WALLIS & NEVILLE
[2015] FCCA 2954
•5 November 2015
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| WALLIS & NEVILLE | [2015] FCCA 2954 |
| Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – Final parenting arrangements for children aged 7, 5 & 3 – prior to parties’ separation mother was primary carer and father was family’s breadwinner on a fly in/fly out basis – following separation children continued to live with mother – father sought to spend modest amounts of time with the children – arrangements for children to spend time with father wholly ineffective – evidence indicative of the mother being unable to separate from the children and support proper level of relationship with their father – professional supervision and handover also unsuccessful – independent children’s lawyer appointed – at interim stage expert evidence provided that the mother refusal to allow children to spend time with their father emotionally abusive – psychiatric evidence – relevance of electronic correspondence from mother to father – children’s residence changed at interim stage – best interests – meaningful relationship – family violence – degree of insight into responsibilities of parenthood – parental responsibility. |
| Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss.4(1); 4AB; 60B; 60CA; 60CC; 61CA; 61DA; 64B; 65C; 65D, 65DAA 65DAC; 65DAE; 68LA(2) Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s.140 |
| Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 B v B: Family Law Reform Act 1995 (1997) FLC 92-755 MRR v GR (2010) 240 CLR 461 |
| Applicant: | MR WALLIS |
| Respondent: | MS NEVILLE |
| File Number: | BRC 4739 of 2014 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Brown |
| Hearing date: | 25 September 2015 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 25 September 2015 |
| Delivered at: | Adelaide |
| Delivered on: | 5 November 2015 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Tucker |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Pippa Coleman & Associates |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | In person |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Not Applicable |
| Counsel for the Independent Children's Lawyer: | Mr Andrew |
| Solicitors for the Independent Children's Lawyer: | Liz Rayment |
ORDERS
All previous orders be discharged.
The father have sole parental responsibility in relation to the children X born (omitted) 2008, Y born (omitted) 2010 and Z born (omitted) 2011 ("the children").
The father shall, prior to making any decision about any major long term issue pertaining to the children:
(a)Use his best endeavours to advise the mother in writing of the decision intended to be made;
(b)Seek the mother's written response in relation thereto;
(c)Consider, by reference to the best interests of the children, any such response prior to making any such decision; and
(d)Advise the mother in writing as soon as reasonably practicable of his ultimate decision.
The children live with the father.
The mother shall attend at (omitted) Family Contact Centre ("Harmony House") for the purposes of a meeting to discuss any matters considered relevant by the staff of Harmony House.
The parties shall adhere to the rules of Harmony House at all times.
The parties shall speak respectfully to and of staff at Harmony House.
The children shall spend time with the mother at Harmony House:
(a)On commencement, consistently for 2 hours each week as can be accommodated by Harmony House;
(b)After 8 weekly consistent visits, supervised time to be up to 10 hours per month, available in blocks greater than 2 hours as can be accommodated by Harmony House;
(c)On dates as close as possible to the events listed below as can be accommodated by Harmony House:
(i)The birthdays of the children;
(ii)The mother's birthday;
(iii)Mother's Day;
(iv)Easter Sunday; and
(v)Christmas Day.
The mother shall pay the costs of the supervision at Harmony House.
Mother's Treatment
The mother shall continue to attend upon Dr F her psychiatrist, or any other psychiatrist of her choice, for treatment and medication as he deems necessary.
The mother shall follow any and all directions made by her psychiatrist.
The mother shall inform the father within 24 hours of a change of her psychiatrist's details and provide to him the name, contact address and telephone number of her new treating psychiatrist.
The mother shall pay the costs of her treating psychiatrist.
Progress of Time
After the expiration of 9 months of consistent supervised time between the children and their mother, the following shall occur:
(a)The parties shall attend upon Ms J at the first available appointment for provision of an updated family report to include any matters that Ms J considers relevant to the best interests of the children, and a recommendation about the progress or otherwise of time between the children and their mother;
(b)This order authorises Harmony House and Dr F (or other treating psychiatrist) to release their notes to Ms J by either party requesting in writing for them to do so, with the cost of provision of that information to be borne by the mother;
(c)The parties are to share equally the cost of the report by Ms J
Upon provision of the report from Ms J indicating that it is in the children's best interests for the children's time with their mother to progress, or otherwise, the parties shall attend upon a mediator as agreed, and if they cannot agree, then (omitted) Community, and if no agreement can be reached as to the children's time with their mother, then either party is at liberty to make an application to this Honourable Court.
Restraint
The mother shall not approach within 500m of the home occupied by the father without the agreement in writing of the father.
The mother shall not approach within 500m of the paternal grandparents home without the agreement in writing of the father;
The father shall 'not approach within 500m of the home occupied by the mother without the agreement in writing of the mother.
The mother shall not approach within 500m of the children's school/ day care/ extracurricular activities.
Each party shall speak respectfully of the other in the presence or hearing of the children.
Neither party shall publish identifying details and/ or photographs of the children on any internet site.
Exchangeof Information
The mother and father shall keep each other informed at all times of the residential address and mobile phone contact number but they are restrained from informing any other person of those details.
The father shall keep the mother informed of the names and addresses of any treating medical practitioners who treat the children and authorise those practitioners to provide either parent with information that they are lawfully able to provide at the requesting parent's cost.
The father shall inform the mother as soon as reasonably practicable of any medical condition, significant health issue or illness suffered by the children. This Order authorises any treating medical practitioner to release the children's medical information to either parent, at the requesting parent's cost.
Communication
During the time the children are with either parent, communication shall be as follows:
(a)In case of emergencies concerning parenting matters the parties shall communicate by telephone;
(b)All communication that a reasonable person would not regard as urgent is to be by email only;
(c)Communication that a reasonable person would not regard as urgent but not an emergency shall be by way of text message with either party using their best endeavours to respond as quickly as reasonably practicable; and
(d)Both parties shall be reasonable and polite in all communication exchanges.
Authority to School
This Order authorises the schools that that the children attend from time to time to provide to each parent the same information about the children's educational progress and other school related activities and supply them with copies of school reports, photographs, certificates and awards obtained by the children, at the requesting parent's cost.
Respect for Other Party and Non-Denigration
During the time the children are with either parent, that parent shall
(a)Respect the privacy of the other parent and not question the children about the personal life of the other parent;
(b)Speak of the other party respectfully and positively;
(c)Not denigrate or insult the other parent in the presence or hearing of the children and use their best endeavours to ensure that others do not denigrate or insult the other parent in the hearing or presence of the children;
(d)Not use the children to communicate between the parties and use their best efforts to ensure others do not; and
(e)Not discuss adult issue with the children including but not limited to these court proceedings and will refrain from involving the children in any parental conflict and use their best efforts to ensure others do not involve the children in any such discussions.
Provision to Third Parties
The father have leave to provide a copy of these Orders to any school staff and/ or school authority and/ or State Welfare authority, State or Commonwealth government department, and any child's health care practitioners.
The father has leave to release a copy of this Order and the Reasons for Judgment to the mother's treating psychiatrist.
The proceedings be otherwise dismissed and the order for the appointment of the Independent Children’s Lawyer be discharged.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Wallis & Neville is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
BRC 4739 of 2014
| MR WALLIS |
Applicant
And
| MS NEVILLE |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This is a sad and perplexing case. It concerns final parenting arrangements for three children – X born (omitted) 2008; Y born (omitted) 2010; and Z born (omitted) 2011.
X, Y and Z’s parents are Mr Wallis (“the father”) and Ms Neville (“the mother”). They are in bitter dispute regarding what is the best parenting outcome for the children and have been since they separated, in difficult circumstances, on 28 April 2014.
At present, the children live with their father and spend no time whatsoever with their mother. At this stage, it is Mr Wallis’ position that this living arrangement should continue and, in order to secure the emotional protection of the children, they should only spend professionally supervised time with their mother.
From the mother’s perspective, this would be an appalling outcome, which is inimical to the children’s best interests. She has expressed what appears to be her visceral response to the father’s position in her self-prepared affidavit as follows:
“Best person to look after MY (sic) children is me, and I was sole care[r] for fi[r]st 7 years of X’s life. Y, 5 years and Z, 3 years. This is criminal!!!”[1]
[1] See mother’s affidavit filed 14 September 2014 at page 11
In my view, this powerful statement represents the mother’s inchoate plea for help, made to the court, in order to right what she believes is the great wrong, which has been done to her and the children. It underlines the essential difficulty and sadness of this case.
Ms Neville denies that she constitutes any threat to the emotional wellbeing of the children. To the contrary, it is her position that it is the father who is intent on alienating the children from her and it is he who is oppressing and coercing her, rather than vice versa, through the oppressive legal proceedings, which he has commenced against her.
She presented herself as a reasonable but put upon person, who, notwithstanding the injustice done to her, is nonetheless prepared to share the care of the children, with the father and work with him to ensure their best interests are served.
Given this dichotomy between the parties, it is to be expected that the circumstances in which the children came into their father’s care would be highly controversial. This occurred on 27 November 2014, as a consequence of an order of Judge Spelleken.
At that stage, her Honour was satisfied that the children had spent negligible periods of time with their father, since the parties’ separation around six months earlier, notwithstanding a series of orders which the court had made requiring the mother to make the children available to their father.
Judge Spelleken was satisfied that this state of affairs was attributable solely to the mother’s implacable opposition to the father having any kind of appropriate or loving level of relationship with the three children concerned.
