FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Wang v Anying Group Pty Ltd (No 3) [2012] FCA 1380
Citation: Wang v Anying Group Pty Ltd (No 3) [2012] FCA 1380 Parties: HUA WEI WANG, XINYING PTY LTD (ACN 118 548 977) and NEW CENTURY 2001 PTY LTD TRADING AS ANYING SYDNEY COMPANY (ACN 114 661 568) v ANYING GROUP PTY LTD (ACN 126 282 657), YANYAN SUN and YUN CHEN; ANYING GROUP PTY LTD (ACN 126 282 657), YANYAN SUN and YUN CHEN v HUA WEI WANG, XINYING PTY LTD (ACN 118 548 977), NEW CENTURY 2001 PTY LTD TRADING AS ANYING SYDNEY COMPANY (ACN 114 661 568), REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS, CHUANG WANG and ANYING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL PTY LIMITED (ACN 105 067 990) File number: NSD 768 of 2008 Judge: FOSTER J Date of judgment: 4 December 2012 Catchwords: PASSING OFF – account of profits – relevant principles discussed and applied – whether, in the circumstances of the present case, all of the profits derived by the first respondent from passing off its business as that of the third applicant should be accounted for or whether an apportionment was necessary – whether legal fees and disbursements incurred by the first respondent in defending the proceedings should be allowed to the first respondent as an expense incurred by it in deriving profits by reason of its wrongful conduct Legislation: Australian Consumer Law, ss 18(1), 29(1)(g), 232
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 51A
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), ss 52, 53(d), 75B
Federal Court Rules 2011, r 22.05 and r 30.21Cases cited: Anying Group Pty Limited v Hua Wei Wang [2012] FCA 702 related
Wang v Anying Group Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 1196 related
Colbeam Palmer Ltd v Stock Affiliates Pty Ltd (1968) 122 CLR 25 applied
Dart Industries v Décor Corporation Pty Ltd (1993) 179 CLR 101 cited
Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 494 cited
Multigroup Distribution Services Pty Ltd v TNT Australia Pty Ltd (2001) 109 FCR 528 citedDate of hearing: 4 December 2012 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 30 Solicitor for the Applicants/First, Second and Third Cross-Respondents: Mr DP Barlow of Colin Biggers & Paisley Solicitor for the Respondents/Cross-Claimants: The Respondents/Cross-Claimants did not appear Solicitor for the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Cross-Respondents: The Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Cross-Respondents did not appear
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 768 of 2008
BETWEEN: HUA WEI WANG
First ApplicantXINYING PTY LTD (ACN 118 548 977)
Second ApplicantNEW CENTURY 2001 PTY LTD TRADING AS ANYING SYDNEY COMPANY (ACN 114 661 568)
Third ApplicantAND: ANYING GROUP PTY LTD (ACN 126 282 657)
First RespondentYANYAN SUN
Second RespondentYUN CHEN
Third Respondentand between: ANYING GROUP PTY LTD (ACN 126 282 657)
First Cross-ClaimantYANYAN SUN
Second Cross-ClaimantYUN CHEN
Third Cross-ClaimantAND: HUA WEI WANG
First Cross-RespondentXINYING PTY LTD (ACN 118 548 977)
Second Cross-RespondentNEW CENTURY…
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- Case
- [2012] FCA 1380
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court examined the principles of accounting for profits in cases of passing off, referencing the leading case of Colbeam Palmer Ltd v Stock Affiliates Pty Ltd. The Court determined that the plaintiff was entitled to an account of only those profits derived by the defendant from the wrongful conduct. The Court rejected the defendant's argument to add back legal fees and disbursements as an expense incurred in deriving profits by reason of its wrongful conduct. The Court concluded that these expenses should not be deducted from the profits derived from the wrongful conduct, as they were not directly related to the profits made from the infringement or passing off. The Court ordered Anying Group Pty Ltd to pay New Century 2001 Pty Ltd $138,000, comprising $125,334 in profits and $12,666 in interest, and also to pay New Century's costs of the proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Pursuant to r 30.21 of the Federal Court Rules 2011, the hearing of the third applicant’s claim against the first respondent for an order for an account of profits and for an order quantifying those profits proceed generally in the absence of the first respondent.
2. Accounts having been ordered and taken of the profits made by the first respondent by carrying on business under or by reference to the name “Anying” and by using in connection with such business the logo and four Chinese characters depicted below:
either alone or in conjunction with the Anying name thereby passing off its business as the business of the third applicant, the first respondent pay to the third applicant $138,000 being the total of the amount of the said profits as determined by the Court after the taking of accounts namely $125,334 and a lump sum in lieu of interest hereby ordered pursuant to s 51A(1)(b) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) in the amount of $12,666.
