FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Walsh v State of Queensland [2019] FCA 871
File number: QUD 204 of 2019 Judge: LOGAN J Date of judgment: 29 May 2019 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – disclaimer of real property under s 133 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) – application for order under s 133(9) for property to vest in the applicants – where trustee in bankruptcy disclaimed onerous real property – where applicants purported to buy the property from the bankrupt after he entered into bankruptcy – where contract had settled and mortgage had been discharged – where bankrupt personally received no funds – whether it is just and equitable for the Court to make a s 133(9) order. Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 58, 133
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Companies Act 1961 (NSW) s 296
Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) ss 28, 29
Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) s 20
Cases cited: Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Fairfield City Council (2016) 18 BPR 36,045
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v State of Queensland [2018] FCA 464
Breskvar v Wall (1971) 126 CLR 376
Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1
National Australia Bank Ltd v State of New South Wales (2009) 182 FCR 52
Re Tulloch Ltd (In Liquidation) (1978) 3 ACLR 808
Date of hearing: 29 May 2019 Registry: Queensland Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 37 Counsel for the Applicants: Ms K A Gothard Solicitor for the Applicants: Statewide Conveyancing Solicitor for the Respondent: Department of Natural Resources, Mines & Energy ORDERS
QUD 204 of 2019 BETWEEN: LOUISE ALEXIS WALSH
First Applicant
RYAN JOHN WALSH
Second Applicant
AND: STATE OF QUEENSLAND
Respondent
JUDGE:
LOGAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
29 MAY 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Pursuant to section 133(9) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), the estate in fee simple in the property located at 8 Macpherson Street, Moranbah in the State of Queensland more properly described as Lot 21 on Survey Plan 167238, Title Reference 50490386, vest in the applicants as joint tenants subject to:
(a)any charges over the property (if any) imposed by statute including but not limited to unpaid land tax, rates and water;
(b)the Suncorp-Metway Ltd Mortgage executed by the applicants on 29 November 2018 (and currently lodged, but under requisition, in the Titles Registry under dealing number 719211410).
2.No order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised From Transcript)LOGAN J:
These proceedings are a sequel to lamentable lapses in good conveyancing practice by certain firms of solicitors in this State. It may also be that they are a sequel to an absence of a requirement, as a condition of admission to practice as a legal practitioner, that applicants have studied satisfactorily the law with respect to bankruptcy. The latter is but an interrogative note flowing from…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 871
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, as well as the precedent set by cases such as Re Tulloch and National Australia Bank Ltd v State of Queensland. The court held that the disclaimer of the property under the Bankruptcy Act did not result in an immediate and indefeasible escheat to the Crown in right of the State. Instead, the court had the power to make an order vesting the title in someone else, pursuant to section 133(9). The court found that it was just and equitable to make such an order in this case, given the circumstances of the sale and the fact that the bankrupt had received no personal funds from the transaction.
The court made an order pursuant to section 133(9) of the Bankruptcy Act, vesting the estate in fee simple in the property in the applicants as joint tenants, subject to any charges over the property imposed by statute and the Suncorp-Metway Ltd Mortgage. No order was made as to costs. The decision of the court in this case provides guidance on the consequences of a disclaimer of property under the Bankruptcy Act and the circumstances in which it may be just and equitable to make an order for the vesting of the property in another party.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Pursuant to section 133(9) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), the estate in fee simple in the property located at 8 Macpherson Street, Moranbah in the State of Queensland more properly described as Lot 21 on Survey Plan 167238, Title Reference 50490386, vest in the applicants as joint tenants subject to:
(a) any charges over the property (if any) imposed by statute including but not limited to unpaid land tax, rates and water;
(b) the Suncorp-Metway Ltd Mortgage executed by the applicants on 29 November 2018 (and currently lodged, but under requisition, in the Titles Registry under dealing number 719211410).
2. No order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
There is a similar regime in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act) to the Bankruptcy Act in respect of the disclaimer of onerous property. That present regime in the Corporations Act has a provenance which may be traced materially to s 296(2) of the Companies Act 1961 (NSW). In relation to that regime, Needham J, in Re Tulloch Ltd (In Liquidation) (1978) 3 ACLR 808 (Re Tulloch), observed at 813 that it was “not easy to give an entirely satisfactory meaning to s 296(2)”. That observation was made against the background of a case where in respect of a company in liquidation, a disclaimer had been made, but there existed a registered mortgage. His Honour further stated at 813:The next question is what remains to the mortgagee … In order to release “the company and the property of the company from liability” it is certainly necessary to hold that the contractual provisions of the mortgage cease to apply … There can remain no personal covenant and, as the Crown would take not as a successor to the company but by operation of law, the various provisions of the mortgage would not apply to it. There being no obligation on the company to comply with the contractual covenants, there could be, it would seem, no default in complying with them which would permit the mortgagee to exercise its powers, eg, of sale. Where however, the default already exists, it would follow, in my opinion, that the right to sell vested in the mortgagee is one of the rights not affected by the disclaimer … Needham J’s view in Re Tulloch has become something of a root authority in both corporate and personal insolvency law in relation to the consequences of a disclaimer insofar as that affects the holder of a registered mortgage. It has been repeatedly applied both in this Court as well as in the State Courts, exercising Federal corporations jurisdiction: see the authorities collected by me in Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v State of Queensland [2018] FCA 464 (ANZ v Queensland) at [8]. In that case, and with particular reference to a view expressed by Rares J in National Australia Bank Ltd v State of New South Wales (2009) 182 FCR 52 (NAB v New South Wales) at [23], I observed at [11] – [12]:11.Absent authority, I should have thought that because the authority for the disclaimer is found in the Bankruptcy Act, whatever effect the disclaimer might have under the doctrine of escheat must necessarily be subject to what is otherwise the operation of the Bankruptcy Act. As it happens, I have the benefit of the consideration by Rares J on that very same point in National Australia Bank Ltd v State of New South Wales (2009) 182 FCR 52 (National Australia Bank v State of New South Wales), where his Honour stated at [23]:23.I think that the better view may be that by force of a disclaimer under the Bankruptcy Act (or Div 7A of Pt 5.6 of the Corporations Act) the title to the fee simple or other property does not escheat absolutely to the Crown in right of the State because the Court can make an order vesting that title in someone else. The Court’s power to make such a vesting order is created by a law of the Commonwealth (s 133(9) of the Bankruptcy Act or s 568F(1) of the Corporations Act). By force of s 109 of the Constitution that law supplants any inconsistent automatic operation of a law of a State to the extent that some form of immediate and indefeasible escheat to the Crown in right of the State would otherwise have occurred. As I have observed, the ordinary incidents of an escheat are not readily seen as conformable with its suggested application to disclaimers. However, it is not necessary to express a final view, since this matter was not argued and I do not need to decide it.12.His Honour’s considered view accords with my initial impression. That view, I note, was also adopted by Bennett J in National Australia Bank Ltd v Victoria [2010] FCA 1230 at [12]. Her Honour’s observation at [15], that the land concerned, “does not escheat absolutely to the Crown”, such as to preclude the court’s ability to make an order vesting the title in someone else, pursuant to s 133(9), is completely congruent with the views expressed by Rares J in National Australia Bank v State of New South Wales.