At that stage, Judge Spelleken was not satisfied that Ms Neville would abide by any of the court’s orders, at least in the short to medium term, in respect of parenting arrangements, but rather was intent on sabotaging or undermining the children’s relationship with their father, through whatever mechanisms were at her disposal, in order to satisfy her own deep-seated emotional needs and assuage her feelings of distress, at the end of the parties’ marriage.
Judge Spelleken’s order was informed by two family reports prepared by the court’s appointed expert, Ms J, a consultant social worker and very experienced family consultant.[2]
[2] Family reports dated 17 August 2014 & 6 November 2014.
In November 2014, Ms J indicated, following her observations of the mother with children and as a consequence of her understanding that there had been a continuing failure of the father to spend any time with the children, that she (Ms J) had:
“… little faith that Ms Neville can execute court orders for the children to spend time with their father. She has been unable to stay away from the school when he was supposed to be collecting X. Her text messages appear to indicate relentless rumination upon feelings about Mr Wallis rejection and abandonment of the children and her.”[3]
[3] See family report dated 6 November 2014 at para.80.
In these circumstances, Ms J recommended that the court place the children in their father’s care forthwith. Ms J made this recommendation with “trepidation” recognising that its implementation would likely have severe consequences for Ms Neville’s mental health, which she considered had already been severely compromised by the parties’ separation and Ms Neville’s perception that the emotional framework of her life had been abruptly kicked away.
Ms J hoped that this placement could be a temporary one of around six months, which would allow Ms Neville to move on and adjust to her changed circumstances, possibly with some professional assistance. Ms J’s optimistic expectation was that this severe intervention would enable Ms Neville to refocus and adjust so that she and Mr Wallis could have a more normal and child-focused post-separation parenting relationship, in future, in which both the father and mother were involved.
At the time, Ms J recognised that her proposal contained great risks for all concerned, particularly the children, given that it was incontrovertibly the case that hitherto Ms Neville had been the children’s primary carer, whilst Mr Wallis had been the family’s breadwinner, working long hours, away from home, as a fly-in fly-out (occupation omitted), on the (omitted) project in Western Australia.
As such, Ms J conceded that a transition, for the children into the care of the father, would inevitably involve a significant emotional trauma for the children, particularly X and Y, who obviously loved their mother and were at a vulnerable age, so far as such a major change of circumstances was concerned.
However, counterpointing these concerns, was Ms J’s view that if the court did not take such an extreme action, given Ms Neville’s extraordinary behaviour, up to that point, it would otherwise seem to be:
“…inevitable that the children will not be able to have their father in their lives – which itself is developmentally unhealthy for them.”[4]
[4] Ibid at para.85.
Underpinning this view was Ms J’s assessment that, notwithstanding his separation from them, the father shared a “natural and easy” relationship with the children. During her first observation of the children with their father, in early August 2014, Ms J was of the view that the children enjoyed their relationship with their father and the parental attachment between father and children remained intact.
I was not present at court on 27 November 2014 and so did not observe the reactions of the parties concerned to Judge Spelleken’s order. I accept however Ms Neville’s evidence, provided to me at trial, that she was shocked and rendered emotionally numb by what happened, which she did not anticipate nor comprehend as being a remotely possible outcome of the proceedings. Whether her subjective reaction to the outcome can be considered objectively realistic is one of the central issues in the case.
From Ms Neville’s perspective, she has always been an exemplary parent, who has sacrificed much for her children, whom she loves beyond anyone or anything. Ms Neville proudly identifies as a “stay at home mum”. I accept that for her any home without her children living in it will be an incomplete one.
In these circumstances, I also accept that it was likely to be viscerally incomprehensible, for Ms Neville, that the court would take the extreme step of removing young children from such a loving and devoted mother. However, it is the father’s position that the mother was on notice that such an outcome was a possibility, particularly given Ms J’s recommendations and he took the steps, which he did to secure it, only as a last resort.
Having provided this brief summary, it is obvious that this case is one heavy with emotion, which emotion has driven what has occurred in it, both before and since the orders of 27 November 2014, with at times unpredictable consequences.
The essential conundrum in the case being why Ms Neville, an intelligent and otherwise pleasant person, who obviously loves her children, acts in ways which, to any independent, dispassionate and objective observer, seem calculated to be against her own interests and which will inevitably make her situation, vis-à-vis the children, worse.
Mr Wallis’ position in the case has remained consistent. He aspires to an outcome which will see the children, whom I accept he also loves devotedly, having a significant but safe level of relationship with their mother. However, at the same time, he is not willing to stand passively by and watch the children lose their relationship with him or be emotionally harmed by their mother’s bitterly informed view of him, as an evil home-wrecking person.
Regrettably, from the father’s perspective, the extreme orders of 27 November 2014 did not serve as a “wake-up call” for Ms Neville. It is his case that, in spite of concessions made on his part and protestations made by Ms Neville that she has changed her attitudes, the mother remains incapable of resisting the call of her emotions.
This lack of emotional regulation on Ms Neville’s part, on the father’s case, will inevitably result in her being unable to resist the impulse to undermine his relationship with the children through whatever means are available to her, both subtle and obvious.
After a moratorium, between late November 2014 and mid-December 2014, the mother began to spend time with the children, which was initially supervised. She was also formally restrained from approaching the father’s home; the home of the paternal grandparents; and the children’s school.
Thereafter, on 23 February 2015, it was ordered that the children would spend weekly periods of time, with their mother, from Thursday to Saturday, with the children being exchanged at a neutral location, such as their school or Harmony House, a children’s contact service on the (omitted).
The case returned to court on 6 May 2015, as a consequence of contravention applications filed by the father. At this time, it was his position that the mother continued, both actively and passively, to undermine the orders of February 2015 and seemed to remain stuck in her attitude towards him and so incapable of following the orders of the court.
The father alleged that the mother kept coming to X and Y’s classrooms at (omitted) State School; failed to utilise Harmony House as a handover point, as ordered; did not return the children to his care as scheduled, but over held them; and kept bombarding him with inappropriate text messages and emails. From his perspective, this behaviour was intolerable and indicated that the mother had no wish to have a normal parenting relationship with him.
On 6 May 2015 Judge Spelleken suspended the order for the mother to spend time with the children and, in lieu thereof, ordered that she have supervised time with the children at Harmony House for two hours per week.
Regrettably, it is the view of staff at Harmony House that the mother has not behaved appropriately, whilst engaging with the children there. In particular, it is alleged that Ms Neville has been aggressive toward staff and has whispered things to the children, which are likely to create false expectations for them, particularly that they will soon be coming home to her.
In these circumstances, Harmony House has suspended the family from using its services, effective from 2 July 2015. Accordingly, Ms Neville has had no direct interaction with the children for a period in excess of two months.
I accept that this must be heartbreakingly difficult for her. It is also my perception that she regards this outcome as being a grave injustice, which is largely the fault of Mr Wallis for instituting proceedings in the first place, after ending the marriage between the parties.
The mother has acted on her own behalf in these final hearing proceedings. I acknowledge that this was a daunting and difficult task for her, particularly given the emotional moment of the case for her. In support of her case, she has recently prepared a length affidavit.[5]
[5] See mother’s affidavit filed 14 September 2015.
In this affidavit, Ms Neville acknowledges that her conduct, in respect of the father engaging with the children, was initially inappropriate, following separation. However, it is her case that what she characterises as her “over protection” of the children was a consequence of the father’s violent and controlling behaviour towards her. She asserts that it is Mr Wallis, who is intent on alienating the children from their mother, in the long term, rather than vice-versa.
It is her case that this contention is demonstrably true because it is Mr Wallis, who has prevented and stopped all contact between “the beautiful children and [their] loving mother”. Ms Neville contends that this is evidence of “parental alienation syndrome”, which the father has plotted, with his legal advisers, to achieve against her.
In her affidavit and indeed her other oral evidence, the mother attempted to portray herself as a reasonable person, who only wanted to share the care of the children with the father. In this context, she has prepared a raft of orders to facilitate the exchange of the children between their parents and ensure essential decisions about X, Y and Z are consensually made.
Accordingly, it is the mother’s position that she has not been the sole contributor to the current dysfunctional parental relationship between the parties but has been the victim of that relationship. She proposes what she characterises as a rational solution to the problems arising in the parties’ relationship and professes that she has overcome her previous emotional difficulties. In the mother’s own words, she is currently “where [she] needs to be” whereas, on the other hand, the father remains angry and non-communicative with her.
In this context, Ms Neville proposes that the parties should have equal shared parental responsibility for X, Y and Z and the children should live in close to an equal time regime, living with their father on the Sunday, Monday and Tuesday of each week and with her on each Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and Sunday.
It is further the mother’s position that this arrangement should continue during school holidays and a roster established, through court order, which divides special occasions, such as Christmas, Easter and birthdays equally between the parties.
In support of her position, Ms Neville describes herself as the “best person” to look after her children, as she has been their sole carer for the entirety of their respective lives. She describes the current situation as “criminal” and a “gross injustice”. Notwithstanding her criticisms of both the father and those representing him, Ms Neville asserts as follows:
“I do not want all out war. I just want my children back please, our children be shared and cared, loved by both the mother and father.”[6]
[6] See mother’s affidavit filed 14 September 2015 at p.7.
