Walsh and Walsh

Case

[2010] FamCA 152

18 February 2010


FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WALSH & WALSH [2010] FamCA 152
FAMILY LAW - CHILDREN - With whom a child lives - Undefended hearing - Mother failed to participate in these proceedings over several months and there was no appearance by her or on her behalf at the final hearing - Sexual abuse allegations - Mother alleges that the father sexually abused the child - Expert evidence - Single Expert found that the sexual abuse allegations are likely to be false and recommended that the child be removed from the mother’s care as soon as possible - Orders made for the child to live with the father and the father have sole parental responsibility for the child
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286
Rice v Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725
APPLICANT: Ms Walsh
RESPONDENT: Mr Walsh
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Ms O'Rourke,
Legal Aid NSW
FILE NUMBER: NCC 2501 of 2008
DATE DELIVERED: 18 February 2010
PLACE DELIVERED: Newcastle
PLACE HEARD: Newcastle
JUDGMENT OF: Justice Austin
HEARING DATE: 18 February 2010

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Not Applicable
SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Not Applicable
COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Mr Wilkinson
SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Sam Hegney Solicitors
COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Not Applicable
SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Ms O'Rourke, Legal Aid NSW

Orders

  1. With the consent of the Independent Children’s Lawyer, leave is granted to the respondent father to rely upon his affidavit filed on 17 February 2010.

  2. Leave is granted to the father and the Independent Children’s Lawyer to inspect the documents produced on subpoena by the W Early Learning Centre, with no photocopy access permitted.

  3. All former parenting orders are discharged.

  4. The father shall have sole parental responsibility for the child N, born … April 2004 (“the child”).

  5. The child shall live with the father.

  6. Each party is restrained from denigrating the other in the presence or hearing of the child, and from permitting the child to remain in the presence or hearing of another person denigrating the other.

  7. Each party shall notify the other of any medical emergency, illness or injury suffered by the child whilst in their respective care warranting treatment by a third party, and shall authorise any treating health professionals to communicate with the other parent about the condition and treatment of the child.

  8. Each party shall forthwith inform the other, and keep each other informed, in writing of their respective current residential address, landline telephone number, mobile telephone number, and email address.

  9. The father shall authorise the Principal of any school attended by the child to provide to the mother, at her request and expense, copies of school reports, school photographs and other information related to the child’s scholastic progress.

  10. The mother is restrained from causing or allowing the child to be examined for the purposes of assessing whether the child has been sexually abused in the past.

  11. Pursuant to s 65DA(2) and s 62B of the Family Law Act, the particulars of the obligations that these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders and details of who can assist parties adjust to and comply with an order are set out in the Fact Sheet attached hereto and these particulars are included in these orders.

NOTATION

A.The absence of any express order for the child to spend time and/or communicate with the mother is not intended to mean that the child cannot spend time and/or communicate with the mother.  Those are issues for private agreement between the parties and, in the absence of agreement, further judicial determination.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Walsh & Walsh is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT NEWCASTLE

FILE NUMBER: NCC 2501  of 2008

MS WALSH

Applicant

And

MR WALSH

Respondent

And

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER

EX TEMPORE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. Pending before the Court are parenting proceedings concerning the child N, born in April 2004, (“the child”). 

  2. The parties to the proceedings are the biological parents of the child, namely the applicant mother, Ms Walsh, and the respondent father, Mr Walsh.

  3. The mother commenced the proceedings on 30 May 2008 by filing an Application for parenting orders and a Form 4 Notice of Abuse.  The Form 4 Notice of Abuse related to allegations of suspected sexual abuse of the child by the father and those allegations have, ever since, been the pivotal issue in the proceedings.

  4. The mother filed an Amended Application on 3 August 2009, effectively seeking orders to the effect that the Court allocate equal shared parental responsibility in respect of the child, that the child live with the mother, and that the child spend supervised time with the father.

  5. The father filed his Response on 30 October 2008 in which he sought an allocation of equal shared parental responsibility in respect of the child and proposed an order that the child spend equal time in each parent’s household.

  6. The Court subsequently appointed a Chapter 15 expert and that expert, Ms S, furnished a report dated 15 July 2009, pursuant to the procedural orders.

