FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Wang v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2004] FCA 108MIGRATION – appeal under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) – questions of law to be stated as pure questions of law – whether discretionary power exercised according to policy without regard to merits – whether failure to take account of relevant considerations - whether irrelevant considerations – whether decision based on the existence of a fact that did not exist – whether evidence to support decision - whether decision illogical or irrational – whether failure to make findings and consider matters raised
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, s 44
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 200Birdseye v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2003] FCAFC 232, applied
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Saxby Bridge Financial Planning Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 244; (2003) 202 ALR 450, applied
R v Moore; ex parteAustralian Telephone and Phonogram Officers’ Association (1982) 148 CLR 600, referred to
Madafferi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 220; 70 ALD 644; (2002) 118 FCR 326, referred to
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24, applied
Australian Telecommunications Corporation v Lambroglou (1990) 12 AAR 515, followed
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611, applied
Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280, applied
Muralidharan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 62 FCR 402, referred to
Our Town FM Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1987) 16 FCR 465, cited
Bustescu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1713 (1999); 57 ALD 161, distinguished
Ruddock v Vadarlis [2001] FCA 1865 at 11; (2001) 188 ALR 143; (2001) 115 FCR 229, referred to
XIANG DONG WANG v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
V 504 OF 2003
MARSHALL J
20 FEBRUARY 2004
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 504 OF 2003
BETWEEN:
XIANG DONG WANG
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
MARSHALL J
DATE OF ORDER:
20 FEBRUARY 2004
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed with costs.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 504 OF 2003
BETWEEN:
XIANG DONG WANG
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
MARSHALL J
DATE:
20 FEBRUARY 2004
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The proceeding before the Court is “an appeal” pursuant to s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the AAT”), in which the AAT affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent to deport the applicant pursuant to s 200 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”).
The…
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- Case
- [2004] FCA 108
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the AAT did not err in law in several respects. It noted that the AAT had properly considered the applicant's criminal history and the risk he posed to the Australian community, which was a central consideration in the deportation decision. The court held that the AAT's decision was rational and based on the material presented before it. Moreover, the court determined that the AAT did not fail to consider relevant evidence or make findings as required by law. The AAT's assessment of the applicant's risk of re-offending, including the completion of a rehabilitation program, was deemed sufficient and within its jurisdiction. The court also dismissed the argument that the AAT's exercise of power was unreasonable, as the AAT's reasoning was found to be fair and within the bounds of what a reasonable decision-maker could have done.
In light of the above findings, the court concluded that the AAT did not commit any jurisdictional or legal errors in its decision-making process. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed with costs. The court's decision affirmed the AAT's authority to deport the applicant based on the serious nature of the crimes committed and the risk he posed to the community, despite the arguments raised by the applicant regarding the potential hardships of deportation and the AAT's consideration of mitigating factors.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: MARSHALL J
On the assumption that it does raise a question of law, it is without merit because the question of completion or otherwise of the CORE program was treated by the AAT as a central consideration on the issue of the likelihood that the applicant would re-offend on release.Failure to take into account relevant considerations The third question of law allegedly raised by the applicant was:“Did the Tribunal err in law by failing to take relevant considerations into account in the exercise of the power under s 200 of the Act?” The ground in support of that question referred to various considerations said not to have been considered by the AAT. This is not a proper question of law as it “seems to [me] to be intended to call into question whether the Tribunal failed to give proper consideration to the evidence before it”: Saxby at [152]. As pointed out in Birdseye at [11], the existence of a question of law is the subject matter of the appeal itself. At [13], it was emphasised that a question does not become one of law simply because it is framed using expressions such as “whether the Tribunal erred in law”. The framing of a question in that way cannot make it a question of law. Further, even if the AAT failed to take into account “relevant considerations”, it does not lead to the conclusion that jurisdictional error occurred. An administrative tribunal will only err in that way if it fails to take into account a relevant consideration that it was bound to take into account: see Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 40, per Mason J. In any event, most of the matters recited in the ground in support of the alleged question of law were dealt with by the AAT. To the extent that they were not dealt with in the way the applicant desired, the applicant’s complaint is essentially that the AAT failed to give proper consideration to the evidence before it. That involves the examination of a question of fact, not one of law. The third alleged question of law is not a properly framed question of law. On the assumption that it has that quality for the reasons expressed above, its answer is in the negative.Reasonableness The fourth alleged question of law was:“Did the Tribunal err in law by an exercise of power that was so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power?” The ground in support of the question merely re-states the question so as to answer it in the applicant’s favour. The ground does not “indicate in a summary way the reason why that resolution [of a question of law] requires the decision of the AAT to be set aside”: see Australian Telecommunications Corporation v Lambroglou (1990) 12 AAR 515 at 524 per Ryan J, which was cited with approval by Branson and Stone JJ in Birdseye at [13] to [16]. In any event, on a fair reading, it would be unrealistic to describe the reasons of the AAT as unreasonable, in the legal sense. This alleged question of law appears to do no more than take issue with the reasoning of the AAT on questions of fact: see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611 at 626 per Gleeson CJ and McHugh J.