Notwithstanding the mother’s assertion that it is the father, who needs psychiatric support rather than she, because of his apparent unwillingness to co-parent, Ms Neville has been referred, by her GP, for psychiatric support.
Ms Neville’s treating psychiatrist is Dr F. Dr F has provided a medical report for the case. In subsequent oral evidence provided to the court, Dr F has indicated a willingness to provide ongoing psychiatric treatment for Ms Neville. He has also indicated a willingness to waive his normal fee and treat Ms Neville through Medicare.
The mother and the father are not the only parties to the proceedings. As a consequence of the intractability of the dispute between the parents and the vulnerability of the children to it, on 27 November 2014, Judge Spelleken ordered that X, Y and Z be represented in these proceedings independently of their parents.
The children’s legal representative is Liz Rayment. She has briefed a barrister, Mr Andrew to appear on her behalf, at the final hearing. Pursuant to the provisions of the Family Law Act 1975, both Ms Rayment and Mr Andrew are required to consider all the evidence available to them and advocate the position to the court, which they consider will best serve X, Y and Z’s overall interests.[7]
[7] See Family Law Act 1975 at s.68LA.
In my view, Ms Rayment and Mr Andrew have discharged their statutory responsibilities diligently. At the conclusion of the proceedings, Mr Andrew provided me with detailed submissions and a comprehensive minute of the orders, which he considered to be the ones best calculated to regulate the parenting arrangements for the children concerned, in what he characterised as troubling and difficult circumstances.
It is Mr Andrew’s submission that the evidence available to him (and so to the court) clearly indicates that the mother’s behaviour and attitude continues to constitute a grave threat to the emotional welfare of the children. He goes as far as characterising it as constituting both “abuse” and “family violence”, in the sense that it has been coercive and controlling, so far as Mr Wallis is concerned.
Mr Andrew contends that the only person who can rectify the current unfortunate situation is the mother herself. Whether she is capable of doing so depends on what insight she has been able to draw from her current predicament, particularly whether she is able to reach the realisation that her pattern of behaviour, to date, has been helpful neither to herself nor to the children and therefore needs to change.
Because of he what he would characterise as the emotionally abusive conduct of the mother, Mr Andrew contends that the mother’s behaviour has constituted and has the potential to remain in future a grave threat to the well-being of these children. In these circumstances, Mr Andrew submits that it would represent an unacceptable risk, for the court to take, so far as the children’s welfare is concerned, if they spend any unsupervised time with their mother at present.
It is also Mr Andrew’s position that is it is patently impracticable for the parties to exercise parental responsibility for X, Y and Z jointly or to have an equal or significant and substantial time regime, given their obvious inability to communicate effectively with one another and the extreme level of mistrust between them. Accordingly, Mr Andrew is in no way supportive of the mother’s position in this case.
However, in my view to his credit, Mr Andrew recognises the great moment of these proceedings, not only for Ms Neville but also for X, Y and Z. Unless the mother changes her mode of behaviour, it is his submission that the court has no realistic alternative other than to sever the relationship between mother and children, which hitherto has been a valuable and loving one for each of the children and indeed for Ms Neville herself. Mr Andrew does not question the mother’s love for the children in any way.
In this context, from Mr Andrew’s point of view, the essential question is whether the mother should be given a further opportunity to see if she can change her behaviour and, as a corollary of such an opportunity, whether the evidence indicates that she is capable of utilising it effectively.
To some extent, this latter issue is a psychiatric one, depending on whether the mother can learn, with the assistance of therapy, to control her emotional response to her difficult situation, through the application of her cognitive reason.
In order to examine this issue and in response to a recommendation of Ms J, arrangements were made for Ms Neville to be forensically examined by a consultant psychiatrist, Dr D. In addition, the independent children’s lawyer subpoenaed Dr F to give evidence before the court.
At this stage, it is Mr Andrew’s submission that it would be premature to cut off all contact between the mother and the children. However, from his perspective, the only realistic option is for further professionally supervised time to be implemented. Harmony House has indicated that it is prepared to reconsider its position, so far as the family is concerned, provided Ms Neville abides by its rules and speaks respectfully to its staff.
Mr Andrew is also mindful that it may constitute an unreasonable burden, on both the children and Harmony House, if an open-ended order is made for supervised time. Invariably, such orders are a temporary or stop-gap response to a parenting problem and rarely represent a permanent solution to it.
As such, Mr Andrew considers that there should be a review of the case, in about nine months’ time, to see if any progress has been made, particular so far as the mother’s behaviour is concerned. Ms J shares these concerns and has indicated a willingness to undertake the review concerned. During this period, Mr Andrew envisages the mother continuing to seek psychiatric treatment from Dr F.
Dr F is guardedly optimistic that he can help Ms Neville, but he is currently unable to indicate how long what he characterises as a process of “insight psycho-therapy” will take to bear fruit, if indeed it will at all. In Dr F’s own words, it is not a case of “a switch being flicked”, so far as Ms Neville is concerned. Rather, her psychiatric health and her emotional response to her current situation remain a “work in progress”.
The father adopts the submissions of the independent children’s lawyer. Mr Wallis remains perplexed at what he categorises as the mother’s unhealthy and obsessive attitude towards him. He contends that she is unable to draw appropriate boundaries between her emotional needs and those of the children.
It would be the father’s preference, if at all possible, that the children spend regular periods of time with their mother, provided that they can be emotionally safe and he himself is not subjected to bombardment by the mother of constant emails, which he finds both threatening and distressing.
These proceedings are directed to resolve this complex case. In resolving the case, the court’s focus must remain on the best interests of X, Y and Z which remain the paramount or most important consideration.[8]
[8] See Family Law Act 1975 at s.61CA.
The witnesses and material before the court
The following witnesses gave evidence before the Court:
·Ms N, she is a team leader at Harmony House. It is the policy of Harmony House that its workers do not formally identify themselves. Ms N provided the business records of Harmony House in respect of its supervision of handovers between the parties both prior to the children’s change of residence and in respect of the supervision of the mother’s time with the children in the period since the change of residence.[9]
·Dr F. He provided evidence regarding the mother’s referral to him and his view of the mother’s mental health. In particular, he provided evidence regarding the treatment he would be able to provide the mother.
·The father. He relied on four affidavits deposed by himself.[10] Attached to Mr Wallis’ most recent affidavit were copies of text messages and email sent by the mother to him, his solicitor, the independent children’s lawyer and the court by Ms Neville. The documents concerned occupy some 563 pages. He was cross-examined by Ms Neville and Mr Andrew. Mr Wallis also provided a card containing correspondence and some photographs, which had been delivered to X at her school, in the days prior to the final hearing. These documents assumed some importance as the case unfolded, particularly regarding the mother’s current level of insight.[11]
·Ms K. She is Mr Wallis’s sister. She normally lives in suburban Adelaide. She gave evidence regarding the parties’ parenting relationship in the period following separation, particularly what occurred, from her perspective, when the children came into the father’s care.[12] She also gave evidence in respect of her knowledge of a website entitled “gofundme”. This is a website were individuals seek crowd funding particularly for legal proceedings.
·Ms T, who is also a sister of the father. She too provided evidence in respect of the “gofundme” website, on which a photograph of the mother and the children concerned appeared, as well as other information relating to their situation.[13] Again this evidence is relevant to the mother’s insight.
·The mother. She relied on all of the affidavit evidence filed on her behalf to date.[14] Some of this was professionally prepared but her most recent affidavit was prepared by Ms Neville herself. Attached to this last affidavit were a number of testimonials as to Ms Neville’s character and her qualities as a mother. These were not on oath. As such, objection was taken to them. Ms Neville also wished some of these persons to sit in court with her as support persons. I determined to admit the testimonials but indicated that I would give them little weight, as Ms Neville’s good character was not in issue. Neither Mr Andrew nor Mr Tucker wished to cross-examine the makers of the testimonials. Accordingly the persons concerned sat in court to support Ms Neville.
·Dr D. He gave evidence of his opinion of the mother’s psychiatric condition, following his forensic examination of her in February 2015. Neither Mr Andrew nor Mr Tucker wished to cross-examine Dr D. This left Ms Neville somewhat nonplussed. In these circumstances, I asked Dr D a number of questions to give Ms Neville some context in which to ask the questions which she wished.
·Ms J. She was cross-examined by each of the parties concerned. She had re-visited the family in January of 2015 and written a third family report following the placement of the children in their father’s care.[15] She was asked to read the records of Harmony House and the correspondence which had passed between the parties, including the recent card delivered to X.
·In addition, I was provided with a number of other documents. The most significant of which came for the (omitted) State School and detailed X’s school attendance, whilst in the mother’s care. I was also provided with correspondence passing between the parties in respect of dental issues relating to Z and Y and some medical records in respect of X, which related to the mother electing not to return her to her father’s care in mid-April of 2015.
[9] See exhibit A.
[10] See father’s affidavits filed 20 February 2015; 27 April 2015; 30 April 2015; and 11 September 2015.
[11] See exhibit B.
[12] See affidavit of Ms K filed 11 September 2015.
[13] See affidavit of Ms T filed 11 September 2015.
[14] See mother’s affidavits filed 28 July 2014; 19 November 2014; 27 November 2014; and 14 September 2015.