  7. The Chapter 15 expert’s report was comprehensive, but in essence rejected the allegations of sexual abuse made against the father and made strong recommendations about the removal of the child from the mother’s household without undue delay.

  8. The Court made interim parenting orders on 18 August 2009, which largely implemented the recommendations of the Chapter 15 expert. 

  9. Since that time, the mother has demonstrated a waning interest in both the child and these proceedings, and the evidence indicates that she has ceased spending time with the child, although she retains intermittent contact with her.  The matter came to be listed for undefended hearing today as a consequence of the mother’s disengagement from the litigation.

  10. There was no appearance by, or on behalf of, the mother before the Court today.  The applicant mother was previously represented at a directions hearing before the Registrar on 30 September 2009, at which time the proceedings were adjourned for further review before the Registrar on 17 December 2009.  The Court notified the parties of the change of that date for review before the Registrar from 17 December 2009 until 13 January 2010.  There was no appearance by, or on behalf of, the applicant mother at the review before the Registrar on the amended date of 13 January 2010. Not long beforehand, on 14 December 2009, the mother’s solicitor filed a Notice of Ceasing to Act. 

  11. The Court wrote to the applicant mother on 15 January 2010, at her last notified residential address in regional New South Wales, notifying her of the listing of the case before the Court on 28 January 2010.  There was no appearance by, or on behalf of, the mother before the Court on that date either.

  12. I am satisfied that the mother has voluntarily chosen to disengage from the litigation and am consequently satisfied the matter should properly proceed today on an undefended basis.

Proposals and Evidence

  1. Despite the absence from the hearing of the applicant mother, the respondent father still agitates for final parenting orders concerning the child.  The father moves upon his Amended Response filed on 19 January 2010 and reads his affidavits filed on 30 October 2008 and 17 February 2010 in support of his position.

  2. The Independent Children’s Lawyer relies upon the evidence found within the Chapter 15 expert’s report dated 15 July 2009.

  3. Learned Counsel appearing for the respondent father indicated that the orders set out within the father’s Amended Response filed on 19 January 2010 are not the actual parenting orders now proposed by the father.  In lieu thereof the father proposes orders to the following effect:

    a)That sole parental responsibility for the child be allocated to the father;

    b)That the child live with the father; and

    c)That the child spend time and communicate with the mother as agreed between the parents.

  4. The Independent Children’s Lawyer consents to orders of that ilk. 

  5. In addition, the Independent Children’s Lawyer advocates for the making of some ancillary orders making provision for the father to keep the mother appraised of his contact details, that the father keep the mother notified about the child’s physical condition, that the father authorise the child’s school to furnish information to the mother upon her request, that the parties be restrained from denigrating one another in the presence of the child, and that the mother be restrained from causing the child to be examined in relation to any allegations of sexual abuse.  The father offers his consent to those ancillary orders sought by the Independent Children’s Lawyer.

  6. The father was not required for cross-examination by the Independent Children’s Lawyer.  Neither the father, nor the Independent Children’s Lawyer, required the Chapter 15 expert for cross-examination.

Background History

  1. The applicant and respondent met whilst both attending TAFE in 2003.  They began a sexually intimate relationship and commenced cohabitation in or about February 2004.  They lived for the duration of their relationship in regional New South Wales.

  2. By the time the parties commenced their cohabitation the applicant was pregnant with the child.  The child was born in April 2004.  The parties married in September 2004.

  3. The matrimonial life of the parties and the child was uneventful up until the time of the parties’ separation on or about 2 August 2007.  Thereafter, the parties occupied different households within the same town and the parties were able to consensually make arrangements for the time that would be spent by the child in each household.

  4. The child spent much of her time with the father until about April 2008 when he noticed that there was a restriction placed by the mother on the amount of time spent by the child with the father.

  5. On 29 May 2008, the parties and the child attended a circus together.  That was the last time that the child saw the father for a protracted period.

  6. As I have already mentioned, the mother filed an Application for parenting orders to commence proceedings between the parties on 30 May 2008.  Contemporaneously with the filing of her Application, the mother filed a Form 4 Notice of Abuse disclosing the allegations of sexual abuse made against the father and when the father was subsequently served with those documents, the reason for the restriction of the child’s time with him became apparent.