3. The first respondent pay the third applicant’s costs of and incidental to the third applicant’s claim for an account of profits against the first respondent as described in par 2 above.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Initially, Mr Barlow submitted that New Century was entitled to a lesser sum viz $64,076. This latter figure was arrived at by adding back the total amount of legal fees and disbursements expensed in the Detailed Profit and Loss Statements for the years ended 30 June 2009 and 30 June 2011 and, in respect of the year ended 30 June 2010, adding back the total amount rendered in the memoranda of fees and tax invoices in that year. I informed Mr Barlow that I considered that this approach was not correct since it did not adopt the same source for legal expenses for each year in question and failed to take into account timing differences between legal fees and disbursements expensed in the Detailed Profit and Loss Statements in any given year, on the one hand, and those derived from memoranda of fees and tax invoices, on the other hand. In light of my comments, Mr Barlow then submitted that I should take a consistent approach across all years and use the figures for legal fees and disbursements derived from the Detailed Profit and Loss Statements. As I have noted at [16(d)] above, this revised approach by Mr Barlow justified a profit figure of $125,334. CONSIDERATION The submissions made by Mr Barlow are sound in principle and supported by the evidence. I accept them. There will, therefore, be an award on New Century’s claim for an account of profits against Anying Auburn in the amount of $125,334 plus interest. I propose to award a lump sum for interest pursuant to s 51A(1)(b) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). I think that an amount which broadly equates to interest at the rate of 6.75% pa on $125,334 for one and a half years is appropriate. I have in mind awarding $12,666 by way of interest. I shall now explain my reasons for the orders which I propose to make. The leading case in which the relevant principles were discussed is Colbeam Palmer Ltd v Stock Affiliates Pty Ltd (1968) 122 CLR 25. In that case, the wrongful conduct was the infringement of the first plaintiff’s registered trade mark. Windeyer J explained that the plaintiff in such a case is entitled to an account of only those profits which were derived by the infringer from the infringement of the registered trade mark. In the circumstances of that case, what needed to be shown was the precise amount of profit derived from using the trademark in question in respect of certain painting sets sold by the defendant. The point was that his Honour did not think that all of the profit made from selling the painting sets should be the subject of an account. Rather only that proportion of those profits which was truly referable to the infringing conduct should be brought to account. In the course of dealing with the matter before him, Windeyer J made a number of references to the way in which the core principle might be applied in a passing off case. After discussing the common form of order for an account, at 37–38, his Honour said: It was suggested that the defendant’s profit should be measured by the difference between the amount it received for painting sets bearing the trade mark and the amount it had paid to obtain them. The account taken when a patent has been infringed was suggested as an analogy. But to my mind there is an important distinction. If the infringer of a patent sells an article made wholly in accordance with the invention and thereby obtains more than it cost him to make or acquire it, he is accountable for the difference as profit. That is because he has infringed the patentee’s monopoly right to make, use, exercise and vend the invention. But in the case of a registered trade mark, infringement consists in the unauthorized use of the mark in the course of trade in relation to goods in respect of which it is registered. The profit for which the infringer of a trade mark must account is thus not the profit he made from selling the article itself but, as the ordinary form of order shews, the profit made in selling it under the trade mark. This creates a difficulty in taking the account—a difficulty which also arises sometimes in cases of patents for improvements: see e.g. Goodlet v. Fowler ((1876) 14 S.C.R. (N.S.W.) 496). In passing-off cases an infringer has sometimes been required to account for the whole profits made by his selling of an article under a spurious description. For example in Lever v. Goodwin ((1887) 36 Ch. D. 1) the Court of Appeal upheld the order of Chitty J. to this effect, Cotton L.J. saying that the sale of soap “in a fraudulent dress was a wrongful act” and that “the profit for which the defendants must account is the profit which they have made by the sale of soap in that fraudulent dress”. In a case of that sort, where a man sells goods by a false representation, the profit for which he is accountable may well be the profit which he makes by selling the goods. But there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that in this case the defendant by its use of the plaintiff’s trade mark in fact passed off the painting sets it sold as the goods of the plaintiff. There is no evidence that the name Craftmaster had come to denote for the Australian public the plaintiff’s goods. Indeed it seems that the name was as likely, perhaps more likely, to have meant a kind of article than the products of either the plaintiff or the American company.