[15] See family report dated 26 January 2015
The Evidence
In these reasons for judgement, findings of fact are made on the balance of probabilities, from my observation of the demeanour of each of the witnesses concerned.[16] I have tried to reach my conclusions on credibility and reliability on the basis of contemporary materials, objectively established facts and importantly, on the apparent logic of events.[17]
[16] See Evidence Act1995 (Cth) at section 140
[17] See Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at 129 [31] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ
In my assessment, the father was a far more reliable and credible witness than the mother. He presented as perplexed by the mother’s attitude toward him and bemused as to why she seemed incapable of behaving rationally (as he perceived it) in respect of on-going arrangements for the children. The impression I derived from his evidence was that he remained focussed on the children and was not motivated by any feelings of vindictiveness towards the mother.
The father’s stance in the proceedings appears to me to have been measured and reasonable throughout. He has been willing to compromise with the mother and, in my impression, aspires to having a normal or conventional post separation parenting relationship with the mother. He characterised her pre-separation parenting of the children as being excellent. He concedes that the mother loves the children and they love her. In these circumstances, he has no explanation for the mother’s attitude towards him, which he finds deeply distressing and perplexing.
There are numerous examples of the father’s willingness to compromise. Initially, he sought only modest time with the children. I accept that it was only as a consequence of the close to total failure of these arrangements that he agitated for a change in the children’s living arrangements. Later, after the change of residence, he offered the mother significant overnight time with the children.
Thereafter, I further accept that he has aspired to a normalisation of the children’s relationship with their mother. These overtures have been either been rebuffed or frustrated by the mother’s behaviour, who in my assessment remains fixated on the past and upon her feelings of having been abandoned by the father.
In these circumstances and for reasons upon which I will expand upon further in these reasons for judgement, I find that the father is emotionally capable of supporting the children having an appropriate level of relationship with their mother. I do not consider that the same can be said of the mother. This is the central issue in the case – essentially are there any cogent indications that the mother is capable of changing her behaviour and controlling her emotional impulses in future?
The mother’s evidence was marked by obfuscation and argument. Regrettably, it was my impression that she found it very difficult to answer even the most straightforward question put to her without some form of self-serving evasion. She refused to make any appropriate concession, even when the evidence against her position was overwhelming.
The impression I have of Ms Neville is that, in ordinary society, she is likely to be a pleasant and honest person. However, in these proceedings, concerning her children, it is her perspective that normal rules and standards of probity no longer apply to her and she is entitled to say and do whatever she likes to achieve what she believes is the appropriate outcome in the case.
Her stance in this regard is best summarised by her position that she has been compelled to fight for her children because of what the father has done to her. Regrettably, as such, I did not believe much of her evidence. She presented as a person out of control and subject to her emotions.
The expert witnesses each presented as objective and professional. For obvious reasons, Dr F, a kindly and generous person, was sympathetic to his patient and supportive of her position, but I did not think this alignment had any significant implications for his overall objectivity.
Ms N has been involved as a worker with Harmony House for over fourteen years. As such, she must be regarded as being highly experienced in dealing with high conflict families. I will expand upon the evidence of each of the expert witnesses in due course.
Ms J had a significant advantage, over me, in these proceedings. She was able to see the parties interacting directly with the children concerned. Accordingly, her opinion in the case was informed not only by her professional expertise, but also her direct observations of the family, gained over the period involved in the preparation of three family reports.
Ms J has a vast experience. She has been involved in compiling family reports since 1985. In my assessment, Ms J approached her task in compiling the family reports conscientiously and methodically. She was at pains to be objective and fair. Significantly she was well aware of the moment contained in her recommendations, particularly so far as Ms Neville was concerned.
As such, I do not consider that the recommendations, which she made, either in her reports or her subsequent oral evidence, can be regarded as being glib or doctrinaire. Rather she seemed to me to be insightful into the needs of this complicated family and sensitive to the feelings of the parents concerned, whilst remaining focussed on the best interests of X, Y and Z. I accept her evidence.
After detailing the applicable legal principles, I will turn to consider in more detail the evidence of each of the parties and witnesses concerned. In so doing, I will utilise the following headings:
·Background;
·Events prior to 27 November 2014;
·Family Violence;
·Events after 27 November 2014, particularly around mid-April and 18 May 2015;
·Issues to do with the children’s dental treatment;
·Harmony House;
·The psychiatric evidence;
·The family reports and the evidence of Ms J.
The legal considerations applicable
Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 deals with orders relating to children. Before making any particular parenting order, the court must regard the best interests of any child concerned as the paramount consideration [Family Law Act section 60CA].
The matters which the court must take into account, in deciding how a child’s best interests are to be served, are set out specifically in the Act in section 60CC.
Section 60CC creates two classes of considerations which apply to the court’s determination of how a child’s best interests will be determined in proceedings before it – primary considerations and additional considerations. There are two primary considerations, which are set out in section 60CC(2)(a)(b) namely:
(a) the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child's parents; and
(b) the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence.
Prior to recent legislative amendments, these considerations were not formally ranked in regards to one another. They have been referred to, in a number of decisions of the Family Court, as “twin pillars”, the importance of which depends on the circumstance of the case concerned.
However, as a result of the insertion of section 60CC(2A) into the Act, the court is now directed, in applying the primary considerations “to give greater weight” to the primary consideration relating to the need to protect children from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence.
These primary considerations are stressed through the provisions of section 60B(1) & (2) of the Act, which contain a list of aims and principles, which the court is directed to apply to ensure that a child’s best interests are met through any orders it makes.
The list of objects or aims of the legislation is set out in s.60B(1). They are as follows:
“(a)ensuring that children have the benefit of both of their parents having a meaningful involvement in their lives, to the maximum extent consistent with the best interests of the child; and
(b)protecting children from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence; and
(c)ensuring that children receive adequate and proper parenting to help them achieve their full potential; and
(d)ensuring that parents fulfil their duties, and meet their responsibilities, concerning the care, welfare and development of their children.”
The principles, which underpin these objects, are set out in s.60B(2) and are as follows:
“(a)children have the right to know and be cared for by both their parents, regardless of whether their parents are married, separated, have never married or have never lived together; and
(b)children have a right to spend time on a regular basis with, and communicate on a regular basis with, both their parents and other people significant to their care, welfare and development (such as grandparents and other relatives); and
(c)parents jointly share duties and responsibilities concerning the care, welfare and development of their children; and
(d)parents should agree about the future parenting of their children; and
(e)children have a right to enjoy their culture (including the right to enjoy that culture with other people who share that culture).”
Other specific criteria, relating to how the court is directed to consider how the best interests of any children concerned may be served, by any order which is made, are set out in section 60CC(3). There are fourteen such criteria, which are categorised as being additional considerations.
Pursuant to section 60CC(3)(m) the court is empowered to have regard to any other fact or circumstance, which it considers relevant. This ensures that the infinite variety of individual children’s circumstances may be addressed in any order which the court makes.
Although the court is directed to consider many factors, in discharging its duties under Part VII of the Act, the best interests of the children concerned remain paramount. The court’s duty is to deliver individual justice, for the child affected, in every case.[18]
[18] See B v B: Family Law Reform Act 1995 (1997) FLC 92-755
In this sense, the court’s inquiry is a “positive one tailored to the best interests of the particular children and not children in general …”[19] As such the various factors, in section 60CC, are inclusive but not exclusive of one another.[20]
[19] See B v B: Family Law Reform Act 1995 (ibid) at 84,220
[20] See Russell & Russell & Anor [2009] FamCA 28 at [141] per Ryan J
The fundamental task for the court is to determine, bearing in mind all the considerations contained in section 60CC and bearing in mind the goals and principles contained in section 60B, what is the best outcome for any child concerned, both now and in the future.
Given the importance, which the applicable legislation places on the co-involvement of parents in their child’s life and development there is a presumption that it is in a child’s best interests for his or her parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for him or her [Family Law Act 1975 section 61DA].
The presumption relates to the allocation of parental responsibility, not the allocation of time which a child spends with each of his or her parents.
The presumption of equal shared parental responsibility is rebutted if it is found, on reasonable grounds, that one of the child’s parents has abused the child concerned or exposed him or her to family violence [section 61DA(2)].
The presumption is also rebutted if evidence is provided which satisfies the court that it would not be in the child’s interests for his or her parents to have such equal shared parental responsibility for the child concerned [section 61DA(4)].
The Family Law legislation emphasises the importance of parents being actively involved in their children’s lives – in their schooling; sporting activities and recreation; and their daily routine; as well as special occasions; – so long as this involvement is commensurate with protecting the children concerned from harm.
Section 61DA deals with the allocation of parental responsibility in respect of a child. It does not deal directly with more practical aspects of a child’s life, particularly the amount and type of time a child spends with his or her parents or where a child is to live. Such matters are dealt with by section 65DAA.
By application of section 65DAA, if the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility applies in respect of a child, the court is required to consider firstly whether the child concerned should spend equal periods of time with both his or her parents, provided such an outcome is both likely to be in the child’s best interests and reasonably practicable.
If the court rejects equal time, it is then required to consider the child spending “substantial and significant” periods of time with each of his or her parents. Again, this outcome is subject to consideration of the child’s best interests and reasonable practicality.
The expression “substantial and significant time” is defined in the Family Law Act 1975 [section 65DAA(3)]. It means time that allows a child to spend time with a parent on both weekends and holidays; and days during the working or school week.
More significantly, it is time which enables a parent to be involved in a child’s daily routine and in occasions and events, which are of particular significance to the child concerned.