  7. The father asserts that he was devastated when he became aware of the allegations made against him by the mother.  He has steadfastly denied the allegations.  He denies that he has ever sexually molested the child or, for that matter, anyone else.

  8. The Court made interim parenting orders on 10 July 2008, the general tenor of which was that the child would have no interaction with the father unless agreed upon by the parties in writing through their respective solicitors.  The unresolved sexual abuse allegations were the genesis for such orders.

  9. Further interim parenting orders were made on 10 February 2009, the effect of which was that the child would continue living with the mother and would spend time with the father each alternate weekend for a period of two hours supervised by the regional Family Support Children’s Contact Service. The unresolved allegations of sexual abuse were the reasons for the restriction being placed upon the time spent by the child with the father.

  10. Further interim parenting orders were made on 18 August 2009.  Those orders changed the interim parenting regime significantly.  The child was then ordered to live with the father and to spend time with the mother on certain specified dates.  The reason for such a significant change in the parenting regime was the release of the Chapter 15 expert’s report some weeks before, which raised serious doubt about the veracity of the mother’s allegations of sexual abuse against the father, and made recommendations that the child be removed from the mother’s household without delay.

  11. The child has lived with the father since being placed into his care pursuant to the interim orders made on 18 August 2009.  The child has continued to attend the same school in regional New South Wales.

  12. The orders made on 18 August 2009 make provision for the child to spend time with the mother.  The mother has not availed herself of that opportunity, in that the father gives uncontested evidence that the mother only spent two mornings looking after the child before school, and only saw the child on afternoons for a period of about three weeks following the making of those orders. The father also gives uncontested evidence to the effect that the child spent several Saturdays with the mother following the making of those orders but that the mother declined to have the child with her on those occasions for the entirety of the time permitted under the orders.

  13. The mother departed the township on or about 20 November 2009.  At or about that time she said to the father “I am moving.  I will give you all [the child’s] stuff”.  The father replied “Are you leaving [the town]?”  The mother said nothing in reply but just smiled.

  14. Thereafter, the father made unsuccessful attempts to contact the mother by telephone.  About two weeks later the mother telephoned the father and furnished him with a new mobile telephone number.  The father has resorted to that mobile telephone number for the purposes of contacting the mother.  The father does not know where the mother now lives and his only conduit for contact with her is the mobile telephone number she provided to him.  The mother occasionally telephones the father to speak with the child, but that is relatively infrequent.

Summary of Parenting Law

  1. Orders in respect of children are regulated under Part VII of the Family Law Act (“the Act”). The Act defines the meaning of a “parenting order” (s 64B).

  2. When called upon to make a parenting order, the Court is enjoined to bear in mind both the objects of the legislation and the principles which underpin those objects (s 60B) in determining the nature of the parenting orders which ought properly be made (s 65D).

  3. When making parenting orders the Court is mandated to regard the child’s best interests as the paramount consideration (ss 60CA, 65AA). The Act specifies with precision the criteria which the Court must contemplate in arriving at a conclusion as to what is in the best interests of the child (s 60CC).

  4. The Court is required to apply a rebuttable presumption that it is in the best interests of a child for the child’s parents to be allocated equal shared parental responsibility for the child (s 61DA). That parental responsibility pertains to the major long-term issues concerning the child (ss 65DAC, 65DAE), being matters such as education, religion, culture, health, name, and living arrangements (s 4).

  5. However, the presumption does not apply if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a parent has engaged in abuse of the child or family violence (s 61DA(2)), and the presumption may be rebutted if the Court is satisfied that it would not be in the best interests of the child for the parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child (s 61DA(4)).

  6. In the event that an order is made allocating equal shared parental responsibility, either presumptively or otherwise, the Court is then obliged to consider the advisability and practicability of the child spending equal, or alternatively, substantial and significant time with each of the parents (s 65DAA).

  7. If the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility does not apply, or is successfully rebutted, and a different form of parental responsibility order is made, then the Court’s discretion is at large in the determination of the parenting orders warranted, although that discretion must still be exercised within the parameters of the prevailing legislative provisions.

  8. The principles outlined above have been authoritatively examined in Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286.

Evaluation of the Abuse Allegations

  1. As I have already mentioned, the allegations made by the mother against the father of sexual abuse of the child occupied a position of pre-eminence in the litigation.  Those allegations were the subject of consideration by the Chapter 15 expert.

