it fails to take into account a relevant consideration that it was bound to take into account: see Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 40, per Mason J. In any event, most of the matters recited in the ground in support of the alleged question of law were dealt with by the AAT. To the extent that they were not dealt with in the way the applicant desired, the applicant’s complaint is essentially that the AAT failed to give proper consideration to the evidence before it. That involves the examination of a question of fact, not one of law. The third alleged question of law is not a properly framed question of law. On the assumption that it has that quality for the reasons expressed above, its answer is in the negative.Reasonableness The fourth alleged question of law was:“Did the Tribunal err in law by an exercise of power that was so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power?” The ground in support of the question merely re-states the question so as to answer it in the applicant’s favour. The ground does not “indicate in a summary way the reason why that resolution [of a question of law] requires the decision of the AAT to be set aside”: see Australian Telecommunications Corporation v Lambroglou (1990) 12 AAR 515 at 524 per Ryan J, which was cited with approval by Branson and Stone JJ in Birdseye at [13] to [16]. In any event, on a fair reading, it would be unrealistic to describe the reasons of the AAT as unreasonable, in the legal sense. This alleged question of law appears to do no more than take issue with the reasoning of the AAT on questions of fact: see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611 at 626 per Gleeson CJ and McHugh J.