Again, the aim of the legislation is to enhance the parent/child relationship concerned, through mechanisms which enable the child to spend time with a parent in a variety of settings.
Issues of practicality are dealt with by section 65DAA(5). The court is required to consider how far apart are the parties’ homes; the parties’ current and future capacity to implement shared care type arrangements; the parties’ ability to communicate with one another and solve parenting problems consensually; and most importantly, the likely impact of such an arrangement on the child concerned.
The High Court has recently considered the interplay between the question of whether it is in a child’s best interests to spend equal time with each parent (and substantial and significant time) and the question of whether such outcomes are reasonably practicable, which arises from s.65DAA(1) & (2) of the Act. It has determined that both questions must be answered in the affirmative before an equal time order may be made.
The High Court has held that it is a statutory pre-condition of the making of an equal time order that it is reasonably practicable for such an order to be made. Accordingly courts such as this are directed to consider the reality of the situation which confronts parents and child not merely whether it is desirable that there be equal time spent by the child with each parent. Essentially, a consideration of what is feasible for a child is of equal importance to what is desirable for that child.[21]
[21] See MRR v GR (2010) 240 CLR 461 at [13] & [15]
In the case of Goode & Goode[22], the Full Court of the Family Court has laid out a pathway for the determination of parenting cases such as this one. Essentially, the court should:
·consider the section 60CC matters relevant;
·decide whether the presumption in section 61DA should be applied or, if it is rebutted because:
Ø there are reasonable grounds to believe abuse or family violence has occurred;
·If the presumption is rebutted or found not to apply, then make the orders considered to be in the best interests of the child, again as a result of applying the relevant section 60CC matters;
·If the presumption does apply, decide whether it should be rebutted because it would not be in the child's best interests;
·If the presumption applies, consider first making an order that the children spend equal time with each parent, then second, an order that the child spend substantial and significant time with each parent unless it is contrary to the children's best interests as a result of the consideration of any relevant section 60CC matter, or is impracticable in the terms specified by section 65DAA(5);
·If neither equal time nor substantial and significant time are considered to be in the best interests of the child, then make the orders which are considered to be in the best interests of the child when considering applicable matters in section 60CC.
·Even in this latter situation, it is open to the court to make an order for equal time or substantial and significant time if the court considers it to be in the best interests of the child concerned.
[22] Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286
Legal considerations relating to issues of family violence and abuse
As I have already indicated, pursuant to the provisions of section 60CC(2A), the court is required to give greater weight, in its determination of a child’s best interests, to issues arising under the primary consideration relating to the protection of children from abuse, neglect or family violence. The recent changes to the Family Law Act are significant ones. The key amendments are designed to “prioritise the safety of children in parenting matters”.[23]
[23] See Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum (Senate) Family Law Legislation Amendment (Family Violence and Other Measures) Bill 2011
In the words of the relevant explanatory memorandum “where child safety is a concern, this new provision will provide the court with clear legislative guidance that protecting the child from harm is the priority consideration.” Future protective issues for a child are the court’s priority.
Family violence is defined by section 4AB(1) of the Family Law Act. It means:
“violent, threatening or other behaviour by a person that coerces or controls a member of the persons family, or causes the family member to be fearful.”
Interestingly, the legislature has provided a list of examples of behaviour which may constitute family violence in section 4AB(2) of the Act. Some of these examples are:
·An assault;
·Repeated derogatory taunts;
·Unreasonably withholding financial support needed to meet the reasonable living expenses of the family member concerned;
·Stalking;
·Preventing a family member from making or keeping connections with his or her family, friends or culture.
Accordingly, family violence means not only violence which causes a family member to be fearful, such as a direct assault to the person, but also encompasses behaviour that unreasonably coerces or controls that person.
Pursuant to section 4AB(3) of the Act, a child is exposed to family violence if he or she “sees or hears family violence or otherwise experiences the effects of family violence”.
Abuse, in respect of a child, is defined by section 4(1) of the Family Law Act. It means:
“(a) an assault, including a sexual assault, of the child; or
(b)a person (the first person ) involving the child in a sexual activity with the first person or another person in which the child is used, directly or indirectly, as a sexual object by the first person or the other person, and where there is unequal power in the relationship between the child and the first person; or
(c)causing the child to suffer serious psychological harm, including (but not limited to) when that harm is caused by the child being subjected to, or exposed to, family violence; or
(d) serious neglect of the child.”
It is the submission of Mr Andrew that the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility is rebutted in this case because there is available to the court evidence to support the conclusion that the mother’s behaviour constitutes both abuse and family violence, to which all three children have been exposed.
In particular, Mr Andrew contends that the mother has engaged in coercive and controlling behaviour, which has had the object of preventing the children from maintaining and keeping a connection with an important member of their family, namely their father. He submits, largely on the basis of the evidence of Ms J that this behaviour constitutes abuse of the children because it has the potential to cause the children serious psychological harm.
It is further Mr Andrew’s submission that a consideration of the various section 60CC factors applicable favours the children continuing to live predominantly with their father and having only closely circumscribed time with their mother, until such time as she has demonstrated either some level of insight into her harmful behaviour or it has become apparent that she is incapable of it.
In this latter context, it is Mr Andrew’s submission that it is likely to be harmful to the children to expose them to indefinite supervision. In addition, he submits that such an outcome would represent an undesirable burden on the resources of the community.
Accordingly, he submits that it is necessary for the court to do whatever it can to finalise the proceedings at this juncture but it will be necessary for it to fashion some mechanism for review, rather than make an order for indefinite supervision of the children’s time with their mother.[24] Mr Tucker, counsel for the father, supports and adopts this submission.
[24] See Moose & Moose (2008) FLC 93-375 at [119] – [120]
Although Ms Neville asserts that Mr Wallis has committed acts of family violence towards her, to which the children have been exposed, it appears to be her position that the presumption of equal shared responsibility should be applied and that thereafter, a consideration of the relevant factors favours an equal time regime.
The family violence, which she alleges, is constituted by a number of separate assaults, upon her person, both before and after separation, to which the children were exposed. She also asserts that she was denied a proper level of financial support, following separation.
The father submits that it is both impractical and contrary to the children’s best interests for the parties to share parental responsibility for the children. He contends that he should have sole parental responsibility for X, Y and Z conferred upon him.
The court has authority conferred upon, through the provisions of Part VII of the Family Law Act, to alter the conferral of parental responsibility on any parent or parents, which arises by reason of their status as parents of any child concerned. This is done through the mechanism of a parenting order.
A parenting order is an order which deals with such issues as the persons with whom a child should live; spend time and communicate with; and the persons, who should have responsibility for making decisions, both significant and otherwise, about a child and the degree of consultation necessary to implement such decisions [section 64B(2)].
Pursuant to section 65C of the Act, a child’s parents; the child him or herself; a child’s grandparents; or any other person concerned with the child’s care, welfare or development; may apply for a parenting order. In addition, as a consequence of the provisions of section 65D, the court is empowered to make whatever parenting order it considers “proper”.
Clearly this provision, when considered in the light of the objects and principles underlying Part VII, contained in 60B, is supportive of the concept of parents sharing parental responsibility and meeting their responsibilities concerning their children’s care, welfare and development.
In this case, I have no doubt that both Mr Wallis and Ms Neville are deeply interested in every aspect of X, Y and Z’s care, welfare and development. Whatever criticisms each parent has of the other, I am satisfied that both love the children very much indeed. In this context, it is a significant thing indeed to confer parental responsibility for the children on one parent in priority over the other.
However, in this case, the parental relationship between the parties is conflicted. Given what has occurred, since their separation, it is also apparent that they have little facility to communicate effectively with one another. Regrettably, every interaction between them is likely to be infused with a high degree of suspicion.
An order which provides for shared parental responsibility requires that the parties to it to consult with one another and make a genuine effort to come to a joint decision about major long-term issues to do with the child or children concerned [section 65DAC].
Major long-term issues is defined in section 4 of the Act and includes issues to do with a child’s education; religious and cultural upbringing; the child’s health; the child’s name; and changes to the child’s living arrangements that would make it significantly more difficult for the child concerned to spend time with a parent.
Pursuant to section 65DAE, parents (or other relevant persons) do not have to consult on matters, which are not concerned with long term issues, when the child is spending time with one or other of them. This is to ensure that the myriad decisions, which have no long term significance concerning a child and which need to be made on a day to day basis, by both of the child’s parents, can be made.
In Bartel & Schmucker (No 3) Cronin J said as follows regarding the nature of parental responsibility:
“Whilst parental responsibility is vaguely defined, some insight into what is needed from a parent can be seen in s 65DAC(3) which provides that if both parents have that responsibility, they are taken to be required to consult about parenting issues and make a genuine effort to come to a joint decision. It will again be remembered that the focus of the objects and principles in this Act is on joint parenting.” [25]
[25] See Bartel & Schmucker (No 3) [2012] FamCA 1094, at [18]
If it is not already clear from the introduction to these reasons for judgment, as the reasons further unfold, it is apparent that the parties’ relationship with one another is fraught with all manner of difficulties. Considerations of this type will be relevant, in my view, as to issues with the conferral of parental responsibility, in this case, particularly in regards of the making of decisions in respect of major long term issues to do with X, Y and Z.