  2. By reference to information provided by the mother to the Chapter 15 expert in consultation, it is clear that comments and behaviour exhibited by the child to the mother and the maternal grandmother between October 2007 and April 2008 caused the mother to suspect the father of having sexually molested the child.

  3. The mother presented herself at the Police Station on 8 April 2008 to report her belief to police that the child was being sexually abused by the father.  The mother told the police at that time that the changes in the child’s behaviour led her to that conclusion.

  4. Following upon the mother’s complaint to police, the matter was referred to the Joint Investigation Response Team (JIRT). That Team instigated an investigation of the allegations, which resulted in JIRT closing its file and taking no further action.  It is common ground that the allegations were not substantiated by the JIRT investigation.

  5. The mother reported to the Chapter 15 expert that she had been informed that the investigation had been closed without action, and the mother told the Chapter 15 expert that she believed she had been referred to as a “jealous ex-wife” by one or more JIRT officers.

  6. The father gives evidence that in June 2008 he was contacted by a JIRT officer who told him words to the effect of “It’s alright, I just wanted to tell you [the child] is okay and speaks very highly of you.  You have nothing to worry about.  I think your wife is only making these accusations to use in the court case”.

  7. In assessing the veracity of the mother’s allegations against the father, the Chapter 15 expert took into account numerous curiosities about the allegations.

  8. Despite making quite heinous allegations against the father of his sexual abuse of the child, the mother incongruently expressed no concern at all about the child being minded by the father whilst the mother participated in consultations with the Chapter 15 expert.  The Chapter 15 expert reports that at no time during her interview with the mother did the mother express any concern or anxiety about the father being left alone with the child.  Rather, at the end of the interview the mother was friendly towards the father and offered to go to her car to get some bottled water for the father.

  9. The expert also had regard for similar prior allegations of sexual abuse made by the mother against a former partner concerning another child, which were apparently baseless and had been fabricated.

  10. The Chapter 15 expert, in the course of preparing her report, perused documents produced on subpoena, which had been furnished to her by the Independent Children’s Lawyer.

  11. Documents produced by the Queensland Department of Child Safety disclosed that in 1993 the mother alleged that her then partner, Mr H, had sexually abused their daughter A who was then aged only six and a half months.  Mr H was charged with a criminal offence and whilst on remand awaiting trial the mother made a detailed statement to a solicitor retracting her allegations, which resulted in the charges against Mr H being dismissed.

  12. The expert raised that issue with the mother.  The mother initially denied that she had made those former allegations against her former partner.  When the expert contradicted the mother with documents verifying the claim, the mother was compelled to admit those circumstances.

  13. When the expert inquired of the mother’s retraction of the claims of sexual abuse against Mr H, the mother again denied that she had done so.  Again, the expert was able to contradict the mother with documents to that effect and the mother was forced to concede that she had in fact retracted the allegations.  She then asserted that she may have been forced to sign the retraction statement, but she could not remember.

  1. The expert states in her report that the documents perused by her indicate that the mother had made a statement to her solicitor withdrawing the sexual abuse allegations against Mr H, and furthermore, that the mother had been adamant that the abuse had not occurred.  In fact, the maternal grandmother and maternal aunt apparently claimed that the mother had admitted to them that she had “fabricated the whole thing”.

  2. The fabrication of those former allegations and the similarity of those allegations to those raised by the mother in these proceedings self-evidently give cause for concern.

  3. The expert also reports upon behaviour which is suggestive of the mother aligning the child with her against the father.  During the course of her consultations with the parties and the child, the expert witnessed the mother entering a room with the father and child.  The child immediately said to the mother “I didn’t speak to him, Mum”, which was noteworthy because that was a lie.  The expert had momentarily before heard the child laughing and talking loudly with her father.  The child then kissed her father forcefully several times on his neck and said to the mother “I kissed him on the cheeks, not the lips”.  The significance of that statement was that one of the allegations of sexual abuse raised by the mother against the father was that he had been kissing the child passionately on the lips.

  4. The expert was moved to conclude that the child was acutely alive to the allegations made by the mother against the father in these proceedings.

  5. The expert also found it noteworthy that there was a clear inconsistency between the behaviour of the child in the presence of the mother, as reported by the mother, and the behaviour of the child at her school. 