Background
The father was born on (omitted) 1975. The mother was born on (omitted) 1980. They met on the (omitted) in 2006 and began to live together soon after. They married on (omitted) 2007. The mother has tertiary qualifications and is currently registered as a (occupation omitted) with (employer omitted). [26]
[26] See Annexure A to the mother’s affidavit filed 14 September 2015
Ms Neville is interested in (hobby omitted). At present, she is living in rented accommodation. She has recently had a single day doing (occupation omitted) but otherwise derives her income from Centrelink and doing casual (occupation omitted). As previously indicated, it is a central aspect of her case that she left the workforce when X was born and was a stay at home mum until well after the parties separated.
The father is a (occupation omitted) by profession. However, at present he has left the workforce, whilst he remains responsible for providing care for X, Y and Z. Both parties complain that the current proceedings have placed a significant financial burden on each of them.
At the time of the parties’ separation, the father was working, on a fly in fly out basis, three weeks on and three weeks off. No doubt, this was a difficult arrangement, for the family from time to time. These stresses were compounded by a decision, made by the parties, in 2011, to sell their existing home and purchase a house at (omitted), which required considerable renovations.
The renovations took far longer to complete and were more expensive than expected. Over time, difficulties began to appear in the parties’ relationship. In addition, to Ms J, the parties disclosed that there were long standing tensions between Ms Neville and the paternal grandparents. These tensions resulted in the paternal grandparents spending only limited time with the children.
Ms J also reported the parties’ view that they had differences in personality. The mother perceiving that the father was obsessively tidy and organised, which led him to being unreasonably critical of her homemaking skills, whilst leaving her with exclusive responsibility for looking after the children and the home.
On the other hand, the husband perceived that Ms Neville began to push him away and started to wrap herself up in the kids. It was his perception that the mother wanted to exclude him from the children’s lives. He denies that he did not pull his weight in the home. As these proceedings have unfolded before me, it is also my perception that there are significant differences in personality between the father and the mother.
Undoubtedly, the mother does define herself through her relationship with the children. It is also the case that the father is well organised and a person who creates structure in his life, whenever he can. He is frustrated at his perception that the mother seems incapable of abiding by any rules, put in place by the court, to organise arrangements for the care of the children.
In her first affidavit, filed in these proceedings,[27] the mother complained that the relationship with her father was marred with domestic violence. This violence was allegedly categorised by verbal abuse and financial control. Mr Wallis denies that he used financial issues to control Ms Neville.
[27] See mother’s affidavit filed 28 July 2014 at paragraphs 8 -13
At this early stage, Ms Neville alleged that she had been personally assaulted by the father on 27 March 2014, when Mr Wallis had almost head-butted her, after an argument involving X and her use of a mobile telephone. She alleged that the father had ripped the telephone away from X.
In an affidavit filed on her behalf on 19 November 2014, the mother alleges that the father lost his temper with her, which caused him to smash his fist into a desk. She alleges that Y witnessed this incident, which caused her to become inconsolable. The mother also alleges that the father continued to yell at her following this incident. She also alleges that the father frequently disparaged her. [28] During the trial before me the father denied that the desk incident took place.
[28] See mother’s affidavit filed 19 November 2014 at paragraphs 40 - 41
In addition, during the first family report interview, the mother alleged to Ms J that the father had taken a swing at her, during an argument over insurance, in which the father referred to her as fucking dumb. Mr Wallis conceded that there had been such an argument but denied the specific assault and the verbal abuse. It was his position that he had lost his composure because the mother did not understand his position that the taking out of income insurance would be a prudent and beneficial thing to do for the family.
The mother has deposed that she considered obtaining a family violence order against the father, following the insurance policy incident but decided against it. It was her evidence that she wished to get the marriage back on track. Accordingly, up to this stage, there has been no independent investigation of family violence issues in the family.
In any event, it is common ground that the parties finally separated in early April 2014. At this stage, the father vacated the former family home, which remained occupied by the mother and X, Y and Z. From her joint interview, with the parties as part of her preparation for compiling the first family report, Ms J characterised the parties’ separation in the following terms:
“The lead-up to separation seems to have been an emotionally turbulent time – more evidenced by Ms Neville’s behaviour than by that of Mr Wallis. Separation appears to have ‘happened’ rather than have been precipitated by a series of events and changes. Both had still wanted to rescue their relationship.”[29]
[29] See family report dated 17 August 2014 at paragraph 101
I agree with this assessment. From the outside, it is my view, that the parties presented as a conventional family, which was subjected to the everyday stresses of modern life – financial pressures; the strain of fly-in/fly-out employment; and disputes about the sharing of parenting and home-making responsibilities.
In my assessment, this was not a marriage characterised by one party (the father) consistently exercising coercive control over the other (the mother). Rather the parties drifted apart because of differences in personality traits and the pressures arising from their financial and familial situation.
In this, the parties cannot be regarded as unique in any way. To the contrary, their situation and the stresses leading to the breakdown of their marriage must be regarded as commonplace, in this day and age.
What is out of the ordinary is the mother’s emotional reaction to this situation and how she has sought to enmesh the children in her behaviour. From Ms J’s perspective, this is demonstrative of an inability, on Ms Neville’s part, to draw appropriate boundaries between her behaviour and the children.
Events prior to 27 November 2014
The father commenced these proceedings on 29 May 2014. At this stage, it was his position that he had spent almost no time whatsoever with the children since the parties had begun to separate in February/March of that year. He asserted that the mother had been opposed to him seeing the children and had rebuffed his overtures of mediation. In this context the father asserted that the mother had informed him that she was in denial that the relationship had ended.
It is Mr Wallis’ evidence, which I accept, that the mother has consistently obstructed all his attempts to spend time with the children and indicated to him unequivocally that she was extremely bitterly disposed towards him because of her perception that it was he who had ended the marriage between the parties.
In his initiating application, the father proposed an eight-stage process leading up to a regime which would see the children living with him, when he was at home on the (omitted) from his work on the (omitted) and otherwise with their mother.
The first stage of this proposal involved him collecting the children from the mother on the first Monday, Wednesday and the Friday, when the father was at home from work and having them in his care for around three hours, subject to day care/pre-school/and school arrangements. In addition, he proposed time on Sundays from 8:00am until 3:00pm.
The mother responded to this application on 22 July 2014. Ostensibly at least, her formal position did not differ greatly from that of the father. She did however raise a desire to relocate, with the children, to (omitted). In her supporting affidavit, she indicated that she wished the court to make orders:
“That the children spend time with Mr Wallis on a graduated basis leading up to two out of three weekends while Mr Wallis is home from work and half of school holiday periods.”[30]
[30] See mother’s affidavit filed 28 July 2014 at paragraph 7
Against this background, on 29 July 2014, Judge Jarrett made orders, with the apparent consent of both the mother and father, which saw Mr Wallis spending modest daylight periods of time with the children on both weekdays and weekends. Specific arrangements were made to allow him to take X to swimming. The children were to be exchanged at the newsagents at (omitted), or at the (omitted) School, which is the school attended by X.
It was at this stage that it was also ordered that Ms J prepare the first family report. The case was then adjourned to the Maroochydore sittings of the court, which I understand would have been more convenient for each of the parties concerned. The adjourned date was 29 August 2014.
In an affidavit filed shortly prior to this date, the father deposed that the consent order of 29 July 2014, which had put in place the regime for him to spend regular periods of daytime with the children, had been totally ineffective. It was his position that the mother had frustrated his entitlement to spend time with X, Y and Z.
I accept the father’s evidence that the mother actively obstructed his attempts to spend time with the children. On occasions she claimed that the children were ill, without providing documentary support of her claim. On other occasions, she was late to handovers and when she did arrive, did not encourage the children to separate from her, but rather subjected to them to displays of her own extreme emotional distress.
In addition, she said things to the children, which were likely to actively discourage them to go with their father. Amongst other things, she said to the children and the father, words to the effect of:
“[Y]ou make up your own mind, but you know I will get into trouble. I had to come here. I am not going to force you to go” and “they haven’t said yes and haven’t got out of the car. Let them choose. X is six nearly seven” and “you need to explain to them [the children] why you broke up the family.”
On 5 August 2014, following the intervention of Ms J, arrangements were made for the father to spend time with the children, with handover to occur at a public venue. Ms J advised Ms Neville that she needed to speak enthusiastically to the children about their upcoming time with their father and she (Ms Neville) needed to make her goodbyes and departure swift.
The parties now have a very different view as to what occurred at the handover of 5 August 2014. It is the father’s evidence that the mother failed to heed any of Ms J’s directions. On the other hand, it is the mother’s evidence that the father assaulted her on this occasion, when he hit or slapped her two or three times on her arm.
Having heard oral evidence, from each of the parties, it is my finding that the father’s account of the incident is to be preferred. The designated handover point was at X’s school. Mr Wallis collected X from her classroom and walked her to his car, where he buckled X into her booster seat and gave her some BBQ shape biscuits.
At this stage, the mother arrived with the two other children. The father asserts that she then removed X from her seat in his car and took her own position in the car, rummaging through his possessions. At this juncture, after a few minutes, it is the father’s evidence that he turned from the driver’s seat and shooed the mother away with his hand making a light touch with her body.
Eventually, after about five minutes, the mother left his vehicle and Mr Wallis departed without any of the children. It being his perception that it was likely to be both fruitless and to have the potential to lead to the children being exposed to conflict if he remained and attempted to reason with the mother about her conduct in obstructing the court orders.
The mother claims that she was assaulted by the father. It being her case that the father did more than shoo her away. The incident was not investigated by any independent authority, such as the police. In this respect the mother deposes that she was too shocked to contact police. In my view, the father gave detailed and compelling evidence about the incident to the court, including demonstrating what he did to the mother with his shooing gesture. I accept this evidence.
In my view, this behaviour cannot be regarded as any species of assault, particularly given the mother’s extraordinary and provocative behaviour in removing X and then entering the father’s car and remaining there for upwards of five minutes. In my view, the father’s actions were restrained and proportionate to the difficult and tense situation engineered by the mother. He had no alternative but to remove himself from the situation.
The mother’s evidence about the same incident was not persuasive. She demonstrated no understanding that what she did on this occasion was unacceptable and inflammatory. In all these circumstances, I accept that the mother behaved in a deliberately provocative and obstructive fashion towards the father’s reasonable efforts to spend time with the children, which had been mediated by Ms J.
At this point, in my view, it is useful to consider the circumstances which led Ms J to organise the father spending some time with the children. This occurred following her observation of the children interacting with each of their parents, particularly the process of the children separating from their mother.
Ms J described the process as follows:
When it was time to see the children with their father, I brought him into the room before I asked her to leave. She complied, giving each of the children a kiss goodbye and seemingly having some difficulty in making herself leave the room. Perhaps not surprisingly, Z objected to this and he wanted to go with her. He followed her into the hallway and refused to return when she asked him to. Mr Wallis tended to hover uncertainly in the playroom, seemingly feeling that it was not his place to take a more active stance in encouraging Z to come to him. I asked Mr Wallis to go into the hallway to pick the child up and bring him back inside. He did, although I doubt if he would have done so without this explicit instruction.
When he did, Z began to cry more loudly and this precipitated Ms Neville’s silent distress. She asked me whether it was right to put the children through this distress. The likelihood of the session breaking down was escalating rapidly. I advised Ms Neville that it was indeed necessary, and I closed the door so that she and the children could not see each other any longer. I asked her to sit in the hallway where I knew that she would be able to hear the session in progress.[31]
[31] See Family Report dated 17 August 2014 at paragraphs 81 & 82.
This observation, when coupled with Mr Wallis’ report of failed arrangements to spend time with the children caused Ms J to observe as follows:
Despite Court Orders providing Mr Wallis with what can be regarded as minimal time with the children as a starter, Ms Neville has been unable to execute this. She has limited affective regulation, unable to help herself from attacking Mr Wallis verbally. When the children become upset, she attributes their distress to Mr Wallis’s actions. At such times, she seems to lose all sight of the boundary between her feelings and those of the children.
During this assessment, I needed to take a strong hand in order to facilitate Ms Neville separating from the children and thus allowing Mr Wallis to be alone with them. It is likely that Contact Centre staff would see it as outside their authority to be as forthright and directive as I was.
Once the transition was complete, the children took no time to settle into enjoying their relationship with their Dad. It was comfortable and easy. The children's expressions of affection towards him were somewhat measured but, within the context of the past four months, I am left in no doubt that Mr Wallis’/child attachments are still intact.
Ms Neville’s presentation is concerning. In my opinion, there is a strong likelihood that she is suffering from a breakdown in her emotional health. I am confident that she has a cognitive understanding of how it is important for the children to have a relationship with their father. She referred to how her solicitor has explained the significance of the Court Orders to her. Nothing that said yet has allayed her sense of foreboding. When she sees Mr Wallis, she becomes overwhelmed by her feelings of futility and rage.[32]
[32] See Family Report dated 17 August 2014 at paragraphs 104 – 107.
Accordingly, it is the mother’s current proposal, which represents the potential for the greater degree of change for the children. At present, given what has occurred since the children came into Mr Wallis’ predominant care, I do not think that this change can be justified.
In my view, it would pose a risk to the children’s emotional wellbeing, if they were to return to the mother’s care. If this was to occur, I have no competence that Ms Neville would be capable of ensuring that the children maintained a proper level of relationship with their father.
I appreciate that is not usual for there to be a significant change, in arrangements for the care of children of tender years, at an interim stage. However, in my view, the change of arrangements in the current case was justified, given Ms Neville’s extreme and destructive behaviour.
In these circumstances, I hold grave concerns about the emotional consequences, for the children, if they are subjected to any further extreme level of change. At this stage, it seems to be more likely than not that X, Y and Z have adjusted to their change in circumstances and to impose any further change, on them, would not be in their interests.
e) The practical difficulty and expense of the children spending time and communicating with each of their parents
For many reasons, the current case cannot be regarded as a conventional matter. As such, the issues of logistics, which currently arise in parenting cases, where the parties concerned live some distance away from one another and have limited means, do not apply in this case.
However, the impediments to Ms Neville spending time with the children are significant. However, in my assessment, these difficulties arisen solely because of the mother’s own conduct and attitude towards Mr Wallis. In this case, the issue is not about the practicalities of time spending, rather the focus is on how the children can spend time with their mother in an emotionally safe environment.
I reiterate that it is my finding that it would represent an emotional threat to the wellbeing of these children if they are exposed to their mother’s current bitterly informed view of their father. As such, it is essential, in my estimation, that the children spend whatever time is possible, with their mother, at this stage, in a professionally supervised setting.
Regrettably, in the past, the mother has shown herself to be unamenable to such supervision. In these circumstances, it is uncertain whether Harmony House will re-accept Ms Neville into its supervised contact program.
However, in my view, the non-availability of Harmony House should not militate in favour of the court discounting Ms J’s recommendation that time be supervised. I accept her opinion that, if the court did so, it would represent an abrogation of its fundamental responsibility to ensure the best interests of X, Y and Z.
f) The capacity for the parents to provide the children’s emotional and educational needs
In my assessment, at present, Mr Wallis is far better placed than Ms Neville to meet the children’s emotional and educational needs. I accept Ms J’s assessment that X and Y, in particular, are vulnerable children. As such, they require emotional stability and predictability in arrangements for their care.
It is my finding that Ms Neville is currently emotionally labile. In contrast, Mr Wallis is emotionally predictable and able to provide emotional stability to the children. Certainly, he is not likely to undermine the children’s relationship with their mother, which cannot be said so far as Ms Neville is concerned in respect of the children’s relationship with their father.
The fundamental danger of Ms Neville, at present, arises because of her inability to set proper boundaries between her own emotional need and those of the children. She has a warped view of Mr Wallis, which she will convey to the children if she is able to do so.
In this context, I accept Ms J’s evidence that unguarded exposure to the gulf between their mother’s view of the father and their own experience of him, is likely to be very emotionally unstabilising for the children and have long-standing implications for their development.
In contrast, Mr Wallis is able to shield the children from his emotions. He is able to regulate his feelings. Of the two parents, he is more capable of supporting a normalisation in the parties’ post separation relationship.
In addition, the evidence indicates that the father is more focussed on ensuring that the children attend school regularly. In this context, I agree with Ms J’s assessment that X’s frequent absences from school, during her prep year, indicate that, in the past, Ms Neville struggled to organise herself to facilitate X’s timely attendance at school, which for obvious reasons is not likely to be helpful to her (X) progressing satisfactorily at school.[58]
[58] See second family report at paragraph 79
This lack of punctuality may also indicate an inability, on Ms Neville’s part, to be appropriately directive towards the children, in respect of the discharge of essential parental responsibilities such as ensuring the children attend school regularly and on time.
g) The child’s maturity, sex, lifestyle and background
h) Aboriginality
These are not relevant considerations in this case.
i)The attitude that each parent has demonstrated to the responsibilities of being a parent
One of the responsibilities of being a capable parent is the capacity to support and ensure that an offspring has a sufficient level of relationship with the other parent concerned. For obvious reasons, this responsibility is likely to become important following separation from that parent. Ms Neville has demonstrated that she has no capacity whatsoever to support X, Y and Z having a conventional post-separation relationship with their father.
The same cannot be said of Mr Wallis. He began the current proceedings seeking only modest periods of time with the children. In his material, he described Ms Neville as a loving and capable parent. He has resisted the impulse to demonise her throughout the case. I share his bemusement at the extraordinary steps Ms Neville has taken to sabotage his relationship with the children.
In my view, throughout this case, Mr Wallis has demonstrated a mature and insightful attitude to the responsibilities of being a parent. This is most exemplified in his response to the dental crisis involving Z and to a lesser extent Y. Mr Wallis organised appropriate treatment. He arranged payment for the treatment. He informed the mother about it respectfully, clearly and calmly.
Regrettably Ms Neville, on the other hand, let her emotions control her response to the situation. She did not focus on what was best for the children, namely that Z and Y got prompt and appropriate dental treatment. Rather the crisis became an opportunity for her to act out her hostility for Mr Wallis.
j) Family violence
k) Any family violence order
I have dealt extensively with the issue of family violence earlier in these reasons for judgement. It is not useful to add to these comments, otherwise than to say that the mother has never sought a family violence order and nor has the father.
l) Whether it would be preferable to make the order that would be least likely to lead to the institution of further proceedings
Finality is generally preferable in children’s cases. Litigation is expensive in both financial and emotional terms and does little to encourage an easy parenting relationship between the parties concerned. In addition, so far as children are concerned, it is usually desirable that arrangements for their care are stable and constant and not subject to the threat of further litigation.