  6. The mother reported to the expert that she had had contact with the school counsellor because the school had noticed that after a visit with the father the child was angry and aggressive towards other children.  The mother alleged that when the child had not seen the father for several weeks those aggressive behaviours at school had disappeared. The mother also reported to the expert that after visits with the father the child wet herself three times a day at school, wet the bed at home, and suffered nightmares. 

  7. Those reports by the mother excited the interest of the expert who subsequently had a discussion by telephone with the child’s school principal.  The expert reports that she learned that the child had shown no sexualised behaviours at school. That information dovetails with the evidence adduced by the father in the form of a faxed message dated 1 February 2010 written by the child’s class teacher to the child’s treating paediatrician.  The school teacher informs the paediatrician that the child has demonstrated a vast improvement in her general behaviour in both the classroom and playground, and that she had demonstrated more control with her toileting habits. 

  8. It is submitted, and I accept, that it is more than coincidental that the progress made by the child in that regard has coincided with her living with the father, pursuant to the interim parenting orders made in August 2009.

  9. The mother is developmentally delayed.  She conceded to the expert that she had previously been diagnosed by her own psychologist as “slow borderline”.  The expert reports that formal cognitive testing of the mother by her psychologist in 2002 revealed that the mother functions in the borderline range of developmental delay with a full scale IQ of 77, which places her in the lowest 6% of the population.

  10. Ultimately, the expert was moved to conclude that this was a case involving a mother who “has serious mental health (personality) issues and Developmental Delay and who appears to be making false claims that her child has been sexually abused in order to restrict the father’s contact with the child”.

  11. The expert regarded the mother’s allegations as implausible and regarded the child as having been “coached” to convey the allegations to others.

  12. The expert noted that there was no medical evidence that the child had been sexually abused, nor was there any substantiation of the allegations by the JIRT investigation.  The expert noted that rather than being assured by those negative findings, the mother was angered by them and believed that the JIRT was biased against her.  She noted that the mother took the child to a number of counsellors in relation to the allegations before she was precluded from doing so by court order.

  13. The expert noted that the child had a history of vulval irritations, with both parents treating that condition with the application of paw-paw cream.  The expert considered that that treatment had been excessive, in that it occurred at times even though it was not needed.  The expert accepted that the father continued that treatment in accordance with instructions issued to him by the mother.

  14. On one occasion, the father had exhausted his supply of paw-paw cream and used a substitute cream which stung the child on her vulva.  The expert regarded the father’s allegation about that incident as credible and consistent with the child’s claims.  The expert considered that the mother had woven that incident into her allegations of sexual abuse.

  15. The expert ultimately concluded that the mother’s claims that the child had been sexually abused by the father were likely false. 

  16. It is tolerably plain from the report of the Chapter 15 expert that she does not regard the father as posing any unacceptable risk of abuse of any sort to the child.

Best Interests of the Child

  1. As I have already indicated, the criteria set out within s 60CC of the Act guide the Court’s determination as to what outcome is in the best interests of the child.

  2. It is quite plain that the child has a meaningful relationship with the father.  On the occasions that the Chapter 15 expert had the opportunity to observe the interaction between the child and the father, she saw that the child was “delighted to see her father” and “squealed with excitement when she saw him, then hugged him”.  She also observed the child to say to the father “I love you Daddy.  See you tomorrow” when no such comment was solicited from her.  On another occasion, when the child was informed that the father had arrived at the expert’s rooms, the child ran past the expert into the interview room, ran to the father, jumped onto him and hugged and kissed him.

  3. The child is not yet six years of age however her behaviour of that sort, demonstrated towards the father, clearly indicates that she has a very important relationship with the father.  Orders must necessarily be made which enable that relationship between them to flourish.

  4. As I have indicated, the expert concludes that the father poses no risk of abuse to the child.  Regrettably, the same cannot be said for the mother.  The expert was very concerned about the child remaining in the care of the mother whom she described as “highly emotionally disturbed”.  The expert regarded the mother as continuing to embroil the child in the baseless allegations against the father by encouraging and coaching the child to make such claims.  The expert understandably thought that it was emotionally abusive for the child to remain exposed to that sort of parenting atmosphere.