At this stage, the prognosis for the family is far from certain. The father and the independent children’s lawyer propose only supervised time, between the mother and the children which, if successful can be reviewed in around nine months’ time. The mark of success will be if the mother accepts that her conduct, up to this time, has been unhelpful and must change. Only she can demonstrate this change. It will depend largely on her progress with Dr F.
If this process is unsuccessful, it is Ms J’s opinion, again adopted by counsel for the father and the independent children’s lawyer that time between the mother and the children should cease. I suspect that Ms Neville would find this a difficult outcome to accept. In addition she is not likely to find any outcome, other than the one proposed by her, palatable.
Accordingly the outcome proposed by the independent children’s lawyer and supported by Mr Wallis is open ended. This must mean that the prospect of further litigation between the parties is high. As is the fact that Ms Neville is not likely to be supportive of any orders with which she disagrees.
However, in my view, regardless of its shortcomings, the outcome proposed by the independent children’s lawyer is the only viable one at the present time. It is also provides the possibility, that if it is successful and all goes well with Ms Neville’s treatment with Dr F, the parties will be able consensually to normalise the children’s relationship with the mother through a process of mediation, following further professional assessment.
Conclusions
Having considered all the applicable section 60CC factors, I have come to the conclusion that it is neither in the best interests of X, Y or Z nor reasonably practicable for the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility to be applied to their care.
It is not beneficial, to the children, for them to be exposed to their mother’s extreme antipathy for their father. At this point, there is no viable parental relationship between the parties and their capacity to communicate effectively and appropriately, about their children, is negligible. As such, the children must live with one parent, who should have parental responsibility for the children conferred solely on him or her.
It is always upsetting, when a court reaches such a conclusion. It is particularly so in this sad and troubling case. X, Y and Z have a father and mother, who both love and care about them very much indeed. Neither Ms Neville nor Mr Wallis have any issue to do with drug abuse or other form of anti-social behaviour, which is frequently the case in matters which come before the court.
Both of them are able to meet the physical needs of the children for food, shelter and clothing, without any deficit. Undoubtedly, the children love both their father and their mother and know their parents well. How could it be otherwise, given that the children, for the vast majority of their lives, have lived in the same household, with each of their parents, for the vast majority of their lives to date.
Accordingly, in generic terms, the children have the potential to benefit greatly from interacting regularly with both of their parents, as they did prior to the breakdown of their parents’ marriage. However, given the powerful emotions unleashed with the end of the marriage, that optimal and desirable outcome, for the children, is simply not available at the present time. The family can no longer be described as typical.
The evidence indicates that the children can have a meaningful level of relationship currently with one but not both of their parents. I am satisfied that, at present, the children cannot safely have a relationship with each of their parents, which entails substantial and significant time. If the court did endeavour to create such a regime, in my view, the evidence indicates that it would be emotionally injurious for the children.
Regrettably, the evidence available to me, indicates that Ms Neville has far from adjusted to the changes in her circumstances engendered by the end of the parties’ marriage, which had such traumatic consequences for her sense of identity. She reacted bitterly to the end of the relationship and, as a consequence, found it impossible to support the children spending time with their father, in any normal or constructive fashion. She reacted, at times, in a volatile and unpredictable fashion, which was emotionally threatening to the children.
In these circumstances, the court took the extreme step of changing the children’s living arrangements. Perhaps naïvely, it was hoped this could be a temporary measure in a process of normalisation of the children’s relationship with each of their parents, in the post-separation environment. This has not proved to be the case. Rather, a problematic situation has become more difficult and entrenched.
Regrettably, at this stage, there are no positive signs of adjustment demonstrated by the mother. In my view, she remains bitterly disposed towards Mr Wallis and accordingly, the court must proceed cautiously at the present time. In these circumstances, in my view, it would not be in the interests of X, Y or Z for there to be any dramatic changes in their current care arrangements.
At present, the best prospect of the children having a meaningful level of relationship with both their parents, whilst having a happy and secure childhood, is if they continue to live with their father, in the hope that Ms Neville will benefit from the course of insight psychotherapy, proposed by Dr F.
In the meantime, the only emotionally safe means by which the children can interact with their mother is under close professional supervision. It is to be hoped that Harmony House will review its decision in respect of Ms Neville and she, in future, will abide by the rules of the contact centre.
I appreciate that this is a stopgap measure. It will enable only the slightest conduit for the children to maintain their relationship with their mother. As such, it cannot be any permanent solution to the difficulties arising in this case. Such solutions reside with Ms Neville herself and depend on her changing her attitude to the father and behaving in a more controlled and insightful way in future.
Whether Dr F’s treatment will bear fruit is unclear. It will largely depend on Ms Neville. How she will respond to these reasons for judgement, which necessarily are critical of her, is also unclear. I hope she will understand from them that she must change her behaviour and more significantly that she is capable of such change.
If Ms Neville does not demonstrate that she is capable of changing her behaviour and attitude, I accept the submission of the independent children’s lawyer that it would not be in the interests of the children to continue with the process of supervised time. Sadly, if this outcome comes to pass, I also accept the opinion of Ms J that the least bad outcome for the children would be to lose their relationship with their mother, rather than having an unsafe and unstable relationship with her, whilst they live with their father.
This is the essential tragedy of the case. Given the mother’s behaviour and attitude, the children can only currently have a significant relationship with one of their parents. In my view, the father is by far the better option in this regard. He is more emotionally insightful; he is less bitter at the end of the parties’ marriage; and most significantly, he is capable of supporting some form of relationship between the mother and the children, which Ms Neville has demonstrated is beyond her.
For all these reasons, I have elected to adopt the recommendations of the independent children’s lawyer. Essentially, the mother has around nine months to get her house in order and demonstrate that she can adjust to the change of circumstances inaugurated by the parties’ separation, which occurred over eighteen months ago.
At the end of this period, I will direct that the parties undergo a further family assessment and endeavour to see whether it is appropriate for there to be some normalisation in the children’s relationship with their mother. As indicated above, I appreciate that this does not provide a clear and obvious outcome in these proceedings and that therefore the prospect of further litigation is high.
However, in my view, it provides the best outcome for the children, in the sense that it maintains their emotional safety, whilst not shutting out entirely the prospect of them having a relationship with their mother. Whether that relationship can be maintained and extended depends entirely on Ms Neville. Although she is likely to see herself as the victim of these proceedings, in my view, the current sad outcome is largely attributable to her conduct and only she can ameliorate it.
Given the rebuttal of the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility and the fact that I have determined that the children should live with their father, it is axiomatic that Mr Wallis should have sole parental responsibility for X, Y and Z. At present, it is impossible to envisage the parties making any major long term decision, relating to the children, in a consensual and rational fashion.
However, having reached this decision, I acknowledge that Ms Neville remains vitally interested in every decision to do with the children. In no way, can she be described as a disinterested parent. In these circumstances, I propose to adopt the proposals of the independent children’s lawyer that the father advise the mother of any major parenting issue and seek her response in respect of it. However, he must have the ultimate responsibility for making any such decision. I will also mandate the requirement that the father make arrangements to ensure that the mother receives copies of the children’s school reports and photographs.
I am aware that centres, such as Harmony House, have many calls on their resources. As such, the time available to Ms Neville to spend time, with the children, at Harmony House, will be limited. As a consequence of this, I will adopt Mr Andrew’s recommendations about the parameters of the time, at Harmony House.
In this context, I also accept that the court must be cautious in how the children are reintroduced to their mother. Much will depend on the mother’s behaviour at Harmony House. I appreciate that the time will be only around two hours per fortnight and cannot be guaranteed to coincide with special occasions relating to the children.
Ms Neville has indicated a willingness to keep attending upon Dr F and he has indicated a willingness to do whatever he can to support Ms Neville’s attendance upon him, including treating her as a public patient. I will make orders mandating this treatment regime.
Significantly, in this case, it is necessary for me to underline once again to Ms Neville that she is not authorised to come within 500 metres of either the father or the paternal grandparents’ home. In addition, as a consequence of her behaviour, the mother has forfeited a parent’s normal entitlements to attend at the children’s sporting and extracurricular activities or indeed at their school.
The various injunctions, at the commencement of these reasons for judgment, are significant. Ms Neville is bound by them. In my view, in the unusual circumstances of this case, such orders are justified as being in the best interests of the three children concerned. The aim of the orders is to protect the children.
Finally, it needs to be emphasised to Ms Neville that the uncontrolled methods of communication, which she has hitherto utilised in these proceedings, in respect of Mr Wallis are unacceptable. Her communications are not child focussed and not helpful to the welfare of the children concerned in this case. They must stop. The order regarding non denigration and respectful communication, between the parties, is required to be respected. The children are not to be exposed to the mother’s bitter feelings for the children’s father.
Apart from the requirement that the father provide information to the mother regarding the children’s educational progress and any medical treatment, the only other permissible communications passing between the parties, in electronic form or through other written medium, should be in respect of any emergency situations arising, which pertain to the children. The mother is not permitted otherwise to badger the father with the types of electronic messaging and emails, which have been referred to in these reasons for judgement.
For all these reasons, the orders of the court will be as set out at the commencement of these reasons for judgment.
I certify that the preceding five hundred and eighteen (518) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Brown
Associate:
Date: 5 November 2015
[36] See mother’s Affidavit filed 19 November 2014 at paragraph 55.
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