  5. The child has not expressed any view, on the evidence adduced, about the parenting outcome in this case.  Even if she had done so, she is too young for any serious weight to be reposed in her views.

  6. I am satisfied on the evidence that the father has demonstrated willingness and ability to facilitate and encourage a continuing relationship between the child and the mother.  Although the mother has voluntarily disengaged from the father and the child, the father willingly makes the telephone available to the child whenever the mother chooses to telephone and allows them to speak in private.

  7. The father has suggested to the Court that an order could properly be made that the child continue to spend time and communicate with the mother at times mutually agreed between he and the mother.  That of itself demonstrates a continuing willingness to promote the relationship between the child and the mother.

  8. I conclude that there is likely to be no deleterious effects caused to the child if she is to continue living with the father, as she has done pursuant to the interim orders made in August 2009.

  9. I am satisfied that the father has the capacity to provide for the needs of the child, including her emotional and intellectual needs.

  10. There is nothing about the maturity, sex, lifestyle and background of the father which casts any doubt upon his capacity to continue being the primary carer for the child.

  11. Neither of the parents, or the child, identifies as an indigenous Australian.

  12. The father demonstrates a proper attitude to the child and to the responsibilities of parenthood.  Despite the most heinous allegations having been made about him, he abided by quite a restrictive regime of time spent by the child with him pursuant to interim orders whilst the sexual allegations against him were investigated and considered.  He was happy to accept the role as primary carer of the child pursuant to the orders made in August 2009 consequent upon the publication of the expert’s report.

  13. By comparison, the mother has not demonstrated an appropriate attitude towards the child or her responsibilities of parenthood by disengaging from the father, the child and these proceedings.

  14. There are no allegations of family violence. 

  15. There is no existent family violence order.

  16. Making orders in these proceedings which largely replicate those promulgated by the father and the Independent Children’s Lawyer is the course which is least likely to lead to the institution of further proceedings.

  17. The Chapter 15 expert recommends in these proceedings that the child should not remain in the care of the mother, such are the risks to the child’s wellbeing and development by remaining in the mother’s care.  The expert considered that because of the entrenched nature of the mother’s personality problems, her developmental delay, and her profound lack of insight, the mother was unlikely to have the capacity to change, even with the most intense counselling and therapy.

  18. The expert was satisfied that the father was likely to be able to offer a much more nurturing, responsive, child-focused and stable environment for the child.  Ultimately, the Chapter 15 expert recommended that the child be removed from the mother’s care as soon as possible.  Those recommendations were previously acted upon by the making of the interim parenting orders on 18 August 2009.

Parental Responsibility

  1. For reasons already addressed, the mother no longer seems willing to participate in the exercise of parental responsibility in respect of the child.  The father and the Independent Children’s Lawyer have mutually proposed the allocation of sole parental responsibility for the child to the father.

  2. I accept their joint submissions that the best interests of the child require the allocation of sole parental responsibility for her to the father.

Living Arrangements

  1. Given that equal shared parental responsibility for the child is not allocated to the parties, there is no obligation cast upon the Court to consider the child spending either equal time, or alternatively, substantial and significant in the household of each party. 

  2. I am satisfied that the best interests of the child warrant an order that she live with the father.

  3. Although the father and the Independent Children’s Lawyer mutually advocated an order to the effect that the child spend time and communicate with the mother at times agreed between the parties, I am not satisfied that such an order should be made. 

  4. I will abstain from making any order that the child spend time or communicate with the mother, but it should be understood that the absence of such an order is not intended to indicate that the child should not spend time or communicate with the mother. Rather, the arrangements for the child to spend time and communicate with the mother will be a matter left to consensual arrangements between the parties.  In the event that they are unable to reach agreement about those issues, it will leave the way clear for the mother to petition the Court for further orders in relation to the time that will be spent, and the manner of communication, by the child with the mother without confronting any impediment in the form of the principle established by Rice v Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725 about those issues having already been adjudicated in the context of these proceedings.

  5. For those reasons, I am satisfied that the orders I am about to make properly reflect the best interests of the child.

I certify that the preceding ninety four (94) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Austin.

Associate: 

Date:  18 February 2010

Areas of Law

  • Family Law

Legal Concepts

  • Consent

  • Remedies

  • Procedural Fairness

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